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I have swam through libraries and sailed through 
oceans. 
--Herman Melville, in Moby Dick-- 
 
 
 
A Few Words On The Soul  
Wislawa Szymborska 
Translated from the Polish by Stanisław Barańczak and Clare Cavanagh 
 
We have a soul at times.  
No one's got it non-stop,  
for keeps.  
 
Day after day,  
year after year  
may pass without it.  
 
Sometimes  
it will settle for awhile  
only in childhood's fears and raptures.  
Sometimes only in astonishment  
that we are old.  
 
It rarely lends a hand  
in uphill tasks,  
like moving furniture,  
or lifting luggage,  
or going miles in shoes that pinch.  
 
It usually steps out  
whenever meat needs chopping  
or forms have to be filled.  
 
For every thousand conversations  
it participates in one,  
if even that,  
since it prefers silence.  
 
Just when our body goes from ache to 
pain,  
it slips off-duty.  
 
It's picky:  
it doesn't like seeing us in crowds,  
our hustling for a dubious advantage  
and creaky machinations make it sick.  
 
Joy and sorrow  
aren't two different feelings for it.  
It attends us  
only when the two are joined.  
 
We can count on it  
when we're sure of nothing  
and curious about everything.  
 
Among the material objects  
it favors clocks with pendulums  
and mirrors, which keep on working  
even when no one is looking.  
 
It won't say where it comes from  
or when it's taking off again,  
though it's clearly expecting such 
questions.  
 
We need it  
but apparently  
it needs us  
for some reason too. 
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"In this business if you don't feel stupid a lot of the time you're not very smart". 
—Kinky Friedman, in The Love Song of J. Edgar Hoover— 
 
 
Maybe… in some way [he]'s one of ours, even though by definition  
every one of ours sails, hunts, fights, and sinks alone.  
Ships that pass in the night.  
Lights in the distance, visible for a brief while, often going in the opposite direction.  
Sometimes a distant sound, the throb of engines.  
Then silence again when it passes, and darkness,  
the glow extinguished in the empty blackness of the sea". 
—Arturo Pérez-Reverte, in The Nautical Chart—
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 1
Introduction 
 
 
Gli errori nelle guerre divengono pianti. 
—Italian proverb— 
 
 
Don’t look for more honour than your learning merits. 
—Jewish proverb—  
 
 
Does the work of  academics have any influence on “real-world” events? Are today’s 
political scientists éminences grises in the mould of  Père Joseph, or simply, to hijack Lenin’s 
phrase, “useful idiots”? Intellectuals often interrogate themselves about the effect of  their 
work outside the ivory tower; for political scientists the corresponding “real-world” locus 
of  that effect is in government policy. The issue of  “real-world” influence is posed with 
particular acuity in question-driven fields. International Relations (IR) is just such a field, 
and policy relevance has become an oft-cited canon among scholars of  governance, war 
and peace. This investigation seeks to engage that notion of  policy relevance, and to shed 
light on the factors which determine academic experts’ policy influence on the making of  
policy in the security studies sub-field of  IR.  
The question of  policy relevance is situated at the confluence of  a number of  avenues 
of  research whose approaches are similar, but whose preoccupations are diverse. These 
include direct concerns with the desirability and feasibility of  policy relevant research itself; 
a focus on the relationship of  theory and practice; the role of  outside actors in policy 
processes; and ancillary higher-order questions such as the role and responsibility of  the 
academic and the intellectual in society.  
At least one of  these lenses—the role of  outside actors in the policy process—lends 
itself  neatly to combination with a broader research agenda within International Relations, 
namely the ongoing debate over the relationship between structural and ideational factors 
as determinants of  state action in the international system. The goal of  this study is to 
combine these two foci and elucidate under what conditions academic discourse—viewed 
as a source of  the production of  ideas—diffuses, in the form of  its individual human 
vectors, into the policy discourse. The project’s hypotheses are thus designed to progress 
toward conclusions centring on the role of  ideational factors. 
Despite frequent admonitions about the desirability of  policy relevance, academic work 
in IR that systematically treats this question as its primary focus is rare, and much of  it is 
found in the interstices of  the discipline. Many of  the most valuable scientific insights into 
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policy relevance arose from work that is not the main concern of  its authors within their 
body of  professional research. Consequently, many general observations and correlations 
have been brought to light by a large number of  authors, but due to their status as a 
secondary concern, these results have never been systematised or brought together in 
cumulative fashion.  
In part, this marginality results from the fact that the very structure of  social science 
militates against an exclusive focus on the interaction of  academic output and the policy 
world. While IR is a strongly question-driven discipline, research theorising the relationship 
between science and policy requires a degree of  multidisciplinarity that further disperses its 
proponents across departments and poses problems for their housing in IR alone.  
There is a certain irony in the provenance of  calls for academic IR’s output to have 
relevance to the policy world. Scholars who admonish their colleagues to be policy-relevant 
frequently employ an empirically grounded approach to the subject, and often—though 
certainly not always—adhere to epistemological viewpoints associated with positivism or 
scientificism. Yet it is precisely these paradigms that, while proclaiming the importance of  
“real-world” relevance to research, tend to view policy-targeted knowledge, which as this 
investigation will show is by nature question-driven and interdisciplinary if  it is to have 
influence, as less valuable than method-driven alternatives.  
The relevance of  academic output targeted to policy concerns is ultimately decided not 
by those producing it, but by its consumers, of  which policymakers make up the largest 
and most important group. The criteria for policy relevance are thus determined largely in 
the halls of  power, not in the academy. It is the “real-world” practitioner who sits as judge 
and jury over the utility of  academics’ endeavours; this situation highlights the tension 
between the demands of  the political sphere and the reward structures of  the academic 
world, which often work to opposite effect. Ironically, it is those whose calls for “real-
world” relevance are most urgent who often find themselves most removed from the 
criteria reigning over attaining that goal. Policy-relevant research is more often than not 
driven by specific situations and questions; this limits the applicability of  theory-driven and 
method-driven approaches, favoured by many who call for policy relevance, to policy 
questions.  
There is a dual tension in the relationship between method-driven research and the 
realm of  practice: first, as noted, rationalism and positivism call for forms of  research less 
immediately suited to satisfying the demands of  the policy world; second, adherence to the 
notion of  value-free research complicates the quest for influence and relevance in the 
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world’s foreign and defence ministries. Academic work is but one type of  input into the 
policy process; scientificity as a source of  legitimacy (based on its putative neutrality) must 
take an equal place alongside the democratic imperative, parochial bureaucratic concerns, 
economic factors, and other normative preferences.  
Because the policy process serves as the locus for the amalgamation of  these forms of  
interest, and not merely as a stage for rational acts of  choice, the more academic research 
takes into account the varied derivation of  these interests, the more influence it is likely to 
have. Just as argumentation in a normatively-based policy process benefits from the ability 
to muster objective fact for its cause, so does ostensibly objective scientific argument 
benefit, in this specific context, from association with a set of  normative preferences held 
by those assessing its applicability. This poses problems for those who seek to wed the 
notion of  value-free research and the idea of  the academic as a neutral observer to 
influence within policy processes.  
The present analysis is based on the view that normative values in some form always 
undergird scientific research. From this arises an interest in the power of  these ideational 
factors to act as policy determinants and to effect policy change. However, ideas cannot be 
decoupled entirely from the structural determinants of  policy; rather they act in concert, 
and in a mutually constitutive fashion, to produce interpretations of  given situations and 
policy outcomes. That said, each set of  determinants, structural and ideational, assumes 
greater or lesser relative importance at distinct points in the policy formulation process, a 
progression reflected in the structure of  this project’s hypotheses. In keeping with this 
interpretation, the present analysis has chosen academics from among the universe of  
potential outside actors in policy processes due to their role as vectors for ideas, as opposed 
to economic or other interests.  
Ideas are the currency of  the intellectual, at least more so than of  the industry lobbyist 
or the single-issue transnational NGO. Presenting academics in this way, however, should 
not be taken to mean that the analysis subscribes to the notion of  value-free science; 
rather, academics are simply viewed here as the least compromisedly idea-driven of  the 
groups available for comparison. As enunciating the interplay of  ideational and structural 
factors is a secondary concern of  the project, the phenomenon at the study’s centre is 
conceptual in nature, and affects both the academic and policy worlds. 
In recent years, the concept of  security has been the subject of  much debate. 
Policymakers and academics both have attempted to give meaning to what is for each a 
seminal notion. Many states have sought to give new content to their security policies in the 
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face of  a changed international landscape. Meanwhile, security intellectuals have striven to 
adapt the main analytical tool of  their discipline, with a view both to reflecting events in 
the “real world” and to keeping the concept in line with the exigencies of  academic 
research. This parallel occupation of  a large body of  researchers and an important division 
of  policymaking bureaucracies worldwide with the same core concept provides fertile 
ground for assessing the form taken by research seeking to be policy-relevant. 
In keeping with the realisation that the systematic analysis of  the interaction of  
academic production and policy outcomes is an interdisciplinary and question-driven 
pursuit, the project is guided by a general central question, and diverse bodies of  literature 
are mustered in the search for theoretical guidance. The central focus of  the investigation 
concerns the factors determining the extent to which academic research can be made to 
exert influence over the outcomes of  security policy formulation processes at the national 
level. In establishing a set of  hypotheses intended to explain these outcomes, the corpora 
of  theory consulted include “policy science”, epistemic communities, ideas and foreign 
policy, as well as relevant insights from the sociology of  knowledge. Much of  this literature 
remains decisively influenced by rationalism, and concentrates on structural factors. This 
project has sought to systematise these insights, using their ineluctable structural 
preoccupation to provide scaffolding for its own focus on ideas, rather than to attempt to 
theorise ex nihilo the interaction of  structure and ideas and how it plays out in the 
relationship between experts and decisionmakers. 
The findings about the mechanisms of  knowledge and academic inputs in the policy 
process are, as has been noted, dispersed into the interstices of  these literatures; thus, it was 
necessary to retain a clear focus on the phenomenon under investigation in the 
establishment of  hypotheses and an argumentational structure. The three hypotheses 
generated each relate directly to the factors determining the potential influence of  
academic advisors on the policy process, and each reflects a distinct avenue of  approach to 
the question of  policy relevance from among those mentioned above. Taken together, they 
constitute a powerful tool for getting at the root of  how and when academics gain access 
to policy processes, and what they can expect to accomplish once called upon to make their 
“real-world” contribution.  
The first chapter grounds the investigation in history and theory, and situates the 
project’s main line of  questioning and research focus. After touching briefly upon the 
historical evolution of  the relationship of  rulers and their advisors, it offers a summary of  
the theoretical approaches to this relationship and their attendant primary foci. It is here 
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that the theoretical underpinnings of  the study are presented. Drawing upon the work of  
sociologists of  knowledge such as Edward Shils and the policy scientists Harold Lasswell 
and Carol Hirschon Weiss, this chapter illustrates the role of  the institutionalisation of  
social science (and its division into disciplines), and the attendant rise of  the positivist 
paradigm, in erecting the barriers extant today between the two communities whose 
interaction is under study.  
The policy science approach is presented in detail here, with particular attention to its 
relevance in constructing a model for the analysis of  academics in the policy process. The 
text then engages the notion of  value-free science and discusses the political role of  the 
academic advisor, taking recourse to literature related directly to security studies. Finally, a 
rationale is provided for the decision to focus on security policy as an appropriate nexus 
for collaboration between the worlds of  academe and policy, theory and practice.  
Chapter Two outlines the structure of  the argument driving the analysis, and gives a 
definition of  terms. The chapter begins by defining the text’s operative concepts, returning 
to the literature to clarify what is meant by the notions of  “academic” and “policymaker”, 
as well as illustrating how the policy process, specifically its nature, phases and various 
participants, are understood in the context of  the study.  
The definition of  terms is followed by the exposition of  the argument itself. The 
project’s line of  argumentation consists of  three hypotheses, each concerned with a distinct 
set of  theoretically grounded variables whose effect on academics’ policy influence will be 
shown. The first hypothesis, intended to circumscribe the nexus of  ideational and 
structural determinants of  policy, considers the principle of  uncertainty as the catalyst for 
ideational constructs “leaping into the breach” when structural factors fail to produce 
viable policy outcomes. This claim is in essence a theoretical precondition to the other two 
hypotheses, whose variables work in concert, and is presented in a slightly different way 
from the subsequent two sets of  variables. This first hypothesis focuses its attention on 
three sources of  uncertainty: international and domestic political change, as well as the 
capacity vacuum that often ensues. Uncertainty opens previously closed policy processes to 
outside participants as policymakers realise that assistance from outside standard operating 
procedures is needed. 
The second hypothesis moves on to a different set of  variables, these now concerning 
the necessary attributes potential advisors must possess in order to come under serious 
consideration for providing input. The four variables discussed consist of  a first set of  two 
attributes experts must show prior to direct interaction with policymakers, and which form 
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the criteria for initial inclusion in a pool of  possible sources of  advice; as well as two later 
abilities these actors must demonstrate once that interaction is underway which ensure their 
success in competition with other admitted potential advisors.  
Initially, it is a critical mass of  specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige that 
awakens policymakers to individual academics as sources of  potentially useful policy inputs. 
Specialised knowledge comes in two stylised forms, either practical or theoretical. The 
distinctions between these forms are made clear and the several factors that influence their 
relative magnitude discussed. Institutionalised prestige, in the case of  academics, is again a 
combination of  either personal (that of  a given individual within her discipline of  
specialisation) or institutional forms (that of  the discipline itself  within the broader 
confines of  academe and, more indirectly, society as a whole).  
The latter two attributes consist of  the ability to tailor one’s proffered policy inputs as 
both cogent to an extant and clearly defined policy problem, and resting to a sufficient 
degree upon normative forms of  argumentation, a sub-question designed to engage the 
notion of  value-free science. These variables in their turn are determined by such qualities 
as concise writing and a research focus dictated by the policy sphere, be it higher-order 
theoretical groundings for threat analysis or the solution of  a clearly bounded and punctual 
policy problem whose scale is quite limited. This line of  questioning investigates the 
tension between academic reward structures and the necessities and vicissitudes of  the 
policy realm.  
The final element of  the second hypothesis calls for normative argumentation in favour 
of  one policy option from among those derived through scientific engagement with a given 
policy environment. The third and final hypothesis elaborates on this concern—and casts 
its gaze upon the role played by the actual content of  ideas as policy determinants—by 
focussing on the normative resonance of  academics’ inputs with the commitments held by 
policymakers as a factor influencing their success once inside the cut-and-thrust of  the 
policy process. The final claim seeks to utilise its understanding of  the role of  ideas’ 
content to engage critically the otherwise tautological notion that decisionmakers “only 
listen to what they want to hear”, or will accept only advice that is not critical. 
A short treatment of  several methodological issues is found in an appendix to the text. 
Its primary concern is with outlining the process of  data collection and with providing 
explicit criteria for the generation and selection of  cases for the testing of  the project’s 
propositions. These criteria, which are outlined in detail, resulted in the selection of  
security policy reformulation processes in three “middle powers” of  varying degrees of  
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economic development, democratisation and civilian control of  the monopoly on violence: 
Brazil, South Africa and Canada. The results of  the cases follow the exposition of  the 
argument, and constitute the heart of  the dissertation. These studies, though they have 
numerous commonalities of  structure, are designed to stand alone rather than to strive for 
uniformity of  presentation. 
The Brazilian case focuses on the period from 1994 to 2002. This period must be seen 
as one in which the first decisive attempts are made to engage with the legacy—in the areas 
of  civil-military relations and defence policymaking—of  the military dictatorship which 
ruled from 1964 to 1985. The eight-year span in question yielded the first attempts to 
produce a declaratory national defence policy (a document entitled Política de Defesa 
Nacional), the creation of  a unified Ministry of  Defence, and the convocation by that new 
body of  a commission of  civilian and retired military experts asked to provide inputs 
leading to a groundbreaking modernisation of  the Brazilian system of  national defence. 
The analysis of  the Brazilian case is based upon extensive interviews with the policymakers 
placed at the centre of  the process, as well as with a number of  participating academics. 
The data for the Brazilian chapter further contain a number of  government documents not 
previously available to the public, within Brazil as well as without. 
The search for a viable security policy by South Africa’s first post-apartheid government 
(including the transition period, this covers the years 1991-1996) is the focus of  the second 
case in the study. This analysis centres on a special circumstance: the resulting White Paper 
on Defence was drafted and guided through numerous revisions by an academic: Laurie 
Nathan, then Executive Director of  the progressive Centre for Conflict Resolution at the 
University of  Cape Town.  
A further concentration of  the South African case is on the efforts of  the Military 
Research Group, a group of  ANC-leaning academics and policymakers, to fill the policy 
vacuum left by the delegitimisation of  both the apartheid philosophy of  security, entitled 
“Total Strategy”, and the Marxist theory and lack of  practical experience of  the incoming 
ANC-led government. This grouping enjoyed success in this undertaking primarily by 
focussing its efforts on the creation and dissemination of  specialised knowledge, as well as 
a guarantee of  normative resonance with policymakers’ beliefs based on its progressive 
membership. The data gathered from this case consist of  interviews with policymakers and 
academics, as well as extensive internal documentation pertaining to the drafting process 
within the defence establishment. 
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The third and final case differs more significantly in form and content from the first 
two. Due to Canada’s higher degree of  democratisation, academic and economic 
development and greater democratic control of  armed forces, the country presents a vastly 
different playing field for academics with respect to their interactions with the world of  
policy. The case focuses on the period from 1996 to 2000, in which extensive efforts were 
undertaken within the Department of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade to lay down 
the conceptual underpinnings for a new policy paradigm known as human security. 
Due to the close collaboration of  the foreign policy establishment with NGOs—
immediately before the work on human security began—on issues such as landmines and 
war-affected children, the focus of  the Canadian study is on the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of  academics vis-à-vis NGOs in the competition for policy influence. The 
hypotheses are applied comparatively to NGOs and academics, and the two groups’ relative 
advantages and shortcomings discussed. Issues of  importance to the Brazilian and South 
African contexts, such as academic peripheralisation and the bifurcation of  the policy 
establishment resulting from incomplete civilian control of  the armed forces, play a 
distinctly diminished role. Where in the first two cases it was possible to establish a 
correlation between the presence of  a given variable and a specific outcome, some 
elements of  the Canadian study present the corresponding absence of  both.  
In a final chapter, the investigation’s conclusions are presented and related to the 
argument in a manner that illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of  the project’s 
suppositions and theoretical approach. The final section seeks to relate these findings back 
to its original concern with the desirability of  policy relevance, and ultimately and briefly to 
reflections of  a more philosophical nature.  
In engaging the concept of  policy relevance from the standpoint of  International 
Relations, and specifically security studies, this text is in itself  a work that is driven to 
answer a question related to the interaction of  theory and practice. As such, it seeks 
relevance to an audience comprised of  members of  both of  these communities in hopes 
of  improving their collaboration. Though it originates in the academic sphere, it is guided 
in its view of  that interaction by its findings, and by the desire to render more useful and 
comprehensible to each side of  that relationship the efforts of  the other. 
 9
 
1. Éminences grises or useful idiots? Academics, policy advice, ideas and 
security 
 
 
“Ich hasse von Natur aus die breiten Worte;  
die mehr als gebührend dehnbaren Begriffe,  
als da sind die Civilisation, die Fortschritte,  
das Gleichgewicht, das europäische Interesse;  
ich hasse den Mißbrauch solcher Worte“.  
—Clemens Prince Metternich— 
 
Students of  defense policy are dealers in other peoples’ futures.  
They traffic in the life and death of  civilizations.  
Their knowledge can never be more  
than a poor match for the difficulty of  their subject.  
The combination of  elements which characterizes their profession  
guarantees eternal dissatisfaction with what they do.  
—Aaron Wildavsky— 
 
 
Those in power have since time immemorial sought the advice of  various types of  
counsellor. This chapter will look at the history of  that relationship, and the ways in which it 
has been theorised. Within early centres of  power, the vocation of  advisor did not exist 
without the advisee, and certain subjects were studied with a view only to their utility to the 
sovereign. Over time, both sides of  the relationship evolved, undergoing divergent processes 
of  socialisation and professionalisation. These processes drew academics and policymakers 
apart; only in the last fifty years has there been a concerted effort to bring them back together 
again.  
The chapter’s first section describes, with the help of  the sociologists of  knowledge Edward 
Shils and Harold Lasswell, how divergent processes of  socialisation and professionalisation led 
to a growing-apart of  policymakers and advisors. In doing so, it touches upon such 
phenomena as the institutionalisation of  universities, the expansion of  government after the 
Second World War and the rise of  the welfare state, as well as the impact of  the natural-
scientific paradigm.  
The notion of  scientific neutrality inherent to natural science (where that paradigm has 
made inroads as a basis for social scientific inquiry) plays a key role in explaining that 
paradigm’s effects on the interaction of  the two communities; whereas science in this view is 
deemed to be value-free, the policy process remains eminently value-driven. A brief  
presentation of  the theorising work carried out by authors from “policy science” follows, 
which emphasises the distinction between knowledge of  and knowledge in the policy process. 
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The next chapter, which presents the project’s hypotheses, contains a more detailed exposition 
of  the policy science approach.  
The second section deals with the rationale for selecting university academics from among 
the various possible types of  advisor taking part in decisionmaking processes today. This 
choice highlights the role of  ideational factors in decisionmaking as a complement to structural 
factors. Academics are viewed here as the vectors for bringing ideas and concepts into the 
policy process, and the focus is on the dichotomy between the normative (value-driven) and 
(ostensibly value-neutral) scientific motivations of  experts.  
Finally, the decision to focus on International Relations and its sub-field of  security studies 
is explained, and a very brief  review of  history of  the concept of  security, and more recent 
efforts to redefine it, given. International Relations has historically been a question-oriented 
field. International Relations scholars have by the interdisciplinary nature of  their subject 
matter been traditionally motivated by “real-world” questions and the relationship of  their 
work to answering those questions: policy relevance is a cantus firmus within the discipline. This 
is particularly true of  those who study war and peace. Numerous scholars are motivated to 
enter the field by normative commitments, and many are concerned with the impact of  their 
efforts in the policy domain. Further, the recent discussions in security studies about both the 
meaning of  “security” itself  and the political role of  the analyst make it an excellent focus for 
this investigation.  
Together, these three sections—the history and theory of  the relationship between the 
analyst and the policymaker, the interplay of  normative commitments and scientific objectivity, 
and the justification for focussing on International Relations and security studies—serve to 
situate this study within the larger scientific endeavour and to set the stage for the presentation 
of  its hypotheses. 
 
1.1. Policymakers and advisors: history and theory 
The holders of  power bear the responsibility of  governing in all domains; this leads to a 
generalist approach in which the decisionmaker has a minimum of  generalist knowledge on a 
wide variety of  topics and thus seeks the counsel of  those with the time and inclination to 
devote themselves exclusively to one of  those fields. These experts have played a role since the 
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earliest formalised notions of  governance1. Given the centrality of  warfare and diplomacy in 
the early development of  centres of  power in all parts of  the world, this is especially true of  
the fields that serve as the precursors to what has today become International Relations and 
particularly its sub-field, security studies.  
 
1.1.1. Incompatible professionalisations: a brief  history of  policymakers 
and advisors 
But what lies between Sun Tzu and Kissinger? How did we get from The Prince2 to the 
“Prince of  Darkness”3? The history of  the relationship between rulers and their advisors (in 
domains associated with what are now termed social sciences) follows a distinct progression. 
At first, the standing of  advisor did not exist outside of  the relationship to the advisee, the 
holder of  power. After a lengthy period in which, essentially, the preoccupation of  the advisor 
was with the concerns of  governance, both professions—that of  governing and that of  
advising—underwent extensive processes of  professionalisation and formalisation which led to 
a divergence of  the goals and rewards of  each standing. Opportunities to specialise in the 
study of  warfare and diplomacy arose outside of  the direct relationship to power. Finally, in 
relatively recent years, there has been a resurgent interest within the academic community in 
once again taking into consideration the relevance of  academic work to the “real world”.  
This view presupposes a series of  refining progressions from these earliest advisors to the 
present day involving a selection whose representativeness will be outlined in section 1.2. 
Beginning with the “man of  knowledge”4, it moves forward through academe, progressively 
narrowing its focus to International Relations (IR) and security studies. One can thus trace 
through to far greater specificity general claims about the symbiotic nature of  the early link 
between theory and practice, such as this example taken from the work of  Edward Shils: 
The great figures of  classical social philosophy considered the fundamental problems of  policy from the point 
of  view of  men who had to exercise authority and to make practical decisions. Even where they themselves 
lived in remoteness from practical affairs, the clarification of  the standards for the judgment and guidance of  
public policy was always close to the center of  their attention. The politicians’ problems, reduced to 
fundamentals, were their problems. […] Political philosophy was regarded, by those who professed it, as a 
means of  enlightening rulers—and citizens—regarding the right ends and the appropriate means. […] 
                                                 
1 Harold Lasswell draws lines of  filiation from modern policy science to Aristotle, Plato, Confucius and Hammurabi. Lasswell, 
Harold. A Pre-View of  Policy Sciences. New York: American Elsevier, 1971 (hereafter, Pre-View); pp. 10-11. 
2 Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Transl. by George Bull. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981. 
3 The moniker given by his detractors to Richard Perle, an influential defence expert associated with neo-conservative factions 
in the United States.  
4 The term is reflected in the title of  a relevant work by a prominent Polish sociologist of  the early 20th century: Znaniecki, 
Florian. The Social Role of  the Man of  Knowledge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.  
 12
The concerns of  counselors to princes, of  philosophers who would be kings, of  disenchanted moralists, of  
rueful critics of  conquest and revolution provided the rudiments of  the sociological outlook.5  
These political philosophers were the antecedents to many vocations in the modern world; 
while they also serve as the precursors to consultants, philosophers, technical experts and 
certain forms of  policymaker6, the focus here is on their descendants in academe. In the 
specific case of  organised science, it was the increasing professionalisation and formalisation 
of  scientific pursuits—aided by the advent of  the modern university—that led to the 
divergence of  academics’ concerns from matters directly relevant to governance. To remain 
with Shils, 
[a] rather fundamental change occurred in the course of  the nineteenth century. The social sciences became 
de-politicised; even the study of  politics adulterated its preoccupation with policy by concrete recipes of  
administration and the aproblematic description of  governmental processes. […] The problems were not 
selected in accordance with an explicit standard of  relevance to the making or execution of  a policy-maker’s 
decision; the policy-making process did not become the object of  realistic investigation and finally the 
practitioners of  these subjects even disavowed any interest in policy-making.7  
Shils highlights the role of  the development of  the university in turning social science away 
from practical issues of  policy: 
[t]he development of  the universities of  the nineteenth century and their relations with the world of  affairs 
also appears to be an important factor in the de-politicisation of  the social sciences. The great schemes of  
interpretation and judgment formulated by the masters of  social science grew up outside the Universities and 
in a fairly close connection with politics and practical affairs.8  
Harold Lasswell, one of  the fathers of  policy science, ascribes the growing-apart of  
policymakers and academics in part to “centrifugal forces” such as increasing disciplinisation 
within universities9; this correlates to Lasswell’s firm belief  in the importance of  a 
multidisciplinary approach in policy science. In one analyst’s words, “the very nature of  the 
scholarly enterprise and its institutional organization impede policy relevance. Scholars focus 
narrowly, with the consequence that what a policymaker needs to know is to be found across 
                                                 
5 Shils, Edward. “The Calling of  Sociology”. In Parsons, Talcott, Edward Shils, Kaspar D. Naegele and Jesse R. Pitts, eds. 
Theories of  Society: Foundations of  Modern Sociological Theory. New York: The Free Press (MacMillan), 1965; pp. 1405-1448. 
Here, pp. 1432, 1433, 1405. The citation is repeated in “Social Science and Social Policy”, in Crawford, Elizabeth T. and 
Albert C. Biderman, eds. Social Scientists and International Affairs: A case for a Sociology of  Social Science. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1969; pp. 35-49. Here, p. 35. It is also cited partially in Wittrock, Björn, Peter Wagner and Helmut Wollmann. 
“Social science and the modern state: policy knowledge and political institutions in Western Europe and the United 
States”. In Wagner, Peter, Carol Hirschon Weiss, Björn Wittrock and Helmut Wollmann, eds. Social Sciences and Modern 
States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 (hereafter, Social Sciences 
and Modern States); pp. 28-85. Here, p. 30. 
6 For example, in the United States, the National Security Advisor. 
7 Shils, “Social Science and Social Policy”, p. 35.  
8 Ibid., p. 36. 
9 Lasswell, Harold. “The Policy Orientation”. In Lerner, Daniel and Harold Lasswell, et al., eds. The Policy Sciences: Recent 
Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951; pp. 3-15. Here, p. 3. See also Rose, Richard. 
"Disciplined Research and Undisciplined Problems;' in Weiss, Carol Hirschon, ed. Using Social Research in Public Policy 
Making. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath; pp. 23-36. Here, pp. 24-25. 
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disciplines and fields”10. Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic describe these “narrowed 
concerns”: 
[w]ithin scholarly communities, a recognition for originality signifies professional accomplishment. Since 
originality comes at more of  a premium the older a field becomes, scholars tend to define originality to mean 
“novel”. In practice, they often look for research projects and intellectual niches that are novel precisely 
because others have ignored them. Academic fields thus tend to shrink into ever-smaller areas of  
specialization and expertise[…] .11 
According to Alexander George, this has led in the modern day to policymakers’ and 
academics’ belonging to two distinct cultures, into which each are socialised according to the 
reward structures of  their professional values and hierarchies12. Academics’ focus on the 
development of  theory estranges them from the preoccupation of  policymakers with 
advancing the national interest.13  
Carol Hirschon Weiss’ summary of  the contradictory reward structures followed by 
academics and policymakers highlights the difficulties inherent to co-operation between the 
two communities: 
[r]esearchers’ behavior is strongly influenced by the institutional settings in which they work. If  they are 
faculty members of  a university, they respond to the academic reward system. Rewards are based on 
publishing research results in books and journals and hewing close to the mainline interests of  the discipline 
rather than getting enmeshed in interdisciplinary research […] Their career goals, climbing the rungs of  the 
ladder to tenure and full professorship, also help to determine what they are and are not likely to do. [This is] 
researchers’ response to the knowledge-building and discipline-tending functions of  the university. […] 
The rewards, interactions, and career patterns in the bureaucracy foster activity and accomplishment, 
accommodation with other actors, and caution about stepping too far beyond the departmental line. Policy 
makers have to satisfy their superiors […] and consult with a range of  interested parties in other executive 
agencies, the legislature, the agency constituencies, and often state and local governments. The work is geared 
to a fiscal year, in which annual budgeting and the calendar of  expiring legislation create pressures to get 
decisions made.14  
The making of  policy does not always have as its highest criterion the rationality of  
decisions. The divergence of  approach between policymakers and academics is in part a result 
of  the increasing reliance of  the latter upon priorities appropriated from the natural-scientific 
paradigm: 
[t]his model aroused the admiration and the emulation of  the insecure social scientists who, as newcomers in 
the university environment and as the browbeaten objects of  the contempt of  the humanists on the one side 
and the natural scientists on the other, sought to legitimate their status as scientists and as searchers for truth 
                                                 
10 Stein, Arthur A. “Counselors, Kings, and International Relations: From Revelation to Reason, and Still No Policy-Relevant 
Theory”. In Nincic, Miroslav and Joseph Lepgold, eds. Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory. Ann 
Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 2000; pp. 50-74. Here, p. 57. 
11 Lepgold, Joseph and Miroslav Nincic. Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of  Policy Relevance. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001 (hereafter, Ivory Tower); p. 15. 
12 An early precursor of  this work is the “two communities theory” developed in the 1970s by Nathan Caplan. See, for 
example, Caplan, Nathan. “The Two-Communities Theory and Knowledge Utilization”. American Behavioral Scientist. Vol. 
22, No. 3 (1979); pp. 459-470. 
13 George, Alexander L. Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of  Peace 
Press; 1993; pp. 3-7. 
14 Weiss, Carol H. “Improving the Linkage Between Social Research and Public Policy”. In Lynn, Laurance E., Jr., ed. Knowledge 
and Policy: The Uncertain Connection. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of  Sciences, 1978 (hereafter, “Linkage”); pp. 23-
81. Here, p. 37.  
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in the same way as the already established branches of  university life. The humanistic tradition did not seem to 
offer sufficiently immediate sustenance, and a misunderstood pattern of  natural science procedure and 
outlook came to dominate the minds of  social scientists.15 
The foremost impediment to immediate policy relevance deriving from the natural-
scientific paradigm is its emphasis on rationality and a value-neutral epistemology. Attempting 
to apply rationality to—and to exclude judgments based on values from—the study of  the 
policy process is of  questionable use in investigating a process notoriously not bound by the 
same restrictions. Put more succinctly, the more scientifically-oriented the study of  policy 
becomes, the further it moves away from what is in fact the art, not the science, of  
policymaking16. In this situation, social scientists under the spell of  rationality assume the 
relevance of  scientific knowledge per se to policy17, a view not necessarily shared by 
policymakers, though there is some evidence that this assumption is more likely to hold true in 
policy domains connected to the natural sciences18.  
The equation of  rationality with policy validity, combined with a positivist epistemological 
outlook, drives a further wedge between what academics produce and what policymakers seek. 
The tendency toward reductionism and the elusive quest for neutrality and objectivity are 
directly at odds with the concrete and partisan inputs policymakers require. The desire for 
parsimony works directly against the intrinsic validity of  rationally derived arguments: 
[…]the gap derives from an exclusive reliance on a positivist epistemological framework for our social science 
knowledge. The knowledge creating process, in this framework, abstracts ideas from the actual world and has 
no meaningful way of  discovering the “devices—institutional, technical and symbolic” for returning from idea 
to action. […] Positivist knowledge is preparatory, not final knowledge. It is a stage in the development of  
knowledge for utilization.19  
Once some disciplines had paradigmatically moved beyond positivism, policy began to 
move back into focus:  
                                                 
15 Shils, “Social Science and Social Policy”, p. 37. On the origins of  this shift, and the difficulties with claims to universality of  
this view of  science, see Machlup, Fritz. Knowledge, its creation, distribution, and economic significance. Volume 1: Knowledge and 
knowledge production. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980; pp. 65-68. 
16 George, p. 8. 
17 Weiss, “Linkage”, p. 25; George, p. 7. See also Bulmer, Martin. “The Policy Process and the Place in it of  Social Research”. 
In Bulmer, Martin, et al. Social Science and Social Policy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986, pp. 3-30. Here, pp. 5-8. See also 
Schwartzman, Simon. “Changing roles of  new knowledge: research institutions and societal transformations in Brazil”. In 
Social Sciences and Modern States, pp. 230-260; and Hall, Peter A. “Policy Paradigms, Experts, and the State: The Case of  
Macroeconomic Policy-Making in Britain”. In Brooks, Stephen and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds. Social Scientists, Policy, and the 
State. New York: Praeger, 1990; pp. 53-78. Here, pp. 53-55.  
18 Weiss, Carol Hirschon. “The Many Meanings of  Research Utilization”. In Bulmer et al., pp. 31-40. Here, p. 32. On the 
diffusion of  the precepts of  the natural-scientific paradigm into other academic disciplines, see Brooks, Harvey. “Scientific 
Concepts and Cultural Change”. Dædalus. Vol. 94, No. 1 (1965); pp. 66-83. Here, pp. 69ff.  
19 Klausner, Samuel Z. “Social Knowledge for Social Policy”. In Holzner, B., K. D. Knorr and H. Strasser, eds. Realizing Social 
Science Knowledge. The Political Realization of  Social Science Knowledge and Research: Towards New Scenarios. A Symposium in Memoriam 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld. Institut für Höhere Studien, IHS Studies, No. 3. Wien: Physica-Verlag, 1983; pp. 93- 121. Here, p. 93. 
Klausner goes on to delineate five distinct weaknesses inherent in positivistically-derived knowledge with respect to its 
fitness for utilization in policymaking; pp. 98-99. On positivism and quantitative methods, see also Lasswell, “The Policy 
Orientation”, pp. 5-7. 
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[w]hen academics challenged the dominant paradigm of  power politics in a sustained way and social science as 
a whole became methodologically and epistemologically more sophisticated, then they felt that 
communication with practitioners was necessary. But it was also difficult for there was no longer paradigmatic 
harmony.20  
Scientificist academics’ level of  abstraction from real events and adherence to a conflicting 
reward structure has opened them to the criticism that they write mainly for one another, and 
not for a broader audience of  which policymakers might be a part. Ironically, one of  the most 
acerbic—and perhaps exaggerated—accusations of  solipsism comes from one of  their own: 
Most academics, however, are only academics. In the course of  their careers, they have been paid a salary only 
by a university; they are one-dimensional people. They therefore have not had the breadth of  experience to 
give them a sense of  the reality of  international relations; nor have they had the depth of  experience to give 
them a sense of  its tragedy. These are the hollow men, and the shallow men, too. For such people, there are 
only a few kinds of  achievements possible in regard to international relations. One of  them is to sit down and 
spin out theories that fellow academics will praise as being rigorous and original. (Merely being realistic and 
responsible, in contrast, will not evoke their praise.) In truth, most academics are only concerned about the 
good opinion of  about a dozen other academic specialists in their particular sub-sub-field.21 
However, advisors were not the only ones to be seduced away from the couple by 
professionalisation and formalisation. Following the mass mobilisations of  the Second World 
War and the larger role this implied for the state, in the industrialised world executive branches 
in general, and foreign and defence policy bureaucracies in particular, ballooned in size. For 
example, from 1939 to 1946, the Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy almost quadrupled in 
size as new missions abroad and domains of  competence were added to its purview22.  
Further arenas in which the state began to increase in size include economic policy and in 
particular the welfare state, which experienced a veritable boom in the 1960s and 1970s in 
Western Europe. In these areas, a body of  expertise existed outside government, and coupled 
with a renewed leaning in some academic fields towards empiricism, researchers in these fields 
began to ask themselves how their work could be better brought to bear on increasingly 
interventionist government policy23. Peter deLeon lists five events that have increased the 
                                                 
20 Groom, A.J.R. “Practitioners and Academics: Towards a Happier Relationship?” In Banks, Michael, ed. Conflict in World 
Society: A New Perspective on International Relations. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984, pp. 192-209. Here, p. 193. 
21 Kurth, James. “Inside the Cave: The Banality of  I.R. Studies”. National Interest. Fall 1998. Available from 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=B2F215684DA24BFAADA5C22454C3F776&nm=Publications&t
ype=pub&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticles&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=3&aid=B4D15E9C
F292465EA9E17E7A4C3ECE92&dtxt=. Accessed 27 February 2004. 
22 “The Golden Age -- 1945-1957”. Available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/history-8-en.asp. 
Accessed 4 October 2003. 
23 The Second World War and the emergence of  the welfare state, both catalysts for increased government involvement, are 
frequently cited as triggers for their approach’s evolution by policy scientists. For brief  statements on the catalytic role of  
the Second World War, see for example McCool, Daniel C. Public Policy Theories, Models and Concepts: An Anthology. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995, p. 1, and several of  the chapters in Social Sciences and Modern States, including 
Wittrock, Wagner and Wollmann, pp. 42-43; Germann, Raimund. “Arenas of  interaction: social science and public policy 
in Switzerland”, pp. 191-206, here, p. 191; Watanuki, Joji. “The impact of  social sciences on the process of  development in 
Japan”, pp. 221-229, here, p. 223; Wittrock, Björn, “Social knowledge and public policy: eight models of  interaction”, pp. 
333-353, here, pp. 334-335. Martin Bulmer lists earlier studies in “National contexts for the development of  social-policy 
research: British and American research on poverty and social welfare compared”, pp. 148-167, esp. pp. 149-152. Several 
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extent to which scientists have sought to apply their work to the policy realm: the Second 
World War, the “War on Poverty” in the United States, the Vietnam War, the Watergate Affair 
and the 1970s energy crisis24.  
As both intellectuals and bureaucrats professionalised and specialised, their goals would 
drift apart until events within both sides of  the relationship led to renewed interest in co-
operation. Intellectuals’ professionalisation brought with it increased specialisation and 
emphasis on method-driven and ostensibly value-free research. At the same time, the 
increasing complexity of  the policy world faced policymakers with problems ever more likely 
to cut across the disciplinary specialisations established in the scientific realm.  
Decisionmakers’ work has always been question-driven, in the sense that it responds to 
problems or questions originating in a given area of  policy. Policymaking is in this sense a 
fundamentally reactive undertaking. Science’s move away from question- to method-driven 
research and increasing disciplinisation widened the utility gap. However, efforts on both sides 
of  the divide have now sought to bring the two spheres back together.  
Bureaucrats began to face increasingly complex policy situations as government 
involvement grew across many increasingly technical domains; and a resurgence of  empiricism, 
particularly in the United States, placed a renewed focus on the “real-world” relevance of  
academics’ work. At the forefront of  the latter community stood an approach dubbed “policy 
science”, upon whose theoretical advances regarding the relationship of  the two communities 
a number of  the underpinnings of  this investigation are based.  
 
1.1.2. Policy relevance in modern social science (policy science) 
The quest for relevance to policy in social science is embodied in the policy sciences 
approach, which can be seen as a formalised forerunner to the less systematic emphasis on 
policy relevance in social science and International Relations today25. Policy scientists work 
                                                                                                                                                    
of  these chapters highlight the advent of  the welfare state as well, as does Singh, Vijai P. “Use of  Social Science 
Knowledge and Data in Public Policy Making: The Deliberations on the Compensatory Educational Policy by U.S. 
Congress”, in Holzner et al. eds., pp. 295-205. Here, pp. 295-296; for a case study of  the development of  social policy and 
the involvement of  both communities, see the first two chapters of  Heclo, Hugh. Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: 
From Relief  to Income Maintenance. London: Yale University Press, 1974; pp. 1-64. 
24 deLeon, Peter. “Political events and the policy sciences”. In Social Sciences and Modern States, pp. 86-109.  
25 Disciplinary boundaries have directed many scholars’ main professional interests away from the policy orientation. In Weiss’ 
words, “[t]heir contributions to the discussion of  the relationship between social science and government were often 
intelligent—even insightful, but their major scholarly commitments lay elsewhere in the disciplines”. In “Three Terms in 
Search of  Reconceptualization: Knowledge, Utilization, and Decision-Making” (hereafter, “Three Terms”). In Holzner et 
al., eds, pp. 201-219. Here, p. 201. Though policy relevance is often cited informally as a canon within International 
Relations, the literature within IR that deals directly with the issue is scant enough that a long footnote suffices. An early 
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within many of  the disciplines that make up the social sciences; what binds them together is 
their common focus on the political decisionmaking process and the relevance within it of  the 
fruits of  intellectual labour.  
Policy science is not a discipline of  its own, and not to be confused with policy analysis or 
political science; it is a cross-disciplinary focus on knowledge in, and of, the policy process. As 
such, it provides a history of  the interaction between the policymaker and the advisor, but also 
insights into the variables governing that relationship, which are the subject of  the next 
chapter. While the objective focus remains the same, several terms are used relatively 
interchangeably to denote the attribute whose impact on the policy process is being tested, 
including knowledge, expertise, science, and social science research26. 
Many of  the underpinnings of  the policy science approach come from the sociology of  
knowledge, and its earliest modern foundations were laid by sociologists. Thus, the seminal 
exposition of  the policy orientation by Harold Lasswell dates from 1951: 
[a] policy orientation has been developing that cuts across the existing specializations. The orientation is 
twofold. In part it is directed toward the policy process, and in part toward the intelligence needs of  policy. 
The first task, which is the development of  a science of  policy forming and execution, uses the methods of  
social and psychological inquiry. The second task, which is the improving of  the concrete content of  the 
information and the interpretations available to policy-makers, typically goes outside the boundaries of  social 
science and psychology.27  
Lasswell then goes beyond delineating a cross-disciplinary “orientation” to outline the first 
working definition of  policy science: 
[w]e may use the term “policy science” for the purpose of  designating the content of  the policy orientation 
during any given period. The policy sciences includes [sic] (1) the methods by which the policy process is 
investigated, (2) the results of  the study of  policy, and (3) the findings of  the disciplines making the most 
important contributions to the intelligence needs of  the time.28  
Twenty years later, Lasswell provided a more succinct working definition: “the policy 
sciences are concerned with knowledge of  and in the decision processes of  the public and civic 
                                                                                                                                                    
example is Wildavsky, Aaron. “Practical Consequences of  the Theoretical Study of  Defense Policy”. Public Administration 
Review. Vol. 25, No. 1 (1965), pp. 90-103. More recent examples include Hill, Christopher and Pamela Beshoff, Two worlds 
of  international relations: Academics, practitioners and the trade in ideas. London: Routledge, 1995; Groom; Bell, Coral, ed., 
Academic Studies and International Politics. Canberra: Department of  International Relations, Australian National University, 
1982; George; Lepgold, Joseph. “Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of  Policy 
Relevance”. Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 113, No. 1 (1998), pp. 43-62; and Gray, Colin S. "New Directions for Strategic 
Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice?". Security Studies. Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 610-635. The most salient very recent 
contributions are Mack, Andrew. “Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community”. Journal of  Peace Research. Vol. 
39, No. 5 (2002), pp. 515-525; and a recent exchange in the Review of  International Studies based on a review by William 
Wallace, “Truth and power, monks and technocrats: theory and practice in international relations”. Review of  International 
Studies. Vol. 22, No. 3 (1996), pp. 301-321; Smith, Steve. “’Power and truth’—a reply to William Wallace”. Review of  
International Studies. Vol. 23, No. 4 (1997), pp. 507-516; Booth, Ken. “Discussion: a reply to Wallace”. Review of  International 
Studies. Vol. 23, No. 3 (1997), pp. 371-377. A relevant exchange in Cooperation and Conflict is cited below in the section 
dealing with the choice of  university academics as the object of  this study. 
26 Greater detail on these terms will be provided in the subsequent chapter containing a definition of  this study’s working 
terminology.  
27 Lasswell, “The Policy Orientation”, p. 3. 
28 Ibid., p. 4. 
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order”29. The focus on the policy process calls for question-driven research across disciplinary 
boundaries:  
“[t]he emphasis on decision process underlines the difference between policy sciences and other forms of  
intellectual activity. By focusing on the making and execution of  policy, one identifies a relatively unique frame 
of  reference, and utilizes many traditional contributions to political science, jurisprudence, and related 
disciplines.30 
These two foci have in fact generated distinct research agendas with different attendant 
intellectual loci: 
[I]n subsequent years, the two activities have in fact proceeded fairly independently, with studies of  the policy 
process becoming part of  the central core of  political science, whereas the provision of  concrete information 
to policymakers has been done by policy analysts and applied scientists in the several disciplines. […] What 
experience in the policy sciences has made increasingly clear is that policy scientists can rarely become 
effective analysts and advisors unless they understand the institutions and processes of  policy making in their 
governmental system.31  
Simultaneously with Lasswell’s second large work, another prominent early policy scientist, 
Yehezkel Dror, summed up the “paradigmatic innovations to be required of  and expected 
from the policy sciences”: 
1. The main concern of  policy sciences is the understanding of  improvement of  societal direction. 
Therefore, its main concern is with societal direction systems and, in particular, the public policymaking 
system. […] 
2. Policy sciences focuses on the macro-level, namely, public policymaking systems—subnational, national, 
and transnational. […] 
3. Policy sciences involves breakdown of  traditional boundaries between disciplines, and especially between 
behavioral sciences and management sciences. Policy sciences must integrate knowledge from a variety 
of  branches of  knowledge and build it up into a supradiscipline focusing on policymaking. […] 
4. Policy sciences involves bridging the usual dichotomy between pure and applied research. […] 
5. Policy sciences accepts tacit knowledge and personal experience as important sources of  knowledge […] 
6. Policy sciences shares contemporary sciences’ [sic] main involvement with instrumental-normative (i.e. 
prescriptive) knowledge, in the sense of  being directed at means and intermediate goals rather than 
absolute values.32 
Dror recognises that the policy orientation will need to surmount several obstacles in order 
to achieve these goals, including those within the academic community; the third above point is 
discussed earlier in the book:  
[t]he strong resistance of  the science community to changes in the basic paradigms of  science and in the 
disciplinary structure of  scientific activity is by now a well-recognized phenomenon. The more right I am in 
my findings on the inadequacies of  contemporary sciences for better policymaking and the necessity, 
therefore, for a new scientific approach based on novel paradigms and involving novel structures, the more 
science’s conservatism constitutes a barrier to the development of  policy sciences.33  
John Kurt Jacobsen illustrates the form such conservatism takes within disciplines, and 
reconstitutes the link to problems with the dominant paradigm: 
                                                 
29 Lasswell, Pre-View, p. 1. Emphasis in the original.  
30 Ibid., p. 1. Emphasis in the original. 
31 Wagner, Peter, Carol Hirschon Weiss, Björn Wittrock and Hellmut Wollmann. “The policy orientation: legacy and promise”. 
In Social Sciences and Modern States, pp. 2-27. Here, p. 9.  
32 Dror, Yehezkel. Design for Policy Sciences. New York: American Elsevier, 1971; pp. 50-53. There are eight further characteristics 
not listed here.  
33 Ibid., p. 33.  
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[t]he rationales are, for the mainstream, that fringe frameworks such as critical theory and Gramscian cultural 
studies are of  interest only to the degree that one converts these analytical modes into positivist and 
measurable terms by which means alone they are to be deemed scientific, and, for scholars outside the 
mainstream, that positivism—which holds no known patent on testable propositions—frequently functions as 
a device by which to exclude forms of  analysis that challenge the scholarly status quo.34  
Daniel McCool identifies six basic characteristics of  policy-oriented science: its 
interdisciplinarity, empirical bent, megapolicy focus, theoretical complexity, focus on applied 
research, and a normative and prescriptive component35. Since the seminal works of  Lasswell 
and Dror laid the foundations, the policy sciences have generated at least three major analytical 
perspectives: the intellectual-institutional, functional-evolutionary and politico-institutional 
modes of  analysis36. The above brief  history of  the relationship between the ruler and the 
advisor has followed the perspective of  intellectual institutionalisation, of  which Shils was the 
foremost proponent.  
This perspective views the historical development of  science, and thus its relation to policy 
and government, through the lens of  the institutionalisation and consolidation of  intellectual 
traditions37. The politico-institutional perspective focuses on the political relationships between 
social science and key societal institutions38. The functional-evolutionary perspective’s  
focus of  analysis is on those societal interactions and patterns that, as it were, functionally require certain 
types of  societal knowledge to be produced and require social-science disciplines to evolve in certain ways. 
[…] [T]here is a clear causal assumption that social-science knowledge develops in response to the functional 
imperatives inherent in a particular pattern of  social interaction.39 
Whereas this categorisation contends with Lasswell’s knowledge of the policy process, policy 
science’s main contributions to the theoreticisation of  the role of  producers of  knowledge in 
the policy process (inasmuch as they serve as underpinnings to the theoretical model 
underlying this investigation) come from its preoccupation with knowledge in the policy 
process. Here, the nefarious influence on academics’ policy relevance of  excessive reliance on 
the attractiveness of  rationality and “value-free” methodology becomes clear. As in the case of  
the historical progression of  the concept of  security and its shrinking into a purely nuclear or 
military phenomenon before it returned to broader application with the “new security agenda”, 
what began as a broad notion with considerable grounding in the practical world was removed 
with the application of  the rationalist and natural-scientific paradigms. In the words of  one 
policy analyst, 
                                                 
34 Jacobsen, John Kurt. “Duelling constructivisms” a post-mortem on the ideas debate in IR/IPE”. Review of  International 
Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1 (2003); pp. 39-60. Here, p. 39. Emphasis in the original.  
35 McCool, p. 2.  
36 These appellations are taken from Wittrock, Wagner and Wollmann, pp. 63-75.  
37 Ibid., pp. 63-67.  
38 Ibid., pp. 71-75. 
39 Ibid., pp. 67, 69.  
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[t]he rationalistic paradigm assumed that the social science product was “research”: data, information, and 
results which were in some sense both new (unknown, before), distinctive (possible only from within the 
science base of  the discipline), and true (both “scientific” and distinct from everyday knowledge or “common 
sense”). There was, in short, an aura of  certainty and authority attached to this product; consequently any 
decision-making process which refused to apply this knowledge when it was offered was, almost by definition, 
perverse and quixotic.40  
Security scholar Bradley Klein adapts this contention to his field: 
[i]n its academic guise as the foundation of  security policy, the field of  Strategic Studies has become 
somewhat winnowed down to a narrower, more technocratic enterprise that has armored against critical 
reflection. To a great extent, highly technical modes of  study such as game theory and systems analysis have 
come to predominate. But these behavioral modes of  analysis have not fundamentally transformed the 
foundational concepts of  Strategic Studies.41 
Giandomenico Majone points out that the rational actor paradigm42, being designed in 
essence for an individual, is ill-suited to the bureaucratic policy process, in which decisions are 
not taken individually and policymakers are required to take into account the diverging 
interests of  their numerous constituencies43. The policy process serves as the locus for the 
amalgamation of  interests; policymakers thus bear a political and normative responsibility by 
which the “pure” data provided by scientists is not informed. Scientists’ not taking this into 
accounts leads to inflated expectations of  the utility of  scientific knowledge: 
[s]ocial scientists often have grandiose expectations, perhaps tainted with self-interest, of  the potential effects 
of  social research on policy. While government officials are favorably disposed to social science, they tend to 
use social science concepts and findings at modest levels. […] It may be that the expectations of  social 
scientists are too high, that immediate and direct use is expected when partial and second-order use is 
reasonable. The passage of  social science knowledge through the filter of  political judgment may often be a 
preferable route to action.44  
Weiss outlines how the patent problems with the rationalistic paradigm and its belief  in the 
provision of  neutral “data” to policy processes and the inherent utility of  scientifically-derived 
knowledge ultimately led to its desuetude. She establishes three types of  inputs by researchers 
into the policy process, beginning with the positivist-inspired provision of  raw data for the 
purpose of  delineating options45. Based on the discovery by the late 1970s that the impact of  
social science research on policy was more diffuse, Weiss considers a second form of  input: 
research as ideas contributing to the general enlightenment of  the policymaker46.  
This conception echoes the most logical contribution of  the scientist who has moved 
beyond the rational paradigm, and it is the conception in which direct influence of  outside 
                                                 
40 Pal, Leslie. “Knowledge, Power, and Policy: Reflections on Foucault”. In Brooks and Gagnon, pp. 139-158. Here, p. 141.  
41 Klein, Bradley S. Strategic Studies and World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994: pp. 27-28. 
42 For a further outline of  the paradigm’s weaknesses, see Rich, Robert F. “Making, Relaying and Using Knowledge”. In 
Holzner et al., pp. 221-235. Here, p. 228-230.  
43 Majone, Giandomenico. Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992; p. 15.  
44 Weiss, Linkage, p. 35.  
45 Weiss, Carol Hirschon. “Policy research: data, ideas, or arguments?” In Social Scientists and Modern States, pp. 307-332 
(hereafter, “Policy research”). Here, pp. 309-311.  
46 Ibid., pp. 311-314.  
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contributors to events within the policy process is most difficult to divine47. Leslie Pal sums 
this notion up in visually evocative fashion:  
[s]ocial science influences public policy in the same way that water seeps through limestone. Tiny rivulets of  
ideas flow unpredictably through institutions and may swirl briefly around decisions; moreover these rivulets 
may combine in unanticipated ways. This all becomes a bit clearer when one thinks of  the various ways a 
social scientist distributes ideas and research: specialized articles and books, routine undergraduate and 
graduate teaching, conferences, colloquia, public speeches, committee appearances, commissioned and 
contract work, newspaper and magazine writing, and radio and TV commentary. […] Who knows by what 
strange alchemy one’s ideas might affect public policy?48  
Weiss’ final type of  policy input conceives of  policy research as arguments. While she 
explicitly links this conception to the role of  advocacy groups49, depending on the structural 
nature of  the decisionmaking process—if  there are competing factions in need of  both 
technical and normative “ammunition” for policy proposals—its applicability is not limited to 
interest groups and includes advisors from the academic realm.  
Weiss links her categorisation of  the way knowledge enters into the policy process back to 
its counterpart in Lasswell’s presentation of  the stance each conception takes with regard to 
knowledge of decisionmaking: 
[t]he three images of  policy research—data, ideas, and arguments—make different assumptions about the 
nature of  the policy-making process. Underlying the image of  research as data is a technocratic view. […] 
The view of  research as ideas has a less mechanistic, more humanistic flavour. Officials are not necessarily 
oriented to an immediate task. […] 
Research as argumentation presupposes adversarial decision making. It has a political underlay. Interests and 
values are in contest. Proponents use research when and if  it advances their case in the rough-and-tumble of  
organizational decision making.50  
Thus, the technical and normative underpinnings of  the inputs provided by academic 
advisors are inseparable. The next section deals in greater detail with the interplay of  
normative commitments and scientific ideals of  neutrality and objectivity in the contribution 
of  the academic expert to the decisionmaking process, as well as with the rationale for 
selecting university academics as the object of  study, in particular their role as vectors for the 
injection of  ideas into the policy process.  
 
1.2. Scientificity and normative commitments: academics in the policy 
process  
Academic experts are not the only outside actors regularly called upon or seeking to contribute 
to the policy process; other such individuals and groups include associations seeking to protect 
                                                 
47 Weiss’ analysis of  this form of  policy input is further developed and linked to the body of  research utilisation literature—
Weiss’ main focus within the policy science approach—in “Research for Policy’s Sake: The Enlightenment Function of  
Social research”. Policy Analysis. Vol. 3, No. 4 (1977); pp. 531-545. 
48 Pal, p. 143.  
49 Weiss, “Policy research”, p. 315. 
50 Ibid., p. 316. 
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specific economic interests, lobbying groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)—
including both those oriented towards research and those whose concentration lies in 
implementation and field work—and technical experts in non-scientific domains, to name only 
a few. Academics, in this case those based at universities and specialising in matters related to 
defence policy, were chosen for this analysis as a result of  two main considerations.  
The first stems from the desire to contribute to the growing literature on the role of  
ideational factors in the policy process. Academics were chosen due to the perception that they 
are motivated by the findings of  their research; that is, by the concepts and ideas that are the 
currency of  the academic enterprise, rather than corporate economic interests or personal 
material gain. This is not to presuppose their normative objectivity or political neutrality. 
However, honesty within the intellectual enterprise binds academics to the notion that, in 
contrast to other actors who explicitly use scientific findings to further normative aims, 
research findings determine conclusions and thus eventually policy prescriptions, rather than 
the inverse. Policy analyst Weiss contends that this is the case: 
[y]et developments in epistemology (and even in quantum mechanics) have undermined notions of  a single 
reality “out there”. In the post-positivist period we are all aware that researchers “construct” the world they 
study and that the values, priorities and conceptual models that they bring to their work influence the things 
they “find”. If  objectivity is really an illusion, is advocacy perhaps an honest admission of  the partial nature of  
their work?51 
Simultaneously, ideas constitute the predominant form of  “ammunition” university 
academics possess in the battle for policy influence. Other types of  policy-advising groups and 
individuals bring to the table means of  attaining influence and swaying policy preferences that, 
where the focus is on the role of  concepts and ideas in the policy process, must be seen as 
intervening variables. Lobbies and economic interest groups bring to bear financial incentives 
to accompany their agendas’ issue choices. Similarly, NGOs frequently bring a political 
incentive to which the academic expert is not privy. In addition to their occasional considerable 
financial clout, issue-based NGOs engage in three activities (domestic awareness-raising, 
international networking and agenda-setting with like-minded foreign and multinational 
NGOs, and field experience) which give them the ability to mobilise political constituencies in 
civil society around their chosen topics, granting their efforts a democratic legitimacy not 
accorded researchers52.  
                                                 
51 Ibid., p. 307. The issue of  objectivity and the legitimacy of  science as a policy input is given an excellent treatment in pp. 
319-322 of  the same chapter.  
52 On the role of  universities in a democratic society, see Nowotny, Helga, Peter Scott and Michael Gibbons. Re-Thinking 
Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of  Uncertainty. Malden: Polity Press, 2001; pp. 82-84.  
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If  politically unaffiliated academics (that is, largely university researchers) are construed, as 
they are here, as the least compromised vectors for the injection of  ideational factors into the 
policy process, what then is exactly the relationship between their political and normative 
commitments and their adherence to the objectivity and neutrality demanded by, if  not the 
design, then the carrying-out of  a research agenda? The natural-scientific conception clearly 
separates one from the other. This viewpoint was influentially enunciated in the work of  Max 
Weber, who flatly stated: “[t]o take a practical political stand is one thing, and to analyze 
political structures and party positions is another”53. A. J. R. Groom circumscribes this logic in 
a policy context, presenting its alternative as well: 
[t]he first of  these is the positivistic one that social science should be as value-free or value-controlled as 
possible and recognise the gulf  between “is” and “ought” statements. In this case, while the academic may 
help the practitioner with means, he can say nothing about ends. […] At the other end of  the scale there is the 
view that social science should be “value-promoting”. The academic, through his research, should join with 
the practitioner in promoting a particular set of  values.54  
Within fewer than twenty years after Weber’s lectures on science and politics as vocations, 
however, Mannheim’s sociology of  knowledge had surpassed his countryman’s rigid positivist 
dichotomy in favour of  a less unselfconscious approach more able to “recognise its own 
limitations and dependence on historically specific assumptions”55: 
[b]ut the examination of  the object is not an isolated act, it takes place in a context which is coloured by values 
and collective-unconscious, volitional impulses. In the social sciences it is this intellectual interest, oriented in a 
matrix of  collective activity, which provides not only the general questions, but the concrete hypotheses for 
research and the thought-models for the ordering of  experience. Only as we succeed in bringing into the area 
of  conscious and explicit observation the various points of  departure and of  approach to the facts which are 
current in scientific as well as popular discussion, can we hope, in the course of  time, to control the 
unconscious motivations and presuppositions which, in the last analysis, have brought these modes of  thought 
into existence. A new type of  objectivity in the social sciences is attainable not through the exclusion of  
evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of  them.56  
This appears to support William Wallace’s lament on the ahistorical nature of  many attacks 
on positivism, noting that these criticisms are “intrinsic to social science, and as old as social 
science”57. Lasswell incorporated this focus into the first exposition of  the policy orientation in 
what is perhaps the best-formulated characterisation of  the relationship between value 
commitments and scientific objectivity: 
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[a]s a scientist becomes value-orientated, he accepts or rejects opportunities for research according to their 
relevance to all of  his goal values, or he initiates research which contributes to these goals.  
It is not necessary for the scientist to sacrifice objectivity in the execution of  a project. The place for 
nonobjectivity is in deciding what ultimate goals are to be implemented. Once this choice is made, the scholar 
proceeds with maximum objectivity and uses all available methods.58  
In Weiss’ formulation, 
Presumably no responsible social scientists would hold that the results of  social science research are 
comprehensive, free of  value premises, or valid for all seasons. […] 
It has become commonplace to recognize that even at the level of  “facts”, data are shaped by value 
assumptions in their definition and collection.59 
Put succinctly, the “normative dilemma”60 between a researcher’s normative commitments 
and the objectivity called for by the scientific enterprise can be expressed chronologically 
(though there is an ongoing process of  mutual constitution): she is guided by values in 
choosing for which questions to seek answers; once she is committed to a given course she 
must carry out the scientific activity of  research with a maximum of  self-conscious objectivity. 
Shils argues in strong language against the notion of  value-free science, adding that even the 
necessarily value-oriented nature of  the problem selection process does not preclude the 
validity of  scientific inputs at that juncture: 
[t]here is no doubt that logically the proposition which distinguishes judgments of  fact from judgments of  
value is the correct one; what is incorrect is the deduction that because scientific knowledge can offer no 
direct guidance in the determination of  the ultimate ends of  individual conduct or social policy, scientists are 
not only unqualified to discuss value-questions but that their very profession as scientists forbids a serious 
involvement in evaluative problems in any way—and particularly in the selection of  problems.61 
However, that which confers upon scientists the legitimacy granting them access to the 
policy process must be clearly identified. The scientific profession does not grant a researcher’s 
normative position on a given policy any more legitimacy or cogency than a member of  any 
other profession; rather it is the manner in which this initial commitment is translated into 
action—the objectivity of  the ensuing execution of  the research itself, the “veneer of  value 
neutrality”62—which confers that privilege. Academics’ contributions to the policy process are 
esteemed because they have been elaborated according to the precepts of  scientific enquiry; 
researchers can thus stake a claim to have arrived at their positions based not on value 
judgments but on objective scientific method.  
At the base of  academics’ ability to make this claim is the following supposition: while 
academics may be guided by their values in choosing their research questions, if  these 
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normative assumptions are not borne out in the research, the researcher will change her mind; 
the results of  science override normative conviction. Lasswell recognised that the researcher’s 
entry ticket into the policy process depended on this intellectual honesty: 
[p]art of  the connotation of  the alleged value neutrality of  science is acceptable. Surely the qualified scientist 
is a participant observer of  events who tries to see things as they are. He demands of  himself, and of  anyone 
who purports to be a scientist, that he suppresses [sic] no relevant fact and that he holds [sic] all explanations 
tentatively, and therefore open to revision if  more adequate explanations are proposed. Such is the 
exploratory, antidogmatic ideal image of  the man of  knowledge. No matter how utterly sure a scientist may be 
of  the enduring truth of  what he has found, the ideal image requires him, when challenged, to reopen his 
mind to possible change.63  
However, as has been pointed out, the policy process serves as the locus for the 
amalgamation of  interests and values. In this sense, it is eminently value-driven, and even if  
value-free knowledge did exist, it would not last long in the policy arena: “[k]nowledge 
becomes ideology as it absorbs the values and passions of  the group creating or bearing it”64. 
While much of  the above reasoning is contained within the scientific discourse itself, the 
Gramscian vision argues that the intellectual’s social role militates for action:  
[t]he mode of  being of  the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and 
momentary mover of  feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, 
organiser, “permanent persuader” and not just as a simple orator.65  
Policymakers seek the answers not to scientific questions but to value-based dilemmas and 
balances of  interests. Experts not only provide options and bounded solutions, but also 
contribute to the identification and elaboration of  what policymakers perceive as interests 
themselves. Thus, when it enters into the policy arena, the separation of  fact and value is even 
more tenuous: 
[e]qually artificial and difficult to sustain is the related distinction between policy analysis and policy 
advocacy—between laying out the alternatives that can accomplish a given goal and advocating changes in 
what governments do. Analysts with extensive experience in advising policymakers in business and 
government point out that clients want and need advice about objectives as well as the most efficient ways of  
achieving them66.  
The same point is taken up by H. Becker in a note on qualitative methodology:  
[w]hatever side we are on, we must use our techniques impartially enough that a belief  to which we are 
especially sympathetic could be proved untrue. We must always inspect our work carefully enough to know 
when our techniques and theories are open enough to allow that possibility.67 
The primacy of  research findings over normative commitment forms the base of  the 
contract between the user and provider of  expert knowledge. When this hierarchy is not 
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respected, the interaction runs the risk of  providing a false mantle of  academic legitimacy. This 
is true both at a higher, discursive level and within the parochial confines of  the policy process:  
[a]mong those who value it, some are genuinely open-minded in seeking and using research findings, others 
attempt to mobilize findings for partisan or legitimizing purposes, and still others view research in a tactical, 
rather than a substantive context—a research program may be a device for keeping an issue alive or for 
delaying action.68  
Mulkay attributes scientists’ ability to get away with this to the fact that they are often called 
in to advise where policymakers’ specialised competence is limited: 
[n]on-scientists, and indeed specialists in other areas, seldom have the technical competence to assess the 
adequacy of  a particular scientist’s claims. It follows that he will be able to use specialised knowledge so as to 
furnish an apparent technical rationale for policies which express his own social interests as well as the 
interests of  other groups on whose behalf  he is acting.  
Claims made by scientists in the wider social context, then, will often be ideological; but this will be obscured 
by their technical content and by scientists’ ability to invoke the “objective facts of  the natural world” as 
leading inevitably to certain economic, political and social conclusions.69 
This can lead to what Dror describes as “[a] mix-up between reliable factual knowledge, 
implicit axiomatic assumptions, provisional theories, conceptual taxonomies, doubtful 
hypotheses, and various types of  hidden value judgments”70. Adhering to the logic that 
subordinating normative commitments to scientific findings is more difficult the more strongly 
those commitments are held, it follows that in disciplines—and their attendant policy domains 
and decisionmaking processes—with many members who entered them in part for normative 
reasons, the risk of  such conflation is higher. Some authors claim that International Relations 
[IR]—in particular its subfield of  security studies—is just such a discipline.  
 
1.3. “Ein dehnbarer Begriff”: security as the locus for the intersection of  
theory and practice  
In William Wallace’s 1996 review article of  the literature on theory and practice in the Review 
of  International Studies, he asserts that “[t]he justification for the place [IR] has gained in the 
university curriculum rests upon utility, not on aesthetics”71. Yet IR has developed 
institutionally by the same precepts as other academic disciplines, some of  which by nature 
draw the discipline away from a policy focus:  
[t]here is a tendency for all academic disciplines to demonstrate their intellectual standing in the university by 
privileging theoretical studies over applied. This tendency has been particularly evident in the social sciences, 
as they struggled to gain respect from disdainful classicists, philosophers and natural scientists.72 
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The degree to which IR possesses a mainstream focussed on the level of  theoretical 
development of  the field can be construed, following Shils, as an indicator of  the degree of  
the field’s disciplinary institutionalisation. One main divide here is between question-driven 
and method-driven research agendas. IR is a strongly question-driven field of  research73, and 
Christopher Hill claims these questions are selected for normative reasons by a 
disproportionately high percentage of  scientists in IR74:  
[m]ost people entering the area of  international relations are motivated by some explicit normative concern, 
however general. […] This is natural and only causes problems if  the motivating values are either disguised 
(perhaps innocently, as part of  a positivist methodology) or exaggerated to the point that they come to 
dominate the analysis.75 
Many of  these “pressing concerns” and issues of  high normative import are to be found in 
IR’s sub-field of  security studies. Security represents a particularly apt field for observing the 
relationship of  academics to policy, as it is one of  a limited number of  terms used frequently 
in both communities, though with considerably different intentions. The changing strategic 
environment of  the last ten years has led to a fundamental re-thinking of  the concept of  
“security” within both policymaking and academe.  
Seminal to understanding the choice of  security as the focus of  the present study is the dual 
function performed by security as a concept within each respective group. The parallel 
existence of  communities focussing their efforts on a concept with the same moniker sets the 
stage for examining the manner in which concepts and ideas from one might diffuse into the 
other.  
Security serves as the core analytical tool of  the discipline of  security studies. As such, 
security academics are driven by the need clearly to define this notion and to distinguish it 
from other concepts. During a period overlapping roughly with the decade of  the 1990s, the 
redefinition of  the concept of  security was one of  the central foci of  the discipline of  security 
studies. The end of  the Cold War and the fading predominance of  the nuclear standoff  as the 
major concern led to a questioning of  the realist conception which had become mutually 
entrenched with the realities of  the Cold War.  
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Modern security studies has its origins in geopolitics; the most notable early works wedding 
politics and structural factors such as geography were Rudolf  Kjellén’s treatise Der Staat als 
Lebensform76; Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of  Sea Power Upon History 1660-178377; Sir 
Halford John Mackinder’s “The Geographical Pivot of  History”78; and the German iteration 
of  geopolitics represented by the works of  Karl Haushofer.  
Geopolitics by its very nature was based upon a wide conception of  the determinants of  
power, but when the concept was adapted to the context of  the nuclear confrontation during 
the Cold War, it experienced a narrowing both of  the scope of  its applicability and in its 
relationship to science; it came to be closely identified with rationalism and method-driven 
inquiry. Geopolitics carried over into the nuclear period as strategic studies and was described 
by one analyst as 
problem-solving theory for the conceptualization and practice of  statecraft. A convenient label for a variety of  
traditions and cultures of  theory and practice, geopolitics sees itself  as an instrumental form of  knowledge 
and rationality. It takes the existing power structures for granted and works within these to provide 
conceptualization and advice to foreign policy decision-makers. Its dominant modes of  narration are 
declarative (“this is how the world is”) and then imperative (“this is what we must do”). Its enduring “plot” is 
the global balance of  power and the future of  strategic advantage in an anarchic world.79 
Strategic studies in the Western World quickly found its work subsumed under the Cold 
War agenda of  the United States. It retained its focus on power and the distribution of  
material resources and was harnessed, under the auspices of  the American search for a “grand 
strategy”, to aiding American policymakers in the process of  matching ends and means in the 
pursuit of  security80. In the tradition of  geopolitics,  
“[s]ome [analysts] employ[ed] a restrictive definition of  grand strategy that specifie[d] only the threats to a 
state and the military means to deal with them. Others use a broader definition that specifies the threats to a 
nation’s security and then details the military, political and economic means to meet them”81.  
Strategic studies orthodoxy, however, dictated that the proper objects of  study were military 
force and the phenomenon of  war. The realist school that evolved after 1945 claimed that the 
legitimate object of  study for security specialists was “the nature, causes, effects, and 
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prevention of  war”82. In a review article on the state of  the field in 1988, the editors of  the 
leading mainstream journal International Security proposed the following definition of  security:  
[t]hese are general issues, such as the causes of  war and of  alliances, as well as policy-oriented research on 
military and other threats confronting particular countries. The field includes basic theoretical work on the 
causes of  conflict and war in the international system, the dynamics and outcomes of  conflict, the nature and 
perception of  threats, and efforts to ameliorate or resolve conflicts caused by such threats. Analyses of  the 
problems of  nuclear strategy, arms control, and deterrence, of  the determinants of  the defense policies of  
states, studies of  military organizations and civil-military relations, and military history are familiar parts of  the 
field. Economic, sociological, and psychological dimensions of  threats, and institutional responses to security 
dilemmas are equally important. A subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of  threat 
perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as peripheral. Tank tactics fall into the 
category of  military science, and depletion of  fisheries falls into ecological sciences, not international security 
studies.83 
The realist and neo-realist schools consistently upheld the goal of  policy relevance for their 
work, and numerous articles combined expositions of  their epistemological viewpoint with 
strong empirical evidence illustrating both the applicability and predictive ability of  realist 
theory84. Authors seeking to engage the rationalist or neo-realist conceptions of  security 
studies have frequently fallen back on an article in which Stephen Walt appropriates for 
himself  the role of  gatekeeper of  security studies and provides his own thoughts on the 
matter: 
security studies may be defined as the study of  the threat, use and control of  military force. It explores the conditions 
that make the use of  force more likely, the ways that the use of  force affects individuals, states, and societies, 
and the specific policies states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.85 
Following the end of  the Cold War, the challenges to this both epistemologically and 
operationally narrow conception of  strategy and security increased in number and volume. A 
period ensued in which conceptual floodgates opened and security was variously described as a 
motive for behaviour86, a policy objective87, a condition of  freedom (emancipation) from 
threats88, a relation between individuals and the state89, a semantic identity90, a political 
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category91, an “essentially contested concept”92, and a practice or mode of  discourse93. A 
majority of  authors too numerous to list here have used the term to designate a convention, a 
framework, or an objective condition. 
These attempts to confront the narrowed vision of  the realist conception coalesced into 
two broad avenues of  engagement termed “broadening” and “deepening”94. Broadening 
designates the addition of  new forms of  threats (to states and their citizens) from outside the 
military realm to which neo-realism limits its concern. Alongside the articles of  a general 
nature that gave the initial impetus to the debate on the “non-military aspects of  security”95, 
the issues that have emerged include, but are not limited to, the economic foundations of  
national security96, environmental degradation as a threat to security (even at the national 
level97), the addition of  qualifying adjectives to security (common98, co-operative99 and 
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comprehensive100), as well as several single issues such as immigration (and its corollary 
concern with linking identity to security101), ethnic conflict and human rights concerns.  
Where “broadening” adapts the logic of  the realist paradigm mutatis mutandis to include new 
issues, “deepening” challenges its very foundations. In the case of  efforts to “deepen” the 
concept of  security, the state and its citizens cease to function as the sole entity to which 
security is provided, or “referent object”. Efforts to provide analytical foundations for a 
deepening of  the security agenda arise from the perceived need to provide an alternative to the 
state as the sole provider of  security.  
This search is a response to three putative deficiencies of  the neorealist state-based view: 
the first is the notion that the state is increasingly unable sufficiently to fulfil its function of  
safeguarding the identity, physical security, material welfare and habitable environment of  its 
citizens. The second is outright hostility to the state, often rooted in classic liberalism; and 
finally the third is the notion that the state must serve as a means to protect its citizens, not as 
an end in itself102 or a potential source of  danger to them in its own right.  
The main foci of  attempts to deepen the concept of  security and to move on to referent 
objects beyond the state and its citizens include, at the “high” end, global environmental 
degradation as a threat to humanity, and at the “low” end, human security as a focus on the 
individual. The development and content of  human security will be discussed in detail in the 
first half  of  the chapter on security policy formulation in Canada. While “broadening” has 
become increasingly common in policy formulation processes the world over, states—Canada 
and human security being a notable exception—appear logically to be more reticent to adopt 
as national doctrine deepened security concepts which remove the state from the centre of  
attention. The debate over the nature of  the concept of  security remains an open one in both 
academic and policymaking circles.  
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The very malleability of  the concept, and the wide range of  uses of  the term “security” that 
ensue, provide the rationale for situating security at the centre of  the analysis of  the 
relationship between the practitioner and the analyst, for it performs a different function in the 
worlds of  each of  the two groups. While for academics the vagueness of  the concept and its 
use constitute the problem of  a nebulously defined object of  study and thus a potential loss of  
intellectual credibility, for policymakers it is precisely security’s opaque nature that constitutes 
its primary point of  attractiveness. Precisely the analytical weakness of  the term is what has 
granted it the power to become an object of  study in the first place.103 
Both uses of  the concept contain the same notion that issues labelled as subject to the logic 
of  security somehow fall beyond the pale of  ordinary politics and thus permit exceptions to 
the ordinary “rules of  the game” of  politics and policy. Whereas this often impels academics 
who realise the power of  such a concept to limit its applicability, policymakers in contrast 
appreciate the special importance of  the concept in an opposite sense; for purposes of  
political expediency, life-or-death importance can be attached to certain issues together with a 
security label. This study will be concerned with manipulations of  the concept of  security as 
they relate to the goal of  national policymaking.  
Academics are far from alone in responding to fundamental changes in the landscape of  
threats and vulnerabilities generated by political processes such as the end of  the bipolar 
ideological conflict, economic processes such as globalisation and regionalisation, and changes 
in domestic political systems throughout the world. States and international organisations must 
respond to these challenges in practical terms both in the immediate and long terms. In doing 
so, some states and international organisations will call on academic security analysts for help 
in formulating their responses.  
Security, then, is a particularly interesting term to investigate. As with power in realist IR, it 
is the operational term around which revolve the main concerns of  a subfield. And as with 
many such terms, its meaning is contested. In a policy-related field such as security studies, 
analytical definitions of  the term have political implications, raising the issue of  the political 
consequences of  analysts’ scientific definitional “moves”.  
The question of  the interplay of  academics’ normative and scientific commitments was 
treated specifically in the security studies context in a symposium published in Cooperation and 
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Conflict in 1999104, which lays bare the effects of  epistemological and methodological 
assumptions on the attitudes of  the different strains in security studies towards policy as well 
as the normative manifestation of  the findings they generate within it. The platform for this 
debate is the contentious issue of  defining security. 
Eriksson discusses the realist paradigm, according it mainstream status and referring to it as 
“traditional security studies”105. He points out that whether or not they are made explicit,  
“[t]he traditional concept has quite obvious political and normative implications: military force is legitimized, 
state sovereignty seen as a superior value and, consequently, all non-state groups which threaten a state are 
delegitimized. […] [I]n order to defend its definition, a concept is often portrayed as “neutral” and 
“scientific”, even though it actually reflects a particular set of  norms and values. The established definition of  
national security can thus be seen as a successful politicization (in this case a victory for state-centric norms) 
rather than as a neutral, purely analytical definition.106  
In the language of  security, the process under scrutiny here is threat construction. Where 
realism typically takes threats as materially given and determined, constructivist approaches 
view them as the product of  power politics. One approach which straddles the divide between 
the realist and constructivist security logics is that developed at the Copenhagen Peace 
Research Institute (COPRI). This view makes use of  speech-act theory to develop an approach 
focussing on “securitisation”. The criterion for what makes a political issue one of  security, 
rather than of  other policy fields, is that it be a matter of  life and death, one calling for an 
exception to ordinary procedure.  
The units of  analysis of  the Copenhagen speech-act approach to security are referent 
objects, securitising actors and functional actors. To securitise an issue is to engage in a speech 
act by which an issue is moved “beyond the established rules of  the game” and framed “either 
as a special kind of  politics or as above politics. [...] What is essential is the designation of  an 
existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of  that 
designation by a significant audience”107. Such actors as political leaders, bureaucracies, 
governments, lobbyists and pressure groups are empowered to perform the security speech-
act108. They do so in the name of  a collectivity—the referent object—whose nature varies from 
one security sector to the next.  
                                                 
104 Eriksson, Johan. “Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of  Security Analysts”; pp. 311-330 (hereafter, 
“Observers”); Goldmann, Kjell. “Issues, Not Labels, Please! reply to Eriksson”; pp. 331-333; Wæver, Ole. “Securitizing 
Sectors? Reply to Eriksson”; pp. 334-340; Williams, Michael. “The Practices of  Security: Critical Contributions”; pp. 341-
344; Eriksson, Johan. “Debating the Politics of  Security Studies: Response to Goldmann, Wæver and Williams”; pp. 345-
352 (hereafter, “Debating”). All in Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 34, No. 3 (1999). 
105 Eriksson, “Observers”, p. 312ff.  
106 Eriksson, “Observers”, p. 313.  
107 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Security: a new framework for analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998; pp. 23, 27. 
108 Ibid., p. 40. 
 34
The urgency attached to a security issue, and its ability to create an exception to the “rules 
of  the game” and place an issue at the top of  the policy agenda, has been cited by some as 
sufficiently attractive to incite certain policy actors to want to attach this label to an issue that is 
not really one of  security109. Here, the political ramifications of  the analytical concept of  
security become clear. If  the definition of  security is expanded to include a given issue, this 
affects that issue’s place on the political agenda, its perceived urgency, and ultimately the 
chances for the implementation of  programmes to deal with it.  
Generally speaking, there are three arguments against securitisation; the first, touched upon 
briefly above,  is that it waters down the analytical usefulness of  the concept, the second that 
excessive securitisation can have devastating effects on civil society. Charges that civil rights 
have been diminished in the United States as the result of  the political manipulation of  fears 
of  terror after the events of  11 September 2001 are one example. Finally, there is the notion 
that rather than bringing a non-military component to the security realm, widening the 
application of  the security logic might have the reverse effect, rather militarising traditionally 
non-security sectors.  
Many of  these arguments make one important tacit supposition: that the threat 
constructions developed in the academic world translate into the loss or saving of  life in the 
“real world” once these new definitions and modes of  threat construction are acted upon 
through policy. It is the task of  this study to return to the relationship between the Prince and 
the whisperers—to investigate that assumption of  real-world relevance, and thus to elucidate 
under what conditions academic discourse (in this case that within security studies) diffuses, in 
the form of  its individual human vectors, into the policy discourse.  
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2. The halls of  power and the ivory tower: argument and hypotheses  
 
 
And so most of  the doors remained tightly shut,  
to keep knowledge at bay. 
—André Brink, in Devil's Valley— 
 
Nam et ipsa Scientia Potestas est.  
—Francis Bacon— 
 
 
This chapter outlines the project’s argument and defines three key terms used in its 
expression. The argument seeks to explain how academic security experts can influence 
security policy, as expressed in declaratory policy documents issued at the national level. 
Though the enunciated claims have broader applicability to a variety of  policy spheres, the 
focus here is on the security realm, and this focus is made clear at each appropriate 
juncture. The foundational premise is that when three conditions are met, influence is 
possible; it is not guaranteed, however, due to the residual power of  contextual 
idiosyncrasies.  
The argument involves three main claims; the first chronologically precedes the two 
others and is a prerequisite for their entry into consideration. The latter two then act in 
concert to determine academics’ chances of  success in affecting the outcome of  the policy 
process. The variables considered in each of  the hypotheses in turn constitute a 
simultaneous triple progression: from structural factors to the content of  ideas; from the 
notion of  value-free science to the embrace of  a self-conscious policy advocacy position; 
and a progression of  types of  input mirroring the advancement of  the policy process.  
The project’s argument is prefaced by the brief  definitions of  three key terms used in 
the analysis—academics, policymakers, and the policy process—before it touches briefly 
upon other potential participants in policy formulation. The object of  study—those who 
seek influence—are university-affiliated researchers whose work relates to national security 
policy. Those whom these academics seek to influence—policymakers—are members of  
the executive branch empowered by law and bureaucratic practice, under each national 
system, to formulate a state’s security policy.  
The three hypotheses concern the “when”, “who”, “what” and to some extent the 
“how” of  academics’ interaction with the policy world. The three variables associated with 
these questions are policymaker uncertainty, academics’ attributes, and the normative 
resonance of  their policy inputs. In a first instance, the policy process is opened—at the 
discretion of  policymakers—to outside advisors as a result of  uncertainty on their part 
about the appropriateness or adequacy of  current policy.  
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The first hypothesis places emphasis on the interaction of  ideas and material factors: 
perceptions of  uncertainty denote periods during which their interaction can be best 
viewed. Ideas, as whose vectors in policy processes academics often act, “leap into the 
breach” when changes in structure temporarily obscure waypoints for policy formulation 
until they can be re-established in a process of  mutual constitution. This precondition for 
the opening of  the policy process is at its core an assumption, based on and borne out by a 
substantial theoretical literature, rather than an empirical proposition. In addition to linking 
the preconditions for academics’ policy access directly to the broader relationship between 
the ideational and material determinants of  policy, this theoretical precondition aids in case 
selection by situating the analyses in polities whose manner of  dealing with defence and 
security issues is in transition. While the project’s analyses do not treat this hypothesis strictu 
sensu as a proposition to be tested, findings are furnished to demonstrate its validity. 
Uncertainty has three main sources: changes in the international environment to which 
policy must respond; changes in the domestic determinants of  a policy stance; and a 
perceived lack of  capacity in a state to make proper policy in response to change in either 
of  these two types of  stimulus. Once uncertainty has opened the policy process, 
policymakers are confronted with many different potential sources of  outside advice. These 
sources are narrowed to a manageable scale, and finally selected for participation in policy 
formulation, based on a set of  attributes and faculties they possess. These characteristics 
build upon one another in a way similar to the hypotheses themselves. An expert must first 
satisfy a material necessary condition (the possession of  attributes such as knowledge and 
prestige) to become known to policymakers before ideational content contributes to the 
critical mass putting her over the threshold for policy influence. 
The first necessary attribute of  the successful policy advisor is the possession of  
exclusive specialised knowledge otherwise not available to the policymaker. This specialised 
knowledge can be either practical or theoretical in nature. Specialised knowledge is used in 
concert with institutionalised prestige as a criterion for the selection of  experts who are 
initially chosen for participation. This selection still occurs prior to any actual directly 
policy-related input on the scholars’ part.  
Institutionalised prestige in turn consists of  two components: the prestige of  a scholar 
within her given academic discipline, and the relative prestige of  that discipline itself. 
Individual prestige within a discipline accrues through the transposition of  prestige gained 
in accordance with the academic reward structures specific to that discipline, such as 
publication and promotion. The prestige of  any one discipline derives, among other things, 
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from its degree of  institutionalisation and the extent to which consensus has been reached 
within it over its appropriate methodological and theoretical constructs.  
Here, the argument takes account not just of  advisors’ personal attributes, but also of  
the effects of  their actions, once selected, on their potential policy influence; this marks the 
final step in the argument’s progression from structure to agency. The contention is that in 
order for the work of  a given expert to be considered, it must show both immediate 
relevance to a current policy problem, and argue normatively in favour of  one from among 
several possible alternative courses of  action. Once an academic has been selected by 
policymakers on the basis of  prestige and knowledge, and has further exhibited the ability 
to present cogent normative argumentation, the final criterion can be considered. 
The third and final hypothesis claims that inputs that are likely to be selected—and thus 
possibly to effect policy—must resonate with the normative commitments of  the target 
policymaker. This approach adds richness and rigour to the otherwise tautological claim 
that policymakers (and, indeed, most receivers of  counsel) only follow the advice of  those 
who tell them what they want to hear.  
Normative commitments range from relatively immutable higher-order value judgments 
to stances taken out of  political expediency at given junctures during the policy formulation 
process. As was the case with the previous two variables, the power to select among 
potential advisors and inputs rests with the decisionmaker. In the case of  resonance, this 
selection is likely to be influenced by academics’ positions vis-à-vis the policy status quo; by 
the level of  methodological and theoretical consensus within a discipline; and by the 
concordance of  beliefs between the discipline and the policy world.  
The argument stops short of  making claims about the role of  academics in the 
implementation of  policy initiatives and the possible effect of  their participation on 
subsequent practice; these questions rest upon a significantly different set of  literatures and 
intellectual conundrums. The exposition of  the argument does, however, highlight the 
various ways in which these variables are interconnected, and provides justification for how 
their treatment is assigned under their respective headings.  
 
2.1. Definition of  terms 
Academics 
Many terms have been used to describe the main object of  this study, and some of  these 
will be used interchangeably in the text. The focus of  this investigation is on university-
affiliated scholars holding academic positions whose fields of  study are those which 
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produce inputs into the formulation processes for security and defence policies, as well as 
those aspects of  foreign policy which concern security and defence. In depicting the nature 
of  these individuals, the argument draws on several bodies of  literature, each of  which 
contributes a part to explaining these actors’ self-understanding, goals, limitations and role 
in the policy process. 
In their interaction with the world of  policy, the actors in question have variously been 
depicted as “intellectuals”110; “(social) scientists”111; “(social) researchers”112; bearers, 
producers (in a metaphor derived from the economic marketplace) or simply “men [sic] 
of ” “knowledge” to be utilised113; “experts”114; security or International Relations 
“academics”115; “advisors”116; and producers or carriers of  ideas117. Each of  these 
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appellations places these actors in a particular optic illuminating one aspect of  their role. 
One commonality they possess, however, is the contention that actors described using 
these terms possess a body of  knowledge or expertise in a bounded field of  inquiry that 
goes beyond that of  the ordinary citizen or the “common man”. The exclusivity of  this 
knowledge is what grants them access to the policy process and thus to that of  
government.  
Alain-G. Gagnon situates the origin of  the term “intellectual” in the negative reaction 
among educated circles to the Dreyfus affair118. Steve Fuller traces the emergence of  the 
term “expert” to specialists in forensic handwriting analysis in 19th-century France; in 
doing so, he establishes the distinction between these men and the ordinary citizen, as well 
as between “experts” and “intellectuals”: 
[t]he climate of  collegiality that harbored the mystique of  the expert led journalists of  the Third Republic 
to distinguish experts from the “lay” public, thereby conjuring up a clerical image redolent of  the secular 
religion that Auguste Comte’s more zealous followers had been promoting under the rubric of  Positivism. 
Moreover, experts were contrasted not only with the lay public but also intellectuals. This point is important 
for understanding the source of  what might be called the epistemic power of  expertise. An intellectual takes 
the entire world as fair game for his judgments, but at the same time he opens himself  to scrutiny from all 
quarters. Indeed, the intellectual’s natural habitat is controversy, and often he seems to spend more time 
on defending and attacking positions than on developing and applying them. In contrast, the experts’ 
judgments are restricted to his area of  training. The credibility of  those judgments are [sic] measured in 
terms of  the freedom from contravention that his colleagues afford him. The mystique of  expertise is 
created by the impression that an expert’s colleagues are sufficiently scrupulous that, were it necessary, 
they would be able and inclined to redress any misuse or abuse of  their expertise. The fact that they do 
not means that the expert must be doing something right.119 
The modern security academic fulfils both of  these roles, acting as both intellectual and 
expert. Where Fuller’s characterisation has its greatest applicability to the modern university 
academic is in the recognition that her position depends on consensus within the body of  
her peers in her area of  expertise—in this case, her academic discipline120. While consensus 
does not by necessity extend into the normative domain, it does extend to agreement on 
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what constitutes the foundation of  their given expertise and its epistemic power121. But 
what sets off  the expert’s from the layman’s knowledge?  
Lindblom and Cohen distinguish the results of  what they term “professional social 
inquiry” from “ordinary knowledge”, which they define as  
knowledge that does not owe its origin, testing, degree of  verification, truth status, or currency to 
distinctive [professional social inquiry] techniques but rather to common sense, casual empiricism, or 
thoughtful speculation and analysis. It is highly fallible, but we shall call it knowledge even if  it is false.122 
Lindblom and Cohen in fact minimise professional social inquiry’s claim to superiority 
over “ordinary knowledge”: 
[b]ut practitioners of  [professional social inquiry] attest that they offer more than ordinary knowledge. 
They claim that they have pushed on to knowledge available exclusively to them because they practice 
professional investigatory techniques not used by the casual empiricist. Moreover, they claim to have 
tested some of  the content of  ordinary knowledge and rejected some of  it as in error, setting in its place, 
consequently, more reliable information than is known to persons other than themselves.  
We grant the claim—on both counts. But, we suggest, it amounts to a much smaller claim than is often 
supposed.123 
The actors who are at the centre of  this analysis, then, are men and women who have 
developed, through professionalised means of  inquiry—embodied in their particular case 
in affiliation to universities—corpora of  specialised knowledge applicable to policy 
problems, to which they have exclusive access. On this exclusive access rests their perceived 
right to inclusion in the process of  making policy. In nations with elected governments, this 
exclusivity conflicts with the representational imperative of  democracy, which is based 
upon the equality of  citizens regardless of  expertise, and their participation in the process 
of  government through elective institutions.  
This emphasis on the epistemic power of  expertise per se privileges a conception of  
policymaking in which the balancing of  normative beliefs and political interests takes a 
back seat to rationally-derived answers to policy problems rendered as objects of  scientific 
inquiry. The literature on epistemic communities is aware of  this charge of  elitism and 
counters it by acknowledging the importance of  identifying the social origins of  
researchers’ normative assumptions124. “Many authors”, Peter Haas admits,  
have been quick to point out that the increasing influence of  specialised groups such as epistemic 
communities may have serious negative implications for such deep-seated political values as democracy 
and participation. The transfer of  decision-making authority to a group of  elite specialists, they argue, can 
further limit access to power by the public. … Others have warned that privileging the advice of  
specialists in a particular domain, such as engineering, may result in the generation of  “bad” decisions, 
either because it leads to a neglect of  potentially valuable interdisciplinary insights or ignores the social 
ends to which decisions regarding specific issues are directed.125  
                                                 
121 This point is also taken up in the literature on epistemic communities, which posits that two defining aspects of such a 
community are shared causal beliefs and shared notions of validity. See Haas, Peter M. “Introduction: epistemic 
communities and international policy coordination” (hereafter, “Introduction”). In Haas, Peter M., ed. Knowledge, 
Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992.; pp. 1-36. 
122 Lindblom and Cohen, p. 12.  
123 Ibid., pp. 13-14.  
124 Haas, “Introduction”, pp. 25-26. 
125 Ibid., p. 24. 
 41
Robert Merton and Daniel Lerner point out that the increasingly frequent recourse of  
policymakers to expert advice relates directly to the appropriation by the state of  ever-
larger areas of  intervention and societal direction, and that the threat to democratic 
participation in fact emanates from both sides of  the advisor-officeholder relationship126. 
Susan D. Phillips places this phenomenon in a more modern context: 
[a]lthough there may be more opportunities and more channels of  representation for citizen interests (e.g. 
advisory councils, regulatory hearings, royal commissions, task forces, legislative committees, “multi-
stakeholder” consultations, and, ultimately, “partnerships”), the mode or practice of  representation by 
social movements and other groups is becoming increasingly constrained. … In other words, 
representation increasingly is being channelled through the para-parliamentary routes of  the bureaucracy, 
the judiciary, and neo-corporatist partnerships with the consequent diminution in importance of  the 
democratic institutions of  parliament and parties. As a result of  both greater competition among more 
actors for representation and the location of  policy-making in these non-partisan forums127, there is a 
greater emphasis on scientific advice and technical expertise.128  
The phenomenon Phillips observes has concurrently had an effect on the nature of  
advisors’ interlocutors within the decisionmaking process. The increasing complexity—and 
attendant specialist compartmentalisation—of  policy issues, including prominently the 
security sphere, has indeed led to the increasing concentration of  policymaking in the 
executive rather than the legislative branches. Due to the increasingly specialised nature of  
defence and security policy issues, those making defence policy are increasingly bureaucrats 
within the executive branches of  their respective governments, including uniformed 
members of  the armed forces.  
 
Policymakers 
Whether referred to as policymakers, decisionmakers, practitioners, bureaucrats, 
governmental officials or knowledge users, on the governmental side the objects of  this 
study are those individuals within the executive branch of  their respective governments 
charged with formulating national policy on issues defined by their government as subject 
to security or defence policy. These individuals are almost exclusively located in the defence 
and foreign ministries, as well as their nations’ armed forces. Regardless of  their 
provenance, these individuals tend to exhibit a common set of  professional characteristics 
and priorities.  
                                                 
126 Merton, Robert K. and Daniel Lerner. “Social Scientists and Research Policy”. In Lerner, Daniel and Harold D. 
Lasswell, eds. with Harold H. Fisher, Ernest R. Hilgard, Saul K. Padover, Ithiel de Sola Pool and C. Easton Rothwell. 
The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951; pp. 282-307. Here, 
pp. 282-283. This observation is particularly salient in the present context as it suggests that where the state’s planning 
role is interventionist, increased opportunities for expert influence might obtain. 
127 From the natural-scientific standpoint it might be argued that such fora are better suited to scientific advice than to the 
cut-and-thrust normative battles of the political aspects of governance. 
128 Phillips, Susan D. “New Social Movements and Routes to Representation: Science versus Politics”. In Brooks and 
Gagnon, Political Influence of Ideas, pp. 57-82. Here, p. 60. Italics in the original. 
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While an academic is trained—and granted the time—to elucidate fully the cause-and-
effect or constitutive relationships behind a given investigative question, and often able to 
focus her research on a limited number of  projects at any given moment, policymakers are 
consistently faced with numerous simultaneous smaller-scale problems in need of  rapid 
resolution. Whereas academic research often takes a long-term approach, tying up 
philosophical and methodological “loose ends”, policymakers’ superiors place a premium 
on quickly-found workable solutions that enable the implementation of  solutions to begin 
as quickly as possible129.  
Because their foremost criterion is the finding of  practical and timely solutions to policy 
problems, bureaucrats often have an instrumental relationship to the inputs of  academic 
analysts:  
[n]either in the main are [social scientists] looked to for basic truths about human behaviour derived 
either from rigorous scientific research or from the slow accretion of  wisdom. Social scientists are rather 
viewed as instruments for the reporting of  descriptive data about particular and concrete situations. This 
type of  knowledge is not of  interest to policymakers simply out of  idle curiosity. In their very role as 
policymakers they are concerned with the future and with the consequences of  particular changes in their 
own behaviour on the behaviour of  others.130 
Policymakers are inclined to continue following an established standard operating 
procedure until it has become demonstrably inadequate. Decisions are made based heavily 
on institutional precedent (oftentimes a single historical antecedent event)131, and often in 
accordance with an atheoretical outlook that entrenches the communication problems 
between the halls of  power and the ivory tower. One observer states openly the 
observation, frequently made tacitly, that when policymakers’ theoretical outlook on the 
nature of  international relations is identifiable, it is overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) 
similar to the realist viewpoint in the academic discipline:  
[a]lthough specialists in the study of  international relations sharply disagree among themselves over 
questions of  method and theory, many of  them hold the belief  that policymakers are too aconceptual, 
even anticonceptual and antitheoretical. At the same time, academic scholars note that policymakers and 
their advisers often do operate with a general view of  international politics influenced by their 
acquaintance with realist theory and such related concepts as national interest and balance of  power. … 
The simplified and dated view of  realist theory employed by many policymakers is seen by academics as 
part of  a larger problem. Granted that policy specialists and top policymakers come into government 
with intellectual capital derived from earlier education and other relevant experience, their work in 
government provides most of  them with little opportunity for replenishing and updating their 
knowledge.132  
While researchers may point out policymakers’ inability or unwillingness to keep up with 
developments in the academic world, this is a solipsistic perspective which aggrandises their 
                                                 
129 Weiss, Carol H. “Improving the Linkage Between Social Research and Public Policy”. In Lynn, pp. 23-81 (hereafter, 
“Improving Linkage). Here, p. 47. 
130 Shils, Edward A. “Social Science and Social Policy”. In Crawford and Biderman, pp. 35-49. Here, p. 37. See also Rose, 
Richard. “Disciplined Research and Undisciplined Problems”. In Weiss, Using Social Research, pp. 25-35. Here, p. 27. 
Rose greatly overstates the extent to which this instrumentalism results in policymakers’ identifying clearly the inputs 
they require once advice is commissioned.  
131 George, p. 13.  
132 George, pp. 11, 12.  
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own focus on concepts and theory. These types of  inputs generated by intellectuals are by 
far not the only contributions to a policymaker’s manner of  decisionmaking133. Institutional 
culture and precedent play a large part, as does the political nature of  the policymaking 
process: 
[t]he first thing that a public official must do is to become effectively socialized into the norms and values 
of  his office, learning what the organization of  which he is a part expects of  him. Whereas the social 
scientist’s work is primarily concerned with ideas, the work of  a public official is much more concerned 
with the allocation and management of  tangible resources: money, personnel, laws, and administrative 
decisions that collectively make up the outputs of  his organization.134  
The policy process, as explicated briefly in the previous chapter, is the locus at which the 
political values and normative interests of  the general public—as represented by the 
government—are amalgamated into a politically sustainable equilibrium. Both structural 
and ideational factors have a part to play in this elaborate tightrope act. A multitude of  
actors with diverging agendas, competing power bases, and different ranks in the hierarchy 
of  governmental priorities make the policy process difficult indeed to force into 
submission to a rational or linear explanatory model. 
 
The policy process 
What is commonly termed “the policy process” is a complex set of  multidirectional 
interactions between numerous actors occurring over an often poorly delineated period of  
time. Of  particular salience to our investigation of  the policy process are the following 
notions: that there exists a profusion of  actors alongside policymaking bureaucrats and 
their academic advisors who participate in it; that its progress is affected by the hierarchies 
of  decisionmaking power (on the governmental side) and prestige,  or “epistemic power” 
(on the advising side); and that it does not conform to a conception based on rational 
choices on the part of  its participants.  
The policy process is the succession of  interactions between governmental instances 
that has the making of  policy as its goal. A policy is a programme of  action, implementable 
by the agencies charged with its formulation, intended to deal with a given problem falling 
under the juridical or institutional competence of  that organ135. In the case of  this study, 
the problems originate in the domain of  defence and security; policy is made by the 
governmental instances granted competence in those domains—most often the ministries 
                                                 
133 See, inter alia, the practitioner’s viewpoint in Uliassi, Pio D. “Research and Foreign Policy: A View from Foggy 
Bottom”. In Weiss, Using Social Research, pp. 85-90. 
134 Rose, p. 25.  
135 Several authors offer similar definitions of the policy process, although much of the policy sciences literature is 
surprisingly reluctant to cast clearly the focus of the approach. For a policymaker’s definition, see for example Coles, 
John. Making Foreign Policy: A Certain Idea of Britain. London: John Murray, 2000; p. 9. See also Lepgold, pp. 58-59; and 
Heclo, Hugh Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance. London: Yale University Press, 
1974; pp. 4-5.  
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of  defence and foreign affairs, but occasionally the head executive’s office. The outcome of  
the process is enshrined in a declaratory policy document which serves as the basis for 
implementation.  
Policy formulation processes typically serve at least a dual purpose: the aggregation of  
political interests within a representative government, and a more focussed search for the 
most incisive solution to a given problem or situation. The process involves several goals 
which are pursued at distinct times during its course. It encompasses many actors from 
within and without the official policy bureaucracy, ranging from members of  the executive 
branch to legislators and occasionally judicial instances, and including a number of  outside 
actors whose participation is based on a variety of  characteristics. 
 
Participants in the policy process 
There are a multitude of  actors involved in the policy process, on both the 
governmental and advisory sides136. While our focus is on the relationship between the 
policymaker and the academic, it is important to recall that the individual policymakers with 
whom an outside expert interacts, even the entire department to which they belong, are 
only one of  many actors whose interests and agendas are being balanced and aggregated in 
the “sausage factory” that is the decisionmaking process.  
Even if, for example, a foreign ministry’s policy recommendations within the negotiating 
process conceptually echo closely the suggestions of  an advisor, the final policy may reflect 
these inputs only inasmuch as, for example, the foreign ministry’s own advisory inputs are 
included in the larger process. The amalgamation of  defence policy interests involves other 
priorities such as the inputs from (and competition with) the defence ministry, legislative 
directives, budgetary concerns, presidential preferences, and others. Similarly, policymakers 
gather the information which enters into their choices from a variety of  sources137.  
Academics thus face competition from other types of  advising actor, such as lobby 
groups and non-governmental organisations. In short, the advisor is but one of  many 
influences making up the final agenda of  a policymaker, who may herself  be one of  many 
inputs into her department’s overall agenda, which in turn may be but one of  many 
contributions to the final declaration of  a governmental policy position. In the case of  
multilateral institutions, this may even be taken one step further before a consensus is 
reached among member states. Outside contributors are thus placed before a situation in 
                                                 
136 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995; p. 
45; Bulmer et al., p. 35.  
137 George, p. 8. 
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which the hierarchical position of  the policymaker to whom they have access can have 
significant consequences for their own ultimate effect on policy.  
Further complicating this task is the fact that the policy process is seldom rational, but 
instead fraught with numerous instances of  idiosyncrasy, context-dependence, and non-
rational action. To begin with, policymakers are often called upon to make decisions under 
conditions of  both time pressure and incomplete information. Institutional precedent thus 
assumes an important role in saving time, as there may be no opportunity to gain complete 
information due to time constraints. The sheer number of  problems facing a bureaucrat 
similarly leads to a preoccupation with the concrete and the short-term. This immediatism 
conflicts with the long-term approach of  many academics and places experts at a 
disadvantage with respect to others whose professional socialisation has not saddled them 
with the handicap of  “long-windedness”.  
Furthermore, analyses of  the policy process and the role of  outside actors therein must 
take account of  such factors as the rank of  the expert’s interlocutor within his organisation, 
the constellation of  personal relationships within the bureaucracy (both within and 
between units) and the policymaker’s own particular view of  the relevance of  scientific as 
opposed to other knowledge. All of  these factors make the policy process an exceptionally 
rich and complicated locus of  study. Taking account of  the complexity of  the 
characteristics outlined above, however, it is possible to develop a series of  hypotheses to 
illuminate under what conditions experts’ inputs can survive this crucible and result in 
ideational influence on declaratory security policy. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
This section presents the three hypotheses, with their attendant sets of  variables, which 
together explain how academics influence the formulation of  security policy at the national 
level. They are to be taken as necessary, though not always sufficient, conditions for 
influence, for the policy process does not always conform to excessively rationalistic 
models Intervening variables and contextual factors complicate attempts at generalisation. 
The hypotheses exhibit simultaneous progression along three axes: structural versus 
ideational policy determinants, scientificity versus advocacy, and the progression of  the 
policy process itself  through various different levels from an initial stock-taking of  the 
strategic environment to selecting and following a specific course of  action. 
The first hypothesis, dealing with uncertainty, deals with the conditions under which 
policy processes are opened to outside contributors. In addition to presenting a view of  the 
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interaction of  structural and material factors, this theoretical assumption bears homage to 
the fact that since the end of  the Cold War, it is a rarity for a state’s defence posture not to 
be in a state of  flux. The argument deals with uncertainty less as a proposition to be tested 
than as a means of  establishing a necessary condition for policy processes to be opened. 
While the original stimulus can come from both the domestic and international levels, it is 
policymakers’ perceptions that are of  most relevance. The role of  uncertainty is contingent 
upon the realisation on the part of  relevant actors in the policy process that help from 
outside established channels might contribute to alleviating the problem.  
The second hypothesis seeks to discern the criteria used by policymakers in selecting the 
advisors to whom they open their office doors; these include factors at the personal level 
that are not part of  a focus on ideational content. These consist of  the properties of  those 
“vectors”, such as institutionalised prestige and specialised knowledge. The second 
hypothesis delves beyond experts’ attributes into ideational content, positing that academics 
must possess the ability to generate inputs reflecting two qualities: the immediate 
applicability of  a proposal to a policy problem, including the generation of  alternative 
courses of  action; and a normatively inspired argument in favour of  one of  these options.  
This distinction marks not only the move from attributes to action, but that of  the basis 
for the judgment of  experts’ merits from the scientific domain to the specific requirements 
of  the policy domain. The final hypothesis engages the notion that policymakers only 
follow the advice they are predisposed to hear. This claim focuses squarely only on the 
ideational content of  experts’ contributions, contending that these must resonate with the 
normative convictions of  the target bureaucracy, at both the higher-order worldview level 
and that of  punctual questions of  parochial concern in bureaucratic politics. The 
determinants here include an expert’s stance with regard to the policy status quo, and 
consensus both within academe and between academe and the policy establishment. Taken 
as a whole, these hypotheses form an argument offering powerful insights into the keys to 
influence for security academics in policy formulation.  
 
2.2.1. Hypothesis one: the precondition of  uncertainty 
Outside advisors will not gain access to the policy process unless 
policymakers are uncertain that present policies are responding 
adequately to the events they are intended to deal with, and realise that 
help is necessary from outside the established channels of  the policy 
process. 
 
Policy processes are generally closed environments, functioning according to established 
procedures in an atmosphere of  “if  it isn’t broken, don’t fix it”. Decisionmakers will not 
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turn to actors external to the policy process for inputs unless their established modi operandi 
somehow cease to produce adequate policy options and outcomes. In this sense, in order to 
situate the study of  the variables governing academics’ role and influence within the policy 
process, that process must first be opened; in the case of  the present argument this is done 
by means of  the precondition, strongly grounded in the relevant theories of  policy 
formulation, of  uncertainty.  
Uncertainty designates the state of  flux in perceptions where structural determinants 
have undergone a sufficient amount of  change that they no longer serve as a satisfactory 
basis for the derivation of  policy responses to a given threat environment. In this situation, 
ideational factors function as a complement to the structural determinants of  policy, 
working in a mutually constitutive fashion to adapt perceptions and responses to new 
environments.  
Where structural factors continue unabated to produce viable policy options, ideational 
factors’ effects will be limited; once structural determinants fail, however, ideas can exercise 
very strong influence, and it is in this type of  situation that the role of  experts can be 
investigated. In this sense, the project’s treatment of  uncertainty as a necessary condition 
for proceeding to the second and third claims should be viewed as a theoretical assumption, 
in lieu of  serving as a fully independent claim to be falsified as is the case with the 
remaining two sets of  hypotheses.  
Structuring the claims in terms of  this precondition also serves the purpose of  initiating 
the argument’s progression from structural to ideational factors. Doing so provides a 
framework outlining the project’s conception of  the interaction between structural and 
ideational determinants, as well as situating its main agentive concern within a structural 
framework. Much of  the literature on policy relevance, as has been shown above, is situated 
in the interstices of  literature possessing a strong rationalist viewpoint; in systematising 
these claims, rather than theorising the academic-practitioner relationship ex nihilo, the 
argument’s theoretical foundations necessarily retain a degree of  attention to structure and 
its relationship to the ideational factors whose investigation constitutes the project’s main 
contribution. The following exposition will demonstrate how this assumption is borne out 
in the relevant literature, and each case study in turn provides evidence of  its relevance.  
The formulation of  security policy is almost always an ongoing process of  adaptation to 
new stimuli emanating from the three sources listed here; as such, it can be said that change 
is occurring permanently. This explains why uncertainty is treated more as a localizing 
precondition than as a proposition to be tested; control cases in which change does not 
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occur and there is no uncertainty are exceptionally rare, and policy adaptation in the 
absence of  uncertainty is even less likely to occur. The project’s analysis concerns the 
origins of  change in state security policy, and thus must by necessity concern itself  with 
cases in which change has taken place or perceptions are in transition; the uncertainty 
precondition provides a representative rationale for that selection.  
Nevertheless, change at the domestic and international levels, and the ensuing 
uncertainty, are a necessary catalyst for the opening of  the policy process. The theoretical 
grounding for this assumption is sound, and is provided below. Further, each case provides 
evidence giving an empirical illustration of  uncertainty’s important role in paving the way 
for outside actors to participate in processes of  policy formulation.  
 
The one-way street 
The road to influence is a one-way street; the institutional structure of  most policy 
processes vests the power to open them solely with the decisionmaker himself. Until such a 
time as policymakers proactively come to the realisation that a new response is 
indispensable and outside input needed, the doors to their offices will remain closed to 
academics and other outsiders. This is not to say that once the process has been opened, 
the interests and values of  policymakers and experts are not mutually constitutive; however, 
it is the bureaucrat who has the power to initiate the interaction. Potential experts can do 
very little to break down this barrier, both in terms of  punctual efforts and with respect to 
gearing their academic efforts over the long term to what they perceive to be policymakers’ 
needs. Guy Benveniste uses a Machiavellian metaphor to make this point: 
[t]o be sure, the doors to the Prince’s office are not always open. … He may call on the experts because 
the conventional wisdom is not working and a radical new approach is needed; but he hides his own 
boldness until he is proven right. His own time pressures legitimate his aloofness, and his doors will 
certainly be closed if  the experts acquire an exaggerated opinion of  their own influence.138  
Jeffrey Checkel’s study of  Soviet foreign policy experts under Brezhnev and Gorbachev 
revealed that “[t]hey were nonactors in the policy process until the political elites granted 
them access”139. In his contribution to the International Organization volume on epistemic 
communities, Emanuel Adler describes, in the case of  the arms control community, the 
motivations and criteria of  policymakers for opening the decisionmaking process: 
[t]he policymaker, in principle at least, served as judge, jury, and, if  necessary, executioner over the 
professional output of  strategic theories. … It was not necessarily the best-fitted ideas that were selected 
and turned into policies, however, but those which best fit the interests of  policymakers and which passed 
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the test of  domestic politics. … The key was not only inventing new concepts but raising them to new 
heights of  public awareness.140 
 
Uncertainty and its remedy: theoretical approaches 
The condition which militates for the opening of  the policy process in this way is 
uncertainty141: the dual realisation that current policy no longer responds properly to the 
stimuli with which it is intended to deal coupled with a sensation that this will not change—
and adequate policy be made—if  current procedures are followed unchanged and not 
supplemented with inputs from outside the policy process. The latter may come 
immediately following the realisation of  the failure of  current policy, or it may come only 
after other alternatives originating within the policy process have been exhausted. What 
occurs during one of  these “policy windows” is in fact a two-step process:  
[t]his task requires an appropriate conceptualization of  ideational change. As opposed to a single 
phenomenon, such change involves two distinct analytical changes (which in practice are often difficult to 
disentangle). First societal actors must somehow concur, explicitly or tacitly, that the old ideational 
structure is inadequate thus causing its collapse. Second, actors must consolidate some new replacement 
set of  ideas, lest they return to the old simply as a default mechanism. Both of  these steps are challenged 
by collective ideation problems that make coordination difficult and/or give individuals incentives to shirk 
efforts to challenge dominant beliefs. At a basic level, collective ideational change is constituted by a shift 
in the ideas of  individuals and some process by which individual notions aggregate to form a new 
dominant social idea.142  
Policymakers will seek to reduce this uncertainty by means of  obtaining information 
that will reduce their lack of  knowledge on a given issue143. Uncertainty should not be 
confused, however, with ambiguity, which cannot be resolved directly with additional 
information, being brought about by the essentially contested nature of  an issue or 
concept—such as the definition of  the analytical concept of  security as opposed to 
concrete policy options for state security policy.  
In Martha Feldman’s usage, uncertainty describes a condition possible under the 
positivist paradigm, whereas ambiguity calls for normatively-laced inputs from experts that 
go beyond sheer data. Successful experts’ inputs, as the second hypothesis will show, must 
evince both of  these elements, and can thus be said to respond to both types of  condition. 
Feldman highlights the distinction: 
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[u]ncertainty can be resolved by obtaining certain specific pieces of  information. These pieces of  
information may be very expensive, or they may not even exist. … However, when the information is 
available, the uncertainty can be resolved. … 
Ambiguity, by contrast, cannot be resolved simply by gathering information. Ambiguity is the state of  
having many ways of  thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena. Thus, more information is 
not directly relevant to resolving ambiguity.144  
Uncertainty has at least three possible origins: changes in the international environment, 
leading to changes in foreign and defence policy preferences as a result; changes in the 
domestic political arena, leading to a re-ordering of  preferences while external stimuli 
remain the same; and finally changes in the policymaking capacity of  a security policy 
bureaucracy that render it unable to respond adequately to dynamic events at either level. 
This division into levels reflects the relationship between the structural or material and 
ideational determinants of  policy outcomes. Generally speaking, structural determinants 
originate at the international level and their ideational counterparts in the domestic arena. 
Florian Znaniecki presented an early formulation of  the dichotomy of  the international 
and domestic levels: 
[d]ifficulties appear only when the persons performing certain functions become aware that they are 
facing a kind of  situation which they do not know how to define because it does not fit into any familiar 
pattern. This awareness may come in two ways. Either the conditions under which occupational functions 
are performed undergo unexpectedly an important change, or else new ways of  defining situations with 
new standards of  success and failure in solving practical problems are introduced into the community in 
consequence of  cultural contacts with other communities or individual innovation.145 
 
Uncertainty of  international (structural) origin 
At the international level, the increasing complexity of  security threats, and their 
interconnectedness, create sufficient uncertainty to open the process: 
[t]he impact of  social science knowledge and professional ideas depends on several factors, the most 
important of  which is uncertainty within government. The complexity of  modern policy problems has 
increased the uncertainties of  policy-makers generally and steadily expanded the role of  professionals. 
The professionals’ influence is greatest when problems have been ignored, when they seem new and 
undefined, when existing approaches no longer seem adequate.146  
In his introduction to the International Organization epistemic communities volume, Peter 
Haas discusses the linkage of  issue complexity, uncertainty and the openness of  the 
policymaking process: 
[c]omplexity tests the limits of  human understanding. Although knowledge may be better than it was in 
the past about the dynamics of  any of  the individual issues, the nature of  the interactions between them 
is particularly difficult to grasp and deal with effectively in the policymaking process. …  
Similarly, in the case of  international environmental issues, decision makers are seldom certain of  the 
complex interplay of  components of  the ecosystem and are therefore unable to anticipate the long-term 
consequences of  measures designed to address one of  the many environmental issues under current 
consideration.147 
Checkel offers a succinct summary of  this argument: 
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[u]nder conditions of  high international uncertainty or foreign policy crisis, decision makers engage in an 
information search and are thus more receptive to new ideas. Their foreign policy preferences, in other 
words, are in flux. 
Conditions of  high international uncertainty or foreign policy crisis create policy windows. These 
windows link the international and domestic environments and motivate advocates of  new ideas to 
promote them.148  
 
Uncertainty of  domestic (ideational) origin 
The international and domestic levels, and thus the structural and ideational 
determinants of  policy as sources of  uncertainty-inducing events, are closely 
interconnected. Checkel illustrates how this is so: 
[i]n the foreign policy arena, policy windows create a crucial link between the domestic and international 
settings. In particular, for entrepreneurs addressing questions of  foreign and national-security policy, 
external threats to the state and their removal or other changes in the international environment help 
form such a window. How wide it opens, however, is a function of  the second factor: a political 
leadership willing to consider the new ideas purveyed by these individuals.149 
Goldstein and Keohane point out that expectations under uncertainty depend on both 
structural factors (in this case, institutional arrangements) and causal beliefs (an ideational 
factor)150; a focus on the international level highlights structural sources of  change and 
uncertainty, while at the domestic level, these are likely to derive from ideational factors. In 
this model, however, it is only when structural determinants change that ideas follow suit. 
Checkel sums this situation up into the notion of  a “policy window”: 
[s]tandard realist theories take elite preferences and state interests as a given. Of  course, realists do admit 
that preferences change—but only as a function of  changing international structure. Elites modify their 
preferences in a rational way to accord with new structural realities; decision makers are above the fray of  
domestic politics. … 
To black-box this response with assumptions of  rationality and unitary state actors, as realists do, 
however, is to obscure the various domestic level factors at work. Rather, a changing international 
environment creates windows of  opportunity by fostering a sense of  crisis or uncertainty among elites or 
undermining previous policies and views. Put another way, the international setting can open policy 
windows that allow decision makers to engage in an information search as they define preferences and 
state interests; decision makers will be in the market for new ideas.151  
In a review of  the literature on ideational factors in economic policy, John Kurt 
Jacobsen clarifies the contention that ideas leap into the breach when structural 
determinants of  policy preferences fail; the notion of  uncertainty is, in a certain sense, a 
shorthand for this occurrence. In referring to the authors of  influential volumes on “ideas 
and foreign policy”152 and epistemic communities, Jacobsen summarises that 
[t]he authors reviewed here turn to ideas to explain choices, especially those made under conditions of  
uncertainty and within margins set by material constraints. Indeed, the influence of  ideas is posited to 
vary with the degree of  uncertainty that actors encounter in a policy realm; that is, the greater the 
uncertainty, the more influential is the role of  ideas. While rejecting the suggestion that ideas alone can 
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create interests, the authors do argue that material constraints are subject to the ideas that actors have 
about them.153 
As the importance of  ideas to a given policy process increases, so does that of  their 
individual bearers. Academic advisors represent one such type of  bearer; this is one channel 
by which conditions of  uncertainty open the door for academics to provide policy advice. 
However, ideational change at the domestic level can take place without a stimulus from 
international structure. A shift in the norms underlying policymaking can occur, for 
example, due to the arrival of  a new government, or a realignment in the balance of  
influence between political factions within a country. The policy goals of  these factions 
may vary due to the ideas they hold, regardless of  the international environment they face.  
This is often the case at the end of  an ideological regime such as Marxism or, for 
example, minority rule in South Africa. In the case of  South Africa in 1994, Pretoria’s 
choice to desist from destabilisation efforts and to end certain weapons programmes is in 
fact an example of  international (structural) change being initiated at the domestic, 
ideational level. The end of  ideology, however, left the country without a policy elite with 
the capacity to develop normatively acceptable policy options; the incumbent government’s 
values were discredited, and the incoming rulers possessed no experience in international 
strategic questions, especially since much of  their prior choices had been based on a now 
equally problematic Marxist ideology.  
 
Policy capacity: recognising the need for help 
Once the realisation has been made that current policy is inadequate, there remains the 
second step of  ascribing this inadequacy to a particular source. If  the source is not 
identified as an insufficient capacity to create policy options, the process will remain closed. 
Returning to Legro’s two-stage model, a policymaker must not only realise that current 
policy is inadequate, he must also realise the value of  outside help in solving his problem 
and proactively go outside the bureaucracy to seek it out. Checkel states that  
[e]ntrepreneurs can be clever, persistent, and politically well connected, and they can offer solutions to 
many problems. But their goal of  changing the direction and flow of  politics will be extraordinarily 
difficult unless elites in positions of  political power also recognize that such problems exist.154  
Znaniecki pinpoints this first step: 
[e]ventually, they come to realize the inadequacy of  their technical knowledge and seek enlightenment 
from someone with superior knowledge. The alternative—to confess the inefficiency of  their practical 
skill—is both objectively and subjectively unsatisfactory. For their difficulty is that they do not know what 
ought to be done: once they learn this, they presume that they will be able to do it. And we find that 
confession of  ignorance comes apparently much more easily to practical people and seems less 
humiliating to them than confession of  incapacity.155  
                                                 
153 Jacobsen, p. 293.  
154 Checkel, p. 10. 
155 Znaniecki, pp. 32-33.  
 53
However, the second step—the recognition by a policymaker that this situation can be 
alleviated with outside help—does not always flow automatically from the first, and 
oftentimes a more acute stimulus, in the form of  a specific international or domestic event, 
is necessary to precipitate the opening of  the policy process to new ideas156:  
[d]ecision makers do not always recognize that their understanding of  complex issues and linkages is 
limited, and it often takes a crisis or shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur them to 
seek help from an epistemic community. …  
The concept of  uncertainty is thus important in our analysis for two reasons. First, in the face of  
uncertainty, and more so in the wake of  a shock or crisis, many of  the conditions facilitating a focus on 
power are absent. … And, second, poorly understood conditions may create enough turbulence that 
established operating procedures may break down, making institutions unworkable. … 
Under conditions of  uncertainty, then, decision makers have a variety of  incentives and reasons for 
consulting epistemic communities.157  
This means that the policymaker must also be able to communicate to outside advisors 
just what her needs are. Bureaucrats’ inability to do this is a frequent obstacle to the 
solicitation of  clearly useful inputs from outside the establishment158. Further, they must be 
able to identify not only what they need from the pool of  academic experts at their 
disposal, but also from which individual experts the desired information is most likely to 
come. There are certain attributes these experts possess which increase their likelihood of  
being asked to contribute to the policy process under conditions of  uncertainty.  
 
2.2.2. Hypothesis two: experts’ necessary attributes 
Outside actors’ likelihood of  being included in the policy process 
increases relatively with their possession of  two necessary attributes—
specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige—as well as on their 
ability to present this information in a brief  and cogent form which 
includes some element of  normative reasoning. 
 
Once the policy process has been opened to participants from outside the established 
policy bureaucracy, a selection process begins at the end of  which only those actors who 
possess certain attributes gain access to decisionmaking. These attributes vary in 
accordance with the basis on which members of  various groups are chosen. In the case of  
academics, these attributes include specialised knowledge, institutionalised prestige, and the 
presentation of  their inputs in a form immediately recognisable to policymakers as targeted 
to the solution of  a given policy problem. Further, these inputs must contain some element 
of  normative argumentation, most often in the form of  a value-based preference for one 
among a set of  options arrived at using an ostensibly value-neutral scientific approach.  
                                                 
156 Peter deLeon illustrates the influence of external stimuli—in the form of events on the international scene—in 
bringing about this type of questioning of extant paradigms in “Political events and the policy sciences”. In Wagner, 
Peter, Carol Hirschon Weiss, Björn Wittrock and Helmut Wollmann, eds. Social Sciences and Modern States: National 
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157 Haas, “Introduction”, pp. 14-15.  
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The possession of  specialised knowledge and particularly of  institutionalised prestige is 
what places analysts on policymakers’ proverbial “radar screen” in the first place. 
Specialised knowledge consists of  two subtypes: practical and theoretical. Theoretical 
specialised knowledge is typically higher-order and more abstract and normatively oriented, 
while practical specialised knowledge is more technical and concrete in nature; the latter 
best describes the typical scientific policy input envisaged by the positivist paradigm.  
Because the policy process is the locus of  aggregation of  political interests and 
normative values, there will always be some element of  advocacy to the position taken by 
an actor, whether from within or outside the bureaucracy. What remains specific to 
academic experts is that their access to the policy process is facilitated by their possession 
of  specialised knowledge derived in accordance with scientific methods of  enquiry. Several 
bodies of  literature provide insight into the different types of  input academic actors 
provide at given moments in the policy process.  
In the policy sciences volume Social Sciences and Modern States, Carol Hirschon Weiss 
recalls the historical development of  three forms of  input policy research was seen as 
providing to the decisionmaking process: data, ideas and arguments. These forms of  input 
clearly echo the progression over time of  approaches within policy science away from 
rationalism and positivism and towards more ideationalist and self-conscious approaches. 
Weiss’ three forms of  input allow for conclusions about the validity of  various paradigms, 
and the types of  variables—structural or ideational—on which they focus.  
In the case of  the first type of  input, in accordance with the positivist paradigm and its 
belief  in the intrinsic value of  scientifically produced knowledge, research is provided as 
pure data, such as on, for example, statistical measurements of  the targets and effects of  
specific government programmes. The success of  this type of  input relies on policymakers’ 
ability to recognise the utility of  this form of  input without the need for its providers to 
argue on its behalf  either normatively or on scientific grounds159.  
Research presented as ideas—the second of  Weiss’ three types of  input—reduces the 
scientificity of  inputs to a considerably more general level and provides generalizations that 
contribute to the general climate in which policymakers take decisions. According to Weiss,  
[w]hat we found… was that… [p]olicy makers were not so much using items of  quantitative or qualitative 
data or sets of  findings as they were influenced by the generalizations that the data yielded.  
What distinguishes policy research as ideas is that most of  the paraphernalia of  research has been 
stripped away. Specifics of  research methodology are lost. Policy makers and their aides have no inkling 
of  the nature of  the sample, the number of  cases, the content of  whatever interventions there may have 
been, the specific questions asked, how the data were processed and analysed, the quality of  the study as 
                                                 
159 Weiss, Carol Hirschon. “Policy research: data, ideas, or arguments?”. In Wagner et al., Social Sciences and Modern States, 
pp. 307-332 (hereafter, “Policy research”). Here, pp. 309-311 on policy research as data.  
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research… The more telling characteristic of  research as ideas is that the actual findings of  the study have 
disappeared as well.160  
Weiss’ final category of  inputs posits policy research presented as arguments within the 
decisionmaking process itself. As will be underlined in the appropriate section below, this 
form of  input, with its focus on ideas and embrace of  a conscious advocacy position, is of  
the most salience to this investigation. The contribution of  this category—to the already 
scientifically “diluted” “ideas” category of  research—is an element of  normative 
argumentation adapted to the necessities of  the decisionmaking process: 
[w]hat has been added is an advocacy position. When this happens, not only are some of  the data lost, as 
with research as ideas, but the data are selectively lost. … 
Rather, research as arguments starts with a set of  values (whether the researcher’s, the client’s, or the 
employer’s) and considers options only within that ideological range. … But some set of  values 
undergirds all research, and whether one views a study as starting from fair or biased premises often 
depends more on whether one agrees with the embedded values than with the characteristics of  the study 
itself. Research that is reported as an argument in support of  a particular conclusion has major advantages 
for busy decision makers. (1) It saves them time and work. They do not have to figure out the 
implications of  the research; research as argument explains the implications of  the research findings in 
easily understood terms. (2) The argument relates the research explicitly to the issue at hand. It says: 
because of  information a, b, and c, change article 4 (a) to read such-and-such. Such a concreteness is 
inherently engaging. The argument starts with the immediate concern of  the policymaker and brings 
research in as warrant. (3) The integration of  argument and evidence makes a tidy package for use in 
bureaucratic or legislative negotiations. Pre-existing supporters can use the package in debate and 
bargaining.161 
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s categorisation of  the three forms ideas take as 
factors influencing policy processes follows a similar progression from the material to the 
ideational. In the introduction to their edited volume on the influence of  ideas on foreign 
policy, they posit that ideas can take three forms: at the higher-order end, world views; 
principled beliefs at a less abstract level, and finally causal beliefs. World views are 
“conceptions of  possibility… embedded in the symbolism of  a culture [which] deeply 
affect modes of  thought and discourse”162. Examples include religions and the concept of  
territorially-based sovereignty underlying the Westphalian system of  states.  
Principled beliefs “[consist] of  normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing 
right from wrong and just from unjust”163. Examples here include normative condemnation 
of  slavery and abortion. Causal beliefs, upon which much of  the (often rationalistically 
inclined) literature surrounding the role of  academics and other policy advisors—such as 
that on epistemic communities—centres, are “beliefs about cause-effect relationships which 
derive authority from the shared consensus of  recognized elites, whether they be village 
elders or scientists at elite institutions”164.  
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In describing the nature of  policy research presented as arguments, Weiss touches upon 
an important element required for policy inputs to gain an audience from policymakers and 
achieve success in the policy process: cogency. Experts’ contributions to the policy process 
must exhibit immediate relevance to a given bounded policy problem, whether early in the 
process in aid to threat identification, or later on during internal bureaucratic bargaining 
over preferred courses of  action.  
A useful input, as Weiss highlights, must contain an element of  normative 
argumentation—an advocacy position—in order to gain the greatest possible utility. In 
these cases, ideas submitted by their academic carriers often go beyond causal reasoning to 
include some element of  principled beliefs. The general normative conditions surrounding 
the selection process are largely dictated by shared worldviews among policymakers and 
advisors, as assuring this concordance is one of  the earliest tacit steps in the process of  
vetting potential contributors. What places academic advisors on policymakers’ radar screen 
at first, however, is their specialised knowledge, coupled at a later—though often virtually 
simultaneous—stage with their institutionalised prestige.  
 
2.2.2.1. Specialised knowledge 
Specialised knowledge consists of  information, either factual or theoretical, of  a 
bounded field of  inquiry, generated by an exclusive group of  experts in accordance with 
institutionalised criteria of  validity. Its power comes from its exclusiveness and its 
legitimacy from commonly shared criteria of  validity among mutually recognised experts. 
Znaniecki illustrates in a general statement how specialised knowledge can be both practical 
and theoretical, defining the knowledge experts provide leaders as “reliable knowledge 
about some specific and as yet insufficiently known data pertaining to the total practical 
situation or about the effects of  some new processes anticipated but untried”165.  
Checkel places this specialised knowledge in direct relation to its utility in the policy 
process: 
[w]hat resources and conditions allow such individuals to change the flow of  politics? The literature 
suggests that successful entrepreneurs possess one or more of  the following: expertise and knowledge in 
their given field; substantial negotiating skills; persistence; connections to relevant political actors. … 
Are there problems whose resolution would be assisted by the implementation of  the entrepreneur’s 
ideas? Are there leaders in power who recognize that such problems exist? Taken together, these two 
factors create an opportunity—a policy window—for the aspiring entrepreneur to sell a particular idea, 
intellectual outlook, or policy.166 
The two main distinguishing facets of  specialised knowledge—as sought by 
policymakers—are that it is exclusive enough not to be commonly possessed by outsiders 
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to a community of  experts (such as policymakers), and that this community of  experts 
possess institutionalised criteria for its validity that render it consistently reliable. These 
criteria are summed up by Peter Haas and included as two of  the four non-normative 
elements defining an epistemic community: 
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of  practices leading or contributing to a central 
set of  problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; [and] shared notions of  validity—that is, 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of  their 
expertise167.  
For John W. Kingdon, such expertise constitutes the only claim to being heard in the 
policy process that does not derive from either legally enshrined competence or the 
democratic imperative168. Since the criteria of  validity which ensure the reliability of  
specialised knowledge within the confines of  a given domain apply only to that domain, 
expert status—and its associated authority—apply only to issues directly related to that area 
of  expertise169.  
In the case of  academics, the shared criteria for validity are those established within 
disciplines. In the case of  security policy, the attendant subfield is security studies, as 
delimited intellectually by general agreement within that field. For our purposes, this group 
of  experts is taken to include all those whose work touches upon matters that fall under 
security policy as defined by states in declaratory documents, that is to say, the subfields 
variously known as security studies, strategic studies, defence studies, military science, 
foreign policy analysis (under certain circumstances) and peace studies.  
Specialised knowledge comes in many forms, and can, among other categorisations, be 
divided into two types, using the criterion outlined above of  its balance of  scientific and 
normative elements of  argumentation. In accordance with the previous chapter’s 
discussion, “scientific” in this context is taken to mean “arrived at in adherence to the 
paradigms of  science”. As has been made clear, this form of  knowledge cannot but carry 
some degree of  normative content; this is not, however, the explicit criterion for its 
inclusion in the policy process.  
Rather it is sought after for the authoritativeness granted its claims because of  its 
scientific source. “Normative” elements are those explicitly brought into the argumentation 
for the purposes of  pursuing a declared value or associated policy goal. Both practical and 
theoretical specialised knowledge will thus contain some degree of  normative motivation, 
though it is understood that the degree of  explicitness of  value-orientation is less in the 
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case of  practical knowledge. Some element of  either, or sufficient combination of  both 
forms of  specialised knowledge, is necessary for academics to gain access to the policy 
process.  
The following two subsections will define each type of  specialised knowledge before 
going on to relate it to those academic domains in which scholars pursue research related to 
matters of  security policy, and then discussing how such knowledge is acquired and 
maintained. 
 
 2.2.2.1.1. Practical specialised knowledge 
Practical specialised knowledge consists of  the type of  information related to the 
occupational expertise of  those charged with implementing policy in a given domain. It is 
largely atheoretical—as the moniker implies—and related to the everyday practice of  
making and implementing policy. In addition, it shadows the form of  input characterised by 
Weiss as “policy research as data”. It includes familiarity with the tools of  policy and the 
options at its disposal for implementation as well as bureaucratic démarches.  
Practical specialised knowledge thus consists of  two major components, one already 
possessed by the policymaker and one for which he might turn to academics for its 
provision. Policymakers are unlikely to need to turn to outside experts for advice on how to 
guide an issue through the policy process or on which concrete options exist for 
implementation. They may, however, not possess data concerning the postures or material 
strength of  other states or the impact of  certain policy options on given geographical areas 
or population groups. Znaniecki likens this form of  knowledge, which he labels technical, 
to the expertise inherent to early vocations: 
[w]e call the first kind of  knowledge technical because it is the background and condition for a successful 
application of  the skill required for the performance of  occupational functions. A hunter is supposed to 
know everything necessary to catch game, everything concerning the wild animals, the implements used in 
hunting, and the natural factors (including magical forces) which may affect his activity. An Indian 
woman’s domestic skills presuppose a considerable complex of  information about the plants she collects, 
the properties of  the materials and instruments used in cooking, sewing, spinning, weaving, pottery, tent-
making and so on. … 
This technical knowledge has a distinctly pragmatic character. The test of  its validity is its practical 
application.170 
This type of  knowledge relates to the elaboration of  concrete options for policy rather 
than the larger worldviews which frame the world of  possible alternatives, which are the 
stuff  of  theoretical specialised knowledge. In the case of  security academics, practical 
specialised knowledge is of  the type more likely to be held by members of  the subfields of  
military science and strategic studies. It includes precedents in military and diplomatic 
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history not known to policymakers, knowledge of  other states’ force strengths and 
postures, familiarity with specific weapons systems and military units, as well as diplomatic 
and military strategy and particularly tactics171. Other forms of  practical specialised 
knowledge include scientific data such as game-theoretical models of  conflict outcomes 
and punctual advice regarding parochial preferences and personalities within the 
bureaucracy.  
Academics’ ability to amass and maintain updated practical specialised knowledge is 
highly dependent upon the degree to which societal and political factors allow this type of  
information to circulate to them from where it originates. Some of  the forms of  data and 
knowledge outlined above originate within the armed forces and the policy apparatus (such 
as weapons systems, force posture and bureaucratic politics) and therefore are subject to 
the information policy set by those organs.  
In each case, the practical specialised knowledge under scrutiny includes knowledge of  
potential enemies’ ideology and force posture, as well as close knowledge of  the capacities 
and characteristics of  an expert’s home country’s military establishment and the political 
priorities of  the decisionmaking process. Since much of  the relevant information here 
originates within a given country’s military establishment, academics’ practical specialised 
knowledge often concerns how neighbouring states’ military capacity—of  which 
policymakers might have less knowledge—contributes to a potential threat scenario.  
The degree to which the state monopolises this information determines both whether 
policymakers will need to turn outside the policy process for it and the degree to which, 
once they do, experts will be able to provide useful and original inputs. Due to their 
inability to claim exclusive possession of  this category of  knowledge, and the irrelevance of  
professional criteria to its validity, experts are more likely to be called upon to provide 
theoretical specialised knowledge, in whose production they are themselves involved and 
whose circulation depends upon them.  
 
 2.2.2.1.2. Theoretical specialised knowledge 
Theoretical specialised knowledge is removed from the everyday practice of  
policymaking. It is less context-dependent and consists of  concepts and ideas rather 
than technical data or practical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is more densely 
infused with explicit normative suppositions than is its practical counterpart, and seeks 
to generalise and remove from a given context the conclusions it draws, in the interest 
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of  greater applicability and parsimony. It draws its epistemic authority from its 
applicability and predictive capacity, as well as from the exclusivity conferred by its 
origins within a closed community of  experts. 
These concepts frame the set of  possible courses of  action within which 
policymakers conceive of  possible options. It consists of  inputs that Weiss characterised 
above as “research as ideas”. In the parlance established by Goldstein and Keohane, 
these theories are based upon causal beliefs, derived from shared approaches among a 
given body of  experts.  
Rather than focussing on one issue, the concepts that make up theoretical knowledge 
are higher-order and serve to link issues and to provide an image of  the entirety of  the 
policy environment172. Similarly, their focus is more on the long-term implications of  a 
given policy alternative than on the short-term, which poses problems for their 
perceived usefulness to harried policymakers who have a number of  short-term 
problems to deal with at once.  
Theoretical specialised knowledge has its origins in the scholarly debates over theory 
within academic disciplines. Thus, in the case of  theories which touch upon matters 
relevant to security policy, it originates in the theory-building work done by experts in 
security studies and peace studies, and in some cases generalists in International 
Relations. Policymakers rarely have the time or the inclination to follow these debates173. 
This underscores the exclusivity of  theoretical specialised knowledge; the onus, however, 
is on the academic to bring it into the policymaker and to highlight those areas in which 
it evinces practical utility to a given policy problem.  
Joseph Lepgold highlights five ways in which the further development of  
International Relations theory would be beneficial to those involved in decisionmaking, 
thus illustrating what theoretical specialised knowledge can bring to the policy process: 
[f]irst, a better awareness of  the theoretical and empirical assumptions in different intellectual traditions 
and perspectives can help officials see how actors frame issues and define strategic situations. This would 
clarify the terms of  some policy debates and, to the extent that one’s own preferred strategy depends on 
another’s definition of  the situation, such clarity would help policy makers deal with other actors.  
Second, arguments that clearly specify prevailing empirical conditions can help officials identify the 
strategic situations they face… 
Third, once policy makers understand the strategic context and the assumptions of  other actors, more 
precisely specified theories can help them assess the possible utility of  different policy goals. … 
Fourth, given a particular set of  preferences over outcomes and a clearer understanding of  the strategic 
situation, more precisely specified theories can help officials make better strategic choices. … 
Having made these judgments, policy makers can then take a second step. They can use more precise 
theoretical and empirical assumptions to identify the risks of  alternative strategies. … 
Fifth, well specified theories can help officials and policy analysts interpret facts and decide which data are 
important to track.174  
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The prime example of  theoretical specialised knowledge within security studies is the 
content of  the debate over the definition of  the operational concept of  the discipline 
itself: security. Of  primary interest here are contributions which favour the abstract 
treatment of  the conceptual nature of  the concept of  security rather than its operational 
implications175. The extent to which the denizens of  a discipline or sub-field can develop 
theoretical specialised knowledge depends on the degree of  theoreticisation of  that 
field: the extent to which its body of  knowledge distances itself  from immediately 
intuitive conclusions related to practical concerns.  
As this debate has matured, theory-building in the field has increased and its 
members have been able to engage with policymakers on the basis of  a claim to ever-
increasing theoretical specialised knowledge. Theory-building within a field not only 
facilitates the development of  theoretical specialised knowledge within security studies, 
it is further an important component of  one aspect of  the second necessary attribute of  
the successfully influential academic advisor: institutionalised prestige.  
 
2.2.2.2. Institutionalised prestige 
The criterion of  specialised knowledge allows policymakers to identify pools of  experts 
to whom they can turn for policy inputs. The institutionalised prestige of  these groups, 
relative to one other and to other possible sources of  input, as well as the prestige of  
individual experts within each of  these communities, further narrows the field to those who 
will in the end be called upon for assistance. The institutionalised prestige of  individual 
academics depends on two factors: the relative reputation and prestige of  the discipline to 
which they belong, and their own prestige and reputation within that community of  
experts.  
The prestige of  an academic discipline depends on two main factors: its degree of  
institutionalisation, and the degree to which consensus has been reached among its 
members on its fundamental investigative concepts and questions. Individual prestige 
within a discipline depends on several variables, including an academic’s professional 
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success, in accordance with the reward structures of  academe, such as promotion and 
publication; her reputation among her peers; and the reputation of  the institution to which 
she is associated. 
 
 2.2.2.2.1. Prestige of  advisor’s discipline 
The prestige of  a given academic discipline depends on institutionalisation and 
consensus. The epistemic status of  an academic discipline is affected by the degree of  
institutionalisation both of  the discipline itself  within the university, and of  universities 
themselves as agents in civil society. Two main factors contribute to the institutionalisation 
of  an academic discipline: its attaining a sufficient level of  theoretical sophistication, and, 
simply, the passage of  time. The history of  disciplinisation within the university is one of  
the continued splintering of  disciplines as new foci of  study have emerged. Medieval 
universities began with three disciplines: Theology, Medicine and Law. Philosophy, Letters 
and (Natural) Sciences were added over time. The vast majority of  modern-day disciplines 
are in one form or another subsets of  these original faculties. The social sciences 
themselves are a relatively recent evolution, and within social science itself, some disciplines 
are distinctly more established—chronologically—than others. Weiss is succinct in her 
claim that “[r]esearchers are affected by the state of  their science; its maturity in theory, 
knowledge, and method sets limits on the authoritativeness of  their research”176.  
Recently-created disciplines must initially struggle to create epistemic space within the 
university. This is done by the creation of  departments within university faculties, the 
establishment of  programmes of  study at the undergraduate and graduate levels which 
serve to perpetuate the discipline, and the foundation of  professional societies and 
journals177. The passage of  time contributes to this solidification178, but more importance is 
attached to theoretical sophistication. The degree to which researchers within a discipline 
are able to develop theoretical approaches specific to their field of  inquiry, and to define 
clearly the subject of  their professional interest, particularly as it relates to borders with 
other disciplines’ scientific preoccupations, legitimises their enterprise179. The degree to 
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which scholars in International Relations and security studies are recognised as experts 
depends on their ability to achieve epistemic space in this way within a national context.  
Theoretical sophistication within a discipline increases through two seemingly 
contradictory processes: the proliferation of  a diversity of  theoretical approaches, and 
consensus within the discipline on the validity of  a selected approach. As pointed out 
above by Fuller, consensus lends credibility to members of  a discipline through its 
indication of  assent by equally reliable peers to the positions taken outside the discipline by 
an expert. Such consensus derives from what Haas describes in his definition of  epistemic 
communities as shared causal beliefs and notions of  validity180. Haas buries in a footnote 
Wolfgang Schluchter’s cogent expression of  the mechanism by which this works: “it is the 
‘trust’ institutionalized in the internal relations between ‘experts’ that communicates to 
outsiders faith in the value of  specialized knowledge”181. 
Guy Benveniste links the need for consensus to its role in reassuring policymakers that 
there is agreement on how their uncertainty is to be reduced: “Experts are aware that they 
cannot disagree among themselves if  they want the Prince and others to listen. Uncertainty 
is not reduced and the multiplier effect does not emerge spontaneously”182. Rose attributes 
the need for consensus to governments’ need for clear answers and for a criterion for 
selection among a large number of  possible disciplinary sources of  advice: 
[t]he normal model of  a scientific discipline presupposes a clear consensus about what professionally 
qualified practitioners should do and an understanding applicable to real-world phenomena. … 
Professionals applying themselves to clearly agreed goals, but without the ability to achieve these ends, 
often enjoy support for their efforts. … 
Professional scientists who disagree about the objectives of  their work and about the technology 
appropriate for undertaking it may have their status as scientists challenged. … 
In a governmental context, the important point that follows from the foregoing distinctions can be 
expressed in terms of  the following hypothesis: Government will make use of  professionals insofar as they 
demonstrate consensus about their objectives and/or have a technology to apply their theories to real-world phenomena. … 
[This] explains why governments are unlikely to give employment to many professionals whose objectives 
are in dispute among themselves and whose understanding is suspect.183  
It has been established that consensus within a discipline contributes to its perceived 
utility within the policy process. Does such a consensus exist within International Relations 
and security studies? George contends that policymakers tend to employ a frame of  
reference derived from realist theory184; thus, they perceive that viewpoint as constituting a 
consensus within the field and accord greater attention to adherents of  this view. In the 
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case of  realist theories, William Wallace reminds us, however, that once again the reward 
structures of  academe and policymaking may be working at cross-purposes (as in the 
tension between theoretisation and practical application), observing that  
[t]he establishment of  hegemonic ‘schools’, imposing tests of  orthodoxy for academic appointments, has 
damaged American social sciences, including American political science and International Relations.185  
Belonging to a well-established professionalised field of  study enjoying a high level of  
theoretical sophistication does not suffice, however; this criterion assists policymakers in 
reducing the number of  possible academic advisors; a next step, and a further criterion, are 
required for the final selection of  who receives the access necessary for the provision of  
inputs.  
 
 2.2.2.2.2. Prestige of  advisor within discipline 
This next criterion shifts the focus away from the status of  a discipline within academe 
to the status of  individual academics within it. The criteria for this type of  prestige rather 
naturally mirror the reward structure within academe, adapted mutatis mutandis to the field 
of  inquiry in question. Within the academic reward structure, the emphasis is on 
publication and position, less on the teaching element. Although numerous policymakers 
retain a viewpoint on policy problems gained while engaged in the academic study of  the 
corresponding discipline, this is often supplanted by bureaucratic operating procedures, 
institutional culture and a lack of  time to remain abreast of  developments on the academic 
side of  the field. Institutionalised prestige within a discipline is further influenced by the 
reputation an academic cultivates among her peers, and by the reputation of  the institution 
by which she is employed.  
Several factors lead to career advancement within academe and within a discipline. 
Notably, these include publication in specialised journals with the widest possible audience 
and a reputation for the high quality of  the research that appears on their pages; on 
occasion, contributions to the mainstream press; tenure and promotion in academic rank; 
and membership and office in professional associations. It is assumed that when unable to 
ascertain the qualitative difference between the inputs of  two advisors, a policymaker will 
be influenced in favour of  the one with the higher professional standing.  
The reputation of  an academic among her peers is a further important factor. Once a 
policymaker has been in contact with a sufficient number of  members of  a given expert 
community, there is a certain “snowball effect” taking place on the basis of  word of  
mouth. Policymakers frequently ask experts to give the names of  colleagues who might also 
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contribute useful inputs on a given problem. Once a given name is repeated often enough, 
that academic will be asked to join the advisory process. A reputation for excellence in 
academe naturally is intertwined with normative agreement with those who suggest a given 
colleague; this also helps to ensure the normative resonance called for in the third 
hypothesis below. Further, it promotes the reproduction of  the consensus on causal beliefs 
and validity exposited above.  
Finally, geographical proximity often plays a role here, as it engenders familiarity among 
national-level bureaucrats with institutions located close to the capital. Similarly, positive 
experiences with researchers from an institution reinforce its reputation as a source of  
useful advice. Peer recommendation is an important source of  institutionalised prestige, 
and this effect is enhanced by the fact that colleagues within departments may recommend 
one another more frequently. This determinant is more common in polities in which 
hierarchy and historical reputation are particularly important; this is true of  the importance 
of  prestige as a whole in its relationship to the other factors granting access to the policy 
process, such as specialised knowledge.  
 
2.2.2.3. Cogency of  inputs to policy problems 
The requirement of  cogency marks the progression of  the selection process from the 
characteristics of  the carrier of  an idea to its content, and thus by extension from a 
structural to an agentive preoccupation. Once the policy process has been opened, and 
actors with knowledge and prestige for input, the selection among those inputs can begin. 
The first step in that choice is determined by the cogency of  a given piece of  advice to a 
given policy problem. This requirement underscores the point that it is the policymaker 
who determines who gives inputs and how they are used, and that this is essentially a 
unilateral phenomenon. Only cogent inputs will be considered; that is, those that evince 
immediate and clearly discernable relevance to a policy problem and demonstrably 
contribute to providing options for its solution.  
This relevance is not limited to providing possible solutions to problems already 
identified by policymakers, or alternative courses of  implementing a policy already decided 
upon; it can also include the theoretical framing of  a new situation or environment which 
previously produced uncertainty, so long as the link is immediately visible to policymakers. 
Advisors thus participate not only in the development of  means of  pursuing the national 
interest in changed environments, but also substantively to the formulation and definition 
of  those interests themselves. In addition to intuitive relevance, cogency includes the need 
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for the brief, concise and attractive presentation, be it orally or in writing, of  such an input 
and a reiteration by the academic of  its practical relevance.  
The onus is on the advisor to prove the link between his advice and the problem at 
hand, and to do so quickly and aesthetically. Lindblom and Cohen contend that “social 
scientists do not write attractively”186 while Weiss labels their efforts “turgid”187; and 
although the present text threatens to lead the reader to agree, George is more expansive 
on the specific ways in which this might be true in a policy context: 
[e]ven when the results of  scholarly research are recognized as potentially relevant, they are often under-
used for another reason: not a few policy specialists exposed to the scholarly literature have concluded 
that most university professors seem to write largely for one another and have little inclination or ability 
to communicate their knowledge in terms comprehensible to policymakers. Some practitioners are acutely 
uncomfortable with the unfamiliar and, to them, pretentious jargon with which their activities are 
described, and they are perplexed by the esoteric explanations that are given for their behavior.188 
Several analysts of  the relationship between policymakers and practitioners, originating 
from both communities, have made the point that it is the advisor’s responsibility to 
highlight the relevance of  his work. Weiss emphasises that  
[p]olicymakers tend to be in a hurry. They want action immediately and tend to ignore long-term aspects 
of  policy issues. They are impatient with research that attempts to explain cause-and-effect relationships, 
to identify factors that give rise to social problems, or to develop empirically based theories of  
intervention.189  
The same author has a suggestion for prospective policy advisors, however: “[t]he 
problematic factors are concreteness, specificity, representativeness, timeliness and 
prediction of  future conditions190. Brevity is a further factor; John Coles, a former British 
Foreign Office bureaucrat, speaks for many of  his colleagues when he claims that 
policymakers “will normally have little time for extensive reading of  academic work” and 
that the fruits of  academic IR research are “unlikely to have much influence on the 
practitioner, largely because the products seem rather remote from the practical business of  
conducting foreign policy191”. Caplan et al. underscore the need to relate inputs clearly to 
the needs of  policy given the instrumental nature of  knowledge use by decisionmakers192. 
This criterion of  direct relevance to policy concerns clearly overrides benchmarks 
internal to academe for the quality of  a theory or body of  research. It is the fit with policy 
that matters, not the fit with academic standards193. This relates cogency back to practical 
specialised knowledge, since the successful depiction of  relevance necessitates the currency 
of  an expert’s knowledge of  present policy concerns and parochial balances of  power. This 
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type of  knowledge indigenous to policymakers, when possessed by experts, is a form of  
practical specialised knowledge. Kingdon underscores this with the observation that  
policy makers in government listen to academics most when their analyses and proposals are directly 
related to the problems that are already occupying the officials’ attention. For the researcher who wants to 
have an effect in the short run, there is a premium on knowing what is on the minds of  people in 
government.194  
Weiss combines statements of  the need for currency, attractiveness and brevity—
described alternately by Bulmer as “the ability to synthesize results and present them in lay 
language”195 in the following assessment:  
[a] usual concession to the policy sphere is that they include an “executive summary”, summarizing the 
key points in a few pages, and sometimes trying to draw out the implications of  the data for the policy 
options facing decision makers. The executive summary is frequently well written, but the application of  
the findings to current policy options sometimes falls wide of  the mark; not all researchers are close 
enough to the “inner game” of  policy making to have insight into the options that are being most 
seriously considered, and their efforts to be timely and relevant may disclose little more than their 
amateur standing in the policy arena.196  
Benveniste phrases this nicely with regard to the modi operandi of  both the policy and 
academic spheres when he points out that “a half-hour presentation may have to 
accomplish what a graduate student takes months to achieve”197. Nicely marrying the 
“scientific” and normative components of  successful inputs, he elaborates that “[c]larity of  
presentation and condensation is [sic] essential. The learning process cannot be overt, 
because the Prince may be impatient if  lectured at. The presentation has to be practical, 
and the technical dimension and political context cannot be dismissed”198.  
Academics, according to Rose, must grasp that in contrast to what their own 
socialisation teaches them, policymakers seek an understanding of  a given issue that 
normally goes no deeper than being able to furnish an immediate, often short-term, 
solution to the quandary at hand, and not one that seeks to elucidate cause-and-effect or 
constitutive relationships and tie off  intellectual loose ends:  
[p]ublic officials tend to define their work in terms of  the problem immediately confronting them…. 
They wish to apply knowledge within the policy process rather than achieve an understanding that 
however elegant theoretically is not relevant to the task before them. A public official does not define 
problems in terms of  a body of  abstract theories and concepts, but rather by looking at the pile of  papers 
placed on his desk each morning or by answering the telephone and learning of  another crisis that must 
be coped with.199  
One final point highlights that not only must potential advisors evince certain necessary 
attributes and faculties in order to be considered, but that their participation depends as 
well on policymakers’ possession of  one crucial trait: receptivity to academic 
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argumentation200. This receptivity may come from policymakers’ possessing an academic 
background themselves, from positive experience with academic advice during their careers, 
or simply from an intellectual bent. Weiss depicts this in more concrete terms:  
[i]t seems there are certain policymakers who are “users”. The personal factor—a person’s interest, 
commitment, enthusiasm—plays a part in determining how much influence a piece of  research will have. 
We don’t yet know why some people become committed enthusiasts—no identifiable background trait or 
experience has yet shown to be consistently associated with frequent reliance on research—but we do see 
a number of  policymakers, and a larger number of  staff  aides, who give social science serious hearing in 
decision making. … Policymakers are busy people, and reading is low on their list of  priorities. More 
issues come at them every day than they have time to consider carefully.201 
What assists policymakers in choosing first between providers of  potential inputs and 
later between inputs themselves is not only the conviction that the information at hand is 
scientifically sound, but that its normative underpinnings are solid in terms of  fit with the 
policymaker’s own view. As the policy process is where values, politics and interests are 
argued and aggregated, practitioners must pay heed to the scientific and the normative 
merits of  the information they use. To this end, successful policy inputs from advisors 
must contain in their underlying argumentation not only the scientific basis for the 
provision of  options, but the normative basis for, and an argument in favour of, a specific 
choice from among them. 
 
2.2.2.4. Normative argumentation 
The normative component of  a given input is geared towards the latter stages of  the 
policy process, and constitutes an important step marking the progression of  the argument 
presented here to this point from purported neutrality to active suggestion by advisors in 
favour of  concrete policy alternatives. The progression has so far roughly shadowed Weiss’ 
above-listed three types of  research inputs; prescriptive theory and the attendant normative 
argumentation fall rather self-evidently under the category of  “research as arguments”202. 
Weiss brings to light the ramifications of  this form of  input for the balance of  science and 
values with regard to the policy process: 
Research as argumentation presupposes adversarial decision making. It has a political underlay. Interests 
and values are in contest. Proponents use research when and if  it advances their case in the rough-and-
tumble of  organizational decision making. Research is likely to benefit those interests in contention that 
have the resources to acquire research and the sophistication to use research to promote their side of  the 
controversy.203  
Haas is more specific as to the exact nature of  research inputs this model calls for:  
[t]he information needed does not consist of  guesses about others’ intentions, about the probability of  
discrete events occurring, or about a state’s own ability to pursue unilaterally attainable goals that are 
amenable to treatment by various political rules of  thumb. Rather, it consists of  depictions of  social or 
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physical processes, their interrelation with other processes, and the likely consequences of  actions that 
require application of  considerable scientific or technical expertise. The information is thus neither 
guesses nor “raw” data; it is the product of  human interpretations of  social and physical phenomena.204  
This requires a certain understanding among potential advisors of  their role in the policy 
process: 
[t]he policy analyst is a producer of  policy arguments, more similar to a lawyer—a specialist in legal 
arguments—than to an engineer or a scientist. His basic skills are not algorithmical but argumentative: the 
ability to probe assumptions critically, to produce and evaluate evidence, to keep many threads in hand, to 
draw for an argument from many disparate sources, to communicate effectively. He recognizes that to say 
anything of  importance in public policy requires value judgments, which must be explained and justified, 
and is willing to apply his skills to any topic relevant to public discussion. … 
Argumentation does not start from axioms but from opinions, values, or contestable viewpoints; it makes 
use of  logical inferences but is not exhausted in deductive systems of  formal statements.205  
This type of  input is the culmination of  the progressive inclusion, echoed internally in 
this hypothesis, of  the advisor in the policy process and the increased tailoring of  his inputs 
to the needs of  policy rather than academe. This entails not only the modification of  
research goals as outlined above—for example, from long-term to short-term—but also 
the irrevocable abandonment of  the illusion of  value-free science.  
The normative component of  policy argumentation thus represents the critical step 
beyond the generation of  options and towards reasoning, on value-based grounds, in 
favour of  a given policy course. The underlying criterion must be loyalty not to scientific 
reward structures but to utility within the policy process. The final step in the progression 
from the opening of  the policy process due to uncertainty to the traceable provision by an 
academic expert of  a successfully implemented policy input—and the gradual departure 
from scientific criteria of  validity to the criteria of  the policy process itself—culminates in 
the substantive content of  the inputs themselves.  
Policy advice must contain normative argumentation in part because policymakers 
require knowledge not only of  its epistemic authority, but of  its utility in the battle of  
interests and values that constitutes decisionmaking. The normative content of  an input 
must not only be made clear, but it must resonate with the general normative worldviews 
and parochial interests of  the specific individual practitioner to whom it is submitted.  
 
2.2.3. Hypothesis three: resonance of  policy inputs 
In order for advisors’ inputs to be taken up into declaratory policy and 
influence policy outcomes, they must resonate with the normative 
preferences held by policymakers. 
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Uncertainty determines when analysts can conceivably be invited to join the policy 
process. Specialised knowledge, institutionalised prestige, cogency and resonance determine 
who is invited and might subsequently contribute substantially to the formulation of  policy. 
This final hypothesis seeks to establish what it is analysts must do within the policy process 
itself  in order to see their work enshrined in declared policy, and how the final synthetic 
document comes about. It also marks the final stage of  the triple progression shaping the 
hypothetical structure of  the case studies to follow: from structural factors to the content 
of  ideas, from the notion of  value-free science to the embrace of  a self-conscious policy 
advocacy position, and from the initial to the latter stages of  the policy process.  
The purpose of  the project’s engagement with the question of  resonance is also to bring 
differentiation to the otherwise commonplace assertion that “people will only listen to 
things they agree with” by pointing out the exact criteria for resonance and the situations in 
which the commonplace does—and does not—hold true. Positing the importance of  
resonance between two sets of  normative propositions prescribes three investigative foci 
for this hypothesis: the preferences of  policymakers; those of  their academic interlocutors; 
and the locus and manner of  synthesis between those viewpoints, resulting in the final 
policy outcome.  
The normative preferences of  policymakers are pitched at three distinct levels: general 
normative worldviews, policy preferences, and considerations of  political expediency 
related to short-term considerations of  parochial bureaucratic interests within the policy 
process. Academics’ policy preferences relate similarly to either their broader normative 
views (which can be considered to have underpinned their research at the outset), or the—
often personal—vindication of  their particular theoretical or methodological stance within 
the discipline.  
The synthesis of  these preferences occurs largely at the decision of  the policymaker; 
practitioners will largely seek out inputs that resonate with their extant viewpoints. In doing 
so, they are, significantly for this analysis, using resonant inputs not only to shape responses 
in accordance with known interests, but allowing academics to participate in the definition 
of  these interests themselves. What is referred to in this claim are higher-order normative 
commitments—sets of  values from which different sets of  actionable interests might be 
derived. That with which academics’ inputs must resonate is thus a complex combination 
of  long-term, higher-order commitments and preferences derived from immediate 
expediency. 
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In the final effect, the decision to follow a given recommendation results from a balance 
of  specialised knowledge, institutionalised prestige and normative resonance. If  these 
criteria are not met, with resonance often at the fore, especially in the latter stages of  the 
formulation process, exclusion can occur. Ken Booth, for example, reveals himself  as a 
critical security scholar in more ways than one in his defence of  his decision as an IR 
academic to forgo further contacts with Whitehall due to a sense of  exclusion: “[i]f  one 
does not say what ‘professionals’ want to hear—or if  one offers more than in-house 
criticism—then contact is certainly not welcome”206.  
Generally, policy decisions with regard to advisor inputs are taken on the basis of  a 
combination of  scientific derivation (Hypothesis Two) and normative underpinnings 
(Hypothesis Three); either one may trump the other in the final decision. Primack and von 
Hippel illustrate this observation, with normative considerations winning out, in the 
American context: 
[b]ecause public officials must often rely upon the combined political and scientific judgment of  their 
technical advisors, they tend to choose as advisors scientists whose political views are similar to their own. 
Presidential science advisors were routinely selected on this basis. But while shared assumptions may 
improve communication, they may also effectively result in political views determining technological 
policies without sufficient regard for technical considerations. In some cases balance has been achieved 
within the executive branch when opposing factions have established their own advisory groups, each 
having different political biases.207  
Weiss has similarly had occasion to observe the primacy of  resonance over scientificity 
at the levels of  both political views and bureaucratic politics: 
[w]hatever research shows, the political climate places limits on what kinds of  change will be 
countenanced, how fast, and at what cost. Not only partisan politics and administration politics but also 
agency politics help to determine the range of  acceptable options.208  
With respect to policymaker preferences, the area of  security policy presents one salient 
specificity: the target audience of  advisors’ inputs is bifurcated. Decisionmakers in the 
security arena in many countries will consist both of  civilian bureaucrats and uniformed 
members of  the armed forces. These two communities may under certain circumstances—
depending on the institutional culture of  the armed forces, the role and clout of  the 
military establishment in society, and the extent to which civilian supremacy has been 
established in civil-military relations—evince fundamentally different normative and 
political commitments. As a general rule, though this is patently not exclusively the case, 
military establishments will possess a conservative institutional culture espousing two main 
expressions: a reactionary or nationalistic political undercurrent, and a strong sense of  the 
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parochial institutional interest, coupled with a willingness to pursue those interests actively 
and forcefully. 
This bifurcation into ostensibly reactionary and progressive audiences highlights the 
need to explore the derivation of  academics’ normative preferences, in particular the 
relationship of  those commitments to their role in maintaining versus challenging the status 
quo. Observers of  the role of  the analyst in society and the policy process are divided on 
whether it is possible to attribute allegiance with either standpoint from the outset to 
academics as a profession or class. Gagnon underscores that many see academics as 
working to legitimate dominant ideologies209; Phillips highlights the interaction of  
government and science in creating meaning and in “gain[ing] and maintain[ing] political 
and social domination”210. Jacobsen transposes the dominance of  the state in society into 
the dominance of  a hegemonic school within an academic discipline, noting the presence 
of  disciplining practices in International Relations: “[m]ainstream scholarship, as a recent 
survey soberly reminds, is not in the business of  promoting the ‘emancipatory interests’ 
that motivate some scholars”211.  
These observations place the focus for a brief  moment on the linkage between 
academics’ normative preferences and the issue of  consensus within a discipline, and its 
role as constitutive of  epistemic authority and expert status. Many disciplines, especially 
those whose institutionalisation has not fully matured, do not evince consensus on basic 
issues of  theory and methodology—International Relations and security studies included. 
Several consensi may in fact exist within a discipline, if  a large enough minority exists to 
challenge a mainstream school of  thought.  
The important factor here is policymakers’ perception of  disciplinary consensus, and the 
contribution of  this perception to advisors’ prestige. Thus, if  policymakers select only 
members of  one school of  thought within a discipline, this perception will continue. This 
favours the members of  mainstream schools; in the case of  security studies and IR, this 
results in the likelihood that if  consensus is attained it will be among advisors whose 
interest lies not in challenging, but in maintaining the extant structures of  power. Other 
observers maintain that challenging the status quo will not prejudice experts’ influence212; 
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indeed Robert J. Brym contends that a critical stance, challenging conventional wisdoms, is 
the natural leaning of  the intellectual213.  
In any case the power of  selection remains with the policymaker, and the criterion for 
that with which inputs must resonate remains within the bureaucracy. Given that experts’ 
participation is contingent upon uncertainty over the effectiveness of  current policy, and 
that thus it can be assumed that some form of  innovation is desired by policymakers, the 
question is one of  how radical that change is to be.  
Change—and criticism—can occur at several levels, ranging from the incremental 
adaptation of  a course of  implementation to a wholesale rethinking of  the very concepts 
underlying a security policy itself. It is along this spectrum that the fit must obtain between 
a policymaker’s and an advisor’s propositions in order for influence to take place, on the 
basis of  the degree to which that policymaker is flexible in adapting his own views on the 
basis of  scientific inputs.  
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3. Academic experts and defence policy formulation in Brazil, 1994-2002: 
of  a fledgling discipline at the “grandparents’ barbecue”213 
 
 
Água mole em pedra dura, tanto bate até que fura.  
—Brazilian proverb— 
 
It is critically important to examine silences. 
—Alfred Stepan— 
 
 
This chapter analyses the period from 1994 to 2002 in Brazil, during which the country’s 
defence policy formulation process went through three distinct stages, each allowing the 
testing of  the project’s three hypotheses. The study begins, as will be the case in the other two 
national case chapters, by situating the study within the regional and national contexts. In the 
case of  Brazil, elements such as civil-military relations and the armed forces’ role in the 
historical development of  the nation’s polity are of  particular importance. The introductory 
orientation is thus quite substantial; important contextual conditions that shape the data are 
contained in this opening section.  
The salient elements of  the Brazilian context are the underdeveloped state of  civil-military 
relations—which calls for greater attention to the history and identity of  the armed forces—
and also the embryonic state of  the debate over the concept of  security in Brazil. Further, the 
lack of  a well-developed and consistently applied language within the country necessitates a 
more detailed explication of  the structural factors mediating each variable.  
The exposition begins with the South American regional context; national security issues 
are a low priority for policymakers in the region, and the reasons for this are given. Thereafter, 
specifically Brazilian conditions are brought to bear, most being legacies of  military rule 
(1964-1985), such as the prerogatives maintained by the military under the new democratic 
constitution, and the stigma on defence issues. The effects of  Brazil’s presidentialist system of  
governance are also discussed, such as immediatism, a reactive tradition of  policymaking, and 
a long lag in policy responses. The unfinished business of  establishing civilian control over the 
armed forces is placed in the context of  the history of  the military establishment; the extent 
of  democratic supremacy is a key element in understanding the relationship between Brazilian 
security academics and their policymaker counterparts.  
Thereafter, the period from 1994-2002 is divided into three phases: these are the drafting 
of  the document entitled Política de Defesa Nacional beginning in 1994 and its eventual 
publication as a government document in 1996; the lengthy process leading to the creation of  
                                                 
213 This is the term used by one Brazilian academic to describe the academic atmosphere surrounding the Escola Superior de 
Guerra. 
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the Ministry of  Defence in 1999; and the convocation by that organ of  an Experts’ 
Commission in 2000 to assist with a comprehensive reformulation of  the country’s 
declaratory defence policy.  
After concluding its presentation of  the specificities of  the Brazilian case, the study turns 
its attention to the search for generalisable information regarding its three hypotheses. First, it 
illustrates how uncertainty indeed played a role in leading Brazilian defence policymakers to 
open the formulation process to experts from outside of  the policy bureaucracy, including a 
number of  academics. Here, the recurring theme of  civil-military relations, and their effect on 
the relationship between the military establishment and civilian policymakers, comes to the 
fore for the first time. Uncertainty generated at both the international and domestic levels led 
to an opening of  the policy process by decisionmakers on both sides of  this relationship, 
albeit for very different reasons, and with very different goals.  
The end of  the Cold War delegitimised many of  the armed forces’ previous postures as 
well as core elements of  their doctrine. In the wake of  this development, civilian and military 
bureaucrats often labour at cross purposes. The ensuing defence policy needed to enshrine 
both civilians’ desire to establish firmly their control over the military, and the military’s search 
for new missions and threat analyses permitting the retention of  a strong role in government, 
as well as certain budgetary and institutional privileges. The creation of  the Ministry of  
Defence ultimately provided the institutional means simultaneously to satisfy both of  these 
divergent goals.  
The study develops its explanatory power most strongly with regard to the second 
hypothesis, which focuses on the attributes necessary for policy advisors’ attainment of  policy 
influence. The influence of  Brazilian academics on declarations of  defence policy has in fact 
been quite limited, and this section explains why this is the case. It illustrates how the 
development of  specialised knowledge depends on the transparency and co-operation of  the 
military establishment. When that co-operation and openness is absent, the basic conditions 
for participation in policy processes are greatly inhibited.  
The outlook of  the Brazilian military establishment is very strongly influenced by the 
American-inspired Doutrina de Segurança Nacional (National Security Doctrine—DSN), which is 
still taught extensively throughout the military’s professional schooling system. This doctrine is 
presented as capable of  providing the answers to all relevant questions regarding security, and 
thus discourages its devotees from looking outside the establishment for assistance. The 
effects of  this doctrine on military thinking in Brazil are inextricably intertwined with the role 
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and function of  the Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher War College [ESG]), where it was 
developed and from where it is disseminated.  
With this in mind, the chapter provides a brief  overview of  the doctrine as well as of  the 
military schooling system, in particular the ESG. Particular attention is paid here not only to 
the comprehensiveness to which the doctrine lays claim, but also to the active measures taken 
by ESG and the military to invalidate other forms of  discourse and entrench the discursive 
dominance of  the doctrine in the language used to discuss defence matters in Brazil.  
Access to the policy realm calls for a balance of  specialised knowledge and institutionalised 
prestige. When specialised knowledge is not present, this can under certain circumstances be 
balanced by prestige, especially in the case of  a traditionalist and personified culture such as 
Brazil’s. What is called for is in fact a critical mass of  both qualities in combination; the study 
goes on to investigate academics’ opportunities to use institutionalised prestige to attain the 
necessary reputation.  
This critical mass is attained primarily by means of  transferring professional prestige from 
the academic ambit into the policy sphere. As called for by the second hypothesis, the analysis 
looks at both the prestige of  individual academics within International Relations and especially 
security studies, as well as the prestige of  the academic caste within civil society more broadly 
conceived. The study lays bare in this section how the recent creation of  International 
Relations and the fledgling status of  security studies in Brazil result at this early stage in under-
institutionalisation. Brazilian IR’s relative youth has led to other limits on the ability of  
Brazilian academics to counter the effects of  the discursive dominance of  ESG doctrine, as 
well as the doctrine’s closing of  many military minds to dissenting approaches. There is, for 
example, still no funding category provided by the state funding agencies for security studies, 
and academic initiatives such as journals and research centres remain too strongly tied to their 
founding personalities.  
The analysis of  the resonance of  academics’ inputs—the focus of  the third and final 
hypothesis—is hindered by the lack of  publicly available policy documents in which resonance 
and influence could be traced. The study therefore proceeds using information gleaned from 
interviews with key policymakers, making it nonetheless possible to illustrate the effects of  
incomplete civilian control over the armed forces. Because supremacy is still contested 
between these two communities, academics are presented with a bifurcated audience to which 
they must pitch proposals which resonate. Academics are thus faced with the choice of  
whether to address these proposals only to one subset of  the policymaking community, or to 
attempt synthesis on their own.  
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Until new declaratory policy is developed, the armed forces and the Ministry of  Defence 
will continue to pursue weapons acquisitions programmes and force designs—as well as other, 
more general developments of  corporate norms and attitudes—in the absence of  civilian 
political direction. This void has already led to embarrassing divergences of  implementation 
from the guidelines laid down in the 1996 Política de Defesa Nacional (PDN) document214. After 
completing its analysis of  academics’ resonance in this divided environment, the study 
concludes with a closing synthesis and a brief  look at the implementation of  the limited 
declaratory policy that does exist.  
 
3.1. National context 
This section provides an overview of  several contextual factors governing the Brazilian 
case, including the regional (Latin American) security context, the structure and character of  
the Brazilian political system, and a brief  look at the role of  the armed forces in society and 
the current state of  civil-military relations.  
 
3.1.1. Regional security context 
Several factors deriving from the Latin American continental security context influence 
national security policymaking and the debate surrounding the issue in Brazilian civil society. 
These include the absence of  major interstate conflict in the region for over a century (and an 
attendant shift in security preoccupations to internal issues), the continent’s perceived lack of  
geostrategic importance (particularly during the Cold War215) and finally the legacy of  
involvement in the region by the United States.  
The last interstate conflict involving South America’s major powers was the War of  the 
Triple Alliance between 1865 and 1870. Since then, the region has seen at worst minor 
interstate conflicts (such as that between Ecuador and Peru in 1941), and limited involvement 
in the two World Wars. Due in part to a tradition of  armed forces involvement in internal 
affairs both during and after the colonial period and  
                                                 
214 One recent example illustrates the extent to which the individual forces and the Ministry of Defence remain at odds in 
normative odds, particularly with regard to how do deal with the legacy of military rule. In October/November 2004, in 
response to an article in Correio Braziliense on the case of Vladimir Herzog, a journalist killed during the ditadura, the 
Army’s Social Communications Centre issued a memorandum justifying the actions of the FA during this time in terms 
not acceptable to the civilian authorities. Defence Minister José Viegas resigned incensed and was replaced by Vice 
President José Alencar, who now holds both posts. The note was quickly retracted; however, the damage has been done. 
See http://www.defesanet.com.br/eb/nota18out04. Accessed 3 December 2004. 
215 Former US Secretary of State Kissinger, when pressed about American intervention in Chile, famously described the 
country as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica”. See http://www.tni.org/archives/landau/kissinger.htm. 
Accessed 3 December 2004.  
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owing to the difficulties of  territorial acquisition, Latin Americans transformed geopolitical strategy from 
conquest of  physical space to that of  political space, while still preserving the organic concept of  the state.216 
The lack of  external military threat and preoccupation with internal matters such as crime, 
drug trafficking, internal revolution and infrastructural development has led to a “conceptual 
morass” surrounding the use of  the term “security” in Latin America217; there is considerable 
confusion regarding the distinction between traditional defence against external military threat 
and internal security matters such as policing and use of  the armed forces within state 
borders. This comes in part as a result of  many of  the region’s military establishments 
adoptation, during the Cold War, of  national security doctrines inspired and taught by the 
armed forces of  the United States.  
Geared as this body of  doctrine was towards combating the Marxist ideological enemy, 
some of  its elements contributed to blurring the distinction between internal and external 
security and condoned, if  not encouraged, armed forces’ involvement in politics and 
governance. Though the various strains of  national security doctrine elaborated by Latin 
American military establishments differ considerably in their sources (some supplemented 
American counterinsurgency tactics with the writings of  German and French military thinkers 
as well as local traditions), there are important commonalities among the doctrines found in 
the region. These include: 
1. A conceptual framework linking national security, strategy, national objectives, and national policy; 
2. A conflict hypothesis stressing internal security, specifically the threat of  revolutionary insurgencies 
sponsored by the international communist movement, rather than conventional external threats; 
3. A theory of  revolutionary war defining the nature of  the internal security threat and the appropriate 
military and policy responses to that threat; 
4. A rationale justifying human rights violations (torture, disappearances) as necessary to eliminate the 
revolutionary threat; 
5. The thesis of  security and development, causally linking the internal security threat to socio-economic 
underdevelopment; and 
6. The belief  that direct military rule is justified when the policy failures of  civilian governments endanger 
national security.218 
The legacy of  the national security doctrine, in its Brazilian form as the Doutrina de 
Segurança Nacional (DSN) developed by the Escola Superior de Guerra (Higher War College—
ESG) will be discussed below with respect to how it has affected the Brazilian discourse on 
security issues and the ability of  civilians to develop specialised knowledge on military issues. 
The most salient effects in a general context are the conceptual confusion that permeates 
debates on security between external and internal threats and military missions, and the stigma 
placed on issues involving the armed forces—though curiously not the Brazilian Armed 
                                                 
216 Pion-Berlin, David. “Latin American National Security Doctrines: Hard- and Softline Themes”. Armed Forces and Society. 
Vol. 15, No. 3 (1989); pp. 411-429. Here, p. 413. 
217 Fitch, J. Samuel. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; p. 
107. 
218 Ibid., p. 107. The points listed are a summary of pp. 13-16 in Comblin, Joseph. A Ideologia da Segurança Nacional. Rio de 
Janeiro: Editora Civilisação Brasileira, 1978. See also, in the former work, pp. 107-119 on the development of the concept 
of security and pp. 151-165 on its implementation in Brazil. 
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Forces themselves—by the human rights violations perpetrated under the cloak of  the DSN 
during the military dictatorship. Further, due to the increased severity of  internal security 
problems such as public safety and drug trafficking, military matters in Brazil are not at all a 
high priority in both civil society and policymaking discussions in Brazil. 
This fact is pointed out even by those who have devoted their careers to the study of  
military issues. Defence Ministry employees have noted the political difficulty of  dealing with 
military issues: “messing with the military usually loses you votes”219; others also pointed out 
the low priority attached to the issue since the end of  the military regime and the rise of  
problems stemming from underdevelopment and violent crime220. Of  17 policy issues 
participants in a 2001 survey of  Brazilian elites were asked to rank in terms of  importance, 
the Armed Forces and security and defence policy placed fifteenth.221 So low a priority was 
defence that Brazil did not have a unified defence policy until 1996, when President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso issued the National Defence Policy, or Política de Defesa Nacional (PDN). 
Similarly, the Armed Forces were able to carry over sufficient influence into the democratic 
civilian governmental structures established in 1985 that a civilian-led Ministry of  Defence 
was not created until 1999.  
 
3.1.2. National political context  
This section will outline briefly the policymaking process in Brazil and the historical 
development of  the state’s role in Brazilian society, with particular emphasis on issues related 
to the military establishment, as well as the state of  the defence debate in Brazilian civil 
society today. Decisionmaking on issues related to the armed forces and security is still heavily 
influenced by the legacy left by the ditadura—the military government that took power in a 
coup in 1964222 and relinquished power through negotiations in 1985. Due to the very strong 
negotiating position the Brazilian Armed Forces (FA) enjoyed when the Constitutional 
Assembly that produced the 1988 Constitution was convened, they were able to carry over a 
number of  prerogatives into the democratic period that do not align well with the notion of  
                                                 
219 Interview with Jadir Dias Proença and Gisele Staudohar, Brasília, 6 August 2002. Free translation from the Brazilian 
Portuguese original. 
220 Interview with Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, Campinas, Brazil, 1 July 2002; Interview with Ministro Carlos Henrique 
Cardim, Brasília, Brazil, 6 August 2002; Interview with Alexandre Fuccille, Campinas, Brazil, 1 July 2002; Presentation by 
Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira at the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 
2002), 9 August 2002, Brasilia, Brazil; Presentation by Prof. Maria Helena de Castro Santos at the Conference on 
Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2002), 9 August 2002, Brasilia, Brazil; Proença Júnior, 
Domício. “Uma Visão da Defesa Nacional no Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Consultancy Report note during 
publishing of Lamounier, Bolívar and Rubens Figueiredo, eds. A Era FHC: um balanço. São Paulo: Cultura Editores 
Associados, 2002 (2001) (hereafter, Visão). 
221 Brigagão, Clóvis and Domício Proença Júnior. Concertação Múltipla: Inserção Internacional de Segurança do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: 
Livraria Francisco Alves Editora, 2002 (hereafter, Concertação Múltipla); pp. 29-30. 
222 See, for example, Farcau, Bruce. The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military. Westport: 
Praeger, 1996; p. 93. 
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civilian supremacy commonly held outside the Latin American context. This privileged 
position is but the continuation of  a long-standing tradition of  intervention by the FA, 
especially the Army, in Brazilian politics, as will be discussed in further detail below. 
The 1988 Constitution instituted a presidentialist regime which concentrated significant 
power in the hands of  the executive branch, to the detriment of  the legislative. The President 
of  the Republic has extensive powers to legislate by decree, as well as other means of  
circumventing or rendering legally unnecessary parliamentary oversight. The large majority of  
legislation regarding the FA has been made in this fashion, including ironically that governing 
the establishment in 1999 of  the Ministry of  Defence (MD), an important step towards 
increasing transparency in the policymaking process. Though the initial period of  heavy 
repression was followed by a progressive opening (abertura), in part due to the negotiated 
character of  the transition back to civilian rule, the FA were able to maintain considerable 
institutional privileges under the civilian regime223, prompting one observer to note that  
the [FA] have become ‘civilianized’ in a very singular way: instead of  acting in accordance with a set of  rules 
defined by the civilian political forces, they established their own restrictions, containing and refraining 
themselves in perspective and perception and restraining themselves in action (though not reformulating nor 
reshaping their basic references), in the absence of  such definition.224 
Prior to the establishment of  the MD, military prerogatives included six Ministerial Cabinet 
posts occupied by active-duty officers: the three service branch Ministries, the military cabinet 
or household (Casa Militar), the Armed Forces General Staff  (Estado-Maior das Forças 
Armadas—EMFA) and eventually the National Intelligence Service (Serviço Nacional de 
Inteligência—SNI)225. In a 1993 article, Jorge Zaverucha, a specialist in civil-military relations, 
rated poorly the degree of  democratic control in the immediate aftermath of  the Brazilian 
transition; his view of  the state of  affairs in this area remains pessimistic nine years later226. 
The increased weight of  the executive branch was conducive to military influence, as this 
was where the influence of  the military establishment was concentrated. The corollary to this 
                                                 
223 Hunter, Wendy. Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997 (hereafter, Military Influence); pp. 32-36; Stepan, Alfred. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988 (hereafter, Military Politics), pp. 93-114; Martins Filho, João R. and Daniel 
Zirker, “The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis”. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs. Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000); pp. 143-170. Here, pp. 147-148. 
224 Dreifuss, René Armand. “The Brazilian Armed Forces: Current changes, new challenges”. Updated version for publication 
of a paper presented at the International Political Science Association International Seminar on “Globalization of Civil-
Military Relations: Democratization, Reform and Security”, Bucharest, Romania, 28 June-3 July 2002 (hereafter, “Armed 
Forces”), p. 5. 
225 On the history of the Brazilian intelligence community, see Antunes, Priscila Carlos Brandão. SNI & Abin: Uma Leitura da 
Atuação dos Serviços Secretos Brasileiros ao Longo do Século XX. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2002. 
226 Zaverucha, Jorge. “The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions”. 
Journal of Latin American Studies. Vol. 25, No. 3 (1993), pp. 285-299 (hereafter, “Transitions”); Zaverucha, Jorge. 
“(Des)Controle Civil sobre os Militares no governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso”. Paper presented at the Conference on 
Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2002), August 7–10, 2002, Brasilia, Brazil. In Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies. “Defense and Security Challenges in the 21st Century: Continuity or Change. REDES 
2002, Brasília, Brazil, August 7-10, 2002”. Compact Disc. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 
2002 (hereafter, REDES). 
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imbalance is that the Brazilian Parliament has traditionally shown a lack of  interest and 
expertise in military affairs. Following a period of  intense interest and substantive 
interventions in defence policy prior to the ditadura, the Brazilian Parliament today plays at 
best a very limited role in both the public debate and policymaking on defence issues227.  
The Chamber of  Deputies (lower house) possessed a Committee on National Defence and 
the Senate a Committee on National Security, but both houses have now merged these into a 
Committee on External Relations and Defence228. Nevertheless, expertise within Parliament is 
limited to a very small number of  legislators. Even observers from the military establishment 
criticise the lack of  expertise and interest emanating from Brazilian lawmakers229. Wendy 
Hunter explains that often this is due to incentive structures in the Brazilian political system 
that serve to dissuade lawmakers from intervening in military issues due to high patronage 
costs and low electoral returns230.  
With the creation of  the MD in 1999, the leverage of  the FA within the executive branch 
was decreased, civilian involvement increased and transparency concerns granted greater 
attention. Brazilian defence policy is still made almost entirely within the executive branch, 
and particularly still by its employees in uniform, who continue in the majority. Although 
military influence within the government has waned somewhat, Brazilian civil society’s 
treatment of  security issues and military matters remains in conceptual infancy. With the 
exception of  theoretical approaches to civil-military relations, this holds true for the academic 
security studies community as well.  
Terminological confusion continues to reign concerning both the definitions of  the 
concepts of  defence and security, and of  notions of  policy and strategy. This situation favours 
the ongoing predominance of  the FA and its schools in the debate. The approaches to these 
questions elaborated by military experts will be dealt with below in the sections on civil-
military relations and specialised knowledge. The distinction between defence policy and 
security policy in English usage is not mirrored in the Portuguese terms defesa and segurança. 
Further, segurança as it is most commonly used today—without the explicit attachment of  the 
suffix nacional—refers to issues related to Brazil's high crime and violence rates, such as public, 
private and citizen security, which lie on the other side of  the notion of  posse comitatus from 
their national equivalents which involve the armed forces instead of  the police.  
                                                 
227 Brigagão and Proença, Concertação Múltipla, p. 137. 
228 Ibid., p. 137. This body is not be confused with an organ of the Presidency bearing a very similar title. 
229 Barbosa, Afonso. “Visão Militar sobre a Inserção Internacional de Segurança do Brasil”. In Brigagão, Clóvis and Domício 
Proença Júnior, eds. Brasil e o Mundo: Novas Visões. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Francisco Alves Editora, 2002; pp. 87-161 
(hereafter, Novas Visões). Here, p. 123. At the time of writing Barbosa was the Commandant of the Escola de Guerra Naval 
(Naval War College).  
230 Hunter, Military Influence, pp. 15-16. 
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The terms segurança and defesa have a strong stigma attached to them in non-military circles 
in Portuguese usage. To this day,  
[a]nother aspect that is helpful in understanding the divorce between civilians and strategic studies is the 
repeated coups d'état that have, like an epidemic, come down on the continent, socio-pathologically creating an 
insurmountable gap between civilians and the military. This justified and guaranteed in a praetorian way the 
hegemony of  the latter, as a societal actor (in some cases as a party), over the definition of  the fate of  their 
nations, based on their supposed moral infallibility in preserving patriotic values.  
This factor had indelible psychological implications on civilians, particularly on intellectuals, as well as 
epistemological implications for the academy. Psychologically, intellectuals are inclined to view their 
colleagues who are dedicated to topics such as military history, civil-military relations, and related issues, as 
“infiltrated” or “reactionaries of  the right”, despite the fact of  many of  the latter having suffered in their 
own flesh and blood the repression inherent to military dictatorships. On the other hand, or perhaps as a 
consequence, the academy closed itself  to these issues, withdrawing from them epistemic dignity. This 
conduct permitted the militaries to continue to exercise their monopoly over thinking on such eminently 
civilian issues as strategy, defence and security.231 
Also, the term estratégia (strategy) is in Portuguese usage more broadly applied to political 
strategies across the political spectrum as, for example, in the case of  strategies for scientific 
development or public health. Presidentialism and the informal and personality-based nature 
of  Brazilian politics encourage confusion over responsibility for policymaking and work 
against the establishment of  clearly bounded areas of  policy. The traditional autonomy of  the 
FA and their leading role in defining both the terms of  and access to the defence debate 
underscore the importance of  understanding the history of  the armed forces and notions of  
civil-military relations as they are seen in Brazil today. 
 
3.1.3. The armed forces and civil-military relations 
The role of  the FA in Brazilian society today is conditioned by both historical and 
institutional factors. The history of  the three branches of  the FA over the last 200 years has 
granted them a prominent place in their interactions with civil society, and the institutional 
arrangements in the defence policy sphere have until recently underscored this dominance. 
From the creation of  the FA out of  the Portuguese colonial military powers, through the ages 
of  the Empire and the New Republic, the development of  the Army (Exército Brasileiro—EB) 
in particular shows a steady trajectory of  increasing involvement in politics that culminated in 
the 1964 coup and installation of  military rule. Following military rule, the FA were able to 
retain considerable privileges within government institutions232.  
                                                 
231 Saint-Pierre, Héctor Luis. “Os Estudos Estratégicos Na Academia: Análise De Um Grupo Binacional”. Paper presented at 
the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2001), Center for Hemispheric 
Defense Studies, May 22–25, 2001, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. Available from 
http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/REDES2001/Papers/Block5/Strategic%20Studies%20Panel%20II/Saint-
Pierre.Strategic%20Studies%20Panel.doc. Accessed 13 April 2002, p. 2. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese 
original. 
232 Alongside Hunter, Zaverucha and Stepan cited above see also Farcau, p. 87. 
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The three branches of  the FA—the Army, Navy and Air Force—have distinct and 
different processes of  historical evolution233. The Army remains the largest and most 
influential of  the three, and it is this branch of  the FA that has played by far the most 
important part in laying down the historical foundations for the current relationship between 
the FA and Brazilian society. Three salient characteristics—aligning it firmly with its Latin 
American counterparts—have marked the historical role of  the EB since the founding of  the 
Republic in 1899: its role in the physical as well as ideological aspects of  nation-building and 
economic development, and its interventionist stance towards the political governance of  the 
country.  
Among others, several events stand out in forging the EB's corporate identity. These 
include the Triple Alliance War of  1865-69, whose “total” and extended nature made clear the 
need for a strong link between the nation's military and non-military capabilities; the 1899 
rebellion against the Emperor and subsequent proclamation of  the republic, followed by a 
civil war against the Navy (Marinha do Brasil—MB), which planted the seeds of  the EB's view 
of  itself  as the true expression of  Brazilian national identity; the French Mission militaire, 
which brought to the EB notions of  the modernising role of  the military, both technologically 
and ideologically; and finally the experience of  the senior officers of  the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force (FEB) in Italy in the Second World War, several of  whose members later 
played a leading role in the process of  doctrinal development within the FA, largely within the 
confines of  ESG234.  
The EB played a fundamental role in the territorial consolidation of  the modern Brazilian 
state, particularly in the remote and sparsely-populated Amazonian region, large parts of  
which were opened to settlement by expeditions led by Cândido Rondon. Often the EB 
represented the only presence in remote areas of  the country. The psychological importance 
of  this presence to the nation-building process cannot be ignored, as large tracts of  land 
became Brazilian territory based on the principle of  uti possidetis facto235. This presence was 
reinforced by the provision of  infrastructure such as roads, telegraph lines and hospitals under 
the auspices of  the EB236.  
The EB's involvement in the physical consolidation of  the Brazilian nation parallels its 
involvement in the development of  Brazilian nationalism and national identity. In addition to 
                                                 
233 The origins of each are described briefly in Fujita, Edmundo Sussumu. “Uma Política de Defesa Sustentável para o Brasil”. 
Parcerias Estratégicas. No. 5 (1998); pp. 101-112. Here, p. 101. 
234 Hunter, Wendy. “State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military's Role in Argentina, Brazil and Chile”. 
Peaceworks. No. 10 (1996) (hereafter, “State and Soldier”), pp. 20-21; interviews with Domício Proença Júnior, 
Copacabana, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 16 and 18 July 2002.  
235 Hunter, Military Influence, p. 118. 
236 Hunter, “State and Soldier”, p. 20; Allen, Elizabeth. “Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amazônia”. 
Glasgow: Centre for Amazonian Studies and Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Glasgow, 1990, p. 1.  
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bringing infrastructure and a state presence to the Amazon as well as other remote and border 
regions237, the Army, as the largest and most influential of  the service branches, also began a 
programme of  economic development for remote areas, particularly the Amazon. Military 
involvement in social and developmental matters was particularly heavy in the Amazonian 
region, although in keeping with the role of  most Latin American armed forces in their 
societies, it was extensive by international standards throughout the country and across 
sectors.  
As in many societies in the developing world, the FA are also seen as one of  the few 
opportunities afforded the lower classes for social mobility, an image of  which the institution 
is proud, as it is intimately connected to its nationalist-developmentalist agenda238. Coupled 
with its view of  itself  as a true expression of  Brazilian national identity and an engine for 
economic development, the Army, to a far greater extent than the Navy and Air Force, has 
historically pursued an interventionist policy towards the political governance of  the country, 
intervening repeatedly prior to 1964 in the handling of  social, political and economic 
questions.  
The intellectual traditions of  the Navy and Air Force, in keeping with the comparatively 
more internationalist and technologically-oriented callings of  these institutions throughout the 
world, are less nationalist, less parochial, and more liberal-internationalist in nature239. The 
interventionist role of  the FA reached its modern-day apex with the installation of  the military 
regime in 1964. Even after the re-establishment of  democracy, military leaders continued to 
give public opinions on matters extending far beyond their cabinet dossiers; this attitude is 
personified by General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves during the Sarney Presidency beginning in 
1985240.  
The nationalist component of  the FA's nationalist-developmentalist agenda was in fact 
corporatist and elitist: when populism interfered with development and the two overarching 
goals were at odds, it was scientific progress and economic development that took precedence 
over the will of  the people. In the words of  one analyst,  
The military's ultimate fear is that politicians with populist leanings will encourage Brazil's historically 
quiescent lower classes to become more assertive, thereby jeopardizing political stability and a model of  
accumulation propitious for Brazil's rapid economic development.241 
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The military regime followed a fundamentally reactionary course, the Cold war context and 
the legacy of  the American military mission (1948-60) instilling in the military rulers a 
staunchly anti-Communist and anti-leftist political agenda derived from what were perceived 
to be the Army’s corporate interests. Restrictions were placed on political and human rights: 
This regime became more clearly centralised and armed with instruments contrary to the democratic regime 
and the free disputation of  political power. Among these were the substitution of  the political parties 
originating in the 1946 Constitution by a two-party system (not so much by the letter of  Institutional Act No. 
2 as by the realistic possibility of  founding a party); the indirect election of  the President of  the Republic (all 
Army Generals from 1964 to 1985), state governors, and mayors of  state capitals and cities of  strategic 
interest; the submission of  the Constitutional order to an institutional order that restricted political liberties 
and, through Institutional Act No. 5, suspended habeas corpus. These restrictions were coupled with the 
judgement of  political offences by the military justice system and with the extensive system of  repression, 
whose centre was made up of  the high command structures of  the Navy, Army and Air Force. Effectively, 
the exercise of  power in the Republic flowed from the Armed Forces, and the Army in particular.242 
Today, assessments of  the ferocity of  the human rights violations under the military regime 
range from personal accounts by those who were slated for assassination or jailed by the 
regime243 to those who point out its relative tameness in comparison to the military regimes in 
neighbouring states244 and finally those who claim that negative remembrances of  the era of  
military rule (and the use of  the word “dictatorship”) are the result of  concerted efforts at 
“semantic chastisement”, based on “politico-ideological resentment” harboured by 
(“leftist/Marxist”) sectors annoyed at not getting their political way under the military regime 
(“segmentos contrariados”)245. Others claim that “[i]t is, at the very least, imprudent to believe that 
without the Movement of  31 March 1964, Brazil would have continued its evolution as a free, 
pluralistic and democratic society without grave convulsions”246. The end of  the Cold War has 
led some analysts—notably Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira and Alexandre Fuccille (now of  the 
MD) of  the Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos at the State University of  Campinas—to posit an 
“identity crisis” within the FA247. This climate of  uncertainty—disputed by active-duty officers 
and reluctantly admitted to by their retired counterparts—underlines the need for a clear 
policy line to be set by the Ministry of  Defence. 
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Among those sections of  civil society frequently identified as particular targets of  the anti-
leftist military regime, two are of  particular interest here: the intellectual/academic milieu and 
the media. While the FA continue to enjoy a very high level of  public confidence overall248, 
this support is not as widespread among academics and journalists, some of  whom were 
victims of  repression. The military establishment’s control over information regarding defence 
issues, and its proactive efforts to shape the language used to discuss military issues, severely 
hampered the ability of  the academic community to address these issues in a manner 
congruent with their professional standards.  
Accordingly, civil-military relations are of  great importance in contextualising Brazilian 
debates on security: for some intellectuals, the pendulum has swung too strongly in the other 
direction, and they decry what they perceive as the negation by their colleagues of  any role for 
the FA in society249. Whatever their views on the legitimate role of  the FA in Brazilian society, 
there is near unanimity among leading Brazilian security scholars that there is a “stigma” on 
the term security as a result of  their strong condemnation of  repression committed while in 
government.250 The FA’s lack of  transparency and the stigma on security issues stand alongside 
the particular historical development of  the discipline of  International Relations and of  
security studies as important factors in evaluating the state of  the academic security debate in 
Brazil today. 
 
3.2. Timeline and decisionmaking process 
The first serious efforts to develop a national defence policy beyond that produced 
exclusively within the individual service branches and focussed solely on the military aspects 
of  security began in 1994 in an organ of  the executive branch, and involved both military 
experts and civilian government employees, some with an academic background. The result 
was a very vague and inclusive document entitled Política de Defesa Nacional. For reasons that 
will be outlined below, this document, though a large step in the direction of  declaratory 
policy, proved insufficient within a short time.  
The defence policymaking landscape shifted drastically with the creation of  the Ministry of  
Defence in 1999, both in terms of  responsibility for policymaking and of  civilian 
involvement. Once the MD had settled into its role somewhat, another effort was undertaken 
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to create a comprehensive declaratory policy beginning in early 2000. This effort involved the 
convening of  a 21-member Experts’ Commission (Comissão de Notáveis). Due to personnel 
changes, election results and a general lack of  transparency and the low priority placed on 
defence issues, by mid-2004 the fruits of  this collaboration had yet to be presented to the 
Defence Minister, much less made public or instituted as state policy.  
 
3.2.1. The 1996 PDN 
Much of  the preparatory work for the 1996 PDN was done under the auspices of  the 
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos—SAE), an organ of  the 
executive branch led by former Navy Minister Almirante-de-Esquadra Mário César Flores 
until late 1994. In 1993, under the leadership of  Luis Bitencourt, several meetings were held at 
SAE’s Centre for Strategic Studies (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos—CEE), to discuss the 
country's future security policy. On one such occasion, several “Young Turks” from within 
various government institutions—including the future Army Commandant Gleuber Vieira, 
then deputy chief  of  the Army General Staff, and the career diplomat Rubens Barbosa, later 
Brazil’s Ambassador to the United Kingdom and to the United States—met, primarily to 
discuss South American priorities in Brazilian foreign policy. 
Around this time, weekly co-ordination meetings, chiefly on the country's South American 
strategy and international security issues, began to be convened by Ambassador José Viegas 
Filho (who was Defence Minister from 2003 to 2004) in the Foreign Ministry, assisted by a 
young diplomat named Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto251. The meetings at CEE increased 
in frequency as well, especially given that 1994 was an election year, in which Itamar Franco 
was eventually to hand the office over for Fernando Henrique Cardoso's first mandate. In 
response to an influential article by the Director of  the Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos at the State 
University of  Campinas calling for political debate on defence issues during the presidential 
campaign, Thomaz Guedes da Costa, a researcher member of  CEE, wrote a policy paper in 
which he pointed out the immediate need for a declaratory policy document outlining 
directives and a clear defence policy stance for the nation.252 
Flores called a meeting within SAE, at which Costa's paper was used as a starting point for 
broader discussions on the country's defence policy needs. Based on these discussions, an 
Inter-Ministerial working Group (Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial—GTI) was convened to lay 
the foundations for a policy document. By September 1994 this group—composed of  mid-
career representatives of  the three armed Forces, SAE, EMFA and the Foreign Ministry—had 
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produced a document entitled Bases para uma política de defesa (Foundations for a Defence 
Policy). As its title implies, this document was intended to provide the basic guidelines for a 
declaratory document. As such, it brought together for the first time the viewpoints of  all of  
the relevant government institutions, but did not go beyond an initial cataloguing and 
synthesis of  viewpoints. This document was ready by September of  1994, in the midst of  the 
election campaign and less than three months before President Itamar Franco was to leave 
office.253  
Flores presented the document to the President, who refused to act on it, preferring to 
leave this task to his successor. With the entry of  President Cardoso, Ambassador Ronaldo 
Mota Sardenberg of  the Foreign Ministry (MRE) took over as head of  SAE. Under 
Sardenberg's stewardship, many of  the powers and tasks delegated to SAE were relinquished 
to other government institutions. According to Costa, this led to a delay of  two years in the 
defence programme discussion—responsibility for this having been ceded to the Military 
Household (Casa Militar)—and four years’ lag in the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence. 
Cardoso's eight-man GTI—this time at the level of  general officers or equivalents, and 
including the Civilian Household (Casa Civil) and Casa Militar—began to discuss the need for a 
defence policy document. The Navy's representative on the GTI, Admiral Miguel Ângelo 
Davena (now the head of  the MD’s Secretariat of  Politics, Strategy and International Affairs), 
pointed out that such a document already existed. It is in this slight misstatement that many of  
the problems surrounding the 1996 PDN are grounded.254  
The Bases para uma política de defesa—intended only as a basic starting point for the policy 
development process—were adopted verbatim as the 1996 Política de Defesa Nacional. The words 
“Bases para uma” were simply dropped and this first, quite basic document used inappropriately 
as a declaratory policy document. This led to harsh criticism of  the document as inadequate 
and to an immediate revival of  cries for a new document following the creation of  the 
Ministry of  Defence in 1999.255  
As it was initially issued in a manner consistent with declaratory policy, though many 
Brazilian analysts knew better the 1996 PDN is a document “to which foreign analysts pay 
much more attention than Brazilians”.256 Leaning heavily on the 1988 Constitution, the PDN 
represents little more than a “harmonisation of  viewpoints […]; a formulation of  
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orientational principles […]; a declaration of  international posture”.257 It lays the basis for 
declaratory policy, claims one analysis, in that it communicates the Brazilian government's 
interpretation of  the limits within which defence policy is made,258 established during the very 
first meetings ever between the Brazilian military and civilians at which high level defence 
guidelines were discussed.259  
Prior to the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence in 1999, each branch service Ministry 
developed its own independent doctrine and strategy. Contrary to similar organs’ role in most 
other countries, it was not among EMFA's tasks to co-ordinate these policies according to 
overarching principles260. The 1996 PDN thus 
has its origins in the difficulties between the Navy and the Air Force over ship-based aviation and those 
between the former and the Army over the country's defence strategy. It represents an appropriation—with 
some innovation, in the face of  a new international environment—of  consolidated conceptual viewpoints 
coming from the diplomatic and military areas.261 
The PDN establishes a set of  directives that include the country's participation in the 
creation of  a just and equitable international order based on international law, the 
amplification of  Brazil's presence in international decisionmaking bodies, nuclear and 
conventional disarmament, and participation in UN peacekeeping operations.262 The doctrine 
was summarised in some circles as “sustainable defence”, particularly with reference to the 
Amazonian region263. The PDN outlines as national defence objectives the following seven 
goals: 
1. to ensure sovereignty by preserving territorial integrity, patrimony and national interests; 
2. to ensure the rule of  law and the protection of  democratic institutions; 
3. to preserve the nation's cohesion and unity; 
4. to safeguard the people, property, and resources which belong to Brazil or come within its jurisdiction; 
5. to pursue and maintain Brazil's interests abroad; 
6. to protect Brazil's place in the community of  nations and enable the country to become more involved in 
the international decision-making process; and  
7. to help maintain international peace and security.264 
The document's conclusion details 20 “guidelines” for defence policy, following  
“a strategic policy of  deterrence based on the following premises: 
—clearly defined borders and coastlines that are internationally recognised; 
—close relationships with neighboring countries and with the international community in general, based on 
mutual confidence and respect; 
—the repudiation of  wars of  conquest; and 
—efforts at peaceful settlement of  disputes, using force only as a means of  self-defense.265 
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What is innovative about the PDN is its establishment of  a defensive force posture for 
Brazil. The entry of  non-offensive defence into parlance marks a departure from traditional 
Brazilian strategy266, and it is not without its detractors267. The 1996 PDN raises the question 
of  the application in practice of  declaratory policy. Much as in the case of  the notorious 
“arms deal” scandal in the period immediately following the issuance of  the 1996 South 
African Defence White Paper, recent Brazilian defence procurement initiatives (inter alia, major 
tank systems, an aircraft-carrier, and the nuclear-submarine programme) have run directly 
counter to the strategies and guidelines expressed in the 1996 PDN.268 
Due to its history and vague nature as, in essence, a catalogue of  first approaches to a 
unified strategy by various government organs, the PDN was not suited as the basis for 
concrete defence policy. Thus, once sworn into his second term and with the new unified 
Defence Ministry in place, Cardoso vested the new Ministry with the task of  establishing a 
viable defence policy. 
 
3.2.2. The creation of  the MD 
Brazil is one of  the last countries in the world, and the last in the Western Hemisphere, to 
submit its Armed Forces to the control of  a unified Ministry of  Defence. Brazil's Singular 
Forces—Army, Navy and Air Force—maintained their own independent Cabinet Ministries 
until 1999, allowing their influential Commanders direct access to the President of  the 
Republic—no small prerogative in Brazil's presidentialist system of  government. In 1967, 
President General Castelo Branco signed a decree ordering studies that were to lead to the 
creation of  a Ministry of  Defence, but the idea was rapidly abandoned269.  
During the 1988 Constitutional Assembly, the Armed Forces were able to stave off  the loss 
of  their considerable institutional prerogatives270; José Sarney, the first civilian President, 
whose regime has often been described as being under the mark of  military “tutelage”271, 
inherited a Cabinet in which sat five active-duty military officers, to which Franco was later to 
add an additional two272. Cardoso proposed the creation of  a Ministry of  Defence and 
commissioned EMFA to conduct a feasibility study. The creation of  a Ministry of  Defence 
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encountered considerable initial resistance from the separate branches of  the armed forces, 
especially the Navy, although all three eventually conceded the inevitability of  such a move 
and came round to support the idea fully in public.  
EMFA's study concluded that of  179 countries evaluated, only 23 did not possess a unified 
Ministry of  Defence, and of  these, only three were of  enough military stature to warrant the 
creation of  one273. Not surprisingly, EMFA's studies suggested that a Defence Ministry be 
placed alongside the extant military ministries, maintaining the established prerogatives at the 
same level. EMFA's study listed nine reasons why the creation of  a Defence Ministry was 
superfluous, betraying a total lack of  comprehension of  the motivations behind the 
democratic control of  armed forces: 
(a) the alteration of  the defence structures is unnecessary, as the Armed Forces are carrying out their 
Constitutional mission satisfactorily; 
(b) there does not exist, neither on the regional or the global level, a risk to Brazil that would justify this 
change; 
(c) there would be a loss of  political power of  the military branch services, with the extinction of  the posts 
of  the military ministers; 
(d) the nomination of  a civilian as Minister of  Defence reveals an unnecessary preoccupation with civilian 
control of  the Armed Forces, a function already exercised in Brazil by the President of  the Republic; 
(e) a new structure would not leave unharmed the present military Ministries, which would provoke the 
dismantling of  their non-military sections, particularly in the case of  the Navy and Air Force274  
(f) there would be the opportunity for undesirable “budgetary meddling”, bringing about disputes over 
funding within the ambit of  the Defence Ministry proper;  
(g) the object of  the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence is to respond to the impositions of  the United 
States;  
(h) what is at stake is the “battle for power”, and not the legitimate interests of  the Armed Forces; and  
(i) the Defence Ministry would only lead to a rise in expenses and the centralisation of  activities very well run 
today by each individual Force.275 
Cardoso rejected the EMFA proposals forthwith and instituted a GTI whose composition 
itself  left much to be desired in terms of  civil-military relations: co-ordinated by the head of  
the Casa Civil, the group included the three military branch Ministers, the Foreign Minister, as 
well as the Heads of  EMFA, the Casa Militar, and SAE276.  
On 1 January 1999, Cardoso nominated a regional politician, Élcio Álvares, Extraordinary 
Minister for Defence. Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, a career diplomat with 
considerable experience in the defence arena gained during his time as head of  SAE, was 
rejected by the military due to parochial rivalries between the Armed Forces and the MRE. 
Álvares' mission was to oversee the establishment of  the MD, which was not to be instituted 
officially until 10 June of  that year. Due to a political scandal in his home state of  Espírito 
Santo, Álvares' tenure in the position was short; he was replaced by the former Attorney-
General of  the Republic, Geraldo Magela de la Cruz Quintão, on 24 January 2000. Despite 
Cardoso's desire to fill the post of  Minister of  Defence with a civilian expert on defence 
                                                 
273 Campos, p. 460; Fuccille, REDES, p. 2; Oliveira, REDES, p. 10. 
274 The Brazilian Navy controls the country's merchant marine fleet, and civilian aviation is the responsibility of the Air Force. 
275 Oliveira, REDES, pp. 8-9. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
276 Oliveira, REDES, p. 14; Oliveira and Soares, p. 112. 
 93
issues, both Álvares and Quintão were complete newcomers to the subject, a situation 
criticised by many observers. While Viegas had some grounding in matters of  defence, his 
successor Alencar has none at all, which adds to the problems facing the MD with respect to 
its institutional strengthening. 
One MD employee describes the Ministry's creation as “an eminently political act”277. 
Several observers have surmised that the reasons behind the creation of  the MD had less to 
do with a desire to strengthen the nature of  civil-military relations within the country, but 
rather with political motives of  another stripe—including Brazil's bid, during the time period 
in question, for a seat on the United Nations Security Council278. Though this assessment may 
appear very cynical, it appears to be borne out by the actual legal path used to create the 
Ministry: many of  the legal underpinnings for the MD's creation were Presidential decrees279, 
leading to the process being dubbed “top-down democratisation”280. In fact, the participation 
of  the legislative branch in the process was minimal; that of  civil society and academics, in the 
opinion of  one scholar, “irrelevant”281.  
The Force Commanders remain powerful, although there is considerable debate as to the 
extent of  the prerogatives they have de facto been able to retain282. One of  these is control over 
the budgets of  the singular forces, which might otherwise have been believed to be the 
primary administrative purpose for the creation of  a consolidated MD. A further distressing 
example of  the incompleteness of  civilian control is the consolidation (frequently by 
Presidential decree) of  power in the heir institution to the Casa Militar—the Gabinete de 
Segurança Institucional283. 
At its inception, the MD was charged with the following missions: 
1. to exercise the high-level direction of  the Armed Forces; 
2. to constitute the central organ of  the National Defence System; 
3. to contribute to the optimisation of  the country's defence capacity; 
4. to integrate, modernise and rationalise the Armed Forces; 
5. to direct the process of  perfecting Brazil's defence structures;  
6. to contribute to the modernisation of  the state within its sphere of  responsibility.284 
In the law establishing it, the MD's areas of  responsibility were defined as follows: 
• national defence policy; 
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• military policy and strategy; 
• doctrine and force-use planning for the Armed Forces; 
• special projects of  interest to national defence; 
• operational and strategic intelligence in the interest of  defence; 
• the military operations of  the Armed Forces; 
• the international relations of  the Armed Forces; 
• the defence budget; 
• Armed Forces science and technology policy; 
• remuneration policy for active and retired military personnel; 
• support to research, development, production and export activities in areas of  national defence interest; 
• national maritime policy; 
• national aeronautical policy and the actualisation of  national policy regarding the development of   
activities in outer space.285 
Chief  among these missions, given the current situation of  uncertainty within the FA and 
the urgent need for the consolidation of  the MD, is the crafting of  a revised National Defence 
Policy to serve as a basis for all other subjugated policies in the defence arena. The MD did 
not hesitate to begin this process and began a search for assistance from civil society in 2000. 
 
3.2.3. The 2000 policy revision process and the Experts’ Commission 
Once the Ministry of  Defence had been created and gained momentum, its Division of  
National Defence Policy (Divisão de Política de Defesa Nacional—DPDN) began to undertake a 
revision of  defence policy, seeking to replace the 1996 PDN document with a more 
implementable and comprehensive version. The ancillary goals of  this effort were to carve out 
the MD’s competencies vis-à-vis other governmental bodies and to secure its budget. A mid-
level career diplomat, José Luiz Machado e Costa, was seconded by the Ministry of  External 
Relations to act as special advisor to Quintão. Charged with assisting the Minister of  Defence 
in updating Brazilian defence policy and finding himself  in a military-heavy environment, 
Machado e Costa realised the merits of  turning to outside experts for assistance: 
There are no civilians in the MD thinking about defence policy, there are only those in uniform who are in 
the Secretariat of  Policy, Strategy and International Affairs, who are generals and colonels. So, what 
happened? I was asked by the Minister, as his Special Advisor, to be the counterpoint to this. The first thing I 
did was to say “alone, I can't pull it off. This is a very large task, and I need to get support from people who 
know these issues better than I do”. I was just the intermediary.286 
Machado e Costa was uncertain about how to proceed, and explicitly recognised the need 
for assistance from actors with greater specialised knowledge of  the subject matter than his 
own. He set about examining the writings of  the Brazilian security studies community and 
taking recommendations as to which other experts might be called upon. Once his selection 
had been made, it consisted of  a group—dubbed the Comissão de Notáveis or Experts’ 
Commission—described by the Defence Ministry official in charge of  policy development as 
                                                 
285 Campos, pp. 466-467. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
286 Interview with José Luiz Machado e Costa, 3 September 2002. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
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comprised of  “seven academic members, six members of  the military, five career diplomats, 
two politicians, one journalist and one political scientist”.287  
 
Table 1: Members of  the MoD Experts' Commission (Comissão de notáveis) 
Academics 
Professor Luís Antônio Bitencourt Woodrow Wilson Center, ex-SAE, ex-SNI 
Professor  Clóvis Brigagão CEAs, Universidade Cândido Mendes 
Coronel (ref.) Geraldo Lesbat  Cavagnari Filho NEE, Universidade Estadual de Campinas 
Professor Thomaz Guedes da Costa CHDS, (US) Nat'l Defense Univ; ex-SAE 
Professor René Armand Dreifuss Universidade Federal Fluminense 
Professor José Augusto Guilhon 
Albuquerque 
Universidade de São Paulo (USP) 
Professor Hélio Jaguaribe IEPES, Rio de Janeiro 
Professor Eliézer Rizzo de  Oliveira NEE, Universidade Estadual de Campinas 
Professor Domício Proença Júnior GEE/COPPE,  
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro 
 
Legislative Branch 
Senator José  Fogaça Brazilian Federal Senate (PMDB-RS) 
Federal Deputy José Genoíno Brazilian Federal Chamber of  Deputies  
(PT-SP) 
 
Executive Branch/FA 
General-de-Exército Alberto Cardoso Army; Director,  
Gabinete de Segurança Institucional 
Vice-Almirante (RRm)  Fernando Manoel 
Fontes 
Diegues Navy (ret.); ex-Director,  
Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN) 
Almirante-de-Esquadra (RRm) Mário César Flores Navy (ret.); ex-Director, EGN;  
ex-Director, SAE 
Tenente-Brigadeiro-do-Ar (RR) Murilo Santos Air Force (ret.) 
Vice-Almirante (RRm)  Armando Amorim 
Ferreira 
Vidigal Navy (ret.);  
ex-Director, EGN 
 
MRE 
Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Júnior MRE, Perm. Rep. to the United Nations 
Ministro Edmundo Fujita MRE, ex-SAE 
Professor/Ministro de Estado Celso Lafer MRE (Minister of  State, Fn. Aff.),  
USP Law Dept. 
Ambassador/Sec. Gen. Rubens Ricupero MRE; Secretary General, UNCTAD 
Ambassador/Min. de Est. Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg MRE; ex-Director, SAE;  
Minister of  State, Sci. + Tech. 
 
Both Machado e Costa and Navy Captain Rudibert Kilian, who until January 2003 headed 
the DPDN and was the Secretary of  the Policy Working Group, indicated that the majority of  
Commission members had been chosen based on institutionalised prestige, such as their 
current or former position or rank. Among the academics, professors were chosen who were 
“well-known for their wisdom”,288 and who had established a record of  continuous excellence 
in publication. Often, issue-specific commentaries in the popular media were taken into 
account as well.  
                                                 
287 E-mail from Capitão-de-Mar-e-Guerra (FN) Rudibert Kilian Júnior, received 2 September 2002. It remains a mystery why 
the status of academic was not accorded to the political scientist. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
288 Interview with Rudibert Kilian Júnior and Gunther Rudzit, Brasília, Brazil, 22 August 2002; Interview with José Luiz 
Machado e Costa, 3 September 2002. The original Portuguese expression used is de notório saber.  
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Among the MRE representatives on the Experts' Commission were Ambassador Gelson 
Fonseca Júnior (then Brazil's Permanent Representative to the United Nations), who had 
written on the history of  the discipline of  International Relations in Brazil and been involved 
in security-related diplomacy and could bring a thorough knowledge of  multilateralist 
diplomacy—one of  the underpinnings of  Brazilian foreign policy—to the table; Foreign 
Minister Professor Celso Lafer, selected both ex officio and for his knowledge gained as a 
Professor in the Faculty of  Law at the University of  São Paulo; Sardenberg, then Minister for 
Science and Technology; Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, a diplomat of  considerable 
experience in security matters who was Secretary-General of  the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development from 1995-2003; and Ministro Edmundo Fujita, a mid-career 
security expert.  
Legislators included Rio Grande do Sul Senator José Fogaça of  the PMDB (the successor 
party to the MDB, the opposition under the military government) and São Paulo Deputy José 
Genoíno of  the Worker's Party, who headed that chamber’s Committee on External Relations 
and National Defence. 
The commission's military officers were all of  flag rank, and all but one were retired. The 
one active-duty officer was four-star Army General Alberto Cardoso, head of  the GSI. It is in 
this office—and, to an extent in his person, that a great deal of  power is accumulated, and 
General Cardoso's power is a favourite target of  critics of  the state of  civil-military relations 
in Brazil. The retired officers were Vice-Almirante Fernando Manoel Fontes, ex-Director of  
the Escola de Guerra Naval (EGN); Flores, who also once headed the EGN and has authored 
numerous articles and a book on strategy; Air Force four-star General Murilo Santos; and 
another former EGN director, Vice-Almirante Armando Amorim Vidigal Ferreira, also with 
several publications and frequent commentaries to his name.  
The academic members of  the Commission, according to Kilian and Machado e Costa, 
were chosen based primarily on their prestige within the discipline and on the demonstration 
of  advanced specialised knowledge through extensive publications and repeated personal 
references: 
Question: What is it that makes an academic—what attribute, what characteristic—makes them 
representatives of  society? 
 
Machado e Costa: It was a criterion that was merely[…] it was based on their academic production, based on 
their profile as a former of  opinion. […] 
 
Question: So there was the criterion of  presence in the media. 
 
Machado e Costa: The criterion—let's put it this way—was empirical. We basically tried to identify who were 
the people that presented consistency and quality of  analysis, and for one month we read everything that 
came out, everything that had been published, asking around at the universities, at the research centres if  
there was anyone else we might be missing. The names were always the same. All the works, those published 
in the field, were always the same. There, we had a certain criterion. There were journalists who wrote on 
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defence, but they weren't primary sources, that is to say they weren't formulators of  new concepts, they were 
not—how would one put this?—articulators of  new ideas. They were not contributing a new thinking.289 
The names that appeared repeatedly and were associated with extensive academic 
production were Prof. Luís Antônio Bitencourt, Prof. Clóvis Brigagão, Col. (ret.) Geraldo 
Lesbat Cavagnari Filho, Prof. Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Prof. René Armand Dreifuss, Prof. 
José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque, Prof. Hélio Jaguaribe, Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira and 
Prof. Domício Proença Júnior. 
  Luís Antônio Bitencourt was a civil servant with SNI and SAE. After 13 years at the Universidade Católica de Brasília, 
he was employed by the United Nations before coming to the Woodrow Wilson Center at the Smithsonian Institution in 
Washington, D.C., whose Brazil Project he headed as of  2003. Bitencourt participated in some of  the early meetings 
convened by Admiral Flores within SAE to discuss Brazilian national strategy.290 
  Prof. Clóvis Brigagão is the Co-Director of  the Centre for the Study of  the Americas at the Universidade Cândido 
Mendes in Rio de Janeiro. A former Chair of  the International Peace Research Association, he was introduced to peace 
studies during a visit to the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, where he was to investigate the Brazilian arms industry. He 
is the founder of  IPRA's Study Group on Ecology and Security and has written extensively on environmental security. 
Prof. Brigagão is also a former Chief  of  the Cabinet of  the Rio de Janeiro State Government. He is a graduate of  
IUPERJ.291 
  Geraldo Lesbat Cavagnari Filho is a retired Army Colonel who now heads the Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos at the 
State University of  Campinas, of  which he was a co-founder in 1985. Posted at Mexico's National War College in 
response to his opposition to human rights violations under the military regime, Cavagnari was an aide to Gen. Octavio 
Costa, who closed down many of  the military torture centres in the country's Northeast. Though he holds no academic 
degree, Cavagnari's military career saw him posted to ECEME in addition to holding several other academic posts within 
the Army. Cavagnari is a frequent contributor to the São Paulo-area press and has produced a lengthy ibliography on 
defence and strategic issues.292 
  Prof. Thomaz Guedes da Costa is currently at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense 
University in Washington, D.C. For twenty years (1980-1999) he was an analyst with CNPq—the Brazilian National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Development. From 1990-1999 he taught in the Department of  International 
Relations at the University of  Brasília. From 1990-1997 he co-ordinated research for the Centre for Strategic Studies at 
SAE. Prof. Costa defended his doctoral dissertation entitled “The formation of  defence policy in Brazil: grand strategy 
and air power politics and doctrine during the Cold War (1945-1974) at Columbia University in 1997.293 
  René Armand Dreifuss was Professor of  Political Science at the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro. He 
held a B.A. from the University of  Haifa, an M.A. from the University of  Leeds and a Ph.D. from the University of  
Glasgow. His research interests were diverse, but included a significant number of  writings on security-related issues, 
predominantly from sociological and class-based perspectives. He was a founding member of  the NEE in Campinas294. 
Dreifuss passed away after a protracted illness in May of  2003. 
  Prof. Hélio Jaguaribe is a renowned sociologist with an extensive catalogue of  publications. Though not a security 
specialist, his publications include texts on political development, international relations, Latin America and social theory. 
Jaguaribe holds a bachelor's degree in law from the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro and a doctorate 
from the Universität Mainz. He has taught at Harvard and Stanford Universities and at M.I.T. A former head of  the 
Department of  Sciences at ISEB (an important counterweight to ESG in the 1960s and home of  important elements of  
the antropofagia movement), he has since 1979 been Dean of  the Institute for Political and Social Studies (IEPES) in Rio 
de Janeiro. 295  
  Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira was Professor of  Political Science at the State University of  Campinas and a member of  
the Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos. He retired in 2004. He holds a doctorate from the Fondation Nationale des Sciences 
Politiques in Paris. Oliveira is a respected expert on civil-military relations and regularly publishes opinion pieces in the 
media as well as numerous academic journals. He is closely involved with one of  Brazil's political parties and has been 
watching closely the process leading to the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence. He is a member of  the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies.296 
  Prof. Domício Proença Júnior is Professor and Chairman of  the Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos (Group for Strategic Studies 
- GEE) at the Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate and Research Engineering (COPPE) of  the University of  
Brazil (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He holds a D.Sc. from that institution and is a graduate of  the Escola Superior de 
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291 Some of this information was obtained in Interviews with Prof. Clóvis Brigagão, 1 and 26 August 2002. 
292 Interview with Coronel (ref.) Geraldo Lesbat Cavagnari Filho, 1 July 2002 
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July 2002. 
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296 Some of this information was obtained in Interviews with Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, 27 June and 1 July 2002 
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Guerra (2000). He was a member of  the NEE in Campinas and is a member of  the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies.297 
The invitation to outside civilian experts to participate in the defence policymaking process 
in fact had a dual purpose: 
we had this criterion of  having people who had consistently produced dense, serious and relevant work in the 
field in the civilian academic sphere. To insert them into the process [sic]. The idea was dual: first and 
foremost, to bring to the internal debate within the Ministry of  Defence and the Government, civilian 
thinking from the academic world that was not being used because of  this closing-off  that had happened. 
And the second idea, which was also important, was to show the academics what was going on in the 
Ministry of  Defence process. That the military had opened the dialogue and agreed to accept that 
contribuition, that help. That they needed to open it up in order to be able to go on, because they couldn't do 
it alone. And they were convinced of  this. … Their contribution was essential and fundamental.298  
The members of  the Experts' Commission were asked to prepare written proposals 
incorporating their views and to submit these to the Ministry of  Defence by 30 June 2000. 
They were then invited separately to Brasília between that date and the end of  2000 to defend 
their proposals in person before a committee of  Defence Ministry and FA representatives. 
High-ranking active officials such as sitting Cabinet Ministers (Sardenberg, Cardoso) were not 
interviewed in this manner. All but one of  the other members—Dreifuss, for health 
reasons—made the trip to the capital. Machado e Costa then aggregated their proposals into a 
document passed on within the Ministry of  Defence, which was to be incorporated to some 
extent into the DPDN's efforts at establishing a new defence policy.299  
As head of  the DPDN, it was Kilian who was largely responsible for formulating the 
theoretical concept of  security in use in the Brazilian Ministry of  Defence. During an 
interview300, Kilian gave an exposition of  the security concept being used within DPDN, 
which is based on a 1985 report submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General by a 
group a security experts. It declares that 
[i]n principle, security is a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of  military attack, 
political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and 
progress. International security is thus the result and the sum of  the security of  each and every State member 
of  the international community; accordingly, international security cannot be reached without full 
international co-operation. However, security is a relative rather than an absolute term. National and 
international security need to be viewed as matters of  degree.301 
According to Kilian, the resulting concept of  security that reigns within the Brazilian 
Ministry of  Defence is broadly defined: 
this was, so to speak, the guiding light. From there we came to the conclusion, after extensive study, that 
security—a broad definition of  security—is an equality, a quality, a condition or an ideal state enjoyed by an 
individual, a family, a community, a society or a nation, in feeling free of  threats, dangers and risks.  
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 99
… This broad definition illustrates that security is a desired effect. And this effect is enjoyed in various layers, 
at various levels, by men, families, communities, societies, and at the highest level, nations. …  
You can enjoy a reasonable degree of  security on the external level and internally, you have security problem 
at the individual level, on a smaller scale… So from there we started to investigate the following; what is 
defence? The first corollary we came up with in this line of  reasoning was that security cannot be associated 
only with the effects resulting from the use of  force, based on military capabilities. Security is not just an 
effect resulting from the use of  force.  
… This resulting effect comes from the adoption of  protective measures in the social, diplomatic, economic 
and scientific-technological302 fields, even with respect to the environment, in response to risks and threats 
that contain non-military dimensions. …  
We soldiers will not enter the social arena to discuss a protective measure that has its effect there, outside of  
the military dimension. Because it doesn't concern our discussion. Understand? The way we define security 
means that both security and defence both are multi-dimensional, which contains the use of  force as a 
resource, both this use doesn't consist only of  militarisation.  
… The words security and defence do not involve only the military dimension. They involve all spheres and 
levels of  power that are constituted by state institutions, and each within his sector must take his measure. 
… So when we speak of  national defence policy, we are speaking of  actions in all areas, not just in the 
military arena. We see defence policy as a system, a systematic organisation in which the central organ is the 
Ministry of  Defence. … 
National defence is the combination of  state actions with an emphasis on the application of  the military 
expression of  national power303 in defence of  territory, sovereignty, and national interests against external 
threats. But external threats need not be only military. Thus, if  in every sector a measure needs to be taken, 
defence policy is multi-sectoral. It is a state policy that must remain in place for an extended period of  time. 
… 
So, for example, derived from the national defence policy, we in the military, as well as every other sector, will 
issue our own policy in relation to defence. In our case, the military, it will be called the Military Defence 
Policy. The Ministry of  Science and Technology will issue a Science and Technology Policy for Defence. The 
Ministry of  Economics should do an Economic Defence Policy. But, you see, this is all still in a very incipient 
state. There will need to be a lot of  adaptations made in the governmental ambit. All this that we have been 
speaking about is still at the level of  a theoretical construct. This system has not been implemented in 
practice. So what we are doing at the moment is constructing this mentality and carving out competencies 
inside the government. Because the central organ will be the Ministry of  Defence.304 
It is important to note that Kilian and his division arrived at this conception without 
knowledge of  sector-based approaches to the redefinition of  security (other than the ESG 
Doctrine) such as that developed at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute305, and utilised 
notions of  levels of  the provision of  security without exposure to bodies of  literature such as 
critical security studies306. The interview cited here took place after the Experts' Commission's 
submissions had been at the disposal of  the DPDN for over a year and a half, indicating that 
notions derived from the new security agenda were not present in the Commission's work. 
Together with input from each of  the service branches as well as elements within the 
Ministry of  Defence, the papers received from members of  the Experts' Commission were 
distilled into a document designed to serve as the cornerstone of  efforts to create new policies 
entitled Modernização do Sistema de Defesa Nacional (MSDN). This document is considered 
confidential and has not been approved as of  December 2004. When asked about the 
usefulness of  the contributions provided by the Experts, Machado e Costa replied that  
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[…]not everything they said was used. A lot of  things were. But what the military had to say was included 
also, logically. Everyone at his own level. You said it very well when you said that those who are in power, in 
the Executive, must decide quickly, and academics can take years to think things through. Many times that 
which was presented was very elaborate, very academic, very far from the focus of  what we were looking for. 
But [the Minister also went to] various countries, China, Russia, Germany, England, France, the USA, all the 
countries of  South America, to see if  this could serve to consolidate a new kind of  thinking. And this new 
thinking was substantiated in [the MSDN]. This is a very concise 50-page document, whose first chapter is 
just that: “The Modernisation of  the National Defence System”.307 
The policy elaboration process was centred on yet another Working Group, this one 
comprised of  flag-rank representatives of  the three Forces, as well as delegates from each of  
the subdivisions of  the MD, the Defence General Staff  (Estado-Maior da Defesa [EMD]—the 
successor to EMFA), and the Minister’s Special Advisors. Most members of  the group were 
active-duty officers, though a small number of  them were civilians. The group's secretary was 
Kilian308.  
Kilian assesses the normative content of  the ensuing document as follows:  
Obviously there was a lot of  reaction to the initial proposals, given the conservative position of  the military 
establishment. As a participant and follower of  the ideas of  the vanguard in the first product, I had 
discussions with other members of  this working group; but despite winning the academic battle, I lost the 
war with the hierarchy. Thus, at the end we had a result that I would classify as possible in the given situation, 
but which goes only halfway towards a more daring and creative project. At least in one area we scored a 
victory; the approach to security was transformed into a multi-dimensional task, removing it from the 
exclusive responsibility of  the FA. Some of  the Experts' ideas were used by the working groups, which I 
would count as a possible forward step.309  
The period from 1994 to 2002, in which although much of  it has not been made public, 
Brazilian policymakers’ thinking on security issues has developed considerably, provides the 
opportunity to examine closely the role of  academics in that process. In doing so, the 
following sections will test the three hypotheses regarding uncertainty, specialised knowledge 
and institutionalised prestige, and resonance and argumentation. 
 
3.3. Policymaker uncertainty 
The first hypothesis states that the initial step towards academics’ influence in defence 
policymaking circles is the opening of  the policy process due to policymakers’ uncertainty. 
This uncertainty is generated by various factors originating either at the domestic or the 
international level. Most importantly to this examination, wherever the uncertainty is 
generated, it must engender a feeling among policymakers that current policy does not 
respond to a new situation faced by the country, and that the adequate response to the new 
parameters can no longer be found within established governmental policy circles alone. In 
other words, policymakers must come to the realisation that they can no longer go it alone and 
that outside help, particularly that of  academics, is necessary.  
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The splitting of  the policymaking community into civilian and military camps due to 
incomplete democratic control of  the armed forces has ramifications for the perception of  
uncertainty as well. The strong influence of  the military establishment—in terms both of  
their considerable autonomy of  individual force planning as well as the preponderance of  
uniformed officials within the Ministry of  Defence—means that, as will also be shown to be 
the case for the second and third hypotheses, perceptions are not uniform between these two 
groups, and in the absence of  dominance by one group, academics remain faced with a 
bifurcated audience. 
As has been mentioned, policy responses to change in Brazil often involve a considerable 
lag time due to the nature of  the political system. Thus, though they took place beginning in 
the mid-to-late 1990s, many of  the pressures to reform Brazilian defence policy came as a 
result of  the end of  the Cold War. The collapse of  the Soviet Union put to rest the threat of  
internal Communist-inspired insurrection that had previously justified the FA’s interventionist 
stance towards domestic politics.  
Similarly, the creation of  Mercosul in 1995 made incongruous the military’s preoccupation 
with Argentina as a potential threat, requiring the military to adopt other external threat 
scenarios if  it was to justify its prestige and privilege. This led uniformed strategists to turn 
both towards internal missions such as drug trafficking and transnational crime and towards 
an emphasis on instability in Colombia as a potential source of  threat to Brazil. Both 
approaches led to increased importance being placed on the Amazon basin, traditionally—as 
shown—already an area of  extensive involvement of  the military in non-traditional missions. 
At the domestic level, a change of  government or sudden changes in policymaking capacity 
within the government can lead policymakers to perceive the need to open the policy process. 
Here again, the reactive nature of  policymaking in Brazil leads to a notoriously lethargic pace 
of  reform. As in the case of  internationally generated uncertainty, the period from 1996 to 
2002 was one in which policy reform efforts were a reaction to changes that occurred as a 
result of  the end of  military rule in 1985 and the adoption of  the new Constitution in 1988.  
In terms of  the secondary goals to be achieved through a redefinition of  security policy in 
the present day, civilian and military policymakers should be seen as working at cross purposes 
in their response to the loss of  political privileges for the FA. While uniformed strategists are 
seeking to redefine the military’s mission in order to maintain and justify budget levels and 
political influence, many civilian policymakers as well as academic experts view the present 
period as the first in which national policy can be made under the control of  civilians, and 
military predominance banished once and for all.  
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The civilian-military divide retains its applicability in the case of  policymaking capacity. 
There are significant differences in the self-perceived level of  policymaking capacity between 
the military and civilian sectors. The formulation of  Brazilian defence policy has for decades 
been almost exclusively in the hands of  the military establishment, which has limited the 
ability of  civil society to develop a certain level of  expertise on military issues. While civilian 
policymakers and academics thus feel a strong degree of  uncertainty and the need to “catch 
up”, the military establishment possesses a very well-developed and highly institutionalised 
system of  professional training and schooling, which includes a strong component of  strategic 
and policy-oriented thinking. Military observers, at least those still in active service and within 
the individual forces as opposed to those seconded to the more progressive-minded MD, are 
thus loath to admit uncertainty, while civilians (and retired officers) are more likely to feel the 
need for fresh inputs and outside advice. 
The military educational system, from officer training schools to ESG, perpetuates a 
culture of  “doing things by the book” and establishes its ubiquitous doctrine as providing the 
answers to all potential issues, creating a culture that does not admit uncertainty or particularly 
the need for outside assistance, especially from civil society. Further, the national security 
doctrine in question lays the foundations for an antagonistic relationship between the military 
and civil society, establishing as it does the notion of  an “internal enemy” among the people. 
Civilian policymakers, such as those in the MRE, do not have the same qualms about outside 
inputs, though here too it is a question of  the expertise present in civil society.  
 
3.3.1. Generated in international arena 
In the case of  Brazil at the beginning of  the time period under investigation, there were 
two primary sources of  uncertainty that were generated in the international arena; these are 
the end of  the Cold War and the establishment of  Mercosul. To these, Domício Proença 
Júnior adds the revolution in military technology: 
In external terms, the end of  the Argentine scenario affected the Armed Forces in different ways. The Navy 
had never made of  it a principal priority […] The Army, on the other hand, had in the Argentine scenario its 
principal contingency, its principal criterion for the disposition of  its forces. […] [T]he Brazilian Air Force 
was in between these outlooks, and a substantial part of  its logic and disposition expressed the priority 
accorded the Argentine scenario by the Army. 
The end of  the Cold War had less marked but no less significant effects. On the one hand, the East-West 
conflict had a particular and substantive role in the way the Brazilian Armed Forces were employed, be it in 
terms of  the forging of  an alliance with the West in general and the USA in particular, or be it in the flow of  
methods and concepts into the Forces’ cognitive structure. The end of  communism and thus of  the anti-
communist fight was a shock to the worldview of  a large number of  officers, and brought with it a sense of  
helplessness as much in terms of  foreign policy as in terms of  internal positioning. To be more incisive: there 
came to be a tension between the obvious need for changes and a profound reluctance to undertake them.310 
                                                 
310 Proença, Visão, pp. 10-11. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
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As Alexandre Fuccille points out, the collapse of  communism effectively invalidated two 
of  the three dominant operational hypotheses in FA planning at the time: while the threat of  
regional conflict—having been minimal to begin with—waned in the face of  increasing 
economic integration, those of  global and (internal) subversive conflict lost credibility311. This 
last form of  conflict, and its disappearance as an accepted rationale for military planning, had 
a pronounced effect on the internal political role of  the military, definitively placing its 
legitimate sphere of  action outside Brazil’s borders and putting an end to the military’s 
traditionally interventionist role in internal politics: 
The nature of  threats facing the region is important in justifying which roles and missions the military plays. 
The end of  the Cold War and the widespread disappearance of  guerrilla insurgencies and their external 
sponsors have largely invalidated internal security missions for Latin America’s armed forces.312  
However, while these assessments could be applied to the international threat environment 
at the time of  the 1996 PDN, and pointed to a reduced internal role for the FA, by the time 
of  the 2002 policy revision the military establishment had once again succeeded in redefining 
its mission to include threats that did not halt at international borders: 
[The Minister of  Defence] affirmed that uncertainty at the international level called for the maintenance of  
military structures capable of  conventional combat, even in countries outside of  tension zones, such as 
Brazil. At the same time he recognised that this type of  forces was of  limited utility in dealing with various 
“new threats, which include drug trafficking and terrorism”.  
These aspects are the basis for a redefinition of  priorities and procedures, for which the Ministry of  Defence 
is undertaking a broad revision of  the guidelines of  Brazilian strategic planning. Its goal is to define the 
military architecture needed by the country and attend to its defence needs in the decades to come.313 
The lack of  a clearly defined mission in the face of  new threats emanating from the 
international level had clear ramifications at the domestic level as well. The lack of  a rationale 
derived from an international threat scenario to underpin the retention of  its extensive 
prerogatives in the domestic political arena plunged the Brazilian military establishment into 
what some analysts have called an “identity crisis”314. This crisis was intimately linked to the 
need for the FA to redefine its internal role—both in terms of  political participation and in 
terms of  internal deployment—in the face of  changed domestic political parameters. 
 
3.3.2. Generated in domestic arena 
Uncertainty at the domestic level over the future relationship between the military 
establishment, the civilian government and Brazilian society led to different preoccupations, 
with different results, on the respective sides of  the military-civilian divide. While civilian 
politicians and members of  the executive branch—including the President himself—saw this 
                                                 
311 Fuccille, temática interna, p. 11.  
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as the moment to cement a new, less interventionist and less privileged role for the military, 
the FA sought to find new missions and threats to justify their extant privileges. The result of  
the civilian efforts was the long-awaited creation of  the Ministry of  Defence; the FA’s search 
for new priorities resulted in an emphasis on the Amazonian region and new, often internal, 
threats such as drug trafficking and international organised crime.  
Ironically, the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence did more to alleviate military concerns 
about loss of  influence than the renewed focus on the Amazon. Zaverucha points out that 
this is due in part to President Cardoso’s concern with remaining in the military’s good graces 
through budgetary doting and other, less tangible, favours towards the FA315. Also, during 
Cardoso’s first term in office, he repeatedly made use of  the armed forces in internal security 
missions316. Though João R. Martins Filho and Daniel Zirker argue that by the time of  the 
creation of  the MD, the identity crisis had been largely overcome, they do highlight succinctly 
the sources of  military preoccupation with a loss of  status and redefinition of  their mission: 
 […][T]he administration of  Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) took steps to extinguish the National 
Information Service (SNI) and National Security Council, two agencies fundamental to the exercise of  
military tutelage over civilian political power. This significantly changed the pattern that had existed during 
José Sarney’s presidency, in which the minister of  the army clearly played the role of  eminence noir [sic] in the 
regime. The impact of  these changes on the military was aggravated, moreover, by officers’ perception that 
civilians were very little aware of  the importance of  the armed forces. The salary crisis, the lack of  modern 
equipment, and external proposals (particularly those from the United States) for reorienting the functions of  
the armed forces of  the Third World agitated this medley of  uncertainty.317 
Fuccille underscores the fact that uncertainty among the military derived primarily from 
preoccupation with finding a new mission regarding internal security318 similar to previous 
missions within Brazil’s borders underpinned by the US-inspired DSN and its vision of  the 
“internal enemy”, perpetuating the military’s self-perceived role as a poder moderador319. After 
the demise of  the Argentine threat scenario, such missions centred heavily on the Amazonian 
region.  
After a typically protracted gestation period, the military’s plans to increase its role in 
Amazonia came to fruition with the inauguration in 2002 of  the SIVAM (Sistema de Vigilância 
da Amazônia—Amazonian Surveillance System). A joint, though Air Force-dominated, system 
of  radars and intervention forces designed to combat drug trafficking and monitor the 
spillover of  the Colombian civil war into Brazilian territory, SIVAM and the Calha Norte 
project illustrate the prominent place of  the Amazon region in current Brazilian military 
thinking320. In refocusing its efforts on Amazonia, the Brazilian military was able to retain if  
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not institutional influence over the governing process, certainly a continued role within the 
country’s borders.  
Civilian efforts centred around the institutionalisation of  civilian control over military and 
security issues through the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence. The MD not only provided a 
legal basis for the definitive subordination of  military privilege, but also clearly contributed to 
the elaboration of  new missions for the FA. The security policy formulation process is the 
foremost example of  the latter. 
According to the head of  its Secretariat of  Institutional Organisation in 2002, the creation 
of  the MD was an “eminently political act”, directed by the executive branch, designed to 
realign civil-military relations in Brazil alongside its more clearly visible role in streamlining the 
defence decisionmaking process321. Jadir Dias Proença admits that uncertainty was an 
important component in creating the MD: “we had to create uncertainty in order to get rid of  
the status quo”322. Citing what he deemed a positive example in Argentina and a negative one 
in Chile, he pointed out that the climate of  political contestation led to the desire to avoid 
rupture by creating the conditions for debate first within government and later with civil 
society regarding the creation of  the MD323.  
The MD thus had two primary types of  mission, both intended to alleviate uncertainty and 
each catering to one side of  the civil-military equation. Alongside those quoted above, which 
are the legally anchored institutional responsibilities of  the Ministry and serve to alleviate the 
military identity crisis through the provision of  clear policy guidelines and missions, there was 
the MD’s role in institutionalising civilian control over the decisionmaking process regarding 
both national security policy and the role of  the armed forces with respect to debates within 
civil society.  
Whether uncertainty actually leads to an opening of  the policy process depends on the 
attributes not only of  the experts later called upon, but equally upon those of  the key security 
policymakers. Once extant policy has been deemed inadequate, there must be both the 
realisation that adequate policy cannot be made without assistance, and of  the value of  
academic input in providing that assistance. Two major factors come into play here: the 
intellectual inclinations of  policymakers, and the emphasis placed on engagement with civil 
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society. The origins of  the Brazilian Ministry of  Defence in an “eminently political act” 
designed to entrench civil supremacy and engage civil society were reflected in the actions of  
policymakers once the process of  policy formulation within the Ministry got underway. The 
foremost example of  this is the inclusion of  academics in the Experts’ Commission.  
The clearest evidence of  uncertainty on the part of  policymakers, and of  an ensuing 
realisation of  the need for outside input, comes from Machado e Costa himself. His statement 
underscores once again the differences between the uncertainty felt by civilian policymakers 
and the need they perceived to democratise the policymaking process, and the closed nature 
of  military institutional culture and the reliance on extant doctrine’s ability to confront new 
threats:  
There [were] no civilians thinking about defence policy, only the military officers in the [Defence Ministry’s] 
Secretariat of  Policy, Strategy and International Affairs, who are generals and colonels. So what happened? I 
was put there by the Minister as a Special Advisor to be the counterweight to this. The first thing I [said] was 
“alone, I can’t do this. This is a very big task, I need to get support from people who think better on this than 
I do”. I was just the intermediary. 
 
Question: So as in the first hypothesis, this is the idea of  “I need help”? 
 
No. Not quite. The prevailing idea was, we can very well do this alone. […] The military thought they could 
do it, but they weren’t pulling it off. The documents that were coming out were not good. They were 
documents that did not apply to reality, in part because each branch made its own policy..  
 
Question: Not in the sense of  “I can’t do it alone”, but that it might be a good idea to get an input from 
outside. 
  
I wouldn’t say that. I did not feel that, on the contrary, I felt a withdrawal, a fear that now with the civilian 
Ministry, agreements might come along that could compromise the corporate interests of  the Forces. So this 
was seen with a lot of  suspicion. A lot of  distrust. […] When the academics began to show up[…] the 
generals really heard what they had to say; they still were using ESG doctrine, the doctrine of  the three 
forces. […] So, it is an adaptation. [ESG doctrine] is concepts from the Second World War, from the Korean 
War, adapted with counter-insurgency doctrine from the 1970s and 80s, and they have begun to make some 
adaptations for terrorism, support for security forces, when necessary without direct involvement, as armed 
forces against drug trafficking. The society had to be consulted on what it expects from their military, because 
they were in a dilemma. This was our great point of  support. As you said: show them that they needed help. 
Because they were in a dilemma.324 
This quotation reveals that while in Machado e Costa’s estimation, current policy—as made 
by the military establishment—was not responding properly to altered threat scenarios, the 
second step toward the opening of  the policy process—the realisation of  the need for 
assistance—was not occurring. This is due to the fact that the DSN is presented throughout 
the military educational system as universally applicable. It was not until civilian policymakers 
realised the disconnect between the policies and the situations to which they were intended to 
respond that the second step occurred. 
It is interesting to note that when asked about his own uncertainty—which does adhere to 
the predictions of  the first hypothesis—Machado e Costa applies the question to the Ministry 
as a whole, in particular to the military officers to whom he was a civilian “counterweight”. 
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His answer thus highlights both what he perceived as a need for assistance and outside input 
and the refusal on the part of  elements of  the military establishment to admit the same. While 
policymaker characteristics such as these are important, once uncertainty within 
decisionmaking circles has led to an opening of  the formulation process—in some cases due 
to the intellectual proclivities of  certain key figures—it is the attributes possessed by the 
academics themselves that determine the extent to which their inputs are able to influence 
declaratory policy.  
 
3.4. Attributes of  academic advisors 
Once the policy process has been opened to outside input, experts who wish to gain access 
must possess specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige. Specialised knowledge in 
the case of  defence academics can be divided into two types: practical and theoretical. The 
former largely originates within the military and policymaking establishments. The latter 
consists of  general theories of  International Relations and its sub-disciplines as well as 
normative worldviews taken from the practice of  international law and diplomacy. Though 
many policymakers possess academic training in these areas, this is not invariably the case, and 
many bureaucrats with academic grounding do not have the time to stay up to date on the 
latest developments and debates issuing from academe. While there are little if  any hindrances 
to academics’ and civilians’ accumulating this type of  knowledge, the same cannot be said of  
practical knowledge related to defence issues. 
The armed forces have the option of  exercising tight control over the public dissemination 
of  the information upon which practical specialised knowledge is based. Thus, the ability of  
the academic community to accrue such knowledge is highly dependent upon the openness of  
the military establishment, on transparency and by extension on the degree of  political control 
exercised by civilian lawmakers and policymakers over the military. In light of  this fact, in the 
majority of  cases it is likely that the specialised knowledge policymakers seek from academics 
will be theoretical in nature. 
In addition to possession of  specialised knowledge, a requisite attribute of  the successful 
policy academic is institutionalised prestige. The professional socialisation of  academics within 
scholarly institutions rewards certain forms of  academic production that may be different 
from those rewarded within policymaking circles. Security experts who seek to contribute to 
the policy process must demonstrate both success as it is measured within academe, and the 
ability to transform the output that led to that success into inputs that are useful to the 
policymaking community. Academics gain institutionalised prestige by publishing articles and 
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monographs, contributing to mainstream media, exposing their ideas publicly at academic 
conferences and, occasionally, through policy briefings. At a more interpersonal level, former 
students enter into the policy world and retain ideas learned in academe, and colleagues can 
further academics’ reputations with policymakers by word of  mouth. 
The institutionalised prestige of  academics depends on the reputation of  the university 
system within the country in question, and on the status of  International Relations and 
security studies as disciplines within both the local academic structure and public debates on 
issues related to the security problematic. Finally, experts who possess specialized knowledge 
and institutionalised prestige must have the ability to present their inputs in a way that 
highlights their utility to solving specific and bounded policy problems, and they must do so 
while arguing on a normative basis in favour of  a given suggestion.  
At its base, the process involves a choice between aiming directly for policy influence at the 
possible expense of  furtherment in a strictly academic career, and first attaining a certain level 
of  success according to criteria from academe or then transforming this into influence and 
prestige in the policy sphere. Due to the current state of  advancement of  its public security 
debate and policy process, the Brazilian context unfortunately did not provide adequate data 
to allow the effects of  cogency and normative argumentation to be properly traced. 
 
3.4.1. Specialised knowledge 
In the Brazilian case, the access of  academics to specialised knowledge has traditionally 
been limited, though with the advent of  the Ministry of  Defence and improved journalistic 
coverage of  such military issues as the acquisition of  major weapons systems, this situation is 
changing. The Brazilian case showcases the role of  theoretical specialized knowledge in 
determining academics’ ability to build up the types of  expertise that lead to inclusion in 
policy formulation. Of  primary importance to understanding the development of  civilian 
expertise and the flow of  defence-related information, even the language which sets the 
parameters of  the debate on security issues in Brazil, is the role of  ESG and the DSN. 
 
 3.4.1.1. Practical specialised knowledge 
With few exceptions, civil society in Brazil, the academic security studies community 
included, does not possess a high degree of  specialised military-technical knowledge. The 
Brazilian military have traditionally been reluctant to release specific technical data and tactical 
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information to the civilian public325. Civilian expertise is concentrated predominantly on the 
normative aspects of  military issues. In one of  the first works to deal directly with academics’ 
role in security affairs in Brazil, Experts’ Commission members Clóvis Brigagão and Domício 
Proença Júnior highlight the dangers of  such a division of  labour on defence issues: 
[t]here is thus a situation in which we are living with a real deficiency in reflection, which is established in 
research initiatives and practices, in the training of  cadres and in the formulation of  public policy. 
This diagnosis allows the recognition of  a double lacuna. First, there is a pernicious division of  labour. 
Diplomats and the military tend to reduce the discussion to technical and operational questions, viewed from 
a corporative perspective. 
Academics transit through the topic of  peace and security in normative fashion, disregarding the concrete 
functioning and operation of  the institutions that are directly involved. They end up dealing with the question 
by means of  the abstract enunciation of  goals or the institution of  legislative or juridical mechanisms. 
The result is that no-one bears responsibility for the unification (concatenação) of  political goals, diplomatic 
initiatives and the concrete structure of  the armed forces, and, even less, for the formulation of  strategies.  
The second lacuna is a mirror of  the first. Neither the diplomatic and military bureaucracies nor the 
universities face a demand for a more profound technical competence regarding the questions involved.326  
According to Brigagão and Proença, this leaves a situation in which the approach of  the 
diplomatic bureaucracy is too cautious and abstract, whereas the positivist discourse of  the 
military, while appropriate for combat, is not suited for pondering critically the political 
matters at hand, and the discourse in civil society regarding security matters has not moved far 
beyond tautology327. The release of  information regarding military and defence matters in 
Brazil is very restrictive328. Without this information, experts are not able to build up a body 
of  specialised knowledge. Machado e Costa notes that  
[w]hen a more open regime began in 1985, when we had the civilian government, there were not even people 
with sufficient access to information on [defence] issues—I mean civilians, from the academic world. Because 
things were very closed, and nothing was open, people could only guess about what might be happening, they 
had no access. And it would appear that this access remains difficult even today. I mean, 15 or 17 years after 
the end of  the military regime, it's not all the academics who have access to information, to archives and who 
are granted interviews by people from the military who will actually pass on to them relevant information. So, 
the information that the academics have is partial and sectorialised, they never have all the data on a question. 
Sometimes, they think they do. Each one of  the various academics can concentrate the focus of  his work on 
a given question. But none among them has a view of  the big picture. And the military remain extremely 
closed to the participation of  academics.329 
Though access to technical information can often be gained from international sources—
more easily than from the Brazilian military establishment itself330—the specialised knowledge 
accumulated by Brazil’s security academics remains largely centred on its theoretical 
manifestation.  
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 3.4.1.2. Theoretical specialised knowledge 
Given the origins of  much technical information either within the military establishment 
itself  or in sources to which it has greater access, Brazil’s military decisionmakers are not likely 
to turn to academics for assistance. However, even where theoretical specialised knowledge is 
at stake, several factors inhibit military officers’ willingness to take recourse to outside 
assistance. These are rooted in the FA’s institutional culture, particularly as codified in the 
DSN and the workings of  the military educational system.  
Brazil’s military education system is highly developed; each branch has its own separate 
network of  professional training schools which can be roughly but not comprehensively 
equated across services. Of  the three branches, the Army has the most solid and extensive 
teaching system, consisting of  almost 50 schools and academies331. In the EB’s educational 
system, exposure to strategic thinking, and pedagogical treatment of  security and other 
higher-order concepts, increase with rank. Basic notions of  history and geopolitics are taught 
to entering cadets at the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN) and during other 
courses such as the those at Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (EsAO) until mid-career. 
Officers of  the rank of  captain, major and lieutenant colonel may take the highly selective 
Curso de Altos Estudos Militares (CAEM—Higher Military Studies Course) offered by the Army 
Command and General Staff  College (Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército—ECEME).  
ECEME's Army Course on Politics, Strategy and Higher Administration (Curso de Política, 
Estratégia e Alta Administração do Exército—CPEAEx), intended for officers of  the rank of  
colonel, is where the soldier-students deal for the first time with strategy and security concepts 
in earnest. Approximately 30 percent of  the teaching time in this course is devoted to security 
doctrine332. The CPEAEx is the highest course offered within the Army's own education 
system. It is mirrored by the Maritime Politics and Strategy Course (Curso de Política e Estratégia 
Marítimas—C-PEM) taught at the EGN and the Aerospatial Politics and Strategy Course 
(Curso de Política e Estratégia Aeroespaciais—CPEA) taught at the Air Force University.  
According to several officers who have been through the Navy and Air Force systems and 
who are familiar with the Army's system as well, exposure to notions of  security and strategy 
is more gradual in these systems and begins earlier in an officer's career333. In all branches, 
these courses—whose acceptance rate is less than two percent even with candidates given five 
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attempts at admission—are, with very few exceptions, a prerequisite for promotion to flag 
rank, a “ticket to important functions”334. 
At the apex of  the military schooling system sits ESG, the Higher War College. Though 
there is a limited amount of  cross-branch participation in each service’s officer training 
courses335, ESG is the only inter-service academy and its courses are the highest level 
accessible to Brazilian military officers in Brazil itself. ESG was founded in 1949 by officers 
who had fought in Italy with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force during the Second World 
War336. These officers were heavily influenced both by the institutional arrangements they had 
encountered during their post-war training in the United States337 (ESG was modelled after the 
U.S.’ National War College) and the positivist traditions instilled by the French Mission 
militaire338. The positivist tradition also runs strong in the academic world, hampering the 
development of  a policy-oriented strategic studies community by discouraging 
interdisciplinary and question-driven research.  
Although it sits at the top of  the military educational hierarchy and is an eminently military 
institution, subordinated initially to EMFA and now to the MD, one of  ESG’s salient 
characteristics is that a large percentage of  the students attending its yearlong classes are 
civilians. According to Alexandre Barros, this aligns with the school’s function as a training 
centre for an elite chosen to implement the military’s project for the development of  Brazil: 
The project which the military had and which they wanted to implement for the country in terms of  building 
the national state demanded the existence of  […] an elite. One can assert that there were individuals who 
were capable of  being members of  the reliable elite demanded by the military, but this group was scattered 
and atomized. Its socialization had been extremely heterogeneous[…] . The military had developed inside 
their corporation a project which involved civilians and military [sic] in the continual building of  the nation 
state. However, the civilian side of  this group was incapable—as defined by the military—both in quality and 
in quantity, to perform many of  the tasks the military felt that had to be performed, thus forcing the military 
to rationalize their stay in power for at least some time, while the elite which the military were training 
achieved the required degree of  “maturity”, again as defined by the military.339 
Alfred Stepan’s interpretation of  ESG’s role within the military establishment applies 
equally to the military’s view of  its role in the civilian world:  
[…] the ESG performed a central function within the Brazilian military. Precisely because the Brazilian 
military valued doctrinal order and subjected its members to a systematic socialization process at all levels of  
its schooling system, they had a requirement for one institution constantly to systematize, update, and 
disseminate the official doctrine of  national security and development. The ESG had this task. Thus, 
although not a center or initiative, it was the authorized source of  military ideology for the military as 
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institution. It therefore becomes extremely important to study the evolution of  ESG doctrine during the 
abertura because the entire military schooling system and socialization network, state agencies such as the 
SNI, and the military-dominated legal system that produced the National Security Laws, used as their 
doctrinal base the official documents of  the ESG.340 
The goal of  ESG’s activities, embodied in the DSN, was the homogenisation of  thinking 
on security matters within the community of  thinkers on the subject within Brazil341. This 
sentiment was expressed by President Geisel to the 1975 ESG class: 
At the beginning of  the course we have a completely heterogeneous group, and in progression it reaches 
homogeneity by means of  the common base, which is the doctrine which establishes working methods to 
join for national security the efforts and ideas of  people from different sectors.342 
The means utilised by ESG and by extension the Brazilian military establishment in 
pursuing this mission as a “major source of  political socialization”343 was the creation of  the 
Doutrina de Segurança Nacional and the various efforts undertaken over the years to assert its 
discursive dominance. By its very nomenclature, the DSN seeks to establish itself  as the only 
valid security discourse: 
[…]the idea that there could be something like Permanent National Objectives—that would justify the legitimacy 
and perpetuity of  the National Security Doctrine is not only false: it is contrary to reality; a peremptory 
refusal of  the modern world; an atavistic homesickness for a simpler world; a mythical legacy of  an era in 
which the State was the Prince. By classifying an objective as national and permanent, one creates a situation 
in which discordance is not only the distinct position of  a citizen interested in coming up with alternative 
solutions for his country: it is treason against the Fatherland. With this, divergence of  opinion is de-
legitimised and conflict demonised, thereby annihilating the possibility of  democratic cohabitation with the 
differences inherent in a complex society.344 
In its most concise form, ESG doctrine, in the shape of  the DSN, can be summarised into 
the “binomial” of  security and development. Our focus is on the security part of  the 
equation345. The fundamental structure of  the DSN, as outlined in the Fundamentos da Doutrina, 
relies heavily on geopolitics and romantic concepts as evidenced by its basic structure: the 
doctrine’s basic concepts are National Objectives, National Power, National Policy, and 
National Strategy. The capitalisation reflects the usage within the DSN; the practice is 
widespread among those whose work is based on the DSN and other ESG output.  
National Objectives are “the crystallisation of  interests and aspirations which, in a 
particular phase of  its evolution, the Nation seeks to satisfy”346. National Objectives in turn 
are divided into Permanent and Current National Objectives. The determinants of  these 
                                                 
340 Stepan, Military Politics, p. 47. 
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342 Quoted in Selcher, Wayne. “The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government”. Military Issues 
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national objectives include human, physical, institutional and external factors; among the 
human determinants is the reified notion of  National Character. The Brazilian national 
character is described by the self-described guardians of  the nation’s destiny as shaped by 
“individualism, adaptability, improvisation, a pacifist vocation, cordiality, emotionality and 
creativity”347. According to the doctrine, Brazil’s National Objectives are:  
  Democracy 
  National integration 
  Integrity of  the national heritage (patrimônio) 
  Social peace 
  Progress 
  Sovereignty.348 
According to the Fundamentos, “power is the capacity to impose one’s will—here you have 
what can be said is its most simple expression”.349 “The power of  groups”, the document 
continues, “however, is not born and does not remain acephalic—as spontaneously as it 
appears, it gives origin to authority, a principle of  order that leads to the concentration, in one 
or a few wills, of  the Power of  the group.350 The Nation, in organising itself  as a State, 
chooses a form of  agglutinating and expressing its National Power—this is why the State is 
the Nation, politically organised”351.  
National Power, then, is “not an end unto itself—it is the means of  producing effects in 
the social environment. In this line of  thinking, National Power is the instrument which the 
Nation disposes of, under the direction of  the State, to conquer and maintain its 
objectives”352. National Power is divided into four “expressions”, each with its own points of  
reference: 
  The political expression, such as people, territory and political institutions; 
  The economic expression, such as human resources, natural resources and economic institutions; 
  The psycho-social expression, such as the human person, the environment and social institutions; 
  The military expression, such as human resources, territory and military institutions.353 
This short quotation suffices to make evident how the lack of  definition of  these 
concepts—both in terms of  distinguishing them clearly from one another (several of  the 
expressions’ points of  reference overlap) and the internal consistency of  each—has 
contributed to Fitch’s abovementioned “conceptual morass”. Alongside the lack of  clear 
definitions of  concepts, the doctrine itself  devotes little attention to the transformation of  its 
guidelines into national policy, devoting only six of  the fundamental document’s 344 pages to 
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“National Policy”354. National Strategy, which is resumed in a 10-page section, is defined as the 
“art of  preparing and applying National Power under consideration of  existing or potential 
obstacles, to achieve and maintain the objectives established by National Policy”355.  
The division of  National Power into four sectors, or “expressions”, shows parallels not 
only to the Total Strategy doctrine developed in South Africa, also with the help of  the same 
American and French sources356, but also to the approach developed by Barry Buzan, Ole 
Wæver and other members of  what has been dubbed the “Copenhagen school”357. In the case 
of  the DSN, the “expressions” are laid out as follows—in what Proença has termed “little 
more than a glossary”358—as taken from the various relevant chapters of  the Fundamentos: 
 
                                                 
354 Ibid, pp. 75-81. 
355 Ibid, p. 89. 
356 See the treatment of Total Strategy doctrine in the chapter on South Africa; the links are also made evident in Pion-Berlin, 
p. 420; Fitch, p. 109, and Golbery, p. 24.  
357 The original definition of the sectors is in Buzan, Barry. People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-
cold war era. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991; pp. 19-20. 
358 Proenca, Visão, p. 4. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
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Table 2: Foundational principles of  Brazilian national security doctrine 
Expression Foundations Factors Components Indicators 
Political People Political Culture Executive Branch Political Participation 
 Territory Political Ideology Legislative Branch Non-conformism 
 Political Institutions Elite Actions Judicial Branch Social cohesion and harmony  
  Communication Political Parties Harmony between components 
  Geopolitical Situation  Harmony b/w terr. entities 
  Juridical Order  Efficiency/efficacy of  organs 
  Political Regime  Loyalty to national institutions 
  Science and Technology  Political Stability 
     
Economic Human Resources Science and Technology Agric. Sector Ind. of  Potential 
 Natural Resources Capital Accumulation Indus. Sector Ind. of  Situation (conjuntura) 
 Econ. Institutions Productive Capacity Service Sector Ind. of  Trends 
  Cap. for Inst. Change  Ind. of  Security 
     
Psycho-social Human person Demographics Man largely statistical indicators,  
 Environment Ecology Society adapted to each enunciated 
 Social Institutions Education/Culture  factor 
  Health, Nutr., Sanitation   
  Labour   
  Housing   
  Urbanization   
  Social Welfare   
  Science and Technology   
  Social Communication   
  Social Mobility   
  Social Integration   
  Indiv./Comm. Security   
  Religion/Ethics/Morals   
  National Character   
  National Morale   
     
Military Human Resources Military Doctrine Army Manpower 
 Territory Military Structure Navy Mobilisable Population 
 Military Insts.  Command Capacity Air Force Length of  Mil. Service 
  Integration of  FA  Types of  Recruitment 
  Instr./Trng./Readiness  Matériel and Equipment 
  Military Morale  Military Structure 
  Mobilisation Capacity  Military Spending 
  Military Service  Military Morale 
  Psychosocial Factors  Levels of  Instr./Trng./Readiness 
  Political Factors  Command Capacity 
  Economic Factors  Adaptation of  Mil. Doctrine 
  Science and Technology  Level of  Integr. of  FA 
    Support from Public Opinion 
    Geopolitical Situation 
    Mobilisation Capacity 
    Economic Resources 
    Level of  Tech. Devt. 
    Degree of  Pol. Stability 
Perhaps the most pervasive discursive legacy of  the DSN is its definition of  the meanings 
of  and relationship between the notions of  “security” and “defence”. An extremely widely-
held notion in both uniformed and civilian security circles in Brazil is General Lyra Tavares’ 
1966 formulation stating that “security is a state of  being, while defence is an act—directly 
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tied to a given type of  characterised and measured threat”359. ESG founder Castelo Branco 
outlined the conceptual relationship between the two more clearly one year later: 
[t]he traditional concept of  national defence places more emphasis on the military aspects of  security, and, by 
correlation, on problems of  external aggression. The notion of  security is more inclusive. It comprises, so to 
speak, the global defence of  institutions, incorporating, for this purpose, the psycho-social aspects, the 
preservation of  development and internal political stability; beyond this, the concept of  security, much more 
explicitly than that of  defence, takes into account internal aggression, in the form of  infiltration and 
ideological subversion.360 
The DSN laid the foundations for human rights abuses by the military government in its 
treatment of  the question of  internal aggression. In particular, agencies such as SNI were able 
to claim that their operational methods were in accordance with what was called for in the 
doctrine361. The term segurança came to have a stigma attached to it as a result of  the abuses 
committed under military rule. However, an attempt was made in the first post-ditadura 
Constitution, that of  1988, to reverse the all-inclusive logic of  security. The term segurança was 
stricken from legal discourse and no mention made of  it in the document. In public parlance 
the term has largely been replaced by defesa. In keeping with Castelo Branco’s own logic, the 
shift from segurança to defesa has effectively removed non-military issues from those the military 
establishment can acceptably concern itself  with; issues such as internal security have been, at 
least de jure, largely removed from the military ambit.  
A further problem regarding the democratic potential of  the DSN—specifically with 
regard to notions of  the civilian control of  the armed forces—is the equality the doctrine 
establishes between the four “expressions of  National Power”. Specifically, as Proença points 
out, the military “expression” is not subordinated to the political “expression” of  power and 
thus is not effectively subordinated to it, as full civilian control would call for362. Numerous 
critiques have been offered by security analysts of  the DSN and the ESG body of  doctrine; 
of  these, the most trenchant, certainly among Brazilian scholars, ironically comes from the 
only local security academic to have graduated ESG’s flagship course, Domício Proença 
Júnior.  
Proença comments on the division between practical and theoretical specialised knowledge 
and how it is distributed between the military establishment and civil society, including 
academics, noting that civil society is alienated by ignorance from basic issues of  military 
affairs due to the legacy of  military rule and the way the subject is taught at university. When 
civilians do have an informed perspective, he claims, it is often the result of  amateur research 
and personal initiatives.  
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Civil society, according to Proença, lacks the information and technical structures to be 
active in defence issues; this, he asserts, is particularly true of  civilian defence policymakers. 
The military, on the other hand, are alienated from effective debate by an inability to deal with 
such questions except in strictly “technico-professional” terms. Personal initiative aside, the 
military, especially decisionmakers, thus lack an informed perspective as to the political 
consequences of  military decisionmaking363. Proença considers the effect of  ESG doctrine on 
the way in which military issues are discussed in Brazil to have been devastating: 
One must be enormously cautious when faced with affirmations that seek to defend this state of  affairs using 
the argument that, in practice, the doctrine is not followed or updated. This is exactly the question. If  the 
doctrine has these defects and is still the doctrine, it induces to error. If  it is not applied or inapplicable, what 
purpose does it serve? 
The general result […] is an awkward arrangement that serves to sustain, often implicitly, the feeling that the 
military institutions have a monopoly on competence in the areas of  their responsibility, at the same time that 
it makes them unprepared, de facto, for dealing with issues of  national defence in political terms. […] 
This, nevertheless, is the context of  the Brazilian discussion. Far from intellectually integrating national 
thinking on the topic of  national defence, we are experiencing the continuation of  a situation which 
disqualifies both civilians and the military, and which further faces, on the path to its articulation, the diffuse 
obstacle of  the ESG doctrine. The civilians see themselves restricted to an understanding which is entirely 
divorced from the reality of  military practice and theory as taught in the country’s war colleges. The military 
risk losing sight of  the instrumental function of  their institutions and their own corporate raison d’être. And 
the privileged space of  the highest school of  politico-strategic studies engenders the continuation of  a double 
divorce: between society and the armed forces, and between the knowledges of  the [military schools] and the 
[civilian universities]. In this way the distance between the armed forces and society is reified, with the DSN 
serving more to disorient than to assist those who base themselves on its constructs.364 
This situation was exacerbated by the exalted nature of  ESG at the apex of  the military 
doctrinal development and educational system. The school became increasingly isolated as its 
special position made the ESG’s leaders loath to open to outside input: 
This dynamic of  theoretical and methodological re-adaptation was marked by two salient characteristics. First, 
such movements were always undertaken from the inside of  ESG, and always bore the mark of  principles and 
conceptions that had an original ESG profile. Thus the circle of  production and transmission of  knowledge 
and perceptions of  reality—marked by some form of  internal control—closed, be it due to their own 
doctrinal limits and/or the impositions established by the teaching method, with the aim of  tying the 
discussions and analyses in to the theoretical maxims of  the school in the most efficient way.365 
ESG was nevertheless successful in one of  its primary missions: in the words of  a former 
ECEME instructor, “to control and make uniform the language of  security”366. In this 
pursuit, one academic noted that “no civilian institute or university could hope to compete 
with it in effectiveness”.367  
Proponents of  a military monopoly over the security discourse have used three main tactics 
to maintain the exclusion of  civilian security analysts. The first is the appropriation for 
themselves of  the role of  securitising actor for the Brazilian nation and/or state, claiming to 
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speak in the name of  Brazil and its “needs”368; by questioning the expertise, experience, and 
degree of  specialised knowledge of  civilians as compared to analysts from within the military; 
and finally by claiming their own political/ideological objectivity with respect to dealing with 
the FA and military issues while imputing the partisanship of  others.  
One retired general claimed that “the academics in civil society need to develop the 
capacity to bring their debate up to the higher level of  that within the military; they will gladly 
have the barracks doors opened to them once they are competent”369. Another direct claim 
was formulated by a then-student at ECEME in A Defesa Nacional, Brazil's only journal dealing 
explicitly with defence issues, which as an ECEME journal is in essence a vehicle for the 
proliferation of  the FA viewpoint and thus ESG doctrine. Speaking in the name of  “Politics”, 
the author, at the time an Army major, points out the incompatibility of  academic notions 
with the true necessities of  running the country in an article that merits citation at length, as it 
manages to include in a short space all three of  the marginalising tactics mentioned above: 
Within the intellectual milieu of  a free society, ideas of  all sorts proliferate, many of  which contribute to the 
evolution of  that society. However, there is an enormous distance between the creation of  an idea and the 
responsibility of  its application. Let us leave the field of  arts and sciences and enter into Politics […]. 
[…] A history of  ideas over the last 200 years would be replete with violence practised in the name of  high 
ideals. The causes espoused by intellectuals are not always susceptible to being carried out by Politics[…].370 
The same article goes on further to impugn the ideological neutrality of  the entire 
journalistic profession in Brazil: 
The interaction of  persons who are socially influential, albeit little informed about the Armed Forces, and 
intellectuals with their not-always-coherent anxieties about liberty, has, in the current setting, been disastrous 
for the Armed Forces, in particular the Army, and, inevitably, for the Nation. […] Almost in its entirety, when 
the subject is the Armed Forces, [the Brazilian media, in particular television] continues to explore the 
apparently inexhaustible ideological lead afforded by the Marxist interpretation of  the recent history of  our 
national life. […] There exists as well a pseudo-liberal opportunism that hastens to christen the military 
retrograde, nationalist and nationalising.  
This is not to say that there is a conspiracy by an all-powerful media, able all by itself  to mobilise public 
opinion against the Military Institutions. […] However, journalists live in a competitive profession, and 
whatever his ideals, a journalist can only exercise his profession in accordance with the conditions imposed by 
the journalism industry.371 
To this must be added as evidence the claim by the aforementioned recently retired 
ECEME instructor that academics who continue to view negatively the FA and its continued 
control over the security discourse do so not for reasons of  academic distance and critical 
evaluation, but out of  personal spite over their failure to establish a Marxist viewpoint during 
the military regime’s most intensive period of  repression from 1964-1970. In his words, these 
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“annoyed segments of  society” continue to harbour “politico-ideological” resentment toward 
the pro-Western capitalist order established with the help of  the poder moderador of  the FA372. 
Neither the FA nor the large and influential body of  ESG alumni can usefully be portrayed 
as monolithic, however; one ESG alumnus places the onus of  the lack of  information 
circulating in the civilian security community squarely on the shoulders of  the FA themselves: 
The Nation's civil segment is comprehensively under-informed about the real conditions of  the Armed 
Forces. A real ignorance exists, on the part of  society as a whole, about the quality and quantity of  military 
equipment and arms in use in Brazil. […] 
In large part, those responsible for this disinformation are the Armed Forces themselves, who create a false 
image and remain hermetically closed to the discussion of  certain issues, often alleging the inexistence 
outside of  the military segment of  interlocutors capable of  understanding them.373  
In addition to the obstacles it faces in accumulating levels of  specialised knowledge that 
would place its members on the “radar screens” of  security policymakers, the Brazilian 
academic security studies community faces obstacles concerning institutionalised prestige as 
well, due to the relative under-institutionalisation and newness of  IR as a discipline, 
particularly the field of  security studies.  
 
3.4.2. Institutionalised prestige 
The ability of  the Brazilian security studies community to produce relevant research and to 
develop a certain amount of  institutionalised prestige regarding defence issues is related not 
only to the military tradition but to the historical development of  the nation’s academic caste 
as well. Brazil has a comprehensive system of  state and private universities; many were 
founded during the latter half  of  the 20th century. The nation’s academic production is 
characterised by its location on the periphery of  the global academic enterprise, both 
linguistically and geographically, a situation exacerbated by the chronic underfunding and 
dependence on individual personalities of  library development in particular. International 
Relations as a discipline is very young and only slowly emerging from its period of  inception, 
in which it was dominated by state institutions such as the Foreign Ministry. Due to the 
structure of  the funding system and to the stigma on its subject matter, security studies as a 
discipline in Brazil remains in its infancy, though individual experts produce work of  high 
calibre.  
 
 The national public university system 
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The Brazilian system of  federal and state public universities is comprehensive; with the 
exception of  very few rural and recently-created states, every federal state possesses both a 
federal and a state university; the more populous states possess more than one of  either or 
both374. The three major universities in Brazil, both in terms of  reputation and in terms of  
how they represent different paragons of  intellectual tradition, are the University of  São Paulo 
(USP), the Federal University of  Rio de Janeiro  (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro—UFRJ, 
also known, largely internally, as the University of  Brazil) and the University of  Brasília 
(UnB)375. USP was founded in 1934 as an agglomeration of  faculties that had existed since the 
19th century; its intellectual traditions mirror the French university model. UFRJ’s academic 
traditions are based on the Humboldtian model of  the research university; UnB was founded 
in 1962 as an alternative to organizational models imported from abroad, and its mission has 
since been most clearly linked to producing research that contributes to solving distinctly 
Brazilian problems. 
Brazilian public universities are still seen by many as “the brains of  the country”, churning 
out first-class citizens; however, there is a clear expectation that the benefits of  university life 
be balanced by a duty to place the imparted knowledge at the disposal of  society, and to 
conduct research relevant to the state and society376. It is within this optic that the 
development of  the discipline of  International Relations, and that of  security studies and its 
corollaries, must be seen in the Brazilian context, because it influences strongly the incentive 
structure that establishes criteria for prestige and relevance377.  
The academic discipline of  International Relations (IR) in Brazil is very young, and remains 
weakly institutionalised. This is a major source of  difficulty for IR academics in attaining the 
necessary prestige (according to the precepts of  academic socialisation) and specialised 
knowledge to allow them to fulfil the criteria for policy influence being tested here. This is 
particularly true given the fact that prior to the institutionalisation of  IR within the university, 
the Ministry of  External Relations (MRE) held a virtual monopoly on production in the field, 
a tradition that retains considerable significance to this day.  
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This reflects the roots of  International Relations in diplomatic history, an area in which 
academic production was until recently almost exclusively in the hands of  the MRE. The 
MRE has three separate institutions of  teaching and research that in some areas compete with 
the university sector: the Rio Branco Institute, where career diplomats are trained, the Institute 
for Research in International Relations (IPRI) and the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation 
(FUNAG).  
The Brazilian case provides conclusive evidence of  the constitutive role played by the level 
of  development of  local IR in determining the level of  policy influence of  academic experts. 
Advancement in the development of  an independent discipline in Brazil suffered both from 
the lack of  freedom of  expression under the military regime378, and also from the attendant 
lack of  social space in the face of  strongly developed research capacities within the organs of  
the state379. This is particularly true in the domain of  security studies, where the legacy of  
military dictatorship had the strongest effect. 
The academic security studies community in Brazil suffers in its efforts at 
institutionalisation and consolidation from three major obstacles: the stigma placed on the 
subject within the intellectual community due to its association with the military government 
and its human rights violations, directed in large part at the academic community; the 
successful attempts by ESG to monopolise the security discourse within the country; and a 
lack of  access to the basic information on its object of  study. The extremely recent creation 
of  many IR degree programmes contributes to the difficulties. 
 
 The academic discipline of  International Relations 
The first undergraduate teaching programme devoted to IR as a field of  study was founded 
at the University of  Brasília in 1974380. A graduate programme offering a Master's degree 
followed in 1985. Prior to this time, students who chose to focus their efforts on IR proper, 
rather than remain within one of  its traditional constituent disciplines, such as history, political 
science, or law, were forced to study abroad. Twenty to twenty-five years later, analyses of  the 
state of  institutionalisation of  the field in Brazil still describe it as “an immense territory that 
has still not been entirely mapped”381, pointing out its “embryonic”382 character and its relative 
under-theoretisation and largely prescriptive nature383. 
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IR in Brazil roughly followed the classic pattern of  development of  the discipline 
elsewhere, growing out of  diplomatic histories into an ever-more theoretically-inclined field 
of  study. A focus on prescription for Brazilian foreign policy384 was slowly replaced385 by 
independent research and theoretical undertakings, although the main interest of  much of  the 
work in the discipline remains closely focused on issues that affect Brazil. This “explosion”386 
of  independent production brought with it the end of  the MRE's monopoly on research in 
IR. IR research outside of  the state ambit still occupies reduced “social space” compared both 
to other areas of  research and to countries where the academic discipline itself  is more 
advanced387. Accordingly, there are still strong traces of  adaptation and particularism: 
However, Brazil remained at the margin, for example, of  the controversies in the North American academy 
over the respective validity of  the realist, neo-realist and institutionalist theses, and it remained on the 
sidelines of  the academic “industry of  decline” that shook university bastions after the publication of  
Kennedy's famous book in 1987. Even the “end of  History”—which more strongly mobilised the Marxists—
and the “clash of  civilisations”, debates that “emptied inkwells” in the Northern Hemisphere after the end of  
the Cold War, were met here with a reaction that was at best tepid, for the simple reason that it was 
recognised that Brazil's position in the world was never determined by the grand lines of  global strategic 
conflicts. In general, analytical models and approaches that did not present a connection to the specific 
problems of  a “peripheral” and “dependent” nation, as Brazil's own academy classified the country, were not 
reflected here.388  
The “peripheralness” of  the Brazilian discipline is dual: beyond its status as outside what is 
often treated as the “centre” in many political and economic analyses of  the world system—
on which the attendant literature can comment in greater depth than is called for here—there 
is the more fundamental problem of  linguistic difference and distance from the largely 
English-language core of  academic production. The author was able to note that many of  
Brazil's foremost specialised libraries suffer from a lack of  funding and consistent direction. 
While the main cause of  this situation is indeed insufficient funding, it is also a sign of  the 
high degree of  personalisation of  Brazilian academic culture, and again of  its low degree of  
institutionalisation: many important advances and undertakings within the disciplines depend 
heavily on the personal initiative and energy of  those who started them, and many die out 
once their creator is no longer closely involved389.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Brazilian Portuguese original. Almeida is a career diplomat who holds a doctorate in social science from the Free 
University of Brussels.  
382 Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. O estudo das relações internacionais no Brasil. São Paulo: Unimarco Editora, 1999 (hereafter, 
Estudo); pp.115-116. 
383 Fonseca Júnior, Gelson. “Studies on International Relations in Brazil: Recent Times (1950-80)”. Millennium. Vol. 16, No. 2 
(1987), pp. 273-280. Here, p. 273. This view may be somewhat coloured by Fonseca's loyalties to his employer, whose in-
house studies on IR issues are very policy-oriented. Fifteen years later and from within the university, Eliézer Rizzo de 
Oliveira disagrees, claiming that “policy relevance is not a part of academic culture here”. Interview with Prof. Eliézer 
Rizzo de Oliveira, Campinas, Brazil, 1 July 2002. 
384 Fonseca, pp 274-275. 
385 On the history of the discipline, see the early article by Fonseca and the two works by Almeida.  
386 Almeida, Estudo, p. 127. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
387 Interview with Prof. Mônica Herz, Gávea, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 27 August 2002. 
388 Almeida, Estudo, p. 155. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
389 Interviews with Prof. Domício Proença Júnior, 16 and 18 July 2002; interview with Prof. Shiguenoli Miyamoto, 27 June 
2002. 
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Many Brazilian libraries lack the basic modern texts in many of  the sub-fields of  IR, 
although given the strength of  the historiographic tradition in Brazil, the classics of  the first 
half  of  the twentieth century are almost always available in the original. The accessibility of  
these texts is further hampered by the fact that many basic texts have not yet been translated 
into Portuguese. In 2002 IPRI launched a series of  translations of  basic texts of  the discipline, 
which will see published—some for the first time in Portuguese—works by Grotius, Hobbes, 
Kant, Keynes, Bull, Rousseau and others390.  
The Brazilian discipline remains under-theorised and under-preoccupied with 
methodology, however, which Paulo Roberto Almeida attributes to the lack of  graduate 
courses in the country391. Table 3 gives an overview of  the most important degree 
programmes in International Relations offered at the undergraduate and graduate levels in 
Brazil392.  
 
Table 3: International Relations degree programmes in Brazil 
Year Institution/Place Degree(s) offered 
 
1969/1979 Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro  
(with Ford Foundation support) 
M.A./Ph.D. (Political Science) 
1971/1974 Universidade de São Paulo M.A./Ph.D. (Int'l Law/Political Science) 
1973/1982 Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo M.A./Ph.D. (Social Science) 
 
1974/1984/2002 Universidade de Brasília B.A./M.A./Ph.D. (IR) 
1987/2001/2003 Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro M.A./Ph.D./B.A. (IR) 
1995 Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo B.A. (IR) 
1996 Universidade Católica de Brasília B.A. (IR) 
1996 Pontifícia Univ. Católica de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte B.A. (IR) 
2001 Universidade de São Paulo B.A. (IR) 
Source: Based on Almeida, Estudo, pp. 160-162. 
Policymakers in Brazil have identified publications as one of  the indicators they most 
frequently turn to in evaluating the prestige of  an academic, and their likelihood of  calling 
upon an academic specialist for advice393. In Brazil IR publication is less driven by journals and 
more by monographs, perhaps due to the rather small number of  available avenues for 
publication. These include Contexto Internacional, published by the Instituto de Relações 
Internacionais at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro; USP's Carta 
Internacional; Política Externa, the Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, and several others 
devoted to specialisations within the discipline (those dealing with security studies will be 
                                                 
390 Interview with Ministro Carlos Henrique Cardim, 6 August 2002.  
391 Almeida, Estudo, p. 135. 
392 This list is not intended to be exhaustive; there are over 50 programmes in Brazil that offer courses and degrees related to 
the field of International Relations. Those listed here are the result of a selection process based on repeated mention of 
these programmes by interviewees from the fields of IR and security studies in Brazil in 2002. 
393 Interview with Rudibert Kilian Júnior and Gunther Rudzit, 22 August 2002; Interview with José Luiz Machado e Costa, 3 
September 2002. 
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listed below). Many journals perish once their founder leaves their host institution, or funding 
is withdrawn. Even some of  the more robust journals suffer from intermittent publication or 
are struggling to bring issues out on schedule.  
Three factors combine to impede the increased specialisation and theoreticisation of  
Brazilian security studies: refusal by the FA to release important bodies of  specialised data; 
hindrances posed by Brazil's peripheral status in attempts to make theoretical literature—
largely originating outside the country—broadly available, and the essentially compounding 
factor of  insufficient material resources and difficult research conditions. One Brazilian 
security scholar elaborates on this point:  
[…] one has to consider miss-adjustments [sic], which on the other hand, draw away Brazilian potential, 
perpetuating a variety of  undesired societal forms: lacking knowledge, misinformed, ignorant and 
uninterested. […] Problems which are reproduced and visualized in the lack of  resources and foul conditions 
of  the universities — reduced spaces of  knowledge —and in the alarming misfunctioning [sic] and 
impossibilities of  their researchers, analysts, formulators and educators.394 
 
 Security studies 
State funding agencies do not provide a funding category for security studies and there are 
no degree programmes devoted specifically to the field outside the armed forces schooling 
system. In addition to underfunding, the underdevelopment of  the discipline is exacerbated by 
the same factors present in IR: a lack of  graduate programmes has contributed to 
undertheoretisation and a lack of  methodological advancement. Many important works have 
not been translated into Portuguese.  
These factors have combined to produce a situation in which geopolitical and romanticised 
approaches continue to dominate security scholarship in Brazil. While a function of  active 
efforts by the military establishment to entrench the DSN, this is also a result of  Brazil’s 
peripheral location and linguistic distance from the Anglophone centres of  global academic 
production. None of  the key works of  non-Realist security studies have been translated into 
Portuguese, and even classic works of  Realism remain of  limited accessibility. Far from the 
“new security agenda” having entered Brazilian security parlance, the country’s analysts both 
academic and in uniform have yet to develop a viable fully-fledged application of  the Realist 
paradigm to the country’s defence policy surroundings. The outdated paradigm of  the 
National Security Doctrine retains ubiquitous influence as the prime reference for security 
studies in Brazil today. Even progressive academics and policymakers tend to frame their 
considerations to a varying extent using the language and discourse of  the DSN, to the point 
were some even apologise for this fact: 
                                                 
394 Dreifuss, “Armed Forces”, p. 21, fn 85. 
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In effect, interested Brazilians lack even terms and expression—a language—with which to discuss issues of  
security and defence that have not been contaminated by the DSN. We apologise to our readers, due to the 
fact that, in various moments during our discussion, we will be obliged explicitly to confront some of  the 
terms sullied (conspurcados) by the DSN.395  
The division of  the Brazilian defence policymaking establishment between civilians and the 
forces permits the question of  how this confrontation should ideally take place if  policy 
influence is in fact the goal. While adhering to the ESG approach may curry favour with a 
majority of  senior members of  the FA, reversing the dominance of  the DSN may elicit more 
approval from civilian policymakers, given the differences in normative outlook between the 
two subdivisions of  the policy bureaucracy. The next section will investigate how the 
normative and political resonance of  experts’ inputs becomes joins attributes such as 
specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige in determining their influence during the 
formulation process for declaratory policy.  
 
3.5. Resonance  
In a situation where the military establishment clings to important prerogatives in the 
decisionmaking process and in society as a whole, rather than being subordinated fully to 
civilian control, when seeking to craft an argument that resonates with the policy 
establishment's view, outside experts are faced with a split audience. The two halves of  this 
split audience—military policy bureaucrats and their civilian counterparts—will view any 
proposal offered by an expert from within profoundly different institutional cultures.  
Many members of  the Brazilian military establishment will readily admit to the 
fundamentally conservative and nationalist nature of  their own corporate culture396, with its 
preference to retain control of  policy decisions without recourse to advice (or, if  it must be 
given, from within the establishment). Conversely, there is greater variation among the 
possible agendas of  politically-appointed civilian policymakers. Thus, attaining a certain 
degree of  resonance becomes a tricky proposition: a proposal must satisfy both the 
“professional paranoia” and traditional military/tactical focus of  the FA and the proclivity of  
progressive politicians to tie the concept of  security more closely to social issues and a more 
holistic interpretation of  the applicability of  the logic of  security.  
Significant elements of  the Brazilian academic community do harbour resentments over 
their treatment during the period of  military rule397, which are reflected in some cases in an 
                                                 
395 Proença and Diniz, pp. 57-58. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
396 Interview with Sergio Dias da Costa Aita, 27 August 2002; Interview with Rudibert Kilian Júnior and Gunther Rudzit, 22 
August 2002; see also Flores, Mario Cesar. Reflexões Estratégicas: repensando a defesa nacional. São Paulo: Realizações, 2002; 
p.11; the issue of a preference for organic Brazilian ideas over the importation of foreign models is discussed briefly on p. 
43.  
397 On the treatment of academics under military rule, see Schmitter, Philippe C. “The Persecution of Political and Social 
Scientists in Brazil”. PS. Vol. 3, No. 2 (1970); PP. 123-128. 
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anti-militarist outlook398. For at least one military analyst, this legacy of  the ditadura has 
resulted in the armed forces’ feeling that they are not dealt with fairly by some elements of  the 
academic community399. There is a tendency for both sides to malign and view as monolithic 
the other, although as contacts between the two communities increase in frequency, and in 
particular as the recently-created Ministry of  Defence grows into its mediating role, this divide 
appears to be receding in importance. Nevertheless, this emotional legacy of  the period of  
military rule persists in complicating the professional relationship between these two 
communities.  
Another legacy of  this history is the lack of  transparency regarding important elements of  
the policy process. Almost all Brazilian defence policy documents, certainly those related to 
the policy initiatives based on the inputs from the Experts’ Commission, remain confidential 
and not accessible to the public. It is thus very difficult to trace the resonance of  outsiders’ 
inputs due to the impossibility of  tracing their presence in available policy documents. 
Nevertheless, there are some possibilities for establishing the resonance of  inputs, although 
these are greatly affected by the closed documentation policy of  the Ministry of  Defence.  
 
3.5.1. Policymaker normative preferences  
As noted, in a situation such as Brazil’s where the extent of  the democratic control of  the 
armed forces remains incomplete, the corporate interests of  the military establishment and 
the civilian policymaking bureaucracy, including the legislative branch, can diverge 
considerably. As noted above, in Brazil’s case, the policy preferences brought on by 
uncertainty after the end of  the Cold War and of  the ditadura led to different preferences for 
policy solutions among civilian and uniformed decisionmakers.  
While civilians were seeking once and for all to relegate the FA to an external role and to 
put an end to internal roles for the military, the military was seeking to retain this role and, put 
bluntly, to find new enemies to justify its requests based on its extant level of  influence and 
prestige. Furthermore, civilian policymakers were seeking to establish for Brazil a purely 
defensive military posture—such as that ultimately reflected in the 1996 Política de Defesa 
Nacional—which was rejected by some among the higher echelons of  the military, especially 
the terrestrial force.  
Thus, outside policy contributors, for example those convened as members of  the Experts’ 
Commission, well as others who presented inputs designed for the policy process, faced a 
bifurcated audience. In addition, the military’s strategic culture, heavily influenced as it is by 
                                                 
398 Proença and Diniz, p. 32; Saint-Pierre, p. 2. 
399 Flores, p. 97. 
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the DSN, is one of  “doing things by the book” and maintaining the status quo400. Innovation is 
not rewarded, and inputs that mirror the precepts of  the established doctrine taught in the 
military’s professional academies are likely to attain significantly higher degrees of  resonance.  
At the same time, the degree to which policymakers will seek innovation from outside 
outputs often correlates either to a change in who is in government: more specifically, 
progressively-oriented policymakers can be expected to be more likely to seek innovative 
policies than those that uphold the status quo—at least until their own policies have become 
the status quo. However, in the immediate aftermath of  a change in regime that has brought 
them to power, the former half  of  the expectation holds true.  
With the usual caveats, in Brazil it is possible to say that while military institutional culture 
is predominantly conservative, the work of  many academics shows a progressive slant. Several 
prominent academics such as Cavagnari, Dreifuss and Proença were involved in increasing the 
expertise of  the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)—the leftist party whose candidate, 
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, became President of  the Republic on 1 January 2003. However, 
there are of  course some academics whose work is more conservative in nature. Further, there 
appears to have been strong support for Lula and the Workers’ Party among significant 
sectors of  the FA, including some of  the decisionmakers interviewed for this investigation.  
 
3.5.2. Proposals submitted by academic advisors 
In Brazil, the only formalised instances of  participation for academic advisors in the 
defence policy formulation process have been the MD’s Experts’ Commission in 2000 and the 
Ministry’s series of  Policy Round Tables in 2003. Several of  the nation’s top security experts 
have been called upon intermittently to give inputs to both the executive and legislative 
branches, though not in a manner whose repetition was institutionalised. Further, there have 
been instances of  academics’ assisting both Parliament and Ministers and their departments 
with punctual issues and policy needs401.  
In the case of  the Experts’ Commission, the resulting document—the MSDN—remains 
confidential and not accessible to the public. This is true of  all documents related to the post-
PDN revision of  national defence policy. The Defence Minister’s Special Advisor, José Luiz 
Machado e Costa, amalgamated the Experts’ inputs into a document that was presented to 
and used by the DPDN in the MD as the basis for the policy reformulation.  
                                                 
400 Barros, pp. 82, 86, 98. 
401 These were admitted to in off-the-record interviews with those academics.  
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Thus, the Experts’ inputs were not directly used, but rather already filtered through 
Machado e Costa by the time they were used as inputs for the policy reformulation402. This 
amalgamation makes it difficult to trace the inputs of  individual academics as several 
proposals may have already been fused prior to inclusion in the document. For this reason, 
several of  the members of  the Commission have expressed doubts over the extent to which 
the ensuing document to whose formulation they supposedly contributed would reflect the 
actual inputs of  the Experts themselves403.  
This illustrates the importance of  the bureaucratic structure of  a policy formulation 
process; however, most clearly, it demonstrates that the provision of  advice by outside experts 
is a two-way relationship. The usefulness of  experts’ inputs depends directly on the degree to 
which policymakers are able to formulate clearly their expectations of  what is to be provided 
by outsiders.  
Given the different approaches of  academics and decisionmakers, in addition to academics’ 
making an effort to provide cogent inputs that can be clearly seen to contribute to solving a 
bounded problem, policymakers must communicate clearly the object of  their request for 
assistance and the bounds of  the specific problem with which academics have been called 
upon to assist. Machado e Costa explains how this affected the Brazilian process:  
Many times that which was presented was very elaborate, very academic, very far away from the focus we 
needed. […] And this new thinking was collected in [the MSDN]. The “Modernização” has various chapters. 
There is one that deals with the concepts of  security and defence, which is very confused, very confused.404  
The DPDN eventually created from the Experts’ inputs a “matrix” of  35 general topics for 
inclusion in its thinking on defence policy. These can be taken as those inputs which did 
resonate with the normative viewpoints presented within the Defence Ministry Working 
Group405: 
  
                                                 
402 Interview with José Luiz Machado e Costa, 3 September 2002; Interview with Rudibert Kilian Júnior and Gunther Rudzit, 
22 August 2002. 
403 Interview with Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, 1 July 2002; Interview with Prof. Domício Proença Júnior, 18 July 2002. 
404 Interview with José Luiz Machado e Costa, 3 September 2002. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
405 The left-hand column is a free translation of the corresponding items in the right-hand column, which are in the original 
Brazilian Portuguese. 
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Table 4: Matrix of  topics discussed by the MD Working Group 
BRAZIL’S STRATEGIC PROFILE IN THE COMING 
DECADES AND ITS ROLE AT THE REGIONAL AND 
GLOBAL LEVELS 
PERFIL ESTRATÉGICO DO PAÍS NAS PRÓXIMAS 
DÉCADAS E SUA INSERÇÃO NOS PLANOS 
REGIONAL E MUNDIAL 
FRAMEWORK OF THREATS AND STRATEGIC 
VULNERABILITIES 
QUADRO DE AMEAÇAS E VULNERABILIDADES 
ESTRATÉGICAS 
LINKS BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE 
POLICY 
VÍNCULO ENTRE AS POLÍTICAS EXTERNA E DE 
DEFESA 
THE “NEAR ABROAD”: DEEPENING SOUTH 
AMERICAN INTEGRATION 
ENTORNO IMEDIATO: APROFUNDAMENTO DA 
INTEGRAÇÃO SUL-AMERICANA 
SCENARIO FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND 
AFRICA CENÁRIO SUL-ATLÂNTICO / ÁFRICA 
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
MEDIDAS DE FORTALECIMENTO DE CONFIANÇA 
MÚTUA 
EVALUATION OF HEMISPHERIC POLITICO-
STRATEGIC RELATIONS (USA) 
AVALIAÇÃO DAS RELAÇÕES POLÍTICO-
ESTRATÉGICAS NO PLANO HEMISFÉRICO (EUA) 
RE-EQUIPMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
CONTINENTAL BALANCE OF POWER 
REEQUIPAMENTO E SEUS REFLEXOS NA 
BALANÇA DE PODER CONTINENTAL 
POLICY ON PARTICIPATION IN PEACE 
OPERATIONS POLÍTICA DE PARTICIPAÇÃO EM MISSÕES DE PAZ
RECONFIGURATION OF THE ARMED FORCES RECONFIGURAÇÃO DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS 
INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
ORGANISATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
ORGANIZAÇÃO INSTITUCIONAL E 
ADMINISTRATIVA DO MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA 
READINESS/RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES 
APRESTAMENTO / FORÇAS DE DESLOCAMENTO 
RÁPIDO 
COMBINED USE OF FORCES EMPREGO COMBINADO 
OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE (CONSCRIPTION) SERVIÇO MILITAR OBRIGATÓRIO 
PRESERVATION OF LAW AND ORDER/DRUG 
TRAFFICKING/NATIONAL GUARD 
PRESERVAÇÃO DA LEI E DA ORDEM / 
NARCOTRÁFICO / GUARDA NACIONAL 
CONTROL OF BORDERS, AREA SPACE AND 
MARITIME AREA 
CONTROLE DE FRONTEIRAS, DO ESPAÇO AÉREO 
E DA ÁREA MARÍTIMA 
SUBSIDIARY ACTIVITIES ATIVIDADES SUBSIDIÁRIAS 
ROLE OF SOCIETY IN DEFINING NEW ROLES FOR 
THE ARMED FORCES/SOCIETY'S PERCEPTION OF 
THE ARMED FORCES 
PAPEL DA SOCIEDADE NA DEFINIÇÃO DE NOVAS 
MISSÕES DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS / PERCEPÇÃO DA 
SOCIEDADE DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS 
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES/INTEGRATION 
OF CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY IN THE AREA 
OF DEFENCE 
CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DE DEFESA / INTEGRAÇÃO 
DE CIVIS E MILITARES NA ÁREA DE DEFESA 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEFENCE 
CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA VOLTADAS PARA A 
DEFESA 
DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT PROJECTS/ALLIANCES 
WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES AND DEVELOPED 
STATES 
DESENVOLVIMENTO DE PROJETOS CONJUNTOS / 
ALIANÇAS COM PAÍSES VIZINHOS E PAÍSES 
DESENVOLVIDOS 
INCENTIVES FOR THE NATIONAL ARMS 
INDUSTRY INCENTIVO À INDÚSTRIA BÉLICA NACIONAL 
BRAZILIAN LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICA LIDERANÇA DO BRASIL NA AMÉRICA DO SUL 
CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY POLÍTICA DE DEFESA NACIONAL VIGENTE 
BRAZIL'S ADHESION TO INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
ASSINATURA DE ACORDOS INTERNACIONAIS 
PELO BRASIL 
ALCÂNTARA AIR BASE BASE DE ALCÂNTARA 
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES SUBMARINO NUCLEAR 
AMAZONIA AMAZÔNIA 
SUBREGIONAL DEFENCE MECHANISMS MECANISMO DE SEGURANÇA SUBREGIONAL 
NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY: STATE OR 
GOVERNMENT POLICY? PDN: POLÍTICA DE ESTADO OU DE GOVERNO 
PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
ASSENTO NO CONSELHO DE SEGURANÇA DA 
ONU 
DEFENSIVE DETERRENCE DISSUASÃO MILITAR DEFENSIVA 
BUDGET ORÇAMENTO 
MERCOSUL/FTAA MERCOSUL / ALCA 
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME PROGRAMA NUCLEAR406 
                                                 
406 E-mail from Rudibert Kilian Júnior, received 2 September 2002. 
 130
 One further special example of  the resonance of  ideas influenced strongly by the 
academic viewpoint within the military establishment is the monograph submitted by Proença, 
a member of  the Experts’ Commission, as a requirement for a course in which he participated 
at the ESG in 2000407. In it, Proença lays out a vision for the reorganisation of  ESG along the 
lines proposed by the Ministry of  Defence, to which the ESG was subordinated loosely in 
1999 and more formally in 2004 with the creation of  the Secretariat of  Studies and Co-
operation. To the vague proposals emanating from the Ministry, Proença adds a series of  
suggestions deriving from the structure of  research and teaching in the academic sphere.  
Following his exposition of  the vision for a reorganised ESG, Proença underpins the 
necessity of  such a change with another critique of  several aspects of  ESG culture and 
structure which strike at the heart of  the school’s self-understanding and point out clearly the 
differences in normative preference between academics and the military establishment. His 
main points of  critique are the lack of  definition of  the school’s mission as currently in effect; 
the fragile scientific footing of  the school’s doctrine; and its faculty’s lack of  academic 
degrees408. Proença’s suggestions were met with a certain level of  approval within the MD and 
excoriated privately by representatives of  the military schooling system. 
The resonance of  academic inputs in the Brazilian case is difficult to ascertain due to the 
lack of  publicly available policy documents which might be compared to academics’ previous 
work in the search for similarities. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence in Brazil of  
significant divergence in normative preferences among the military establishment, civilian 
policymakers, and academic security experts. These relate directly to the unfinished de facto 
state of  affairs regarding the civilian control of  the military establishment in the country, and 
to the political legacy of  persecution during the period of  military rule. The same 
independence and military prerogatives that led to this divergence also create problems for the 
implementation of  declaratory security policy in Brazil once it is formulated and disseminated 
within the government and armed forces.  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
The period from 1994 to 2002 in Brazil covers the drafting of  the Política de Defesa Nacional, 
the creation of  the Ministry of  Defence and the convening of  the Experts’ Commission by 
that ministry. The events of  this time period provide ample information for the verification of  
the hypotheses regarding uncertainty, experts’ attributes and normative resonance. Brazilian 
                                                 
407 Proença Júnior, Domício. “Escola Superior de Guerra: Projeto Pedagógico para a Escola de Altos Estudos Estratégicos do 
Brasil”. Monograph, Curso de Altos Estudos Político-Estratégicos, Escola Superior de Guerra, Brazil, 2000 (hereafter, 
ESG). 
408 Proença, ESG, pp. 61-70. 
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policymakers have openly stated that over a given period their actions were undertaken under 
conditions of  uncertainty originating at both the international and domestic levels.  
In the early 1990s, the end of  the Cold War and the Southern Cone regional economic 
integration process invalidated then-current threat scenarios in which the Brazilian Armed 
Forces viewed Argentina as the most prominent threat to the nation. At the domestic level, 
the period beginning in the early 1990s with the Collor government marked the beginning of  
a “cleaning-up” process of  the aftermath of  military rule that by the instauration of  the Lula 
government in 2003 had not yet been completed. This is particularly true in the area of  
defence, where civil-military relations are still in a state of  flux.  
The transition from military to democratic rule, together with the demise of  the 
Communist threat, faced the military establishment with the invalidation of  both its major 
threat hypotheses and its rationale for maintaining its traditionally interventionist role in 
domestic governance. Thus the uncertainty pulled the two halves of  the defence policymaking 
community—military and civilian—in essentially opposite directions. While the military 
sought to maintain the status quo by arriving at a new rationale for similar missions, many 
civilian policymakers and academics saw the need for a new declaratory policy document as an 
opportunity definitively to relegate the military to a position more in accordance with full 
civilian control.  
The result of  these endeavours appears to be something of  a stalemate: while a defensive 
force posture and the peaceful resolution of  conflicts have been enshrined at least in 
declaratory policy such as the 1996 PDN, the armed forces have been successful in their quest 
to redefine missions to retain a certain role within the country. For example, new threats 
centred around the country’s northwestern border, such as drug trafficking and the spillover 
of  instability from the Colombian civil war, have replaced preoccupations with the country’s 
southern flank.  
These scenarios integrate tightly with a renewed focus on the Amazonian region, in which 
the Army has always played a decisive developmental role. Thus while the establishment of  
the Ministry of  Defence has put an end to the branch commanders’ direct access to the 
President and reduced from six to one the number of  uniformed members of  Cabinet, 
projects such as SIVAM have, under the auspices of  the Ministry of  Defence, maintained for 
the armed forces a role within the nation’s borders and alleviated its preoccupations with 
defining a new corporate raison d’être under changed political circumstances.  
The study’s strong point is its treatment of  the second hypothesis; the Brazilian case 
illustrates clearly both the relationship between policymaker perceptions of  civilians’ expertise 
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and their level of  participation in the policy process, and the relative dependence of  that 
ability upon the transparency and discursive openness of  the military corporation. Brazilian 
academics’ ability to be perceived by policymakers—whose majority continues to be furnished 
by uniformed members of  the FA, even within the MD—is inhibited by two main factors. In 
terms of  technical knowledge, there continues to be a diminished level of  transparency (in 
comparison to other democracies) regarding the transfer of  technical knowledge originating in 
the military establishment to the other side of  the barracks door. Normative approaches to 
defence issues in Brazil continue to bear the burden of  the dominance of  the Doutrina de 
Segurança Nacional.  
This body of  doctrine presents itself  as a closed reference providing the solution to all 
relevant problems of  security, discouraging military personnel, to whom it is taught 
extensively throughout their careers in the well-institutionalised military schooling system. 
Furthermore, active steps have been taken by means of  discursive exclusionary tactics to 
establish it as the only acceptable framework for discussing matters of  national defence and 
security. The relative youth and underinstitutionalisation of  International Relations and 
particularly security studies in Brazil, as well as the nation’s location on the geographic and 
linguistic periphery of  traditional academic centres of  production, rob Brazilian academics of  
institutionalised prestige which under different circumstances would serve as a counterweight 
to this hegemony, leading to a greater diversity of  approaches and increased perceived 
legitimacy for approaches originating within the academy.  
Concerning the normative resonance of  the proposals submitted by academics, there 
appears to be a shift underway in the conceptual and policy preferences of  the target 
audience. Though the “new security agenda”—the theoretical expression in many cases of  a 
progressive approach to national defence—has not made inroads in Brazil due to factors such 
as the ESG monopoly on discourse and the nation’s location at the periphery of  academic 
centres of  production, many of  the submissions by the members of  the Experts’ 
Commission, for example, reflect an increasingly progressive approach to defining security. 
This is in many cases closely connected to the inapplicability of  the traditional realist paradigm 
(and U.S. doctrine) in the Latin American context of  comparatively weak democratic 
institutions (and the attendant domestic instability) and the absence of  preoccupation with an 
external military threat.  
The results of  the MD’s efforts demonstrate the extent to which progress has been made 
towards casting off  the ESG doctrine and its reliance on romantic notions predating, in some 
cases, even the advent of  geopolitical theory. New concepts such as the no-threat analysis and 
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the closer wedding of  defence to foreign policy are making inroads in the increasingly (yet still 
insufficiently) civilianised Defence Ministry, and their advance in Brazilian discourse will be 
intimately tied both to the state of  civilian supremacy over the Armed Forces (where the ESG 
doctrine retains a stronger foothold) and the efforts now being sketched out in the MD and 
by the Experts to engage in a process of  opening debate with civil society on defence issues.  
This effort to “democratise” foreign policy bears a resemblance to the Canadian 
government’s efforts to involve civil society during the emergence of  the human security 
agenda. In the Brazilian case, however, the level of  development of  defence-related civil 
society organisations is far behind Canada, and the issue is one of  creating such organisations 
and generating public interest rather than of  making use of  extant expertise. It remains to be 
seen whether government efforts to generate interest in defence issues will guarantee freedom 
of  opinion, and what the role of  academics in spearheading this movement in civil society will 
be, and much depends on the degree to which the MD is able to establish itself  as the 
incarnation of  civilian control over the military. The MSDN and the PDN play an important 
part in establishing it in this role.  
Until the MSDN or a document derived from it is adopted, budgeting, the acquisition of  
weapons systems, and the concrete posture and philosophical outlook of  the Brazilian Armed 
Forces will continue to operate in a void with regard to civilian political oversight. The 1996 
PDN has been described even by its authors as inadequate as a framework for 
implementation, and in the meantime the single branches of  the FA continue to be 
responsible for their own budgeting and overall posture. 
 
Implementation 
Some of  the more embarrassing effects of  this monetary independence are the purchases 
by the individual forces of  military hardware—including major systems such as aircraft 
carriers, fighter jets and heavy tanks—that run entirely counter to the PDN409. The Singular 
Forces’ current projects for acquisition are carried out without overwhelmingly conscientious 
reference to that document, and it appears that were its guidelines are followed, this is largely 
the product of  serendipity410. Perhaps this autonomy is what has led the service commanders 
to offer predominantly positive evaluations of  Quintão's tenure411 after their original 
prolonged intense resistance to the establishment of  the MD412.  
                                                 
409 Zaverucha, REDES, pp. 10-11; Dreifuss, “Armed Forces”, pp. 23-24. 
410 On the Singular Forces’ individual force posture and acquisitions projects, see the excellent résumé in Brigagão and 
Proença, Concertação Múltipla, pp. 65-91. See also Martins and Zirker, pp. 151-156. 
411 Campos, p. 456. 
412 See, for example, Fuccille, REDES, pp. 1-2. 
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Two years into his tenure, President Lula da Silva has yet to embark on any major initiatives 
in the defence arena, and in accordance with recent trends in Brazil and throughout Latin 
America, military issues are not a stated priority of  his administration. The PT government’s 
modus operandi in other sectors, however, may indicate a pattern of  calling on outside advice 
that indicates a role from policy advisors from outside the bureaucracy. In an echo of  the 
Canadian human security initiative and its “democratisation” through “public diplomacy” of  
the foreign and defence policy formulation process, the initial attitude appears to be one of  
openness, albeit preferably for assistance from non-governmental organisations: 
They are a relatively inexperienced bunch, having previously run nothing bigger than Brazil’s most-important 
state. But they are eager learners. “There is a total openness to knowledge”, says Vinod Thomas, who heads 
the World Bank’s Brazil office. To find talent, the government has poached so many activists from “civil 
society” that NGOs are having trouble recruiting.413 
Written with the informal assistance of  a number of  subsequent members of  Cardoso’s 
Experts’ Commission, the PT platform on armed forces policy paints a picture of  uncertainty 
and of  the need for a decisive government, particularly presidential, role: 
12. In the last 20 years, the Armed Forces (FA) have sought to establish a new identity. The decline of  the 
former national security doctrines was not able to leave us with a modern conception of  what role the FA 
should take on in a democratic Brazil and in a world in which the threats to peace and the sovereignty of  
nations are multiplying. The Brazilian Armed Forces resist domestic and international pressure to play a 
policing role. The FA find themselves, however, with few resources, and are not able to offer their 
contingents the training and the means that are compatible with the requirements of  national defence. It is 
imperative that the new government propose to the National Congress a debate on the role of  the FA in the 
next period of  office. From there it will be possible to define with clarity, an orientation for the material re-
equipment of  the Armed Forces, coherent with the reformulation of  national defence policy. The Lula 
government will reinforce, modernise and restore the prestige of  the FA. The permanent introduction of  
new technologies for the full defence of  the national territory, territorial seas and air space constitutes a 
fundamental vector of  national sovereignty.  
13. Already now it is clear, however, that the FA will fulfil their constitutional mission[s], especially those 
related to border defence and the protection of  regions whose integrity is threatened, as is that of  Amazônia. 
They should be able as well to carry out international peace missions.414 
The MD bears the competence to issue a declaratory policy that provides a legal and 
normative framework for weapons systems purchases and the development of  attitudes and 
postures. To do so, it must first develop a cogent concept of  security. This process, fully three 
years after the convocation of  the Experts’ Commission, has not been brought to fruition.  
In searching for models upon which to base the Brazilian MD’s concept of  security, the 
Ministry has turned to concepts developed in other countries, such as India, Chile, Sweden 
and Portugal, as well as the United Nations. Passing reference is made to the debates within 
the academic discipline of  International Relations. What is promising in terms of  a future role 
for academics, and of  the entry of  academically-derived notions of  security into the Brazilian 
bureaucracy, is that several notions first introduced to MD policymakers during the course of  
                                                 
413 “Compromising idealists”. The Economist. 8 March 2003; p. 56. 
414 “Programa de Governo da Coligação Lula Presidente. Um Brasil para Todos: Crescimento, Emprego e Inclusão Social”. 
Available from http://www.estadao.com.br/ext/eleicoes2002/programa_pt/pg_0001.htm. Accessed 1 September 2002. 
Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original. 
 135
the research for this investigation have begun to make their appearance in draft documents 
outlining the security concept at the basis of  MD thinking.  
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4. From Lusaka to Pretoria, or the birth of  a community of  security 
academics: the 1996 South African White Paper on Defence 
 
 
The evils of  apartheid belonged to the civilian leaders;  
its insanities were entirely the property of  the military officer class. 
—Ken Owen— 
 
 
The increasing external opposition to and criticism of  the current South African system […]  
while often vacuous and ineffective, [show] no significant sign of  abating. […]  
The congruence of  [non-racialism] with South African traditions  
and its relevance to South African needs […]appears questionable. 
—Samuel P. Huntington415— 
 
 
In the years immediately following the country’s first-ever free elections, the South 
African transition to democracy was considered to be a shining example of  peaceful 
change. Analysing its impact on the country’s foreign and defence policy became a 
cottage industry among security academics even in the industrialised North. Alongside 
the high profile of  the transition itself, South African security issues received particular 
attention because it was in this area that the normative turnaround from white minority 
to democratic majority rule was most evident. South African defence expert Gavin 
Cawthra writes: 
South Africa has undertaken one of  the most systematic defence and security reviews in the 
developing world. This has led to considerable demilitarisation, the abandoning of  nuclear 
deterrence, a commitment to collective and common security, and the adoption of  a new framework 
for the management of  security. The South African process is remarkable in three ways: first, in the 
way which it consciously sought out a new concept or paradigm for security through engagement 
with academic discourse; second, in the close attention it paid to questions of  security governance 
and management and to civil-military relations; and third, in the way in which the process was 
conducted.416  
The South African transition stands out for the extent of  the normative change that 
took place during the transition from the apartheid government’s adversarial 
relationships with its neighbours to the majority rulers’ efforts to establish common 
security structures in the region in the late 1990s. A military establishment that had 
exercised considerable influence on political decisionmaking was subjected to thorough-
going civilian control. A culture of  transparency and accountability417 replaced the 
secretive machinations of  organs such as the State Security Council. Across almost all 
areas of  policy, the African National Congress’ progressive agenda—summed up into 
                                                 
415 “Reform and Stability in South Africa”. International Security. Vol. 6, No. 4 (1982); pp. 3-25. Here, p. 8. 
416 Cawthra, Gavin. “From “Total Strategy” to “Human Security”: The Making of South Africa’s Defence Policy 
1990-99”. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies. Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000); pp. 51-67 (hereafter, JPCMS). Here, pp. 
51-52. NB: a previous version of this article appeared as Cawthra, Gavin. From “Total Strategy” to “Human Security”: 
The Making of South Africa’s Defence Policy 1990-98. (Working Paper No. 8/1999, Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute). 1999. Available from https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/cag02/cag02.html. Accessed 
15 March 2001 (hereafter, COPRI).  
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the Reconstruction and Development Programme—replaced the more conservative 
approach favoured by the once-dominant National Party.  
This process was extraordinary in that it provided a very rare example of  a 
government negotiating itself  out of  power. Important conceptual debates were to 
follow during this passage of  political power between groups with very different 
normative worldviews that represented “more than the usual gap between theory and 
practice; as South Africa’s transition is showing, [they involve] the complex relationship 
between incumbent power and challenges to it”418. 
This chapter echoes its Brazilian counterpart in initially providing an overview of  the 
South African national context and the regional security situation into which the 
country is embedded. The domestic political situation is presented with particular 
attention to the role of  the state—more precisely, the armed forces—in South African 
society. A more focussed look at civil-military relations follows. The first section ends 
with an overview of  the South African university system and of  the discipline of  
security studies—as a subset of  International Relations—as taught in South Africa.  
The next section provides a timeline of  the decisionmaking process followed during 
the creation of  the first security policy document issued by the democratic South Africa: 
the 1996 White Paper on Defence. It introduces briefly the main actors in the process, 
both inside and outside the governmental bureaucracy, including an important grouping 
of  influential individuals—the Military Research Group (MRG), which laid the 
foundations for a community of  progressive defence intellectuals—and sketches the 
institutional structures within which they operated.  
The chapter then goes on to elucidate in detail the role of  the project’s three sets of  
variables—uncertainty, experts’ attributes and the normative resonance of  experts’ 
input—in determining the role played by the country’s security academics in the 
formulation of  South African security policy between 1991 and 1996. The focus of  the 
chapter is on the MRG and subsequently on the two protagonists of  the White Paper 
drafting process: Deputy Defence Minister Ronnie Kasrils and the White Paper’s lead 
drafter, Laurie Nathan, then Executive Director of  the Centre for Conflict Resolution at 
the University of  Cape Town.  
                                                                                                                                          
417 The recent arms procurement scandal and ongoing allegations of corrupt illustrate, however, just how fragile these 
attempts at transparency remain. It is notable, however, that the obstacles to accountability and transparency now 
come from sources other than inadequate civilian control over the military establishment. 
418 Vale, Peter. Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness: South Africa and Regional Security in the mid-1990s. Chr. Michelsen Institute 
Report 1994:4. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1994 (hereafter, Laagers); p. 2. 
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South African defence policymakers in the immediate post-transition period were 
faced with considerable uncertainty. The new government’s top priority was to distance 
itself  as rapidly as possible from the policies of  the apartheid regime, both in terms of  
normative precepts and concrete policy choices. Therefore, the uncertainty faced in this 
context can be said to derive almost exclusively from domestic political considerations, 
although the situation that facilitated the move to majority rule was precipitated by 
developments at the international level.  
The key factor leading to the critical level of  perceived uncertainty, however, resided 
in the almost non-existent capacity of  South Africa’s defence establishment during this 
period to formulate policy options that adequately wedded strategic know-how to 
widely acceptable normative commitments. The incoming government had very little 
experience in military matters both at the practical and theoretical levels, but enjoyed the 
normative support of  much of  the population.  
Those who did have technical knowledge—holdovers from the minority-rule 
government—saw their views discredited by their previous adherence to concepts 
associated with apartheid. Since the new policy situation called for the combination of  
both attributes, a capacity gap ensued within the policymaking community. The MRG 
set out to fill this gap through the creation of  specialised knowledge among the 
community of  security experts affiliated through position or beliefs to the new 
government. 
In doing so, the MRG set out to do two things: increase the level of  practical 
specialised knowledge within the progressive academic community, and introduce to 
those possessing this know-how a new security paradigm of  greater resonance with the 
outlook of  the African National Congress (ANC), which dominated the first 
democratically elected government. Spurred into action by the disappointed results of  a 
first meeting with representatives of  the previous establishment in Lusaka in 1990, 
MRG members set about creating a community of  security experts that would be 
independent of  the government, and yet committed to assisting it in developing a new 
paradigm that transposed the political commitments of  the ANC into the security 
realm. 
The academic determinants of  institutionalised prestige are in the South African case 
accompanied by a further factor specific to the country’s history: the notion of  
“struggle credentials”. Many experts gained prestige among policymakers from their 
political commitments, and in some cases from their personal sacrifice to the fight 
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against minority rule prior to 1990. Some entered academia only after their return to 
South Africa and after the beginnings of  their involvement with the country’s security 
debate; rather than an academic position conferring policy prestige, struggle credentials 
aided some experts in attaining academic posts.  
Prestige in the South African case was and is closely linked to the normative 
resonance of  experts’ viewpoints, a finding that will be taken up in the appropriate 
section. This correlation holds true in a negative sense as well: almost all of  the 
academic centres producing security-related work within the country had been co-opted 
by the apartheid government; these academics lost their prestige overnight as policy 
elements such as Total Strategy and the destabilisation of  South Africa’s majority-ruled 
neighbours were overturned immediately.  
The link between prestige and resonance was obviously continued as the MRG and 
others began to contribute to the country’s public discussion of  defence issues. MRG 
members were assisted in their efforts at both normative argumentation and cogency by 
their frequent interaction with members of  the group who were policymakers. This also 
assured the continuing normative resonance of  their inputs as they progressed further 
into the policy process.  
The question of  resonance is tested in this investigation through the examination of  
the interaction between Laurie Nathan and Ronnie Kasrils. Nathan, an MRG member 
and an academic, served as the lead drafter of  the 1996 Defence White Paper; his 
principal interlocutor within the Defence Ministry was Kasrils. Here, the text traces the 
drafting process for the White Paper through several versions and extricates the salient 
episodes of  interaction between the two men (as representatives of  greater interests) to 
demonstrate Nathan’s role—and that of  normative resonance—in the formulation of  
the democratic South Africa’s first post-apartheid declaratory policy document.  
 
4.1. Regional and national context 
The security situation in the southern African region was until 1994 profoundly 
marked by the legacy of  colonialism (and later majority rule) north of  the Limpopo and 
white minority rule to its south. Since the end of  the apartheid system, military and 
defence issues in the region have stood in the shadow of  more pressing—and largely 
non-military—problems such as famine, crime and public health concerns, chief  among 
them the spread of  HIV/AIDS. The white government in Pretoria had since its 
instalment in 1948 peered out from behind a cordon sanitaire of  European colonies to its 
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north which it viewed as a buffer zone against Marxist-inspired majority governments 
on the African continent.  
This was to change abruptly after the precipitous collapse of  the Portuguese 
overseas empire following the 1974 Carnation Revolution. The establishment of  black 
rule, often with Soviet assistance419, significantly increased the level of  threat perceived 
by white South Africans, with the defence establishment at the fore. The advent of  
majority rule in Zimbabwe/Southern Rhodesia in 1980 and the loss of  South African 
control over South West Africa in 1990 completed the picture of  South Africa as a lone 
bastion of  capitalist white rule surrounded by Marxist black regimes. Together with 
increasing resistance to apartheid within South Africa itself, this led to increased 
militarisation and a prominent political role for the security apparatus in the years 
leading up to the establishment of  democracy in 1994.  
Since the establishment of  majority rule in South Africa, the military situation in the 
southern African region has been largely stable. The country has gone to some lengths 
to restore its credibility as a regional power, and has been integrated into the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), a regional security and development 
structure originally designed to combat the white regime. As the hegemon in Southern 
Africa, Pretoria has maintained an active role in the region, though now with different 
motives; the South African armed forces led a SADC intervention into Lesotho in 1998 
to quell a coup feared imminent by the newly-elected government.  
South Africa has even emerged as a continental power, despatching troops to assist 
flood victims in Mozambique in the fall of  2000, and contingents of  peacekeepers to 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of  the Congo. Presidents Mandela and Mbeki 
have sought to play a role on the continental stage, and have each sought to become 
involved in the brokering of  regional conflicts ranging from Zimbabwe to the Great 
Lakes region. South Africa has taken a leading role, together with Nigeria, in the 
establishment and strengthening of  the African Union, launched in Durban in 2002 as 
the successor to the Organisation of  African Unity.  
 
4.1.1. National political context 
Racial and ethnic relations have cast a long shadow over South Africa’s political 
history and the role of  the state in South African society. The fundamental division is 
between the black majority, which did not gain an effective vote until 1994, and the 
                                                 
419 On the tradition of hostility to communism among Afrikaners, see Jaster, Robert S. South Africa’s Narrowing Security 
Options. (Adelphi Papers, No. 159). London: Brassey’s [International Institute for Strategic Studies], 1980; pp. 4-5. 
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white minority, which ruled until that time. The white minority is in turn divided 
between Afrikaners and English-speakers. With strong support from London, the 
traditionally more progressive Anglophones began to gain ascendancy over the 
comparatively conservative Afrikaners in the 19th century. This trend culminated in the 
country’s entry on the Allied side in the Second World War, over firm resistance from 
some Afrikaner quarters. A backlash against this development facilitated a landslide 
election victory of  the Afrikaner-led National Party in 1948.  
The National Party, together with an interlocking set of  institutions that included, 
inter alia, the South African Defence Force (SADF), dominated the country’s political 
life. The centrepiece of  National Party policy was its racial doctrine best known by the 
Afrikaans term for “separateness”—apartheid. As apartheid’s discriminatory statutes 
became increasingly severe, resistance grew and increasingly repressive measures were 
needed to uphold white rule, contributing to a vicious circle resulting in the increasing 
militarisation of  South African politics420.  
The apartheid government’s view of  South Africa’s international situation was 
coloured significantly by Afrikaner national myths, which saw the nation as a last 
bastion of  Christianity, civilisation and capitalism on a continent increasingly controlled 
by genetically inferior Marxist black African governments. South African leaders thus 
assumed that the West would come to their aid, due in no small part to the country’s 
strategic natural resources and position along the vital Cape sea route421.  
As decolonisation began to sweep the Third World in the 1960s, minority rule in 
South Africa came to be viewed in many quarters as morally atavistic. South Africa’s 
white leaders were faced with a triple threat to the continuation of  minority rule: 
growing international moral condemnation, leading to a loss of  support from Western 
allies422; the loss of  the strategic buffer zone to the north with the independence of  
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia; and a growing campaign of  internal 
resistance, in which the ANC, a Marxist-inspired non-racial liberation movement, 
figured prominently.  
The ANC’s 1960 campaign against the pass law system, one of  the cornerstones of  
the National Party regime’s apparatus of  repression and the basis of  a system of  forced 
                                                 
420 Grundy, Kenneth W. The Militarization of South African Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987; 
Frankel, Philip H. Pretoria’s Praetorians: Civil-military relations in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984. See also Vale, Laagers, p. 14. 
421 Jaster, p. 6. 
422 In 1963, less than three years after the Sharpeville shootings, the United Nations Security Council placed a 
voluntary arms embargo on South Africa. See Crocker, Chester A. South Africa’s Defense Posture: Coping with 
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labour migration, ended following the Sharpeville massacre during that year. At this 
time, the ANC founded its armed force, UmKhonto we Sizwe (the Spear of  the 
Nation—MK)423. 1960 further saw the establishment of  an exile organisation with 
headquarters in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. Almost the entire leadership of  the ANC 
and MK were sentenced to lengthy prison terms following the 1964 Rivonia trials424.  
As the apartheid government succeeded in curbing ANC activity within the country, 
the organisation’s activities in exile gained in importance. ANC foreign policy consisted 
in the main of  attempts to broadcast the Government’s human rights violations and to 
isolate the South African state on the international scene. A notable success was the 
establishment of  the UN Special Committee on Apartheid in 1962425. 
As the NP regime’s geopolitical situation worsened and the ANC’s efforts to 
ostracise Pretoria internationally took effect, the South African state turned to 
increasing levels of  violence in its attempt to uphold the status quo, basing its actions 
on the theoretical underpinnings provided by the Total Strategy doctrine developed in 
1977. Together with increasing repression, however, white South Africa’s leaders saw 
the need for reforms, many of  them cosmetic, designed to defuse the growing dissent. 
As international condemnation of  minority rule grew rapidly in the 1980s—together 
with battlefield losses in Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa—the emphasis of  
state policy shifted increasingly towards reforms, however sincere, in lieu of  increased 
repression.  
The South African case should be viewed clearly as taking place in a society in 
transition. President Frederik Willem De Klerk quickened the pace of  reforms upon 
taking office in 1989. The controlled reduction of  the repressive apparatus began in 
earnest on 2 February 1990 with the un-banning of  the ANC. Former MK chief  
Nelson Mandela was released nine days later. Ongoing secret negotiations between the 
ANC and the government (including a meeting between then-President Botha and 
Mandela in July 1989)426 became public and the pace of  efforts toward a peaceful 
transition to a democratic South Africa accelerated.  
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A National Peace Accord, containing codes of  conduct and a pledge by the 
signatories to establish a multi-party democracy based on unlimited general elections, 
was signed on 14 September 1991. Mandela’s January 1991 call for “‘an all-party 
congress’ to negotiate the route to a constituent assembly” of  a representative South 
African government culminated in the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) held 21-22 December 1991 and CODESA II in May 1992.  
While the ANC’s Marxist liberation ideology427 was relatively well-developed, the 
organisation had made very few provisions regarding its policy upon taking power. As 
the negotiations on the future shape of  the South African polity began to take form, the 
ANC’s inability to cast off  certain policy frameworks appropriate to liberation 
movements, though not to governmental negotiating partners, was to prove 
problematic428; in addition, its former Communist allies were actively withdrawing their 
support, both rhetorical and financial, for the African liberation movements429. Thus, as 
it entered the negotiating process over the new Constitution and the new political shape 
of  South Africa, the ANC found itself  stripped of  the bearings it had followed for 
almost 40 years. This lack of  policy direction was evident in many areas, including very 
prominently with regard to defence and security issues. 
A Transitional Executive Council (TEC) assumed its responsibilities in October 
1993. South Africa’s first democratic elections were held on 27 April 1994, at which 
time a new interim Constitution took effect and a coalition of  the largest political 
actors, the ANC-dominated Government of  National Unity, assumed power.  
 
4.1.2. The armed forces and civil-military relations 
The most pressing task facing the military establishment after the elections was the 
amalgamation of  the SADF, MK and several other liberation movements’ armed forces 
into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF). This process was 
marked by the fundamental differences in outlook and capacity between MK and the 
other liberation armies on the one hand, and their enemy of  30 years, the SADF, on the 
other.  
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4.1.2.1. The SADF 
As an extension of  the British armed forces in both activity and esprit430, the SADF 
remained a small force with a minuscule budget (spent largely on the procurement of  
British weapons)431 until Pretoria’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961. The 
first NP Prime Minister, D. F. Malan, attempted to integrate South Africa into Western 
defence structures and viewed communism as the gravest danger to South Africa’s 
security432. The SADF played a prominent role in apartheid-era South African politics, 
and increased its influence during the increasingly dire foreign and domestic situations 
facing the white regime beginning in the 1970s.  
As European arms suppliers began to reconsider their shipments to the apartheid 
regime, it became clear that South Africa would have to rely increasingly on indigenous 
arms production; the state arms production and procurement firm Armscor was 
founded in 1966. Relations with the West soured while expenditures on the armed 
forces and procurement continued to increase433. Spending on defence went from 44 
million rand in 1960 to 1857 million in 1979-80 and 4722 million in 1985-86434.  
The search for a policy framework to describe and respond to this situation yielded 
the reductionist and apodictic vision435 of  a comprehensive, monolithic Soviet-
orchestrated “total onslaught” against South Africa. This onslaught, based on what can 
now be said was an over-assessment of  the country’s strategic importance436, supposedly 
spanned almost all fields of  policy:  
There is an onslaught on the Free World, a world of  which we are a part. That onslaught manifests 
itself  not only in the military field and in the field of  diplomacy, but also in the form of  international 
terrorism, which has created an oppressive state for this world. […] there is an attempt, under 
Marxist leadership, to bring about revolution in Southern Africa, more specifically in the Republic of  
South Africa. […] there is an attempt, under the leadership of  these powers, to subvert the high 
degree of  stability, in the economic field as well, we have enjoyed up to now.437 
 
The external threat, which is directed against all the components of  the RSA’s and SWA’s power base 
(political, economic, social, security and psychological) is culminating mainly in a revolutionary 
onslaught. The onslaught is directed and co-ordinated in such a way by Soviet Russia (USSR), as 
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chief  planner and initiator, that it promotes the execution of  the USSR’s indirect strategy in relation 
to Southern African [sic] and furthers Soviet interests in this region.438  
Having created the spectre of  a “total onslaught”, South African policymakers now 
responded by means of  an equally sweeping—and equally reductionist439—”total 
national strategy”. This strategy consisted of  the subordination of  an ever-larger 
number of  policy areas to the needs and logic of  rebuffing the “onslaught”440, a task to 
which the military establishment was best suited;441 this process has been described as 
“militarisation by invitation”442. 
Equating African nationalism with communism and white South Africa with the 
Christian West, Total Strategy allowed any objection to apartheid to be construed as 
supportive of  Marxism443. Further, by increasing the urgency of  its strategic 
perceptions, the defence establishment was able to ratchet up its demands concerning 
the mobilisation of  society behind the defence effort. Defence expenditure began to 
increase as a percentage of  GDP444. The influence, size and budgetary means of  the 
SADF, South African Police Service (SAPS) and the intelligence services skyrocketed. 
The instruments for Total Strategy’s refinement were created by then-Defence Minister 
P. W. Botha, a disciple of  the notions of  strategy propounded by the French General 
André Beaufre.  
The Beaufreian approach was introduced to the South African defence establishment 
through the efforts of  Lieutenant General C. A. Fraser. Fraser had written a review of  
Beaufre’s work and subsequently had requested Professors Deon Fourie of  the 
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University of  South Africa (UNISA) and Benjamin Cockram of  the University of  the 
Witwatersrand to lecture on the strategist to the SADF445. Fourie and Cockram gave 
those lectures at SADF headquarters in 1968. Among those in attendance was Brigadier 
General Magnus Malan, a graduate of  Fort Leavenworth later to become Defence 
Minister following Botha’s ascendancy to the Prime Ministership. Fourie produced a 
series of  articles in the SADF journal Paratus in 1971-2 outlining the Beaufreian 
approach446.  
Botha rapidly became one of  the most avid proponents of  Beaufre’s strategic 
framework. The two men met twice and Beaufre accepted an invitation to lecture at the 
South African Defence War College in 1974. Under the stewardship of  Botha and 
Malan, Beaufre’s conceptual framework began to appear in the official documents of  
the Ministry of  Defence as early as 1971447. While the defence establishment was still 
seeking a cohesive framework allowing it to respond to its changed international and 
domestic environments, the Beaufreian framework was not adapted and fine-tuned in 
the South African context until the tabling of  the 1977 Defence White Paper. 
The 1977 White Paper on Defence provided the first adaptation of  Beaufre’s 
framework to the specific exigencies of  the apartheid regime’s strategic situation. 
Echoing the emphasis of  Beaufre’s An Introduction to Strategy on the multidimensional 
nature of  revolutionary conflict, it proclaimed that  
The process of  ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of  a state’s authority in a conflict situation 
has, through the evolution of  warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action. 
[…] The resolution of  a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-
ordinated action in all fields—military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, 
diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. Germany had already realised this before World War II, and 
Russia has maintained a multi-dimensional campaign against the West since this war. […] It is 
therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. […] the 
maintenance of  the sovereignty of  the RSA is the combined responsibility of  all government 
departments448. 
This characterisation of  the security landscape had two main consequences for 
South African policy. The first was the steadily increasing subjugation of  more and 
more policy areas to the logic of  security and a correspondent rise in the influence of  
the security establishment—what has been dubbed the militarisation of  South African 
politics. This was coupled with the increasing rationalisation and bureaucratisation of  
the state.  
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Echoing the manner in which the American-inspired DSN served as the doctrinal 
basis for military intervention in Brazilian politics, the 1977 White Paper provided the 
foundation for the role of  the State Security Council (SSC)—institutionalised in 
1972449—and the elaborate National Security Management System. The SSC and the 
Bureau of  State Security (BOSS) were the embodiment of  Beaufre’s call for a co-
ordinated and interdependent national strategy450. 
Where in Brazil the military overtly took control of  the country’s governance, in 
South Africa the intervention of  the military establishment in politics took a more 
subtle, if  no less prominent, from. The SSC, chaired by the State President, came to be 
considered by many to be the actual locus of  decisionmaking in the South African 
“garrison state”451. The claim of  the militarisation of  South African society in the 1970s 
and 1980s centres around the SSC and its increasing powers, and on the preponderance 
of  members of  the security apparatus in that body.  
However, the seminal analyses by Frankel and Grundy have been criticised by some 
observers, especially those whose influence rests upon collaboration with the apartheid 
governments, as not only exaggerating but significantly distorting the extent to which 
the military establishment played a role in political decisionmaking452. Further, it is 
important in this respect not to equate an increased role for the executive branch of  
government (which in this particular case relied heavily, by choice, on military input) 
with a forced increase in an institutionalised role for the military. 
Total Strategy went far beyond the military sphere, and succeeded in subjugating vast 
fields of  state activity to the logic of  security. The influence of  the security 
establishment enjoyed an unprecedented rise; military budgets and arms production 
capacity showed enormous growth; and the military effort began to place significant 
strains on South Africa’s white population. Total Strategy’s star began to fade as even its 
core supporters among Afrikaners began to protest against its financial and human 
expense. The reforms introduced by the late 1980s significantly reduced the influence 
of  the military establishment, although some legacies, such as the freedom of  the 
SADF’s decisionmaking processes from meaningful civilian intervention, remained.  
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4.1.2.2. The ANC and MK 
ANC military policy, as that of  many other left-leaning liberation movements, was 
at least partially based on the writings of  Mao Zedong and the North Vietnamese 
General Vo Nguyen Giap453. The two main strategies of  establishing camps in rural 
areas outside the country, and supporting insurrection in urban areas in-country—such 
as Soweto, Alexandria and Springs—were taken from these writings. MK possessed a 
Military Intelligence branch that co-operated closely with the political headquarters of  
the movement in Lusaka; such a link was a rarity among organisations of  its kind. In 
terms of  civil-military relations, MK was subordinate to the political decisionmaking of  
the ANC in a manner consistent with the civilian control of  armed forces in modern-
day state military establishments. 
Nevertheless, the ANC and MK had paid little attention to the manner in which 
their eventual takeover of  power would occur. Their deliberations were based on 
Marxist theory and the idea that MK would defeat the SADF in battle and simply take 
over as the nations’ defence force. With the fall of  Marxism and the realisation that with 
power came a very different set of  problems, uncertainty set in. This disorientation led 
to the creation of  a group called the Military Research Group (MRG).  
The MRG held its first meeting at ANC Headquarters on 25 November 1991 and 
met approximately 30 times over the next four years. Its membership included 
progressive academics and activists (including some who had been ANC members and 
participants in the black liberation struggle in their own right) as well as members of  
ANC departments and MK Military Headquarters. The group’s long-term goal was to 
“provide a forum whereby researchers, academics and policy analysts could network 
with one another, discuss issues of  common relevance and prioritise future areas of  co-
operation”454. It worked towards this goal by furnishing research reports, organising 
conferences, holding training workshops and otherwise facilitating dialogue.  
The MRG had a membership whose origins spanned the spectrum from established 
university professors to anti-militarist activists and current and former ANC/MK 
underground operatives. It had a core membership of  approximately 10-12 people, with 
shifts in membership as MRG personnel began to take on government and advisory 
posts under the new regime and new members emerged among junior academics and 
recently returned exiles.  
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The MRG’s efforts aside, the expectations and outlooks of  the armies that would 
combine to form the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) diverged 
considerably; mutual distrust based on ideological differences was eventually overcome 
thanks to a bond formed by mutual dedication to military professionalism. The first 
face-to-face meetings between members of  the governmental armed forces in uniform 
and members of  MK took place at Simon’s Town near Cape Town on 23-24 April 1993.  
Previous meetings had taken place informally, with Defence Headquarters either 
forbidding SADF members to attend, whether in uniform or even outright. A multitude 
of  conferences, hosted both by the groups negotiating the transition and by various 
academic groupings and NGOs both within South Africa and without, laid the 
cornerstone for the work to be undertaken following the establishment of  negotiations 
in earnest later that year. 
The Transitional Executive Council consisted of  seven Sub-Councils, one of  which 
was assigned the portfolio of  Defence—essentially the planning and creation of  the 
SANDF455. The main aim of  the Defence Sub-Council was to make it impossible for 
any political actor to gain advantage during the talks or the election campaign through 
the use of  military force456. The ANC began to push for the placement of  the new 
Defence Force under TEC (and hence joint) control before the April 1994 elections—
the SADF called for exactly the opposite in a bid to retain its full managerial autonomy 
until the last possible moment457. 
Threat assessment well into the new millennium and the beginnings of  a plan to 
integrate the SANDF fell within the purview of  a component body of  the Sub-Council 
on Defence, the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC). The JMCC was a unique 
example of  sworn enemies working together to unite their armed forces into one 
common military. It was chaired by the Chief  of  the SADF, General Georg Meiring, 
and MK Chief  of  Staff  Siphiwe Nyanda, and consisted of  representatives of  the 
SADF, MK, the four “homeland armies”, and later the Azanian People’s Liberation 
Army. Reaching an accord on the shape and goals of  the new Defence Force proved to 
be one of  the most difficult facets of  drafting the new Constitution458. Once such a 
Defence Force was inaugurated, the necessity of  devising for it guiding principles and a 
strategic outlook became apparent. These were to be provided by the Defence White 
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Paper issued in 1996. The period in which that document was formulated provides the 
locus for this study’s investigation of  its three hypotheses concerning academics’ input 
into policy processes. 
  
4.2. Policymaker uncertainty 
The initial necessary condition paving the way for attributes and resonance is 
policymaker uncertainty. Perceptions of  uncertainty can come as the result of  changes 
in the international arena—such as the fall of  the Berlin Wall and the demise of  
communism; the domestic political situation, such as the change of  government in 
South Africa in 1994; or as a result of  a lack of  policymaking capacity within a 
government such as that experienced by the ANC and the SADF in the early 1990s. 
 
4.2.1. The international and domestic arenas 
Mounting global opprobrium toward white minority rule had discredited the 
apartheid regime’s “Total Strategy”, while the demise of  “real existing socialism”, as 
symbolised by the fall of  the Berlin Wall, highlighted the liabilities of  the ANC’s Marxist 
doctrine. The vacuum that ensued left neither the incumbent defence establishment nor 
the entering liberation movement in possession of  a fully-fledged, viable and legitimate 
policy standpoint, at the level of  broadly normative worldviews as well as concrete 
options for the provision of  national defence to all of  South Africa’s citizens.  
ANC policy on the South African armed forces it inherited had been guided by the 
assumption that MK (which largely did not develop a military agenda of  its own)459 
would defeat the SADF in an armed struggle and simply replace the state security 
apparatus. Given the relative sizes of  MK (estimated at 14.000-16.000 lightly-armed, 
largely infantry troops) and the SADF (roughly 100.000 technologically more highly-
trained troops460), and the evolving view that the two would be integrated, the need for a 
new strategy towards defence under the new dispensation was evident461.  
At the time of  their un-banning, the liberation movements had not altered the 
Marxist-inspired policies and worldviews developed at the height of  the global 
ideological struggle: MK considered itself  a “people’s army” waging a “people’s war” in 
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the classic Marxist sense462; its members received military training in the Soviet Union 
and socialist satellites such as Cuba and the German Democratic Republic. The fall of  
the Berlin Wall and the demise of  the political practice of  Marxism discredited the 
ideological underpinnings of  the organisation’s past policy before the formulation of  a 
new outlook had even begun.  
The ANC and MK’s dependence on now-discredited Marxist ideology led to 
difficulties for the organisation in the period leading up to its entry into government463:  
[t]he ANC had paid surprisingly little attention to the transformation of  defence by 1990: it’s [sic] 
policy approach had been limited by its insistence (whether merely rhetorically or otherwise) that its 
revolutionary army, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) would seize power and form the basis of  the new 
post-apartheid defence force. The onset of  negotiations, and the realisation by the ANC that it 
would inherit the existing South African Defence Force (SADF) into which MK would at best be 
integrated, and possibly assimilated, led to a sudden requirement for new policy options.464 
Many MRG members, for example, individually came to realise that the time had 
come, in the words of  one member, to “lose the theory and get real”465. As the MRG 
became more acquainted with the responsibilities of  office through feedback from 
policymakers, there was a rapid waning of  ideology as a deciding factor in members’ 
production, in favour of  more pragmatic approaches466.  
This renunciation of  strong ideology is echoed in the MRG’s output. Many of  the 
early research reports strongly reflect a Marxist orientation—particularly those 
produced by Rocky Williams, although many of  the group’s members shared at least a 
background in Marxism gained through their involvement in the largely Marxist-
supported and Marxist-oriented liberation struggle. While some of  the earliest papers 
produced by Williams are clearly situated within a Marxist framework467, the ideological 
content of  the MRG papers fades rapidly from one to the next. Similarly the nature of  
MRG output shifted, leading to some less academic forms of  information-gathering 
being dropped.  
One example is the intelligence-style reports on National Party members and 
academics associated with apartheid and Total Strategy. In one such report, the author 
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deemed important enough for inclusion the rumour that a prominent National Party 
politician was said to be a homosexual with a penchant for young boys, and had had an 
affair with the husband of  a close colleague468. Subsequent MRG reports were to 
employ a more sober approach to the relevance and presentation of  data. 
 
4.2.2. Policymaking capacity 
One MRG member described the situation in 1990-1 thus: 
Capacity within the ANC in this regard [the transformation of  defence] was quite limited and was 
largely based within its Military Intelligence section. […] The movement has inspired some liberal 
and radical academics based in South Africa to start examining security issues. The task of  policy 
analysis for the ANC thus fell largely to a somewhat odd grouping of  military intelligence operatives, 
anti-conscription activists and a small number of  activist-academics, who operated within a broad 
framework established by the ANC’s military political leadership.469  
MRG member Gavin Cawthra was quite optimistic about the MRG’s policy 
influence: 
Some of  the ANC’s policy groundwork was carried out by the Military Research Group (MRG), an 
ANC-aligned “think tank” on defence policy, whose dozen or so members played an important role, 
individually and collectively, by workshopping policy options in the context of  emerging international 
debates and then promoting these ideas within ANC structures. The ANC’s negotiators took many 
of  these positions into the conference chambers. They were inevitably diluted during the process of  
negotiation, but [it] is  nevertheless possible to trace the passage of  many policy formulations (often 
word-for-word) from the MRG, through ANC conferences, and then re-emerging as policy outputs 
from the multiparty forums and later from government.470 
By the time of  the founding of  the MRG, the higher echelons within MK itself  had 
recognised the need for the establishment of  a progressive, ANC-leaning defence 
research institute471. Analysts repeatedly speak of  a “policy vacuum”472 within the ANC 
and MK on matters of  defence policy. The prevailing uncertainty was further 
compounded by a lack of  policy capacity (overarching foreign policy guidelines had yet 
to be developed even by the beginning of  the drafting process for the 1996 Defence 
White Paper473) and internal divisions within the liberation movement and even within 
the ANC and MK themselves.  
Gavin Cawthra of  the MRG uses the term “window of  opportunity” to describe this 
situation474; the window, he argues, was used by a group of  Gramscian “organic 
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intellectuals” to seize the opportunity to leave their mark on policy475. Another analyst 
unambiguously links this situation to the emergence of  the MRG: 
Whether MK was equipped to enter the national military was another issue. After being unbanned it 
had developed serious internal problems; it had no clear policy or strategic approach, and the ANC 
itself  had no detailed proposals on defence issues. Insiders also suggested that the organisation was 
riven by institutional and individual rivalries, and that co-ordination between various sectors was 
weak. […]  
One consequence of  the lack of  policy was an attempt by ANC-leaning academics to assist policy-
making on security issues – just as a set of  academics had done on policing. They established a loose 
group of  analysts known as the Military Research Group, whose aim was to stimulate debate within 
the ANC on defence issues and to provide policy-related advice.476 
The policy process must be viewed in terms of  a succession of  negotiating fora, 
both bilateral and broad-based, that culminated in the installation of  the Government 
of  National Unity following the April 1994 elections477. The inclusiveness of  these 
meetings ranged from strictly closed-door talks to broad consultations with interested 
elements of  the public. This process illustrates how the ideational content injected by 
academics—whether their access was quite direct, as in the case of  the White Paper’s 
lead drafter, Cape Town academic Laurie Nathan, or followed more circuitous routes—
is mediated by institutional structures and their inherent turf  battles, parochial interests, 
the nature of  the interaction with other actors and the public, and idiosyncratic and 
ungeneralisable factors such as personality and personal history. 
The issue of  policymakers’ inclination to approach problems in an intellectual 
manner—in this case Deputy Defence Minister Ronnie Kasrils—is not without 
considerable importance. The second hypothesis posits that successful academic 
advisors must possess certain attributes such as specialised knowledge and 
institutionalised prestige. The success of  a relationship between an academic advisor 
and a political decisionmaker depends on certain attributes being present in the latter as 
well.  
Nathan points out that decisionmakers do not always follow international academic 
debates on security, and may not be aware of  the policy options these might provide. 
Uncertainty remains a daunting condition whose effects are all the stronger the more 
technical an issue and the more thoroughgoing the normative change being sought478.  
A given policymaker must value the particular form of  insight provided by 
academics, and recognise the need for this type of  assistance. While certain attributes 
on both sides of  this relationship must be present in a generalisable way across 
examples, these requirements are present at the interpersonal level as well. This also 
                                                 
475 Cawthra, JPCMS, p. 56. 
476 Shaw, “Biting the bullet”, pp. 232-233. 
477 Interview with Prof. Gavin Cawthra, 12 October 2001. 
478 Interview with Laurie Nathan, 22 August 2001. 
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illustrates the interconnectedness of  relevance and resonance in the South African 
context. 
 
4.3. Attributes of  academic advisors 
The second variable governing experts’ policy influence consists of  a set of  
attributes these actors must possess in order for policymakers to become aware of  their 
work and to call on them for assistance in policy formulation. The two salient attributes 
are possession of  specialised knowledge, either of  practical, technical defence-related 
issues or of  theoretical approaches and academic debates apt to provide a normative 
underpinning for higher-order defence policy. Subsequently, once these two attributes 
have gained an actor access to policy formulation, he must present his input in a 
cogently argued form whose relevance to defined policy problems is immediately 
discernible. This argumentation must contain a strong element of  normative reasoning 
which allows a policymaker to choose between two or more enunciated policy options. 
 
4.3.1. Specialised knowledge 
In the South African case as in Brazil, the development of  practical specialised 
knowledge of  defence issues among academics and other experts not associated with 
the apartheid security establishment was effectively made impossible by the tight control 
over the necessary information exercised by the state. The lack of  transparency of  these 
processes as well as the SADF’s restrictive information policy severely limited the ability 
of  progressive and minority academics to develop the defence-related specialised 
knowledge necessary for them to provide useful input into the policy formulation 
process immediately following the establishment of  new dispensation.  
South Africa shows a further similarity with the Brazilian context in that the same 
situation occurred with respect to theoretical specialised knowledge: the apartheid 
defence establishment had succeeded in co-opting all academic security research centres 
and had, on the basis of  a widely-propagated doctrine, succeeded in defining the 
language itself  with which security issues were discussed within the country. 
Public debate on security issues in South Africa had been monopolised by the SADF 
and by military perspectives, effectively and purposefully shutting out much progressive 
or opposition scholarship. The control of  information was such that at the 24 May 1990 
IDASA Conference on the Future of  the Military and Defence in South Africa in 
  156
Lusaka, Zambia, it allowed some SADF members bluntly to tell progressive academics 
and ANC/MK delegates, “you have no idea what you’re talking about”479.  
The Lusaka conference led many progressive attendees to the realisation that while 
the progressive delegates were clear on their vision of  the new defence landscape in 
South Africa and many had a solid sociological grounding, they were “for sure not 
experts on defence policy”480. This lack of  expertise outside the state security apparatus 
prompted several progressive academics and activists—including Nathan—to devote 
themselves to gathering and disseminating that specialised knowledge, in some cases 
from that very moment forward481. 
As the ANC’s accession to power came closer, the organisation’s lack of  an 
established viable defence policy and insufficient capacity to produce adequate policy 
options became painfully evident. The MRG was founded partially in response to this 
dilemma. Those academics who were to become members clearly recognised the need 
for a body of  specialised knowledge to be amassed that would allow the non-co-opted 
security academics to appear on policymakers’ radar and in debates in civil society. 
The MRG’s membership included: 
  The group’s first co-ordinator, Rocklyn “Rocky” Williams, a former schoolteacher and an MK operative 
while a member of  the SADF Citizen Force. Williams holds a Ph.D. from the University of  Essex, 
having written his dissertation on civil-military relations (CMR). Williams gained the rank of  Colonel in 
the new SANDF, playing an instrumental role in the 1998 South African Defence Review482. Williams 
produced the bulk of  the MRG’s early topical research papers and reports. In keeping with his own 
specialisation, his main area of  research was CMR and integration. Williams later was associated with 
ISS and SaferAfrica. 
  Williams’ successor as the group’s co-ordinator, Gavin Cawthra. Cawthra had left South Africa as a 
conscientious objector in 1978. He was the head of  the London-based Committee on South African 
War Resistance, established in 1980. Cawthra is the author of  several influential works on the South 
African defence establishment483. Cawthra and Williams are today both affiliated with the Defence 
Management Programme at the School of  Public Development and Management at the University of  
the Witwatersrand—a programme established under the auspices of  the MRG. 
  Jacklyn Cock, Professor of  Sociology at the University of  the Witwatersrand. Cock holds degrees in 
sociology, political science and history from Rhodes University. A specialist in gender issues and social 
exclusion, with some expertise on defence issues, she is the co-editor (with Laurie Nathan) of  a volume 
on militarisation484 and the author of  volume on war and gender485. Cock was chairwoman of  the MRG 
with Abba Omar until his departure from the group. Her research interests were defence manpower 
policy and defence-related gender and environmental issues. 
  Laurie Nathan, Executive Director of  the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of  
Cape Town during his time as an MRG member. Nathan is a former national organiser of  South 
Africa’s most influential anti-militarist NGO, the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), and the author of  
several books and numerous articles on militarisation and other defence-related issues. He has since 
served as a frequent advisor to the South African government. Nathan’s history will be discussed in 
more detail below. Cock and Nathan were the group’s directors. Nathan’s own research dealt with broad 
issues within security studies as a discipline—such as the broadening of  the concept. He was also 
                                                 
479 MRG Minutes, 25 November 1991; Interview with Laurie Nathan, Cape Town, South Africa, 22 August 2001. 
480 Interview with Laurie Nathan, 22 August 2001. 
481 Ibid; Interview with Prof. Gavin Cawthra, 12 October 2001. 
482 Members’ research interests are based on the minutes of the first meeting of the Military Research Group attended 
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483 Cawthra, Gavin. Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine. London: International Defence and Aid Fund for South 
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484 Cock and Nathan. 
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responsible for a large part of  the group’s publications and networking activities. Nathan left CCR in 
2003 to take up a post at the Crisis States Programme at the Development Research Centre at the 
London School of  Economics. 
  Abba Omar of  the ANC’s Department of  Information and Publicity. Active early on in ANC-aligned 
student organisations and later as an intelligence officer for the organisation, Omar was on the editorial 
board of  Mayibuye, a journal in which many MRG publications appeared. Omar left the MRG in 
October 1993 to become General Manager of  Corporate Communications at Armscor—a move 
greeted sceptically by many other members of  the MRG. He was appointed to President Thabo Mbeki’s 
AIDS Council in 2000. Omar focussed on the Defence Force’s psychological operations and 
communication services. Omar was named South Africa’s Ambassador to Oman in 2003. 
  Sandy Africa, a former member of  the ECC and mid-level ANC intelligence officer, and the group’s 
specialist in intelligence affairs. Africa served on the TEC Sub-Committee on the country’s future 
dispensation and contributed to drafting the South African White Paper on Intelligence in 1994. One of  
many MRG members to take government positions following the transition, Africa is employed by the 
re-vamped National Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, Africa’s main intellectual interest lay in issues 
surrounding the intelligence community. She has recently collaborated with the Harvard University 
Project on Justice in Times of  Transition.  
  Riaz Saloojee, a.k.a. Calvin Kahn, who joined MK in 1983 and eventually became personal assistant to 
MK Commander Joe Modise. Saloojee then joined the SANDF and rose to the rank of  Brigadier 
General. He is now the Western Cape Regional Director for the Independent Complaints Directorate, 
an organisation that deals with rights abuses in the South African Police (SAP). Kahn served as the main 
MRG link to MK headquarters and articulated MK’s research needs to the group. Since his involvement 
with the MRG, Saloojee has been employed, including as CEO, by a succession of  South African 
defence engineering firms. 
  Krish Naidoo, a progressive barrister and ANC activist, who joined Armscor as Senior Manager, 
Corporate Communications, in 1995. Naidoo holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the University of  
Aberdeen. Naidoo’s work for the MRG concentrated on networking with regional security studies 
institutes, international academics links and the generation of  pro-active progressive research on 
defence issues. 
  Mo Shaik, a former high-ranking ANC intelligence officer. Shaik, who has strong connections to the 
South African arms industry through his brothers Chippy and Schabir, was Director-General of  the 
National Intelligence Agency before accepting a posting as Pretoria’s Ambassador to Algeria. 
  Ian Robertson, a member of  the Broederstroom ANC cell under the command of  Ronnie Kasrils. The 
Broederstroom cell had conducted several of  what were deemed terrorist acts of  violence in the 1980s.  
  Ian Phillips, whose early association with Jeff  Radebe continued through his time as an ANC MP and 
Special Adviser to Radebe when the latter was Minister of  Public Enterprises. 
  Peter Batchelor, a Cambridge-trained defence economist at the Centre for Conflict Resolution brought 
in by Nathan in 1993. Batchelor left South Africa in 2000 to head the Small Arms Survey, a research 
project on small arms based in Switzerland. Since 2004 he heads a UNDP team working on issues of  
Small Arms and Demobilisation. 
The key to the MRG’s success was that it brought academics and activists together 
with policymakers and representatives of  the ANC and MK486. In a sense, the MRG’s 
membership was a microcosm of  the interaction between the newly-empowered parties 
to the Government of  National Unity and progressive academics. With members such 
as Calvin Kahn communicating ANC and MK needs and research shortfalls directly to 
the academics in the group, members were able to produce recommendations that made 
their way into policy by filling acknowledged voids in government expertise487. Many of  
these positions eventually found their way—some verbatim—into official ANC and 
government policy488.  
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MRG output was disseminated through a variety of  mechanisms, including the 
publication of  a working paper series, the hosting of  seminars and conferences, articles 
in the general media, and eventually the establishment of  a training programme. This 
interaction was reinforced by the personal links between the academics and the formal 
ANC/MK representatives in the group that pre-dated the ANC’s un-banning. Several 
MRG members were to play deciding roles in the development of  the 1996 South 
African White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review.  
The MRG’s training programme was formalised and is now being continued in the 
form of  courses for SADC military officers and diplomats at the Defence Management 
Programme at the School of  Public Development and Management at the University of  
the Witwatersrand. Gavin Cawthra and Rocky Williams were still involved in the 
teaching and administration of  these courses as of  2003.  
The Military Research Group was formally merged with the Defence Research 
Forum at the Institute for Democracy in South Africa in 1996 after over a year of  
discussion over the future of  the MRG; its attendance had begun to falter as numerous 
members took on posts in the new ANC-led government. Many former MRG members 
continue to be highly influential defence experts in South Africa, due both to the 
specialised knowledge they attained through participation in the MRG’s efforts, and in 
many cases due to the institutionalised prestige they brought to the group both as 
academics and members of  the struggle against apartheid during the years of  minority 
rule.  
 
4.3.2. Institutionalised prestige 
The institutionalised prestige enjoyed by the members of  the MRG derived from 
two divergent sources. First, some members possessed prestige in the sense most closely 
associated with academics. Some members held a high profile within progressive 
academic circles in the area of  defence and issues related to it, through having published 
extensively on the subject and having disseminated their ideas at academic conferences 
and seminars. Another means of  attaining the prestige accompanying a high profile is 
association with a university department or research institute respected for the quality 
of  its intellectual output. While in the majority of  cases academic structures are 
designed in such a way as to make these attributes go hand-in-hand, this is not 
necessarily always the case.  
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For a second set of  MRG members—those whose presence in the group was 
based on ANC membership or engagement in the anti-apartheid movement, the 
prestige they possessed derived from “struggle credentials”—the degree of  their 
commitment to and sacrifice for the black liberation movement. Its institutionalisation 
often took the form of  membership in the ANC or MK or, even more clearly, in the 
attainment of  a high rank within the hierarchies of  these organisations. “Struggle 
credentials” continue to play an important role in brokering political influence in South 
Africa ten years after the establishment of  majority rule.  
 
4.3.2.1. Academic and disciplinary prestige  
The institutionalised prestige of  academics depends on both their own reputation 
and accomplishments within their chosen discipline, and on the prestige associated with 
that discipline itself  and the university system and academic profession in a national 
context. In the case of  the South African universities, the entire system, but IR and 
security studies in particular, suffered from a loss of  prestige following the demise of  
apartheid as the degree of  their co-optation, and their role in perpetuating inequality, 
became increasingly evident. Though efforts are underway to remedy the situation, 
South Africa’s university system still reflects the racial separation and linguistic divisions 
that have shaped all facets of  South African history.  
 
Table 1: South African universities 
University Univ. statute (non-
)white 
Language 
Medical University of  Southern Africa 1978 non-white English 
University of  Durban - Westville  1960 non-white English 
University of  Fort Hare  1959 non-white English 
University of  the North  1960 non-white English 
University of  North West  1980 non-white English 
University of  Transkei  1977 non-white English 
University of  the Western Cape  1960 non-white English 
University of  Zululand  1960 non-white English 
Vista University  1982 non-white English 
Potchefstroom University  1951 white Afrikaans 
Rand Afrikaans University  1966 white Afrikaans 
Stellenbosch University  1918 white Afrikaans 
University of  the Orange Free State  1950 white Afrikaans 
University of  Port Elizabeth  1964 white Afrikaans 
University of  Pretoria  1930 white Afrikaans 
Rhodes University  1951 white English 
University of  Cape Town  1918 white English 
University of  Natal (Durban)  1949 white English 
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University of  Natal (Pietermaritzburg) 1949 white English 
University of  South Africa  1946 open to all English 
University of  the Witwatersrand  1921 white English489 
Though higher education in South Africa has been fully integrated since 1994, the 
legacy of  apartheid is still strongly evident. There are 21 fully-fledged universities in 
South Africa; of  these, nine are historically black universities originally designed to 
provide at best an inferior education for black South Africans. There was a gradual 
opening of  the white universities to non-white students beginning in the 1980s. Six of  
the formerly white universities use Afrikaans as the predominant medium of  instruction 
and six English; several are bilingual. In the early 1960s, about 62,000 of  the 
approximately 67,000 students in the South African university system were white; with 
the advent of  black universities this ratio had evened out somewhat to 122,000 white 
students out of  207,000 by 1999490.  
 
4.3.2.1.1. Peripheralness, policy relevance and the relationship 
to the state 
The peripheralness of  the South African academic community is not increased by 
linguistic factors; this cannot be said for its lack of  geographic proximity to the centres 
of  academic production in the industrialised North. Great Britain remains the central 
point of  affinity for South African culture generally, and this is reflected in academic 
culture as well. English-language monographs and journals are widely and available and 
universally understood. Several major English-language publishing houses have offices 
in Cape Town, including the Cambridge and Oxford University Presses.  
The geographical distance to South Africa from the centres of  academic production 
in the United States and Europe does contribute to the academic community’s isolation, 
though a high degree of  access to the Internet alleviates this situation somewhat. There 
is an extensive network of  national professional journals, although these largely do not 
reach an extended readership outside the region. As with its Southern Hemisphere 
counterpart in Brazil, South Africa lacks a vibrant landscape of  refereed journals dealing 
with international relations. The South African Institute of  International Affairs 
(SAIIA) publishes the South African Journal of  International Affairs. Almost without 
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exception, all other IR journals are in-house journals such as Track Two, Southern African 
Perspectives and African Security Review.  
The financial woes of  many South African institutions of  higher learning are much 
more of  a factor in placing South Africa at the periphery of  relationships of  academic 
production and consumption. Underfunded academic libraries rarely find themselves 
able to maintain comprehensive foreign journal collections; this is due in part to the 
extreme exchange rate fluctuations affecting the South African rand.  
 
4.3.2.1.2. International Relations and security studies and their 
relationship to the state 
Together with large parts of  the private sector, under minority rule almost all security 
academics not in exile were co-opted into the service of  Total Strategy491. Two of  the 
best-known of  the academics commonly associated with the teaching of  Total Strategy 
were Professor Michael Hough, Director of  the Institute for Strategic Studies of  the 
University of  Pretoria (ISSUP), and Deon Fourie, a Brigadier General in the SADF and 
Professor at the University of  South Africa (UNISA) in Pretoria. It was Fourie who had 
introduced the thinking of  Beaufre to the defence establishment together with Gen. 
Fraser; Hough was repeatedly called upon to produce papers in which the government’s 
views were presented under a mantle of  academic rigour492.  
ISSUP in particular showed a high degree of  co-optation into the Total Strategy 
effort493; digests of  the apartheid military establishment’s strategic perceptions were 
published as ISSUP papers. Further, the Military Studies programme at Afrikaans-
speaking Stellenbosch University near Cape Town, in collaboration with the Military 
Academy in Saldanha, was an important point of  interface between the defence and 
intellectual establishments; this programme has made the normative leap and now 
works closely with the new SANDF. Other now-revamped or extinct groups included 
the Terrorism Research centre in Johannesburg and the strategy research centres at the 
Rand Afrikaans University and UNISA494. In the words of  one analyst,  
[I]n virtually all of  South Africa’s universities there are political and strategic experts who are 
absorbed as sources of  information and intellect into the military establishment through their 
research, their appearance before government commissions or, in some cases, in a contracted 
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493 It is mentioned by name by Grundy, Evans, and Frankel, and in Swilling and Phillips, p. 137. 
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capacity for teaching or research purposes. This tendency to feed and articulate the mixture of  myths 
and information upon which total strategy depends is particularly pronounced in the case of  the 
Afrikaans universities and research organizations situated near Defence Force Headquarters in the 
Pretoria-Johannesburg area.495 
In an illustration of  the link between prestige and normative resonance, academics 
such as Hough saw their policy influence wane rapidly and all but totally under the new 
political dispensation. This shift is nowhere illustrated more clearly than in the policy 
influence waged today by Dr. Jakkie Cilliers, founder of  the Institute for Defence Policy 
(IDP; now the Institute for Security Studies—ISS). Cilliers was able to avoid the 
credibility problems faced by Hough, Fourie and Deon Geldenhuys by reacting nimbly 
and astutely to the changing political currents of  the transition period.  
Non-realist approaches to security issues have been slow to make an impact on the 
discipline in South Africa, though some authors such as Peter Vale and those associated 
with the “Stellenbosch school” have succeeded in placing critical and constructivist 
approaches, respectively, on the disciplinary radar496. In a reversal of  the generation of  
prestige through affiliation, those institutes that today enjoy prestige in the eyes of  
South African policymakers are those in which one finds individuals with personal 
prestige derived from normative resonance and “struggle credentials”. 
 
4.3.2.2. Personal prestige: “struggle credentials” 
In the case of  the MRG and the ANC, the importance of  personal relationships to 
the policy formulation process cannot be too clearly stated, particularly with respect to 
relationships forged between certain actors during time spent underground with the 
ANC and MK prior to the establishment of  the new dispensation. Interviews of  several 
influential MRG members—many of  them with impressive “struggle credentials”—
have underscored the difficulty of  quantifying and defining exclusively this attribute. 
Aside from the attainment of  rank within one of  the liberation organisations, there was 
also the possibility of  improving one’s activist pedigree through involvement in well-
known or dangerous operations.  
The notion of  “struggle credentials” is made even more idiosyncratic by the fact that 
much of  its definition takes place within the framework of  interpersonal relationships 
that tend to shift as office-holders rotate and circumstances change. One MRG member 
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described “struggle credentials” as “who you know and when” and considered this 
statement to be in large part ungeneralisable497. The issue of  “struggle credentials” 
highlights the difficulties in quantifying qualities such as prestige, which are in large part 
intersubjectively constituted and are dependent upon the proclivities of  the policymaker 
who selects experts for participation in the policy formulation process. 
 
4.3.3. Cogency and utility  
In the opinion of  one defence policymaker, the element of  credibility—of  rational 
argumentation and lack of  emotionality—explains in part the success of  Nathan and 
the MRG as opposed to groups such as Gun Free South Africa and individuals such as 
Terry Crawford-Browne of  Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, although for the 
purpose of  this analysis it is more applicable to substitute scientifically derived 
argumentation and normatively motivated arguments for “rationality” and 
“emotionality”, respectively.  
The normative arguments presented by these organisations were judged by some 
policymakers to be either unimplementable due to their distance from what is perceived 
as the “reality” of  policy problems (a lack of  cogency), or overly grounded in normative 
argumentation to the detriment of  scientificity. This illustrates the delicate balance in 
policymakers’ desire for both scientific and normative argumentation, and further 
reveals the importance of  their intellectual proclivities and attitude towards academic 
forms of  specialised knowledge. When asked which type of  policymaker is most likely 
to engage academics as advisors, Jack Gründling, a civilianised former SADF Brigadier 
General who supervised the management of  the drafting process in the Defence 
Department, gave three attributes: 
1. he must understand the seriousness of  his job and the consequences of  his actions, and 
understand the need for consultation. 
2. he must have a sense of  responsibility towards his principal. 
3. he should know more about the subject in question than those he pulls in to consult him—not the 
exact subject but more about the framework within which deliberations take place, such as 
international law, the Constitution, democratic laws and so on.498 
Gründling’s assessment underscores the importance of  theoretical specialised 
knowledge to, for example, the workings of  the policy deliberation process and the legal 
framework. The examples of  Machado e Costa and Kilian in Brazil bear out the 
supposition that policymakers will turn to those who have greater specialised knowledge 
of  the subject matter that is under discussion (largely theoretical specialised knowledge), 
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while this is less likely to be the case for practical specialised knowledge based upon 
information originating from within the bureaucracy or military establishment.  
Nathan’s approach, put forth as a positive example by Gründling, also gives insight 
simultaneously into the issues of  the nature of  the argumentation required to gain 
influence with policymakers, and the debate over the relative importance of  scientificity 
and normative leanings in the advisor499. He explains Nathan’s success in terms of  
credibility: 
Laurie was credible in the eyes of  the Defence Department because he had clearly researched the 
issues well in advance. Credibility determines influence. It matters in whose eyes that credibility is 
attained, since the audience is not monolithic; rather, one’s degree of  credibility is very personally 
dependent. Laurie came across as unbiased, and provided the foundations to decision-makers.500  
When asked about how a policymaker might attain credibility, Gründling responded: 
You can’t create it for yourself, but you can increase the probability of  it, although some element will 
always remain serendipitous. Influence depends on the behavioural record of  the individual 
supplier.501 
The members of  the MRG demonstrated that they were aware of  the need to 
present their work in a fashion making explicit both its political normative 
underpinnings and its applicability to the development of  policy in both the short and 
long terms. The credibility to which Gründling refers is also based to a substantial 
degree on the amount of  consistent normative resonance of  a given expert’s policy 
inputs.  
 
4.3.4. Normative content 
One MRG paper provides an example of  how concrete examples and policy 
initiatives were presented in order to implement a high-order principle within the 
SADF502. One of  the main concerns during the transitional period with respect to the 
future South African military was the new Force’s (normative) legitimacy: 
The state was redefined on 2 February 1990: its power was now officially related to popular 
acceptance. The public commitment—rhetoric, in cynical terms—of  the state to authoritative power 
altered its strength. Material assets remained the same, but official mobilization of  the principle of  
legitimacy brought new roles and rules for the security institutions.503 
In “We must take the current”, Williams isolates and defines both what he terms the 
“logical geography” of  the concept of  legitimacy as an amalgam of  inter-related 
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concepts—such as representativeness, consensus, morality, as well as institutional 
mechanisms, principles and sociological underpinnings504—and policy initiatives by 
which this cluster of  norms can be implemented. He thereby transformed a relatively 
abstract notion similar to those common in academic research into a set of  clear policy 
goals transformable into courses of  action505. This is precisely the form of  policy input 
called for in this study’s second hypothesis with respect to both cogency and normative 
resonance. 
The wording of  Williams’ article belies an emphasis on the practical nature of  its 
suggestion, referring to “practical measures” and “micro-strategy”506. Following his 
definition of  the indicators of  legitimacy in the context of  the South African military, 
Williams identifies five areas he deems “central to the process of  legitimation”: the 
composition of  a future defence force; its institutional restructuring; its future roles and 
missions; stable CMR and finally, transparency and accountability. For each he presents 
policy-grounded courses of  action leading to its realisation.  
The racial composition of  a legitimate Defence Force in a South Africa under 
majority rule should reflect, he argues, the racial composition of  the country’s entire 
population; this, he states, must be brought about by means of  a programme of  racially-
based preferential hiring and promotion—“affirmative action”—within the military. 
The future roles and missions of  the Defence Force should be limited to territorial 
defence and the support of  internal developmental programmes and international peace 
missions. The subsequent decrease in spheres of  activity appropriate to military 
intervention (due to the termination of  destabilisation, counter-insurgency and the 
township policing function) would lead to a restructuring resulting in decreased force 
levels and “makes the retention of  such bloated functions as Special Forces, Military 
Intelligence and Army Intelligence difficult to justify”507. 
In expanding his advice to CMR and the related issues of  transparency and 
accountability, Williams advocates inter alia the civilianisation of  the Ministry of  
Defence (in a manner based partially on the Indian model), committee-based 
parliamentary oversight, a military ombudsman and public access to information 
                                                                                                                                          
503 Seegers, Annette. The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996 (hereafter, MMMSA); 
p. 271. 
504 Williams, “We must take the current”, p. 3. 
505 On the importance of legitimacy, see also du Plessis, Louis. “A perspective on perspectives: the expanding focus 
of South African thinking on security”. Strategic Review for Southern Africa. Vol. 17, No. 2; pp. 22-55. Here, pp. 28-
30. Du Plessis considers of particular salience the issues of representativeness and civilian control of the armed 
forces. 
506 Williams, “We must take the current”, pp. 4ff. 
507 Ibid., p. 7. 
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regarding military matters. Williams makes concrete suggestions regarding the roles of  
specific offices such as the Chief  of  the Defence Force, the dropping of  officers with 
“praetorian tendencies”, and the positioning of  the new defence force within the 
Southern African region508.  
In “We must take the current”, Williams advances a form of  argumentation that 
conforms to the second hypothesis. This form of  argumentation and tailored input is 
sorely missing from the Brazilian defence debate, and serves in part to explain Williams’ 
success as a policy advisor and Brazilian academics’ lack thereof. Williams’ article also 
reflects a high degree of  consistency with the political concerns and normative 
worldview of  the policymakers to whom the proposal was forwarded. Compared to his 
Brazilian colleagues, however, Williams was able to exploit one advantage to which the 
former were not privy. Due to the backgrounds of  the MRG’s permanent members in 
various organisations connected to the liberation movement, the resonance of  the 
majority of  the MRG’s research output with the needs and views of  the new 
policymakers was virtually assured.  
 
4.4. Resonance  
 Once policy experts with certain attributes have made use of  “windows of  
opportunity” to enter the policy process, in order for their inputs to be influential, they 
must also resonate with the politics and norms held by the policymakers to which they 
are submitted. This section identifies the views espoused in some proposals from 
experts as well as by policymakers in both the political establishment and the armed 
forces in South Africa, and identifies where and how the synthesis between these points 
of  view took place and was finally enshrined in declaratory policy.  
Following the inauguration of  the Government of  National Unity, there was a 
growing realisation within the defence establishment of  the need rapidly to produce a 
new White Paper on Defence. Policymakers’ motivations revealed the same bifurcation 
of  perspectives as in the Brazilian case. While civilian policymakers sought to use the 
opportunity primarily in order to facilitate the development of  a new normative 
framework for defence policy under the new dispensation, defence officials’ primary 
concern was the definition of  the size and shape of  the new Defence Force in order to 
advance the procurement process—thus laying the groundwork for the Defence 
budget—and the development and training of  personnel509.  
                                                 
508 Ibid., pp. 9-12. 
509 Interview with Major General (ret.) Len Le Roux, by telephone, 10 December 2001. 
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It was clear that the security apparatus would lose political influence, compared to 
the days of  Total Onslaught and the SSC; a return to previous doctrine was 
acknowledged to be out of  the question and was not desired. Rather than seeking, as 
did their Brazilian counterparts, to intervene directly in the definition of  the institutions 
in the new era, South Africa’s soldiers focussed their concerns on retaining budgetary 
means and some degree of  independence in planning. 
In just over a year, 17 Draft White Papers were produced. Drafts were revised in 
consultation with members of  the Defence Secretariat, and inputs were sought from the 
public in a broad process of  consultation. Drafts produced prior to the public 
consultations initiated in June 1995 were internal to the defence establishment, while 
most later versions were, to varying degrees, public documents. 
 
Table 2: Drafts of  the 1996 White Paper on Defence 
Draft date Modifications 
31 May 1995 First draft written by Nathan 
21 Jun 1995 used as basis for public consultation 
18 Sep 1995 incorporates feedback from within DoD 
1 Oct 1995 incorporates feedback from within DoD 
27 Oct 1995 incorporates comments from parties, NGOs, defence family, SANDF 
16 Jan 1996 incorporates feedback from within DoD 
31 Jan 1996 incorporates proposals from JSCD 
22 Feb 1996 incorporates feedback from within DoD 
30 Mar 1996 incorporates Ministerial feedback on JSCD proposals and DoD comments 
22 Apr 1996 incorporates further JSCD comments and Portfolio Committee on Defence 
14 May 1996 Final version tabled in Parliament510 
The White Paper on Defence was adopted by the South African Parliament in May 
1996. The pattern of  formulation and revision consisted of  Laurie Nathan, as the lead 
drafter, and Deputy Minister of  Defence Ronnie Kasrils working suggestions and 
demands from the defence establishment into each successive version, as well as taking 
up inputs from the public consultations and Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on 
Defence, to which matters blocked by too great a divergence of  viewpoints were 
referred. The process centred closely on the two principal interlocutors, Nathan and 
Kasrils. As a result of  the importance to the drafting process of  the personal 
relationship between Kasrils and Nathan, as well as their respective backgrounds, the 
generalisability of  some aspects of  the process is limited.  
Ronald Kasrils joined the ANC at 21 in 1960. He was a founding member of  MK 
and was later banned and went into hiding from the security forces. After completing 
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military training (to the rank of  Brigadier511) in the Soviet Union and serving in 
numerous MK posts throughout Southern Africa and in Great Britain, Kasrils became a 
member of  the organisation’s High Command, later becoming Chief  of  Military 
Intelligence in 1983. He served on the ANC’s Politico-Military Council from 1985 to 
1989. Since 1987, Kasrils has served on the ANC’s National Executive Committee; he 
has been a member of  the Central Committee of  the South African Communist Party 
since 1991.  
Though he holds no university degree, Kasrils is naturally intellectual and has, in a 
private capacity, written several books on the philosopher Bertrand Russell512. During 
the transition period, Kasrils worked with MK Commander-in-Chief  (and later Defence 
Minister) Joe Modise on the TEC Sub-Council on Defence. He was Modise’s Deputy 
Minister of  Defence from 1994 to 1999. During the legislative period from 1999 to 
2004, Kasrils was Minister of  Water Affairs and Forestry; in April 2004 he returned to 
the security arena, taking up the Intelligence portfolio.  
Laurance Neill Nathan began to take an interest in politics while a student at the 
University of  Cape Town, where he was enrolled from 1978 to 1983, earning a dual 
bachelor’s degree in business and law. The pamphlets and fact sheets distributed by the 
National Union of  South African Students (NUSAS) raised his consciousness of  the 
situation of  the black majority, and NUSAS meetings provided him his first opportunity 
to meet blacks on an equal basis. A trip to Dachau concentration camp crystallised the 
revelation that “the same thing was happening in my country”.  
Nathan became Secretary General of  NUSAS in 1984. He was a co-founder of  the 
influential End Conscription Campaign, as whose National Organiser he served in 
1985-86. With the declaration of  the State of  Emergency in 1986 and the detention of  
over 70 other ECC activists, Nathan went into hiding for two years. During this time he 
was on the assassination list of  the notorious Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB); he 
claims to have survived by the grace of  his hunters’ incompetence alone. He obtained 
an M. Phil. from Bradford University’s School of  Peace Studies in 1990. 
In the late 1980s Nathan was recruited into the ANC underground but “never did 
anything significant” due to the detention of  his superiors and the nature of  his 
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operational briefs513. After being employed by several Cape Town NGOs, Nathan joined 
the University of  Cape Town’s Centre for Inter-Group Studies in 1991. He became its 
Executive Director in 1992 (eventually re-christening it the Centre for Conflict 
Resolution), a position he held until 2003. Beginning with ANC advisory positions in 
1991, Nathan held a series of  influential governmental advisory posts throughout the 
1990s. His decision to become a defence expert stemmed from frustration at the 
dismissal of  progressive security academics by the SADF at the Lusaka Conference 
(May 1991), and the lack of  experience with military matters within progressive 
circles514.  
Nathan was a member of  the TEC Sub-Council on Defence’s Ministry of  Defence 
Working Group and a part-time advisor to the Minister of  Defence between 1994 and 
2000 in addition to his role as lead drafter of  the 1996 White Paper. From 1994 to 1997 
he was a member of  the Cameron Commission investigating South Africa’s arms trade. 
He sat on the Defence Review Work Group in 1996 and drafted the SANDF’s Code of  
Conduct in 1998-99.  
Nathan has also held several advisory and drafting posts for international 
organisations and for governments of  neighbouring states. In late 2001 Nathan’s 
publications included three books, eleven contributions to edited volumes, 20 academic 
articles on a variety of  defence-related topics, and five government documents and 
reports515. He has since added considerably to this list, most recently from a post at the 
London School of  Economics.  
Among Nathan’s publications are several that contributed to his prominence in the 
defence sector—and thereby to his selection as lead drafter of  the White Paper. These 
include Society at war: The militarisation of  South Africa (edited with Jacklyn Cock) (1989); 
The Changing of  the Guard: Armed Forces and Defence Policy in a Democratic South Africa (1994) 
and Riding the Tiger: The Integration of  Armed Forces and Post-Apartheid Military516.  
A further influential publication is “The Four Horsemen of  the Apocalypse: The 
Structural Causes of  Crisis and Violence in Africa”, an article published in revised form 
                                                 
513 Interview with Laurie Nathan, 15 August 2001; Interview with Laurie Nathan, 22 August 2001. 
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in several fora, most recently in 2004517. Several of  these publications are analysed in 
greater depth below with respect to their role as predecessors to inputs Nathan 
produced specifically for the White Paper drafting process. 
Alongside a heavy reliance on Nathan’s previous work, the democratic imperative 
dictated that the White Paper drafting process involve the solicitation of  inputs from 
civil society. While providing an important element of  legitimacy to the White Paper in 
the governmental context, many of  the submissions from civil society did not 
contribute substantively to the content of  the Paper:  
The process of  consultation in drafting the White Paper […] was regarded as extremely productive 
and as a model to be followed by other government departments. It undoubtedly resulted in a richer 
and better product. It enabled Modise to assert honestly in Parliament that the White Paper reflected 
a national consensus on defence. […]  
The main problem regarding consultation was that most civil society bodies lacked the requisite 
expertise on defence to make meaningful inputs on several topics. Of  course this problem was due 
to historical circumstances and was not the fault of  the DOD or the consultation process.518 
This assessment highlights once again the difficulties posed by the military 
establishment’s lack of  transparency and co-optation of  academic production on 
security to the accretion of  practical and theoretical specialised knowledge on the part 
of  the progressive community of  security academics. Here, the South African 
experience once more echoes the Brazilian, although the greater level of  
institutionalisation of  security studies and academe in general facilitated South African 
academics’ task of  alleviating this shortcoming.  
Nevertheless, as the general level of  expertise increased, the complex balance 
between specialised knowledge and political resonance as determinants of  policy 
influence began to tilt in favour of  resonance. In addition, as improved notions of  the 
civilian control of  armed forces—some injected by MRG members such as Williams 
and Nathan—took hold, the nature of  the relationship between academic advisors and 
policymakers began to shift. The typical bifurcation, seen already within the Brazilian 
defence establishment, occurred on the policymakers’ side of  the equation. Prior to the 
full integration of  the new SANDF and the civilianisation of  the Defence Secretariat, 
ANC politicians charged with oversight over the security establishment were frequently 
at odds with the responsible echelons within the armed forces.  
Policy advisors were now faced with a divided security establishment, with both 
halves basing their acceptance of  initiatives on different criteria: while ANC politicians 
gave credence to policy proposals based primarily on their political resonance, SADF 
representatives granted greater weight to proposals demonstrating technically-oriented 
                                                 
517 Available most readily in Peace and Change. Vol. 25, No. 2, (2000); pp. 188-207. 
518 Letter from Laurie Nathan to Linda Mti, dated 8 March 2001, p. 3. 
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specialised knowledge, as they were neither able nor inclined to establish the apartheid-
era doctrine as their criterion for normative resonance.  
This approach was also grounded in the SA(N)DF’s technocratic approach to the 
transitional negotiations and to theoretical strategic studies as a whole. The armed 
forces’ entrenched ideas lacked political resonance with the now-empowered black 
majority, which looked to (mostly ANC) politicians to ensure that legitimacy and 
resonance, rather than (but not in place of) technical competence, became the dominant 
hallmarks of  a new defence policy.  
The criterion of  democratic legitimacy placed emphasis, as revealed inter alia in 
Gründling’s statement quoted above about the element of  credibility—on a 
combination of  personal attributes with resonance. The South African process thus 
illustrated how elements that go beyond issue-based inputs into the policy process and 
are difficult to generalise—such as personality and individual history—can come to 
have a decisive role to play in determining the success of  academic security experts in 
the policy process.  
Nathan’s own relationship to the defence policy establishment showed the extent of  
the latter’s bifurcation. There was at the inception of  Nathan’s tenure as lead drafter of  
the White Paper in 1995 a tension between the former anti-conscription activist’s self-
described anti-militarism and the worldview prevalent within those elements of  the 
South African armed forces that remained from the pre-1994 Defence Force.  
The civilian policy community itself  appears to have been divided, with some former 
uniformed officials ironically taking a stance closer to that of  their former enemies. 
While some former MK members such as Modise largely shared the SADF’s suspicion 
of  anti-militarist security concepts, the new approach did find considerable resonance 
within the ANC political establishment. It should be noted, however, that “[t]he 
integration of  MK with the SADF created a powerful block [sic] of  military 
institutional interest within the ranks of  the ANC”519. Nathan—and other academics—
thus faced the prospect of  having to please two masters. The following section will 
examine how they acquitted themselves of  this task. 
 
4.4.1. Policymaker normative preferences 
In an October 2001 interview, Gründling points out the duality of  the audience that 
faces those who interact from outside with the defence establishment, divided between 
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civilians with a given political culture and uniformed members of  the military whose 
institutional culture and orientation may be quite different even from those of  their 
civilian superiors and colleagues520. Gründling’s mention of  the non-monolithic nature 
of  the advisor’s audience is particularly relevant to defence issues in democracies where 
armed forces are insufficiently democratically controlled.  
As with the MRG, Nathan’s proposals were presented to two audiences: one—
parliamentarians and politicians within the Defence Ministry—with whom the 
proposals enjoyed considerable normative resonance, and another—the military 
establishment, much of  it left over from the days of  white rule—where not resonance 
but relevance and mastery of  subject matter and of  the advisory role were paramount. 
Military preferences were at least presented this way, although it is clear that behind 
claims to a technical focus and professionalism, there lurked equally firmly held 
normative commitments, including to a positivist-inspired perspective which facilitated 
simultaneous claims to normative neutrality.  
While Nathan gained acceptance with relative ease in civilian political circles due to a 
higher degree of  normative resonance between the ANC’s progressive agenda and the 
progressively-oriented new security agenda (due, in his words, to the new approach’s 
“corresponding with their political instincts”), this was more difficult in the case of  the 
military and its more conservative institutional culture.  
In May 1992 the ANC laid out the foundational principles that were to serve as the 
basis for future, more concrete, governmental policies in its document “Ready to 
Govern521. One MRG member traces the defence policy component of  that document 
back to the efforts of  the MRG: 
A small group of  intellectuals, drawn mostly from MK Military Intelligence and the anti-conscription 
movement, framed much ANC policy in regard to these issues by articulating a new security 
paradigm, derived from the so-called “critical security studies” which rose to prominence after the 
end of  the Cold War. This conceptual framework was set out very clearly in the ANC’s 1992 policy 
framework (which essentially became its election manifesto), Ready to Govern.522  
This document’s section on a new security and defence policy listed a set of  
principles closely based on the “Principles of  Defence in a Democracy” elaborated by 
Nathan earlier in 1992523; these Principles were also taken up practically verbatim in the 
White Paper on Defence issued in 1996524. “Ready to Govern”, as well as the 1994 
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Reconstruction and Development Programme525, which still serves as the ANC 
government’s overarching policy document, place emphasis on the primacy of  
development over military concerns and define security as that of  people rather than of  
states. “Ready to Govern”’s definition of  security bears resemblance to the human 
security agenda developed several years later in Canada: 
The ANC believes that national and regional security should not be restricted to military, police and 
intelligence matters, but as having political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. 
Underdevelopment, poverty, lack of  democratic participation and the abuse of  human rights are 
regarded as grave threats to the security of  people. Since they invariably give rise to conflict between 
individuals, communities and countries, they threaten the security of  states as well.526 
The main tenets of  the ANC’s preliminary approach to its policy on defence and the 
armed forces were their legitimacy, representativeness, defensive force posture, and 
subjection to democratic civilian control. In addition, there was concern over the size 
and role of  the South African arms industry and over the legality of  its export 
practices527. These themes correspondingly were the focus of  a large part of  the MRG’s 
research.  
Due to the overtly political criteria for membership in the MRG528, the backgrounds 
of  the group’s members generated a high degree of  concordance between MRG policy 
research and the ANC’s political commitments. While asserting its independence of  
formal ANC or governmental structures and stressing its non-partisan stance529, the 
MRG was from the outset intended to serve a progressive audience and provide 
assistance to the ANC and other left-wing parties that were at a disadvantage in terms 
of  strategic policy capacity compared to the National Party and the apartheid state.  
The development of  new policies was defined largely by the desire to distance the 
new policy from that of  the apartheid regime. These policies had been defined by an 
aggressive military stance towards the Frontline States, the increasing militarisation of  
the defence policy decisionmaking process530, and a lack of  representativeness and 
accountability in the Defence Force. Academic security studies in South Africa prior to 
1990 had been largely controlled by the defence establishment and had remained, in 
relative terms, theoretically impoverished531.  
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The search for a new policy paradigm was conducted through engagement with 
academic discourse, and resulted in the adoption of  a new paradigm which stayed true 
to its goals of  transposing the ANC’s political commitments (embodied inter alia in the 
RDP) by maintaining its similarity to what was to become, in the Canadian context, the 
human security agenda532.  
In addition to research aimed directly at producing a new security policy and defence 
force, the MRG—primarily through the work of  Williams—provided assessments (in 
the manner of  intelligence reports) of  the political landscape within the security realm. 
These reports show most clearly the political self-positioning of  the MRG and its view 
of  its role in contributing to an altered landscape under the new government. In one 
early overview of  the discipline of  security studies, the need for progressive academics 
to challenge the Defence Force’s influence on academic strategic studies plays a defining 
role:  
The hegemony of  the S.A.D.F./Afrikaans university axis has yet to be effectively challenged by either 
progressive or non-partisan strategic studies institutes and/or individuals engaged in this research. 
This is not tantamount to saying that the theoretical paradigm of  the state’s strategic studies and 
counter-insurgency network has not been critically engaged in the past. It is simply to acknowledge 
the fact that we have yet to build a strategic studies network and paradigm that critically engages the 
regime itself  within the contested terrain of  the discipline of  strategic studies. It is only then that the 
self-serving nature and theoretical poverty of  the state’s strategic studies institutes can be illustrated 
and, hopefully, replaced.533  
The resonance of  the MRG’s efforts in dealing with these themes was connected to 
its efforts consciously to engage, from a progressive standpoint, with established 
paradigms and institutes in South African security studies that were the result of  co-
optation by the state security apparatus. Right-wing groupings and individuals within 
that establishment were explicitly identified as threats and measures suggested to 
counter their influence534. Many of  these papers adopt a sociological approach, 
focussing on the social backgrounds of  senior military officers or on the military culture 
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and corporate identity of  the SADF. The search for a new paradigm led these 
progressive academics to critical security studies and human security.  
Critical security studies resonated well with both left-leaning academics and ANC 
leaders due to its perceived identification with progressive Western academics engaged 
in peace studies and other non-“mainstream” areas of  security studies. Human security 
gained rapid acceptance as it echoed the primacy of  development over military security 
found in the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme and in “Ready to 
Govern”. Nathan would later include the precepts of  these two approaches in the 1996 
Defence White Paper. But this was not to be the only manner in which the ideas 
generated by this diverse collection of  progressive academics and activists was to 
influence defence debates and policies in the new South Africa.  
On some issues, there was a direct clash between the policy proposals brought 
forward by the MRG or its members and those of  another security think tank with 
closer links to the previous security establishment, the Institute for Defence Policy 
(IDP—later Institute for Security Studies, ISS). One such example was the initial draft 
of  the Defence White Paper, referred to as the Green Paper. A meeting was convened 
in early 1994 to discuss the “Green Paper” draft. In attendance, among others, where 
Kasrils, Defence Secretary General Pierre Steyn, Cilliers, Nathan and Fourie, who 
declined Steyn’s offer to chair the meeting.  
According to participants the meeting was dominated by speakers such as Nathan, 
who found the tenor of  the draft reflected too much the approach of  the “old 
establishment” staff  officers535. Consequently, Kasrils rejected the first draft, produced 
under the auspices of  the Defence Staff  Council together with Cilliers and other 
academics, as “too militaristic, too Cold War in its orientation and too inconsistent with 
the values of  the ANC”536. This “opened the door” for Nathan: 
[I]n practice, however, there was little capacity in the Secretariat and responsibility for drafting the 
White Paper was devolved to consultants, The IDP wrote an initial draft which was almost 
immediately rejected by the Minister, Subsequently, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the 
University of  Cape Town, led by Laurie Nathan, was appointed as the principal drafter.537 
Cilliers’ links to the SADF became a liability—at the very least, in the eyes of  the 
competing MRG—in the transition era as the new government sought to distance itself  
as much as possible from the old regime. This was despite the fact that Cilliers’ and 
IDP’s links were to progressive verligte elements within the Defence Force and that it 
was viewed as pro-ANC by conservative verkrampte elements. As IDP established itself  
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as an independent think tank, establishing networks of  defence academics and bringing 
in foreign expertise, competition with the MRG became inevitable. Although initially 
IDP/ISS was frequently approached for direct policy inputs by the SA(N)DF, as the 
process of  integrating the military progressed, the institute was forced to search for a 
new constituency. Its research interests broadened and direct influence on defence 
policy lessened as the degree of  resonance of  its work with politicians and military 
officers subsided somewhat.  
ISS continues to enjoy respect and a high degree of  indirect influence through its 
work within a broader security framework. ISS has undergone considerable normative 
change since the transition; though its origins remain what they are, its current work is 
not generally brought into this context. Peter Vale’s acerbic criticism seeing it as “fill[ing] 
the void left by the crude pro-apartheid organisations”538 appears to have lost its validity 
in the ten years since its publication. 
In the immediate post-transition period, Nathan’s influence followed a different 
trajectory, and he had clearly become a presence in the defence debates within South 
Africa by the time of  the Green Paper meeting539. He accepted the post as lead drafter 
on the—promptly granted—condition that the Principles of  Defence in a Democracy serve as 
the basis for the work ahead540. According to Kasrils, Nathan’s selection was due in part 
to the fact that he had read Nathan’s Changing of  the Guard, in which were laid down the 
normative underpinnings of  defence policy in a democratic South Africa541.  
In a clear example of  the importance of  resonance in determining academics’ 
influence, Kasrils’ decision was thus demonstrably based on the greater degree of  
convergence between Nathan’s prior work and the needs of  the ANC-controlled 
Defence Department, compared to that of  the drafters of  the Green Paper. The Green 
Paper draft dealt almost exclusively with concrete issues of  military planning and 
procurement and not at all with normative issues such as affirmative action, civic 
education, or the principles to be followed by the Defence Force in a democratic South 
Africa542. Nathan proposed that the green paper draft under discussion be rejected 
outright as “too reactionary”543, a suggestion seconded by Fourie, despite the latter’s role 
in bringing Beaufre’s writings, and their utilisation in the formulation of  the reactionary 
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542 South Africa. Department of Defence. “Green Paper on South African Defence Policy”. 24 April 1995. 
543 Interview with Laurie Nathan, 22 August 2001. 
  177
Total Strategy doctrine, to South Africa. This was the first sign of  the incipient division 
between the drafters’ uniformed and civilian defence establishment audiences. 
The SADF veiled its disagreement with its new political masters’ views on security 
concept, claiming in true positivist form to be following instead a tradition of  neutral 
“professionalism” with regard to its submission to civilian control. Nonetheless, all 
technical focus aside there were widely divergent viewpoints within the armed forces as 
to the desired extent of  their subjugation to civilian control. This was to become one of  
the main points of  contention during the transition period, as the civilian leaders that 
controlled this once dominant institution of  minority rule now came from the opposite 
side of  the trenches.  
The normative beliefs that held sway within the SADF carry weight in two different 
ways in the process of  ameliorating CMR in South Africa. First, there are the actual 
normative underpinnings of  the SADF’s negotiating positions and their relationship to 
the proposals put forward by Nathan. Secondly, given the desire of  the ANC to 
distance itself  as much as possible from the previous regime, attention must be given to 
ANC perceptions of  SADF values and doctrine as a negative example for the ANC—in 
the knowledge that this assessment may not have been accurate or up-to-date.  
There was hence a very strong impetus for academics to produce inputs that would 
enable the ANC to counter SA(N)DF influence and technical superiority in the 
negotiating process and in policy formulation. Academics’ contributions needed to 
combine the desire to distance policy from the previous paradigm with the transposition 
of  ANC political values into the defence arena.  
For example, there was a strong desire among the new civilian leaders to shift the 
referent object of  South African security policy from the white population to all 
citizens, and to establish a Defence Force representative of  the entire population as 
opposed to what had been described by some as the “National Party’s army” and to 
dismantle the security apparatus that had been set up based on the Total Strategy 
doctrine. Individual academics’ influence was primarily determined—once they had in 
fact been included in the formulation process—by their adherence to the ANC’s 
political commitments. 
 
4.4.2. Proposals submitted by academic advisors 
Nathan’s normative contribution to the White Paper represents in condensed form 
the topics of  his research since he entered the defence field around 1990. The 
influential Principles of  Defence in a Democracy were first published in amalgamated form in 
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a 1992 article in the South African Defence Review entitled “Beyond arms and armed forces: 
a new approach to security”544. The approach was developed further in a 1994 article545 
that laid the basis for Nathan’s monograph The Changing of  the Guard: armed forces and 
defence in a democratic South Africa546.  
The book in turn developed these concepts into the basis for the first draft of  the 
1996 Defence White Paper, shifting security doctrine from a state-based notion to one 
dealing with an “all-encompassing condition”—the security of  people547. Nathan 
outlines the main justification for assuming a new approach to security with specific 
regard to the debates surrounding the South African defence forces in the 1992 article: 
The extent to which the military debate has been politicised and is preoccupied with integration 
carries a distinct risk – the new defence force may largely be shaped by deals struck at the negotiating 
table, without an adequate process of  long-term planning and formulating new security principles 
and objectives. 
Such a process, accompanied by an analysis of  the changed international, regional and domestic 
circumstances in the 1990s, would put the military debate on a sounder footing. It would provide a 
coherent framework for designing new security policies and institutions that are consistent with 
democracy and contribute to peace and stability in South Africa and southern Africa.548 
It was largely the work of  Nathan and the MRG that led to the expansion of  the 
debates over defence in the new South Africa beyond the initial issues of  the 
negotiation period—such as the integration and rationalisation of  the Defence 
Force549—and to the subsequent inclusion of  security concepts novel at least to the 
southern African region. Nathan’s main influences in this respect where Ken Booth550, 
Barry Buzan551, and the Palme Commission552.  
The basis of  the new approach is to be found in Buzan’s People, states and fear, in 
which he broadens the notion of  security threats beyond the military sphere to include 
political, economic and environmental “sectors”553. Where Nathan saw in the 
Copenhagen approach the underpinnings of  efforts to demilitarise South African 
society, People, states and fear had ironically been used to the opposite ends as a teaching 
tool by the apartheid-era security apparatus554. This irony notwithstanding, Nathan 
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pursues the demilitarising possibilities of  the sectoral approach in the 1992 “New 
approach” piece: 
The main argument is that “security” should no longer be seen as a predominantly military concept, 
but as having political, social, economic and environmental dimensions. Democracy, social justice, 
economic development and environmental protection are ultimately more important prerequisites for 
lasting security than large arsenals and standing armies.555 
Following a critique outlining the inefficacy of  apartheid security policy in human 
terms, Nathan first lays down his “New approach” in the 1992 article. The relevant 
section relies heavily on Buzan, Booth and the three Independent Commissions, and 
gives a detailed account of  the African Leadership Forum’s initiative to create a 
Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA). 
Modelling its four “calabashes”—security, stability, development and co-operation—
after the three issue baskets employed by the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, the CSSDCA’s founding Kampala Document outlines four fundamental 
principles of  security in the African context. It states that security must be viewed as an 
all-encompassing concept not limited to military threats (a fundamental departure from 
the state-centred notions generally employed by African states); incorporate elements of  
common security, as well as good neighbourliness and peaceful resolution of  conflicts. 
The innovative character of  this approach in the Southern African regional context 
must be underlined. 
The first sections of  the 1994 article recapitulate the version produced in 1992556. 
The main thrust of  the article’s later sections is to suggest concrete initiatives seeking to 
increase the security of  the southern African region. In so doing, Nathan contends that  
[t]he prevailing conditions in southern Africa will be both more and less favourably suited to regional 
co-operation. […] On the balance, it might make practical sense to re-orientate and strengthen 
existing regional forums rather than import new models.557  
Within a regional context the institutions in question almost certainly would be the 
Southern African Development Community and, if  it were to come to fruition, a 
CSSDCA. Nathan argues that situational trends in the region “affirm the applicability to 
southern Africa of  the analysis and solutions offered by the new thinking on security”: 
the region’s major threats are non-military and cross state borders, and thus call for 
confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) to be put in place558. The CSBMs 
instituted in the European context by the 1985 Stockholm Agreement and 1990 Vienna 
Document should, according to Nathan, be supplemented in a southern African 
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context (the main difference being the existence of  strong states in Europe and of  weak 
states in southern Africa) with the following measures559: 
joint patrols of  national boundaries by border guards; the avoidance of  large concentrations of  
troops and heavy artillery close to borders; co-ordinated action to stem the proliferation of  small 
arms; agreement on the type of  weaponry justifiable for procurement or manufacture by member 
states; the placement of  Armscor under some form of  regional control; and the adoption of  non-
offensive defence doctrines.560 
The culmination of  Nathan’s efforts to develop a coherent framework for the new 
approach to security, and to imbue it with relevance to policymakers in the South Africa 
and southern Africa, is The Changing of  the Guard. Confirming again the importance of  
cogency in determining the utility of  academic policy inputs, the monograph 
emphasises that: 
[…] the primary aim of  the book is to promote a set of  principles for defence in a democracy. If  
these are ignored, the new armed services may end up closely resembling the old. At the same time, 
an exclusive concern with abstract principles will be of  limited benefit to defence planners. The book 
therefore translates the relevant theories into concrete and appropriate policies for South Africa.561 
Changing of  the guard’s fifteen chapters are divided into three sections: the new 
approach to security; the orientation of  the armed services, and their role and 
organisational features. Chapter Two reiterates the 1992 and 1994 articles on the new 
approach to security. In Chapter Three, Nathan lays the foundations of  a threat analysis 
process for South Africa. He summarises the domestic, regional and international 
contexts while elevating five policy measures intended to balance the threat selection 
process in such a way that it becomes neither too narrow nor too broad. These are the 
distinction between threat analysis and policy formulation; parliamentary review; 
transparency and freedom of  information; preference for non-military solutions; and 
indications of  the probability and likely implications of  a given threat562. Chapter Four 
gives concrete proposals as to how to proceed with disarmament in the national 
context.  
The basis of  Chapter Five’s analysis of  regional security is the common security 
model outlined in the 1992 and 1994 articles, and an institutional framework is 
suggested for the southern African region. Further chapters discuss CMR, doctrine, 
professionalism, training, international law, functions, size, personnel and composition. 
The proposals exposited in Changing of  the guard serve as the basis for the first draft of  
the Defence White Paper, produced by Nathan in May 1995.  
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Again, the core of  the monograph is the presentation of  the new approach to 
security; the other chapters serve to contextualise the new approach or to deal with 
other issues raised during the political negotiations over the future of  the Defence 
Force. Changing of  the Guard prominently incorporates the Principles of  Defence in a 
Democracy, which were drafted by Nathan (then a member of  the MRG) and first made 
public two years prior to the publishing of  The Changing of  the Guard by future Minister 
of  Defence and former MK Commander-in-Chief  Joe Modise in a visit to the Research 
Institute for the Study of  Conflict and Terrorism in London in May 1992. At the time, 
Modise listed nine principles:  
1.  The defence force shall be bound by the principles of  civil supremacy over the armed forces and be accountable 
to the public through parliament. 
2.  The defence shall at all times act within, adhere to and uphold the constitution of  the country.  
3. The defence force shall respect the ideals of  democracy, non-racialism, non-sexism national unity and national 
reconciliation. 
4.  The defence force shall endeavour to be reflective of  the national composition of  South African society. In this 
regard a programme of  affirmative action shall be implemented. 
5.  The defence force shall be politically non-partisan. 
6.  The defence force shall respect and uphold the Bill of  Rights including the rights of  a soldier as citizen. 
7.  The defence force shall be a permanent volunteer force. 
8.  The defence force shall adopt a defensive military posture. 
9. The defence force shall be bound by international law, treaties and conventions governing the use of  force and 
the conduct of  war in the solution of  conflicts.  
These principles must bind and regulate the defence force in all of  its activities.563 
These nine Principles were expanded to 16 in The Changing of  the Guard; that list was 
then incorporated into the 1996 White Paper on Defence with the following 
modifications. The Principles as they appear in Changing of  the Guard are in normal font; 
modifications in the White Paper text are indicated using strikethrough and italic font564.  
[1.] National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the social, political, economic and cultural 
rights and needs of  the South African people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security. 
[2.] South Africa shall be committed to the international cause of  disarmament. It shall reduce its force levels, 
armaments and military expenditure to the greatest extent possible in the light of  the domestic and regional 
security environment. 
[3.] South Africa shall pursue peaceful and co-operative relations with neighbouring states. It shall participate in 
regional efforts to establish collective arrangements. It will seek a high level of  political, economic and military co-operation 
with Southern African states in particular. 
[4.] South Africa shall adhere to international law which prohibits the use of  force and governs the conduct of  
warfare on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is party. 
[5.] The armed services shall have a primarily defensive doctrine orientation and posture.  
[6.] The functions and responsibilities of  the Defence Force shall be determined by the Constitution and the 
Defence Act. The military shall operate strictly within these parameters. 
[7.] The primary role of  the Defence Force shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression. The 
army shall only be employed in an internal policing capacity in exceptional circumstances and with parliamentary 
approval and safeguards. 
[8.] The Defence Force shall be bound by the principle of  “civil supremacy over armed forces” and shall be 
subordinate and fully accountable to government and parliament and the executive. 
[9.] The Defence Force shall operate strictly within the parameters of  the Constitution, domestic legislation and international 
humanitarian law. It shall respect human rights, the rule of  law and the democratic political process. 
[10.] Military activities and national security policy shall be sufficiently transparent to enable meaningful  
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parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, insofar as this does not endanger the lives of  military personnel or jeopardise 
the success of  military operations.  
[11.] The Defence Force shall be non-partisan with respect to political parties shall not further or prejudice party-political  
interests. 
[12.] The composition of  the leadership and rank-and-file of  the Defence Force shall broadly reflect the racial and  
ethnic composition of  South Africa. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes will be introduced. 
[13.] The Defence Force shall endeavour to develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional  
culture as required by the Constitution. 
[14.] Military training shall include an educational programme which covers the essential features of  the  
Constitution, international law and democratic CMR. 
[15.] The Defence Force shall maintain the necessary technical, managerial, and organisational skills and resources  
shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, to perform its functions capable of  executing 
its tasks effectively and efficiently. 
[16.] The Defence Force shall respect the rights and dignity of  its soldiers within the normal constraints of   
military discipline and training. 
[17.] South Africa is committed to the international goals of  arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to  
strengthen international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of  small arms, conventional armaments and  
weapons of  mass destruction. 
[18.]South Africa’s force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defence policy which derives from an  
analysis of  the external and internal security environment, which takes account of  the social and economic imperatives of  the 
 RDPa, and which is approved by Parliament.565 
It is clear that the above modifications bear the handwriting of  the military 
establishment, as a majority of  them serve to lift restrictions instituted in the original 
version. Some clearly show signs of  the previous realist paradigm still in force in the 
old-guard SADF. Several policy proposals are offered in order to facilitate the 
attainment of  these principles: the resuscitation of  the Organisation for African Unity’s 
Reconciliation and Mediation Commission; peace-keeping operations; confidence and 
security-building measures (CSBMs); a non-aggression treaty; demilitarisation and arms 
procurement limitations566. Integrating the contours of  the CSSDCA initiative with the 
security literature that underpins his notion of  security, Nathan lists seven key features 
of  the “new approach”: 
1. Security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon which is not restricted to military matters but broadened to 
incorporate political, social, economic and environmental issues. 
2. The subjects whose security is sought are not confined to states but extend at different levels of  society to include 
people, geographic regions and the global community. 
3. Threats to security are not seen as arising solely from armed forces and as limited to challenges to state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity; they include poverty, oppression, injustice and host of  ecological problems. 
4. The overriding objective of  security policy therefore goes beyond achieving an absence of  war to encompass the 
pursuit of  democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and a safe environment. 
5. The formulation of  security policy is not confined to executive and administrative officials; it requires greater 
accountability, open debate and the active participation of  elected representatives and the public. 
6. Regional security policy seeks to overcome adversarial relations and advance the principles of  “common security”, 
co-operation, non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs and peaceful settlement of  disputes.  
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7. Military force is viewed as a legitimate means of  defence against external aggression but an unacceptable 
instrument for conducting foreign policy and resolving inter-state conflict.567 
Alongside issues such as transparency, representativeness, broad participation and 
accountability, the policy measures suggested by the approach favoured by Nathan are 
primarily two: CSBMs and non-offensive defence (NOD)568. Both of  these concepts 
were developed in the Northern Hemisphere as tools in the management of  relations 
between the Cold War ideological blocs. Nathan’s main contribution in importing these 
ideas into the South African defence debate was their adaptation, mutatis mutandis, to the 
southern African context (for they are regional approaches to security). 
The southern African region provides one of  the most salient examples of  how the 
neo-realist paradigm fails to provide security to individuals as the referent object of  
security. While it was Nathan’s prominence—gained through his importation of  the 
new approach to security to the South African defence debates—that enabled him to 
become the lead drafter of  the White Paper, Nathan was not the only South African 
author to search for remedies for the apartheid regime’s inadequate security policies in 
the academic literature. Several critical security studies authors have pointed this out, 
among them one renowned for his often trenchant critiques of  the orthodox approach: 
Understanding [security] issues—in South Africa and elsewhere—has mostly been a dismal exercise. 
Orthodox approaches to the fundamental problematiques of  the discipline (used here in the advisory 
sense) have relied on set-pieces and a limited array of  analytical techniques. For all their promise of  
adventure, both are remarkably time-bound; although they deal “literally [with]…the fate of  the 
world” liturgy and ceremony have tied-bound them both to a dismal admixture of  diplomatic history 
and social science.569 
Vale contrasts “South Africa’s approach to international issues”, “underscored by a 
crude positivist logic” with the concern for developmental issues shown by other 
approaches and presents a picture of  “[t]he binary logic of  regular strategic studies, 
vitiated [a]gainst nuanced understandings of  inter-state behaviour in South African 
views of  the world”570. Vale clearly identifies Total Strategy, with its basis in the 
perceived Soviet-orchestrated Total Onslaught, as the culprit:  
To counter the “force” of  degenerate humans, especially its opponents, the state was licensed to 
bring any counter-force. The arcane and really quite nonsensical debates around the “Soviet threat” 
to South Africa demonstrates [sic], as we shall see, the point. This was a pervasive influence and 
explains why [the] peace research tradition was entirely shunned and – as the experience of  the 
country’s campaign to end conscription – demonstrated [sic], deviation from the orthodoxy – even in 
the name of  “non-violence” – was persecuted by the state.571 
Faced with problems not addressed by the dominant security paradigm in the region, 
Vale contends that “[a]mong its myriad problems, perhaps the most salient in Southern 
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Africa today is the lack of  imagination among power holders and brokers in the region 
and beyond’572. This exacerbates Vale’s contention that “[t]raditional ‘realist’ security 
perspectives have yielded only unhappy returns in southern Africa573”. Vale’s critiques 
of  the realist paradigm and of  the problems with the apartheid security paradigm 
provide fertile ground for policy recommendations.  
However, Vale found himself  excluded from policy influence; his strong critiques of  
ANC policy convinced policymakers that the necessary resonance did not exist between 
his work and their policy plans. Vale did not seek to tailor his writings to the policy 
world in accordance with the requirements of  cogency and relevance, and thus found 
himself  looking in on the policy reformulation process from the outside. 
As in the case of  Nathan’s intellectual influences, Buzan’s People, states and fear was 
very influential in providing a primary point of  attack on the state-centred, military-
focussed paradigm. While some found problematic its retention of  the “ontological 
primacy of  the state” (and were later placated by the development of  the notion of  
“societal security” by Buzan’s colleagues at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute)574, 
others have contented themselves to adapt Buzan’s sectoral approach by adding a 
developmental sector of  particular relevance to the South African context575. 
Among the heterogeneous collection of  issues subsumed under the title “critical 
security studies”, several issues are prominent in the literature attempting to adapt new 
security paradigms to the southern African context. These include attempts to grapple 
with the transformation of  the defence establishment by means of  strategic culture576 
(an underlying current of  the policy recommendations formulated by Nathan and 
several members of  the MRG); critical theory (which has largely fallen victim to the 
validation of  the oft-repeated critique that its abstract nature renders it unable to 
provide sufficiently concrete policy proposals)577; regional security approaches such as 
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common security and the CSSDCA model578, and the body of  literature dealing with the 
specificities of  security in the “third world”.  
One of  the most influential proponents of  a regional approach to security—Ken 
Booth—outlined in a February 1994 paper the possible role of  academics in laying the 
foundations for the implementation of  the approach in Southern Africa579. In this 
context, Booth sees academics as being in the front lines of  resistance to the tendency 
for “agendas to fall entirely into the hands of  those with political power”580. How is it, 
concretely, that Booth feels academics can contribute to “promote the goals of  security, 
cooperation and development?”: 
academics can help to provide knowledge, and so a truer image of  the “real world”; they can help to 
give longer-term perspectives than those of  decision-makers; they can help provide a more 
sophisticated language with which to talk about these matters; they can engage in a dialogue with 
practitioners which may fertilise the latter’s minds about the ways in which concepts might be 
translated into practicalities; they can expose false theories and reveal the assumptions of  established 
or proposed policies; they can develop new and (it is hoped) more rational theories; and they can try 
to speak for universal values and speak up for those who do not have a voice.581 
In the eyes of  one observer, “critical security studies, while it does have all the 
hallmarks of  the critical approach, is defence policy in South Africa. Where in the 
North, it is part of  the debates within the discipline, in the South it is talked about as 
policy and ideology”582. Nevertheless, where the approach has been brought into the 
South African policy context, it was introduced by local academics such as Nathan; 
while Nathan’s work is strongly influenced by Booth and critical security studies, the 
writings of  the “critical” authors entered the South African debate not directly but 
through the efforts of  the indigenous security academics. Local academics such as 
Nathan took on a similar role of  intermediary in agglomerating the viewpoints that 
would merge to make up the country’s declaratory policy. 
 
4.4.3. Synthesis and its locus 
In the earliest stages of  the drafting process, Nathan visited Defence Headquarters 
in Pretoria at Gründling’s invitation. At the time, Nathan’s background and his 
associations with anti-militarism and pacifism—often exaggerated in SADF 
perceptions—impinged upon his credibility with certain members of  the defence 
establishment. In order to allay these fears, and to produce from the start a White Paper 
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that would find more resonance with recalcitrant elements of  the military, Nathan spent 
several days in Pretoria listening to the concerns of  the officers charged with managing 
the drafting and consultation processes on the uniformed side. By incorporating these 
concerns into the earliest versions of  the White Paper rather than waiting until the later 
stages of  bargaining between civilian policymakers and the Defence Force, Nathan 
rapidly gained the trust of  those who had initially doubted his suitability as drafter583. 
The 16 drafts of  the White Paper that were to follow largely consisted of  drafts sent 
by Nathan to the managers of  the Defence Force side of  the process (Gründling and 
Major General Len Le Roux), who collected suggestions within Defence Headquarters 
and forwarded these to Nathan for inclusion into the next draft. It was then that 
Kasrils, in conjunction with Nathan, decided upon the acceptance or rejection, often on 
normative grounds, of  these suggestions.  
The broadly consultative nature of  the process was enhanced—at Nathan’s behest—
by a call for inputs from the public, including political parties and government 
departments, and the informed public, consisting largely of  concerned NGOs and 
academics as well as retired military officers. The following analysis of  some of  those 
drafts will illustrate the degree of  resonance between the normative beliefs—expressed 
in proposals related to the drafting process—held variously by the drafter and the two 
policy communities, as well as where the final synthesis of  these views—embodied in 
successive drafts—took place.  
Nathan’s first draft’s presentation of  its conception of  security is contained in the 
first substantive White Paper chapter dealing with transformation. It immediately 
becomes clear that there has been both a broadening and a deepening of  the notion as 
compared to its realist predecessor. Non-military threats have been prominently 
included and the referent object has shifted to the individual human being: 
A fundamentally different approach is required in a democracy and in the light of  the prevailing 
conditions in South Africa. Security policy is no longer a predominantly military problem but has 
been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of  
this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of  people. 
Security is an all-encompassing condition which enables individual citizens to live in freedom, peace 
and safety; participate fully in the process of  governance; enjoy the protection of  fundamental rights; 
have access to resources and the basic necessities of  life; and inhabit an environment which is not 
detrimental to their health and well-being.584 
In an effort to make clear the departure from Total Strategy, whose inclusion of  
non-military threats in its strategic assessment led to a widely-held assessment that it 
                                                                                                                                          
582 Interview with Prof. Annette Seegers, Rondebosch, South Africa, 3 September 2001. 
583 Interview with Jack Gründling, 22 October 2001. 
584 South Africa. Department of Defence. “Defence in a Democracy: Draft White Paper on National Defence for the 
Republic of South Africa”. 31 May 1995 (hereafter, “White Paper First Draft”), p. 4. 
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had permitted the militarisation of  the attendant areas of  state activity, the draft 
underscores that “[t]he new approach to security does not imply an expansive role for 
the armed forces. […] [The Defence Force’s] primary and essential mission is the 
conventional function of  defence against external military aggression”585. The 
similarities between the relevant sections in Changing of  the guard dealing with military 
professionalism586, governmental responsibility towards the military587, and the 
Constitutional dispositions for the structure of  South African civil-military relations588 
go beyond conceptual affinity to virtual textual identity.  
Chapter 4’s threat assessments largely proceed without recourse to earlier published 
works by Nathan, although the drafter does heed his own recommendations from 
Changing of  the guard regarding pitching correctly a threat analysis so as not to allow it to 
become to broadly or too narrowly cast. Changing of  the guard does not go into great 
detail as to the specific parameters of  these deployments, although it does provide a 
normative argumentation—mainly the bitter aftertaste of  township policing and 
regional destabilisation under the apartheid regime—providing a rationale for limiting 
the Defence Force’s role, even in the face of  strong support for a military role in 
combating high crime levels in some communities.  
Nathan’s first draft White Paper has seven substantive chapters: these deal 
respectively with transformation, CMR, the strategic environment, role and functions of  
the Defence Force, human resources, budget and arms control and production. The 
transformation chapter also lists fifteen Principles for Defence in a Democracy, in a form 
amalgamating the versions promulgated in Nathan’s 1992 and 1994 “New approach” 
articles589. 
The third chapter of  the original Nathan draft deals with the issue of  CMR. A 
separate section on international law regarding conflict and the use of  force, based on 
Chapter Ten of  the 1994 monograph, was struck almost at the time of  writing. Chapter 
Four provides an assessment of  the strategic environments at the domestic, regional 
and international levels  
Chapter Five deals with the role and functions of  the Defence Force. The limitation 
of  the Defence Force’s primary mission to territorial self-defence is incorporated here, 
as is the emphasis on the nature of  any possible internal deployment as well as 
                                                 
585 White Paper First Draft, p. 5. 
586 Nathan, Changing of the Guard, pp. 83-84 and White Paper First Draft, p. 12. 
587 Nathan, Changing of the Guard, pp. 63-64 and White Paper First Draft, pp. 14-15. 
588 Nathan, Changing of the Guard, pp. 68-70 and White Paper First Draft, pp. 8-9. 
589 Nathan, “New approach”, 1994; Nathan, “New approach”, 1992. 
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participation in regional peace operations. Further draft chapters concern issues of  
human resources, budgetary constraints, and arms control and the South African arms 
industry.  
Among the submissions from the consultation process, the most important were 
those from the political parties—primarily the ANC and the National Party—and the 
branches of  the SANDF: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the South African 
Medical Service.  
Of  the 17 total drafts of  the White paper, aside from the first (31 May 1995), second 
(21 June) and final (May 1996) drafts, some are of  particular salience. These include the 
drafts dated 27 October 1995, 31 January 1996 and 30 March 1996. As described in the 
drafting history preceding a later draft, these drafts respectively included comments and 
revisions by the following instances: 
The 27 October 1995 draft incorporated comments submitted by political parties, non-governmental 
organisations, the defence industry, defence analysts and members of  the public and the SANDF. 
The 31 January 1996 draft incorporated proposals from the Joint Standing Committee on Defence 
(JSCD) as approved by that committee on 23 January 1996. 
The 30 March 1996 draft incorporated the Minister’s decisions regarding the JSCD proposals and the 
comments of  the Department of  Defence on the 31 January 1996 draft.590 
The clearest example of  the handling of  proposed revisions by Nathan and Kasrils, 
based on the available documentation, can be drawn from one particular element from 
Laurie Nathan’s personal files. This consists of  comments submitted on behalf  of  the 
Department of  Defence by the Chief  of  the SANDF, General Georg Meiring, on the 
basis of  the 31 January 1996 draft591 and incorporated, following their vetting for 
normative consistency, by Nathan into the 30 March 1996 draft, in conjunction with 
Kasrils.  
On three printed versions of  these comments are three sets of  annotations592: one 
initial set of  comments by Nathan indicating his acceptance or rejection of  the 
proposed revisions. These annotations contain motivations for a majority of  the 
decisions taken and act as recommendations to Kasrils, with whom rested the final 
authority to take the given decision. A second set of  annotations consists simply of  
marks indicating acceptance ( ) or rejection ( ) of  the SANDF comment. In all but a 
                                                 
590 South Africa. Department of Defence. “Defence in a Democracy: Draft White Paper on National Defence for the 
Republic of South Africa”. 22 April 1996 (hereafter, “White Paper, 22 April 1996 draft”). 
591 Defence in a Democracy: Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa. 31 January 
1996 (hereafter, “White Paper, 31 January 1996 draft”). 
592 Meiring, Georg. “C SANDF comments on Draft White Paper on Defence (31 January 1996). Memorandum 
submitted to Laurie Nathan, 1996 (hereafter, CSANDF original); Ibid., containing a first set of hand-written 
annotations by Laurie Nathan (hereafter, “CSANDF Nathan first comments”); Ibid., containing hand-written 
comments by Ronnie Kasrils (hereafter, “CSANDF Kasrils comments”); and Ibid., containing a second set of 
hand-written comments by Nathan (hereafter, “CSANDF Nathan second comments”). 
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few cases, Kasrils followed Nathan’s recommendation in establishing his own view 
before incorporating other inputs into his final suggestions for the draft. 
A final set of  hand-written annotations indicates action taken by Nathan in 
preparing the next draft in accordance with Kasrils’ prescriptions. Many of  the 
comments submitted by the Department of  Defence (DoD) pertain to wording rather 
than to matters of  substance, but the annotated documents do contain several 
differences of  opinion and orientation. The way in which these were resolved reveals 
both Nathan’s influence as drafter and his efforts to reflect and embrace key aspects of  
international law, Parliamentary interpretations, and his own normative framework in 
the White Paper. What becomes clear is that synthesis took place largely in the persons 
of  Nathan and Kasrils, with the preferences of  civilian bureaucrats and legislators 
taking precedence in many cases over the wishes of  the military establishment. 
The next draft, dated 30 March 1996593, reflects these inputs, which notably include, 
together with Meiring’s comments, a new set of  recommendations by the Parliamentary 
Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD)594. This case reflects instances of  
normative tension between Nathan and the ANC-led political overseers of  defence in 
South Africa and the representatives of  the less progressively-oriented military 
establishment. As the majority of  the amendments proposed by Meiring related to 
wording issues and linguistic-technical details, Kasrils and Nathan accepted slightly 
more than half  of  the approximately 80 recommendations. After a number of  further 
drafts, the Final Draft of  the White Paper was presented to Parliament by Defence 
Minister Modise on 20 May 1996. Modise had not read the document, leaving the 
formulation process as well as the drafting of  his own statement to Parliament to 
Kasrils and Nathan. The drafts and the drafting process will be discussed in further 
detail in the section below concerned with the synthesis of  normative viewpoints and 
institutional framework in which it takes place. 
In a majority of  the cases where recommendations were rejected, the reasoning for 
dismissal was a decision taken by the JSCD or ANC MPs. In some cases, Nathan agreed 
with Meiring’s suggestions (often the case was one of  a purely linguistic modification) 
but the proposal was rejected on the basis of  the view taken by the JSCD. One such 
example deals with the following provision in the draft: 
[Accordingly, the White Paper considers:] 
                                                 
593 South Africa. Department of Defence. “Defence in a Democracy: Draft White Paper on National Defence for the 
Republic of South Africa”. 30 March 1996 (hereafter, “White Paper, 30 March 1996 draft”).  
594 A first set of JSCD recommendations had formed the basis of the changes leading to the 31 January 1996 draft. 
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Human resource issues, including integration; the maintenance of  an all-volunteer force; the Part-
Time Force; rationalisation and demobilisation; equal opportunity, and affirmative action, non 
discrimination and gender relations; and defence labour relations.595 
Meiring’s comments contain the following suggestion: 
The inclusion “non-discrimination and gender relations” is a tautology. These are inherent aspects of  
EO [equal opportunity] and AA [affirmative action], which are already mentioned. It places 
unnecessary emphasis on these two matters and may indicate to some that they are not part of  EO 
and AA. This could be even more damaging. Deletion of  these words is recommended.596 
Nathan’s comments state: “I agree, but the ANC MPs [on the JSCD] insisted on the 
inclusion of  “gender relations”597. Kasrils subsequently rejected the amendment598, 
favouring political over military authority, and the suggestion was not taken up in the 30 
March 1996 draft599. The number of  cases in which distinct normative differences 
appeared between Nathan and Meiring are limited, although telling in nature; some 
relate directly to the “new approach” to security imported by Nathan into the 
policymaking process, others to issues such as gender and race.  
Meiring’s comments contain a request that the phrase “[t]he Minister shall appoint a 
work group to facilitate and monitor the implementation of  the policy outlined above 
regarding [non-discrimination on the basis of] religion, language and sexual 
orientation”600 be removed, claiming “[t]here are sufficient controlling mechanisms”601. 
Nathan signalled the comment with exclamation marks and provided his principal with 
the information necessary to make a decision: “!!! Your call (ANC proposed; NP 
opposed because of  their opposition to the preceding paragraphs)”602. Kasrils referred 
the decision to Defence Minister Joe Modise603; ultimately, the suggestion was not 
included604. 
One of  the suggestions Meiring’s document contains—originating in the Defence 
Corporate Communications Directorate—challenges the validity of  the consultative 
process in defence policymaking, a process instituted at the explicit behest of  Nathan. 
The policy is outlined as follows: 
The Minister and the DOD shall consult with interest groups and stakeholders in civil society in the 
formulation of  defence policy, and shall provide the public with adequate information on defence 
matters.605 
                                                 
595 White Paper, 31 January 1996 draft, p. 2, chapter 2, paragraph 12, sentence 5. 
596 CSANDF original, p. 3.  
597 CSANDF Nathan first comments, p. 3. 
598 CSANDF Kasrils comments, p. 3. 
599 CSANDF Nathan second comments, p. 3; White Paper, 30 March 1996 draft, p. 2. 
600 White Paper, 30 January 1996 draft, p. 20, chapter 3 paragraph 40C. 
601 CSANDF original, p. 6. 
602 CSANDF Nathan first comments, p. 6. 
603 CSANDF Kasrils comments, p. 6. 
604 CSANDF Nathan second comments, p. 6; White Paper, 30 March 1996 draft, p. 18. 
605 White Paper, 30 January 1996 draft, p. 21, chapter 3 paragraph 43. 
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The SANDF comments request that Nathan “[a]dd to end of  sentence: ‘except 
when it endangers the lives of  military personnel, jeopardizes the integrity or success of  
military operations or threatens the safeguarding of  national security interests”606. 
Nathan responded: “No. The paragraph speaks of  the provision of  adequate 
information. The concern expressed in this proposed amendment is covered in Chapter 
3, para 7, page 12”607. This paragraph reads in part “[a] measure of  secrecy will 
undoubtedly be necessary in order to safeguard national security interests, the lives of  
military personnel and the integrity of  military operations”608. The proposal was rejected 
by Kasrils and Nathan’s justification passed on verbatim to the SANDF609.  
Differences regarding threat scenarios also came to fore. The earlier of  the two 
drafts maintains that: 
Third, since the sub-continent is politically volatile and its national and regional institutions are 
relatively weak, internal conflicts could give rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities. This 
volatility and weakness also makes the region vulnerable to foreign interference and intervention 
from land, sea and air.610 
The Defence Force comments request the addition of  the text “[t]here is a real 
threat of  a spill-over of  instability from Northern Africa and the Horn of  Africa to 
Southern Africa”611. Nathan’s judgement that this was “totally ridiculous”612 was 
followed up613 and the amendment rejected614. A similar Defence Force comment 
highlighted the possibility of  foreign intervention in response to non-military threats 
was rejected as “very controversial”—a phrase frequently used in defence of  a 
recommendation to reject a proposed SANDF amendment615. A further SANDF 
amendment proposal strikes at the heart of  the White Paper’s normative basis in 
Nathan’s earlier work, focussing on the issue of  CSBMs. The 31 January draft states that 
[a]ppropriate CSBMs might include the following: 
Annual consultation and exchange of  information on defence budgets, force structure,  
modernisation plans and troop deployment. 
Consideration of  mutual national threat perceptions regarding force structure and  
modernisation plans. 
The establishment of  a regional arms register which records information on imports, exports,  
production and holdings of  conventional arms and light weaponry.616 
The SANDF comments in response to these proposals reveal that the SANDF 
policy experts did not share the “common security” paradigm CSBMs represent: “[t]he 
                                                 
606 CSANDF original, p. 6. 
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inclusion of  these elements has serious and negative implications for national 
security”617. Nathan answers by pointing out that the Defence Department’s White 
Paper Working Group had accepted these paragraphs618; the SANDF’s concerns about 
the potential dangers of  common security were consequently rejected and this element 
of  the “new approach” incorporated into the following draft619.  
The synthesis of  viewpoints between the civilian and uniformed participants in the 
formulation process for the 1996 South African White Paper on Defence took place in 
a series of  progressive drafts, in which Nathan and Kasrils worked in concert to align 
the stance of  the SANDF—represented by its Chief, General Georg Meiring—with the 
overriding parameters set by the nation’s legislators and civilian policymakers. Though 
both men overwhelmingly favoured the civilian decisionmakers’ viewpoints, instances 
did occur in which Nathan found himself  defending suggestions made by Meiring. 
Nathan’s involvement in the drafting process presents a unique case of  extremely strong 
influence, as he was involved not only in the drafting of  the document, but also in that 
his advice carried considerable weight with Kasrils, who bore the ultimate responsibility 
for the (civilian) oversight of  the document’s content.  
 
4.5. Conclusions  
The drafting process for the 1996 South African White Paper on Defence offers 
ample evidence of  all three variables this investigation posits as governing the extent of  
academic experts’ influence during the process of  security policy formulation at the 
national level. In the case of  each claim, the results from the South African case 
demonstrate not only the validity of  each hypothesis, but also how closely 
interconnected their suppositions are. The issue of  policymaker uncertainty is the first 
example. The main reason for the uncertainty felt by policymakers was a change in 
national government, in this case from minority to majority rule. This change was, of  
course, connected to shifts on the international level such as increased condemnation of  
the apartheid regime and the complication of  apartheid South Africa’s military situation 
in Angola and South West Africa.  
The change in government led to one of  the most clear-cut cases in history of  an 
incoming government seeking to distance itself  from the normative precepts of  its 
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617 CSANDF original, p. 7. 
618 CSANDF Nathan first comments, p. 7. 
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predecessor. Uncertainty ensued as to how to translate the general normative beliefs of  
the new rulers successfully into defence and security policy. In the South African case, 
the situation was exacerbated by a lack of  civilian expertise due to the apartheid state’s 
restrictive information policy and the co-optation of  the academic security studies 
community by the state security apparatus. Thus, the main cause of  policymaker 
uncertainty in the South African context was a lack of  policy formulation capacity in the 
security bureaucracy.  
This illustrates the interconnectedness of  the three possible sources of  
uncertainty—particularly in the case of  policymaking capacity, with the determinants 
governing the development of  specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige 
exposited in the project’s second hypothesis. Put succinctly, the old died before the new 
had been born. The normative underpinnings of  apartheid-era security policy became 
totally untenable in the democratic era, based as they were on racial inequality, 
destabilisation and the militarisation of  society.  
However, the policymakers and academic experts associated with Total Strategy were 
the sole possessors, initially, of  any semblance of  practical specialised knowledge. This 
practical specialised knowledge became inaccessible due to the unacceptability of  the 
normative suppositions to which it was wedded. On the other hand, many of  the 
policymakers and academics associated with the new ANC-led government, while in 
possession of  the progressive normative outlook called for by government preferences, 
possessed neither the practical nor the theoretical specialised knowledge to contribute 
successfully to policy formulation. This was exacerbated by change at the international 
level which delegitimised the Marxist-inspired theoretical specialised knowledge of  
security policy upon which ANC doctrine was based.  
Over the course of  the next five years (1990-1995) this situation was remedied, due 
in large part to the efforts undertaken by the Military Research Group to create almost 
ex nihilo the necessary expertise and policymaking capacity. In the end, these efforts bore 
fruit bi-directionally, with both increased practical and theoretical specialised knowledge 
on the part of  progressive ANC-leaning academics, and an increased awareness and 
acceptance of  the new government’s normative commitments on the part of  the 
previous, and largely carried-over, military establishment.  
As its spill-over into the uncertainty discussion demonstrates, the validity of  experts’ 
attributes as a factor in determining their influence is seminal in the South African case, 
lending support to this investigation’s claims regarding their explanatory value. As in the 
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Brazilian case, the militarisation of  society, and particularly of  the political process, had 
led to military decisionmaking with unacceptable independence from civilian control, 
and to the tight control of  the flow of  information by the military establishment. This 
hampered the ability of  non-coopted intellectuals to build up a body of  specialised 
knowledge, particularly when these efforts are placed in the context of  the heavy 
reliance of  many opposition academics on Marxist theory, whose credibility crumbled 
with the last remnants of  the Berlin Wall and Soviet support for liberation movements 
in the developing world.  
The efforts of  the MRG played a seminal role in building up specialised knowledge 
among security experts with a friendly normative disposition toward the new 
government. The presence of  ANC and MK members at the MRG meetings afforded 
their academics a clear view of  the type of  inputs being sought by the government to 
cover its own lacunae in policymaking capacity.  
Here again, the interconnectedness of  the variables comes to the fore: the MRG’s 
ANC and MK members clearly communicated not only the needs of  the policy 
bureaucracy in the areas both of  practical and theoretical specialised knowledge, but 
also their normative preferences, a prerequisite in later phases of  the policy process 
whose emphasis would be on the resonance of  experts’ inputs with those preferences.  
Beginning with the frustration experienced at the 1990 Lusaka meeting with SADF 
officials, these academics succeeded in creating their own specialised knowledge and in 
making use of  it to increase their own chances of  gaining influence over policy 
alternatives. The results of  the South African case are thus unique and powerful in that 
they demonstrate not only that specialised knowledge was an important factor—
providing clear examples of  how specialised knowledge was perceived and measured, in 
relative terms, by policymakers—but also offering a thoroughly documented example 
of  how such knowledge was created and put to use in generating ultimately successful 
policy inputs.  
The analysis of  institutionalised prestige in the South African case is clouded by two 
factors. The first is the origin of  many South African security experts outside the 
academic world, and their immigration to it during the period under consideration. This 
hampers the analysis of  the relative importance of  their personal prestige with their 
given discipline, though the effect is not the same for the institutionalised prestige of  
the discipline of  IR itself. This reflects a certain reversal of  the causality assumed by the 
model’s second hypothesis: rather than the institutionalised prestige of  an analyst within 
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the academic world translating into proximity to the policy sphere, in the case of  some 
South African analysts, this proximity translated into a solid academic reputation. 
In the case of  the institutionalised prestige of  the university system itself, and of  the 
several disciplines related to security issues, the co-optation of  the universities, their 
explicit role in maintaining racial equality during minority rule, and their location at the 
periphery of  academic production (softened nonetheless by the use of  English as the 
dominant language of  instruction and research) led to a sharp decline in the prestige 
(and usable theoretical specialised knowledge) of  academic experts associated with the 
apartheid regime. Further, the arrival of  experts with prestige gained outside the 
academic sphere at universities of  lesser prestige served to decouple prestige and policy 
relevance.  
This process highlights the second intervening factor: the importance of  an expert’s 
personal involvement with the anti-apartheid movement—“struggle credentials”—in 
determining influence-relevant prestige. Many policymakers and academics, as well as 
other key figures in South African public life, obtained positions during the transition 
for which their actual expertise was less relevant as a hiring factor than their service to 
the cause of  combating minority rule, which—further highlighting the 
interconnectedness of  the first two sets of  variables—occasionally led to a crisis of  
capacity in some sectors.  
The cogency and utility of  academic experts’ policy inputs depend considerably on 
the ability of  the policy establishment to communicate clearly to these individuals its 
needs and preferences. The community of  progressive South African security academics 
possessed a considerable advantage in this area due to the existence of  the MRG and its 
mixed academic-policymaker membership. MRG members such as Calvin Khan 
communicated clearly to their academic counterparts the current concerns of  the 
government, and enabled analysts such as Rocky Williams (during the earlier years) and 
Laurie Nathan (in the run-up to the White Paper drafting process) to produce well-
targeted and cogent analyses which later demonstrably found their way into government 
policy. This was particularly true of  civilian policymakers’ reliance upon these 
documents in countering the influence of  the SADF old guard and particularly its 
proposals during the transitional negotiations and the White Paper formulation process. 
These conclusions hold true for the requirement that such inputs contain a strong 
element of  normative argumentation as well.  
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Because this researcher was granted a high level of  access to the personal files of  key 
individuals involved in the drafting process for the 1996 White Paper, the South African 
study is able to trace in considerable detail the issue of  resonance as it played out in the 
correspondence between the lead drafter, his principal in the Defence Ministry, and the 
inputs submitted by the Chief  of  the SANDF.  
The drafting process illustrated the chronological relationship between the variables 
of  specialised knowledge and normative resonance, supporting the contention that 
uncertainty, expert attributes and normative resonance take effect on the extent of  
policy relevance one after the other, with some degree of  overlap. Once specialised 
knowledge had been created and served is purpose as a selection criterion for academics 
providing inputs to the policy process, those selected began to see their interaction with 
policymakers become much more heavily dependent on the resonance of  their inputs.  
This is due in part to the dual nature of  the audience with which these analysts were 
faced. Nathan as the lead drafter of  the White Paper dealt predominantly with civilian 
decisionmakers in the civilian defence bureaucracy, though it was necessary to 
accommodate the proposals originating in the uniformed services. The relationship 
between these inputs reflected closely the evolving balance of  power, and of  political 
legitimacy, between the military and its civilian controllers.  
Nathan’s collaboration with the Defence Ministry provides several crystal-clear 
examples of  policy influence. Such influence is demonstrated must adequately through 
the close similarity, verging on textual identity in a number of  cases, between Nathan’s 
academic work on security issues prior to his signing on as drafter and the final product 
of  his efforts, in the form of  public declaratory policy.  
Examples of  textual analysis that amply underscore this point are provided, and 
include the Principles of  Defence in a Democracy and the comparative analysis of  
Nathan’s Changing of  the guard and the White Paper itself. As indicated, in the case of  the 
MRG, resonance was almost guaranteed given the clarity with which civilian 
policymakers’ preferences were indicated to members, and the explicit calling of  the 
group to assist the ANC in developing both policy and the sustainable capacity to 
formulate it in the future.  
Selected excerpts from Nathan’s correspondence with Kasrils further show the 
drafter’s influence in the decisionmaking process with regard to the balancing of  the 
Ministry’s progressive views—as expressed by Nathan—and the more conservative—
though decreasingly so—inputs submitted by the uniformed military. Nathan’s influence 
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was considerable, though as with any policy process it is necessary to recall that ultimate 
decisionmaking power did not lie with him, and that his inputs were few among many, 
including from stakeholders across the government as well as civil society.  
While the consultation process with the South African public—instituted at Nathan’s 
explicit behest—perhaps did not produce an overwhelming number of  cogent inputs, 
the opening vested the process with a democratic legitimacy hitherto unknown in South 
Africa and stimulated a debate far beyond what has yet to be unleashed, for example, in 
Brazil. The consultation process bears the signs of  having been inspired by the process 
of  “democratising” foreign policy associated with the human security concept in 
Canada, though this link is not explicit. 
In the South African case, it is possible not only to prove strong influence on the 
part of  academics on the policy process, but to illustrate what it looks like when it 
happens. Thanks to the availability of  significant bodies of  detailed documentation, the 
South African study provides the strongest picture of  the functioning of  normative 
resonance as a determinant of  academics’ policy influence. The results of  the 
consultation process highlights that NGOs, on the other hand, did not enjoy the same 
clout, as seen in the limited applicability of  their contributions to the consultations. This 
outcome was to be reversed in the study of  the period in which the human security 
agenda was conceptualised in Canada, which saw very strong NGO participation to the 
detriment of  effective participation on the part of  the academics security community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  198
 
 199
5. Two solitudes620 and a laughing third: academics, policymakers and NGOs 
and the human security agenda in Canada, 1995-1999 
 
 
I do think we are our brother's keepers –  
in this case, our brother's peacekeepers. 
—Winrich Kühne— 
 
 
Ich kann mir nun zwar einen moralischen Politiker,  
d. i. einen, der die Prinzipien der Staatsklugheit so nimmt,  
daß sie mit der Moral zusammen bestehen können,  
aber nicht einen politischen Moralisten denken,  
der sich eine Moral so schmiedet,  
wie es der Vorteil des Staatsmannes zuträglich findet. 
—Immanuel Kant— 
 
 
Both Canada and the development of  its human security agenda from 1994 to 1999 present 
a series of  important departures from the commonalities inherent to the Brazilian and South 
African contexts. Here, the impact of  immature civil-military relations is negated, as the 
democratic control of  the Canadian Forces is not in question. Furthermore, whereas in the 
previous two cases the policy formulation process under investigation took place within the 
respective defence ministries with substantial participation by the SANDF and the FA, in the 
Canadian case the locus has shifted to the ministry of  foreign affairs. In addition, while in 
Brazil and South Africa academics’ relationship to the policy process was examined in 
isolation, in Canada many outcomes were determined by the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of  academics in relation to civil society, in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
According to its proponents in Ottawa, the concept of  human security traces its intellectual 
filiation back over one hundred years621; it reflects key elements both of  the Liberal tradition in 
politics, and of  more recent concerns emanating from the development community. It is 
generally considered to have first been articulated in coherent form in 1994 by the United 
Nations Development Programme in its fifth annual Human Development Report. Canadian 
policymakers, under the leadership of  then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, took up the 
concept in the search for a common thread to tie together conceptually a string of  single 
issues, including landmines and the protection of  civilians in conflict. These efforts 
                                                 
620 The original “two solitudes” are Canada’s Francophone and Anglophone linguistic communities; the term comes from the 
title of  a 1945 monograph on their relationship by Hugh MacLellan (Toronto: Collins). The characterisation all too often 
holds true for the relationship between Canadian policymakers and academics as well. 
621 Canada. Department of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing 
World. Ottawa: DFAIT, 1999 (hereafter, DFAIT, Safety for People); p. 3. 
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transformed a vague and practically unimplementable concept into the intellectual platform for 
concrete programmes delivered in the field as a part of  Canadian foreign and development 
policy initiatives.  
The current chapter follows the same pattern as the previous two, though with slight 
alterations due to the specificities and additional variables under consideration in the Canadian 
case. It first provides national context for the Canadian study before moving on to each of  the 
hypotheses in turn. The contextual section pays particular attention to the relevance of  human 
security and its conceptualisation for the debates within security studies on the nature of  the 
discipline’s guiding concept. The survey begins with historical antecedents in the Canadian 
foreign and security policy tradition which tie the human security agenda to previous traditions 
and outlooks such as internationalism and the functionalist principle; the notion of  “middle 
powers” and the debates between Atlanticists and Continentalists are discussed as well. Moving 
on to more modern times, it describes the foreign policy conditions inherited by Axworthy.  
An overview of  the academic debate on Canada’s role in the world at the time of  
Axworthy’s takeover at Foreign Affairs maintains the balance of  focus between the 
policymaking and academic worlds. Next, Axworthy’s personal importance to the development 
of  the human security agenda is underlined and relevant elements of  his personal history 
briefly presented. The conceptual consolidation of  human security culminated in its coalescing 
into a coherent concept beginning in late 1998. Its implementation could thus begin, finding its 
most prominent example in the NATO bombing of  Yugoslavia in early 1999 in connection 
with human rights violations in the autonomous republic of  Kosovo. The first section is 
rounded out again by a review of  academic reactions to the conceptual forays made by the 
foreign policy bureaucracy. 
Policymaker uncertainty in the Canadian case was concentrated on the international level, 
though some observers contend that there was some domestic motivation to innovate (in 
accordance with the fiscally propitious functionalist principle) due to the financial constraints 
hampering Canada’s ability to maintain its traditionally active international role. A changing 
international environment was used by Axworthy in numerous public pronouncements as the 
rationale for embarking on a reconceptualisation of  the Canadian approach to security policy.  
However, in this case, policymakers’ public use of  the term “uncertainty” was situated at a 
different point along the formulation timeline. Canada’s ability to retain its “middle power” 
role on the international stage was threatened both by changes in the international system and 
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by fiscal constraints at home. Canadian foreign policymakers responded to this stimulus with a 
reconceptualization of  Canada’s security agenda and the inception of  the human security 
paradigm. However, while the impetus to craft new policy came from uncertainty, their public 
use of  the term, differently from their counterparts in South Africa, consisted not as a prior 
motivation for change but as an ex post facto justification for it. Nevertheless, uncertainty’s role 
as a catalyst for policy change remains the same. 
In a departure from the treatment of  the subject in the preceding studies, this chapter’s 
examination of  the attributes of  external policy process participants selects both academics 
and NGOs as its objects of  study in an effort to highlight three aspects of  the attributes 
ascribed to academics: how they may not be exclusive to academics; how NGOs in the 
Canadian case possessed attributes conducive to policy influence which academics did not; and 
how this distribution of  attributes between the two communities amounted to a clear 
advantage for NGOs in what is portrayed as a competition for influence.  
Confirming in negative form the findings on the subject from the South African study, the 
section on the normative resonance of  experts’ inputs shows again the complex and tight 
interconnectedness of  this variable with the forms of  specialised knowledge. Canadian foreign 
policymakers sought practical inputs related to implementation and did not open the policy 
process to more abstract and theoretical inputs from academics, the need for normative 
underpinnings having been satisfied with the transfer of  many points from the NGOs’ agenda 
first brought to the table during the period in which the precursor issues dominated the 
agenda. 
Further, human security’s origins in the development community had a marginalising effect 
on security experts, particularly those adhering to the state-centred neorealist approach, whose 
outlook did not resonate with the individual referent object posited by the human security 
agenda. Thus, the academic reaction to human security was initially not euphoric, though its 
reception has grown considerably warmer over time. The first academic responses are 
presented briefly here, and the main ramifications of  the human security lens on debates 
within the discipline of  security studies are reviewed, before the chapter moves on to its final 
section, presenting general conclusions and seeking to elicit the fate of  the human security 
agenda in the post-Axworthy era.  
 
5.1. Canadian foreign policy and the human security initiative 
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This section presents an overview of  the historical and institutional context in which 
former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy led the development and implementation 
of  the human security agenda. Evoking precedents and continuities in post-war Canadian 
foreign policy, it illustrates that human security, while arrived at and implemented through 
patently novel avenues, does not represent a rupture—some would say, even a novelty—in 
Ottawa’s diplomatic traditions. 
The contextual review begins by summarising briefly and selectively the antecedents of  the 
Canadian foreign policy of  the period from 1996 to 2000. Beginning with Canada’s initial 
strong allegiance to both Great Britain and the United States and the consequent duality 
between Continentalist and Atlanticist approaches to the country’s role in the world, it moves 
on to a presentation of  Canada’s dominant philosophy of  internationalism and the 
functionalist principle that provides criteria for the application of  this “middle power”’s 
resources, including Lester Pearson’s peacekeeping innovation. It further highlights the role of  
values as determinants of  policy priorities before discussing the policy conditions in the 
security domain inherited by Axworthy upon taking office in early 1996.  
These conditions largely derive from the financial constraints of  the period immediately 
surrounding Axworthy’s taking over in Foreign Affairs, including severe budget cuts at both 
the Department of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of  
National Defence (DND). This subsection also provides a brief  summary of  Axworthy’s 
curriculum prior to 1996, which included time spent as a professor in Winnipeg, as a critic for 
the Opposition, and in other provincial and federal ministerial posts.  
The final element in setting the stage for the human security agenda itself  is a summary of  
the academic debates on Canada’s foreign policy and role in the world as of  1996. The more 
important positions taken on this issue were the notion of  “niche diplomacy”, “selective 
internationalism” and returns to the idea of  the “middle power”, a term originating in the 
Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy itself. Finally, the text moves on to present elements of  
Axworthy’s own handiwork.  
The 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo and other parts of  Serbia is often cited by 
DFAIT622 as the foremost example of  human security in action. The responsibility for making 
                                                 
622 The Department of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade was split up into Foreign Affairs Canada and International 
Trade Canada by a 12 December 2003 directive from Prime Minister Paul Martin. In terms of  the human security agenda, 
DFAIT’s successor is Foreign Affairs Canada. When used here to denote the Canadian foreign policy establishment after 
this date, DFAIT refers to FAC.  
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the link between human security and the Balkan intervention—and taking it to the informed 
public in a series of  academic articles—was delegated to one of  Axworthy’s deputies, 
Ambassador Paul Heinbecker. 
Heinbecker’s articles, Axworthy’s proclamations, and the conduct of  human security-based 
policy gave rise to an extensive response, both supportive and critical, among Canadian 
security academics. These efforts centred on five major issues: the basis of  much of  human 
security’s justification in arguments of  a moral nature; contestation of  Axworthy’s and others’ 
innumerable claims that the human security agenda was an innovation; the use of  the notion 
of  “soft power”; critiques of  some of  the basic tenets underlying the argument that 
fundamental changes had occurred that required a new thinking in Canadian foreign policy; 
and finally, the highlighting of  certain inconsistencies in human security’s implementation, 
especially with regard to the normative argumentation frequently used to legitimise it. 
 
5.1.1. Antecedents in the Canadian foreign and security policy tradition 
Historically, Canadian foreign and security policy has been influenced primarily by two 
factors, one geographical, the other historical. The first is the country’s proximity to the United 
States of  America; the primary effects of  this proximity to a neighbour much larger by almost 
any measure shape both Canadian trade and security policies. Canada shares the world’s longest 
undefended border with the United States, and the two nations’ trade relationship is by far the 
world’s largest, with USD 1,2 billion worth of  goods crossing the 49th parallel every day as of  
October 2003623—accounting for 72% of  Canadian imports and 85% of  exports624. This high 
degree of  economic dependence on the United States is the first component that underscores 
the importance of  Ottawa’s southern neighbour and the imperative to maintain excellent 
relations with Washington. 
The predominance of  the United States is even more deeply entrenched in the area of  
defence policy: as the only member of  NATO contiguous to the United States, Canada’s 
territorial defence is considerably more closely integrated with that of  the United States than 
that of  most other alliance member states. In addition, Canada participates actively in bilateral 
and alliance structures established with an eye to the defence of  the North American 
homeland, such as NORAD and the Arctic Distant Early Warning defence system. Canada’s 
                                                 
623 “Trade and the Economy”. Available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?mid=1&cat=1029. 
Accessed 4 October 2003.  
624 von Baratta, Mario, ed. Fischer Weltalmanach 2004. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003; p. 474. 
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strong and asymmetrical integration with a preponderant United States is thus an ineluctable 
geographical fact of  life for both trade and defence planning in the Canadian context625.  
Canada’s historical affinities, however, point it in another direction. Canada gained 
autonomy from Great Britain in 1867 and remains a member of  the Commonwealth. As such, 
its security policy before the advent of  NATO was heavily based upon British interests. 
Similarly to fellow Commonwealth member South Africa, Canada participated in the two 
World Wars and maintained a relatively small constabulary armed force in peacetime. The 
divide between what have become known as the Continentalist and Atlanticist traditions 
continues to shape Canadian foreign and security policy today, together with a preoccupation 
with divining what role a state of  neither great nor negligible power such as Canada should 
play on the international scene.  
In many ways, the human security agenda maintains the continuity of  Canadian foreign 
policy tradition, whose modern foundations were laid in the immediate aftermath of  the 
Second World War. Canada’s participation in the conflict had left it with one of  the world’s 
largest armed forces, a competent and widely present diplomatic corps, and a highly developed 
industrial sector, including in the military arena. It could thus be counted, according to one 
important textbook, as a principal among the actors who sat down to create the multilateral 
institutions that would shape the post-war order626.  
Those responsible for Canada’s foreign policy quickly realised the potential of  
multilateralism for the pursuit of  Canadian interests, and laid the groundwork for a tradition 
governed by three fundamental principles that continue into the present day: internationalism, 
multilateralism and functionalism. Furthermore, the elaboration of  Canadian policies abroad 
has traditionally had at its base a strong element of  moral values and normative commitments.  
Internationalism establishes Canada’s continued interest in engagement on the international 
scene and the recognition of  the interconnectedness of  Canadian national interests with those 
of  other states. This realisation was quickly put into practice with Canadian representation in 
post-war multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and NATO; Ottawa’s strong 
commitment to multilateralism has continued unabated into the present. Multilateralism was 
                                                 
625 These factors are termed “invariants” and treated inter alia in Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of  Canadian Foreign Policy. 
Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1985 (hereafter, Politics); pp. 4-9.  
626 Dewitt, David B. and David Leyton-Brown, eds. Canada’s International Security Policy. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 
1995; pp. 5-6. 
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and is seen as a means for a state of  medium power to wage influence and pursue its interests 
to a degree not afforded by unilateral action.  
The Canadian government coined the term “middle power” to describe its status towards 
the end of  the Second World War, with a view towards adequate participation in the creation 
of  the post-war order627. The functionalist principle arose both as a justification for a Canadian 
seat at the table with the major powers such as the United States and Great Britain, and as a 
way for Canada to allocate intelligently its limited resources within the framework of  its new 
international commitments. 
Functionalism provided Canada with a rationale to “be regarded as a major power” “where 
[it] had both an interest and an expertise”628:  
[f]unctionalism was the organizing principle behind the government’s approach to representation in 
international organizations. The fundamental idea was that decision-making responsibility had to be shared 
and that it should be shared by those who were most capable of  making a contribution. The government had 
indicated its willingness to take on greater responsibilities. In return it wanted recognition and influence.629 
Concomitantly, the functionalist principle provided Canadian policymakers with a selective 
rationale for avoiding overstretch; this selectivity would experience periodic recrudescence due 
to budget constraints over the next half  a century630:  
Consistent with [functionalism], as developed particularly in the immediate post-1945 period, Canada directed 
much of  its diplomatic attention towards the spheres where it had plentiful resources and a good reputation. 
Functionalism legitimized the application of  issue-specific strengths and skills possessed by individual 
countries such as Canada. On this criteria [sic] Canada moved to take greater responsibilities on the 
international stage in a number of  selected areas.631 
The other side of  the coin was that states such as Canada had far less influence over 
matters where they did not possess significant expertise:  
“[b]y the same token, its grounds for claiming such access would be correspondingly weakened when neither 
its interests nor its resources were centrally involved. In the circumstances it could be expected to take a back 
seat”632. 
This set of  commitments led to a decade-long (1948-1957) “golden age” for Canadian 
diplomacy under the aegis of  Liberal Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson633. Pearson’s legacy 
                                                 
627 Nossal, Politics, p. 11. 
628 Ibid., p. 10. 
629 Keating, Tom. Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1993; pp. 28-29. 
630 NB: some authors have placed this selectivity in opposition to internationalism; see Rioux, Jean-François and Robin Hay. 
“Canadian foreign policy: From internationalism to isolationism?”. International Journal. Vol. 54, No. 1 (1998-9); pp. 57-75. 
Here, p. 58. 
631 Cooper, Andrew F. “In Search of  Niches: Saying ‘Yes’ and Saying ‘No’ in Canada’s International Relations”. Canadian Foreign 
Policy. Vol. 3, No. 3 (1995); pp. 1-13. Here, p. 2. 
632 Stairs, Denis. “The Political Culture of  Canadian Foreign Policy”. Canadian Journal of  Political Science. Vol. 15, No. 4 (1982); 
pp. 667-690. Here, p. 672.  
633 “The Golden Age -- 1945-1957”. Available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/history-8-en.asp; 
Dealing with Diefenbaker -- 1957-1963. Available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/history-9-
en.asp. Both accessed 4 October 2003. 
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has come to be identified primarily with the development of  the concept of  peacekeeping, 
Ottawa’s long-standing contribution to which is a point of  pride in Canadian political culture. 
Pearson developed the idea of  a modern peacekeeping force—as opposed to the observational 
missions the United Nations had deployed prior to 1956—in response to the Suez Crisis; the 
very origins of  the first mission illustrate how the concept was not in fact altruistic but rather 
quite concretely served Canadian interests at the time.  
Ostensibly neutral634 United Nations forces—including a very large Canadian contingent—
were despatched to Egypt to replace the British/French police force that had taken control of  
the Suez Canal over objections from Washington. In proposing the idea, Canada and Pearson 
sought to resolve a conflict between Ottawa’s two closest allies and to allay impending rifts in 
the transatlantic alliance. The idea quickly caught on, and the practice of  United Nations 
peacekeeping took hold, with Canadians acutely aware of  their nation’s cachet on the doctrine. 
Pearsonianism—as the new commitment to international involvement, multilateral institutions 
and functionalism came to be called—laid the basis for Canadian foreign policy for the next 
half-century.  
Ottawa’s foreign and security policy, and the way in which its citizens view it, has 
traditionally—certainly in the era influenced by Pearsonianism—been strongly coloured by 
values and norms alongside a more conventional concern for the national interest. This reveals 
a commitment (made public as early as 1970635) by those responsible for foreign policy to 
reflect Canadian domestic values and policies through the country’s diplomacy, a goal echoed 
in many developed nations. Interest in foreign policy, and commitment to a certain set of  
values, runs high in Canadian civil society. In 1994, the Special Joint Committee reviewing 
Canadian Foreign Policy outlined these values: 
[t]he practice of  dialogue, tolerance and compromise; the commitment to an open, democratic society, to 
human rights and to social and economic justice; responsibility for solving global environmental problems; 
working for international peace; and helping to ease poverty and hunger in the developing world.636  
                                                 
634 One analyst points out that from the Egyptian perspective, Canada’s deployment of  the Queen’s Own Rifles to the Suez might 
have appeared to a less than impartial replacement for the British forces already stationed there. See Lowe, Steven Wallace. 
“Peacekeeping, Peace building, Human Security, and Self-Interest: Why Canada Remains the Prolific Peacekeeper”. Paper 
presented at the Conference of  Defence Associations Institute Third Annual Graduate Student Symposium, 3-4 
November 2000. Available from http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2000/lowe.htm. Accessed 4 October 2003. 
635 At that time, the government of  Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau stated that foreign policy was “the extension abroad of  
national policies”. Nossal, Politics, p. 3. 
636 Canada. Parliament. Special Joint Committee on Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy. Canada’s foreign policy : principles and 
priorities for the future: report of  the Special Joint Committee of  the Senate and the House of  Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy. 
Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1994; p. 8. 
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In an article outlining the continuity between the human security agenda and Canadian 
foreign policy traditions, one of  the policy’s architects underscores that  
it embodies long-standing Canadian values of  tolerance, democracy and respect for human rights. Canadians 
are moved by humanitarian impulse, not by the cold-blooded or rational calculations of  realpolitik. Principles 
are often more important than power to Canadians.637 
Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky are more concrete in outlining both how Canadian values are 
disseminated abroad and how the human security agenda is a continuation of  this tradition: 
[…] at home Canada is concerned through its social programmes with the welfare of  the individual, providing 
protection against natural ills in the form of  a publicly funded health care system and against the vagaries of  
the market in the form of  myriad income support and subsidy programmes. While their language is awkward, 
there is no doubt what Axworthy and other Liberals mean when they say that Canadian values can be 
projected abroad in foreign policy.638 
Such a strong moral stance is bound not to lack for critics. While Canadian analyst Evan H. 
Potter observed that “[w]e are still seen as do-gooders”639, former United States Secretary of  
State Dean Acheson paraphrased Wordsworth in labelling his northern neighbour “the stern 
daughter of  the voice of  God”640. This moral element—strengthened through increasing 
efforts over time to involve the populace in the foreign policy process—would engender 
strong critiques of  the human security agenda from some observers, who saw it instead as 
moralising and crusading. These critiques also in some cases echoed party political 
commitments, due to the overlap between Liberal values and those projected in foreign policy. 
Given Canada’s Westminster-style political system, Pearson’s legacy (in the domain of  
foreign policy) came to be identified as well with the Liberal party to which he belonged. The 
Progressive Conservative Party has a somewhat less internationalist platform and has on 
occasion been less enthusiastic about peacekeeping and other Canadian international 
commitments641.  
                                                 
637 Heinbecker, Paul. “Human Security: The Hard Edge”. Canadian Military Journal. Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000); pp. 11-16 (hereafter, 
“Hard Edge”). Here, p. 12.  
638 Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolsky. “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy: Human security and the rescue of  Canadian defence policy”. 
International Journal. Vol. 56, No. 1 (2000-2001); pp. 1-18. Here, p. 9. 
639 Potter, Evan H. “Niche diplomacy as Canadian foreign policy”. International Journal. Vol. 52, No. 1 (1996-7) (hereafter, 
“Niche diplomacy”); pp. 25-38. Here, p. 31.  
640 “Canadians/Relations. 1946-57: A Divided World”. Available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ciw-cdm/6divid-en.asp. 
Accessed 5 December 2004. 
641 On the foreign policy priorities of  the Progressive Conservative governments, particularly the relatively progressive 
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The 1993 takeover of  power by the Liberal Chrétien government coincided with a period 
of  thoroughgoing changes both in the international arena and within Canada itself. The end of  
the Cold War and the need to respond to a host of  new challenges coincided with an era of  
stringent fiscal austerity in Canada. These changes soon made clear the need for a new policy 
that reflected both the new international and domestic realities. This was the situation inherited 
by Lloyd Axworthy when he took office as Canada’s Minister of  Foreign Affairs in January 
1996.  
 
5.1.2. Enter stage left: the foreign policy conditions inherited by Axworthy  
The development of  the human security agenda is inextricably linked to the personality of  
Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s Minister of  Foreign Affairs from January 1996 to October 2000. 
Born in 1939 in Saskatchewan, Axworthy at first began an academic career, obtaining a Ph.D. 
from Princeton University in 1972 and teaching at the University of  Winnipeg from 1965 to 
1979. Axworthy entered elected office in 1973 as a Liberal member of  the Manitoba 
Legislative Assembly, moving on to Parliament in Ottawa in 1979642. Axworthy held various 
Ministerial posts until the Trudeau government lost the 1984 election. With the passage of  the 
Liberals into opposition, Axworthy eventually became the party’s Trade Critic and Deputy 
Critic for External Affairs from 1985 to 1988. 
In 1990, Axworthy was chosen as the Liberals’ Critic for External Affairs and Chairman of  
the Liberal Caucus Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. However, due to a 
reputation for anti-Americanism and his firm positioning on the left flank of  the Liberal 
platform643, upon his party’s return to power under Chrétien, rather than investing the top 
floor of  the Pearson Building, Axworthy was named Minister of  Human Resources 
Development and Minister of  Western Economic Diversification644. He would not assume the 
post of  Minister of  Foreign Affairs until 25 January 1996. 
Axworthy entered office with a reputation for progressive social activism—the monikers 
attributed to him ranged from “‘red Liberal”645 to “Pink Lloyd”646—coupled with what some 
                                                 
642 “Backgrounder: Lloyd Axworthy profile”. Available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/facts/axworthy_lloyd.html. 
Accessed 5 October 2003. 
643 Bothwell, Robert. “Lloyd Axworthy: Man of  principle”. National Post. 19 September 2000; p. A18 (hereafter, “Man of  
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645 Kirton, John J. “Foreign Policy Under the Liberals: Prime Ministerial Leadership in the Chrétien Government’s Foreign 
Policy-making Process”. In Hampson, Fen Osler, Maureen Appel Molot and Martin Rudner, eds. Canada Among Nations 
1997: Asia Pacific Face-Off. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997; pp. 21-50 (hereafter, “Liberals”). Here, p. 32. 
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have described as a nationalistically flavoured critical view of  American policies in the areas of  
defence and free trade. Axworthy’s activism can be traced in part to his embracing the social 
activism of  the United Church, of  which he is a practising member647. In addition, his student 
days at Princeton overlapped with the rise of  the civil rights movement and the campus 
upheavals of  the late 1960s648. This left-leaning approach has often brought Axworthy into 
conflict with the policy positions taken up by the United States; for instance, he opposed 
Operation Desert Storm and stood firmly against the use of  nuclear weapons by NATO649.  
Axworthy’s activities as Foreign Minister reflected the strength of  his personal 
commitments, which were reflected in his—and, often enough, the Department’s—policy 
positions. Sarah Taylor, one of  Axworthy’s closest collaborators on the human security agenda, 
states that  
The Minister was very involved in the drafting of  his major speeches and there was often a substantial 
exchange amongst him, his staff, myself, and other DFAIT officers in drafting the speeches. […] He had also 
read and thought widely on foreign policy and issues related to human security, as an academic and a 
politician. Thus he came into office with a well-established policy stance and a list of  issues he wished to 
pursue. He and many of  his personal staff  were very much “policy wonks” and engaged in the formulation 
and application of  policy.650 
In terms of  the human security agenda, one of  the most important themes Axworthy was 
to take up during the course of  his career in politics before taking over the Foreign Affairs 
dossier would be the issue of  public participation in the formulation process for Canadian 
foreign policy. During his tenure as the opposition critic for foreign policy, shortly before the 
Liberals’ return to office Axworthy co-authored the Liberal Handbook for Foreign Policy651, 
which outlined the foreign policy elements of  the party’s platform document for the 1993 
elections (also authored by Axworthy), dubbed the “Red Book”652. 
Accusing the sitting Progressive Conservative government of  not doing enough to consult 
with the citizenry about foreign policy issues653, Axworthy, with his Foreign Policy Handbook 
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co-author, Christine Stewart, introduced the term “democratisation of  foreign policy”654. The 
call for an opening of  the foreign policy process also bore Axworthy’s imprint: an expanded 
concept of  security to include concerns with environmental issues and the alleviation of  
poverty655. Axworthy’s early experiences with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as far 
back as his days as a provincial minister and as Minister for Human Resources Development 
contributed to his interest in opening the foreign policy process656. The Liberals’ interest in 
what came to be known as public consultations can also be traced to Axworthy’s efforts to 
attract anti-free trade NGOs to the party during the run-up to the 1988 elections657.  
The Red Book contained a promise that an eventual Liberal government would convene a 
National Forum on Canada’s International Relations. The promise was kept, and a National 
Forum was held in March 1994 in Ottawa; the process has been repeated annually ever since. 
The first National Forum spawned two Parliamentary Special Joint Committees, which 
respectively were charged with reviewing the country’s foreign and defence policies, and 
allowed the Chrétien government to follow up on its pledge to involve the nation’s lawmakers 
more closely in the policy process658.  
The foreign policy review was an extensive undertaking: the committee heard from over 
550 witnesses and met 80 times.659 Even after this lengthy process, however, the Special Joint 
Committee was still unable to deliver to the government clear guidelines for the making of  
foreign policy660. The subsequent National Forums would serve to institutionalise the 
relationship between the foreign and security policy bureaucracy in Ottawa and Canadian civil 
society, particularly as represented by NGOs. This relationship was to take on great 
importance under Axworthy’s time in office, and played a crucial role in the development and 
implementation of  the human security agenda.  
 
5.1.3. The academic debate on Canada’s role in the world 
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 211
The academic literature on Canada’s international relations is extensive, though Robert 
Bothwell’s assessment of  its amplitude is perhaps exaggerated: 
[a]s a visit to any academic library would show, the literature on Canadian international relations abounds. 
Bibliographies creak at the seams. Conferences, hearings, task forces sing a virtual song without end. Usually 
the music is subsequently published, further adding to the confusion. If  Europe has its butter mountain and 
its wine lake, then Canada, thanks to abundant subsidy and an indefatigable professoriate, has a veritable open 
pit mine of  diplomacy. Indeed, if  the significance of  Canadian foreign relations were measured by the quantity 
of  Canadian woodpulp sacrificed to the cause, or by the contribution of  the literature to the national landfill, 
then Canada would be, without question, a Principal Power.661 
The secondary literature on Canada’s international policy and role is indeed extensive, and is 
both more ample and theoretically and analytically of  higher quality than that produced within 
Brazil and South Africa. In describing the post-Cold war changes both within Canada and 
without, Canada’s academic security experts have generated a number of  main avenues of  
research, including inter alia two closely interrelated sets of  preoccupations: various 
incarnations of  the functionalist approach such as “selective internationalism” and “niche 
diplomacy”, and a reprise of  the “middle power” concept coined by the foreign policy 
bureaucracy in Ottawa in the immediate post-war period.  
These contributions in their diversity constitute responses to the same fundamental 
question: how to maintain a strong Canadian international presence—in line with the country’s 
tradition of  involvedness—in the face of  severe constraints, especially financial, on the 
country’s ability to carry out that very objective. Jean-François Rioux and David Hay observed 
a government response they termed “selective internationalism”, and argued against a turn 
away from Pearsonian traditions to satisfy financial considerations: 
Canada is, de facto, practising “selective internationalism”, an approach to foreign policy that has been 
encouraged by several influential commentators who insist that since the end of  the cold war the promotion 
of  Canadian interests no longer requires broad international commitments and initiatives. […] The argument 
usually begins with the assumption that the fiscal situation in Canada is the major impediment to broad 
engagement in foreign affairs. […] In sum, domestic circumstances and ideologies combine with international 
constraints to reduce the appeal of  internationalism. 
Internationalism is not dead in Canada, but there are strong pressures to dilute it and to shift to a more 
selective approach to international commitments. The selection criteria, moreover, are almost entirely 
economic, designed to promote immediate self-interest.662 
It is not without irony—duly noted by Rioux and Hay—that the putative move away from 
Pearsonianism took place under the tutelage of  a Liberal government663. Elements of  the 
Liberal tradition, such as a commitment to multilateralism, have remained untouched by the 
selection process664. Nevertheless, other analysts noted a “commitment-capability gap”665 and 
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662 Rioux and Hay, pp. 57-58. 
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the need for “a transparent articulation of  criteria for determining priorities for Canadian 
commitments in the various sectors of  international affairs so that effective policy can be 
pursued”666.  
For Potter and Andrew Cooper, in separate articles, the appropriate response to cuts in the 
foreign policy departments’ budgets, coupled with a rise in situations requiring attention at the 
international level, is “niche” diplomacy. As Cooper acknowledges, the term was first used in 
the Canadian context by an influential professor at the University of  Toronto in an article 
designed to publicise a report released by a group of  prominent experts with an eye to 
influencing the 1994 White Paper on Defence667. The concept was taken up approximately a 
year later by Potter and honed further in a subsequent article668.  
Potter’s work is more concerned with the actual means by which the selection process is put 
into practice within the foreign policy departments, and he makes concrete recommendations 
regarding areas of  potential financial savings. For one analyst, this selective functionalism ran 
the risk of  losing sight of  its internationalist origins and becoming a “back door into neo-
isolationism”669. Potter takes a page from the government’s own book and suggests making use 
of  the capacities of  Canadian civil society in the name of  the country’s diplomacy. Taking the 
consultation process (in its second annual round when his second article was published) to a 
higher level, Potter foresaw that  
[l]ess and less will Canada’s international face be that of  a diplomat, soldier, or aid official; more and more it 
will be the staff  of  Canadian-based international organizations—academic, philanthropic, and business.670  
Both Potter and Cooper link the new selectivity of  Canadian foreign policy to a particular 
pattern of  behaviour associated with a term coined by the Canadian foreign policy 
establishment shortly before the end of  the Second World War: that of  describing Canada as a 
“middle power”671. The term is closely linked to the functionalist principle and remains tightly 
associated with Canada’s role within multilateral institutions. Middle powers pursued a  
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particular kind of  statecraft predicated on the primacy of  the maintenance of  peace […]: general attempts to 
mitigate tensions between the two blocs of  the tight bipolar postwar world; and specific mediatory missions to 
defuse intra-bloc disputes.672  
Cooper, Nossal and Richard Higgott established a series of  criteria for “middle power” 
status which include a particular normative view and state behaviour. The normative view is 
the belief  of  middle powers in the moral superiority of  their foreign policy; empirical evidence 
hereof  in the human security agenda generated strong critiques towards the end of  Axworthy’s 
tenure as Foreign Minister. The behavioural approach provides the best description of  what 
makes a “middle power” for definitional purposes, noting these states’  
tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise 
positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of  “good international citizenship” 
to guide their diplomacy.673 
States with “middle power” foreign policies reacted to the end of  the Cold War with an 
increasingly activist stance, according to the authors. The window of  opportunity left by the 
decline in American power, coupled with a heightened susceptibility to the vagaries of  the 
globalisation process, led to an increased role for these states. Together with two other factors 
that propelled “middle powers” toward activism and non-traditional diplomatic initiatives—the 
reversal in the meaning of  “high” and “low” politics within the international agenda, and the 
increasingly porous boundary between domestic policy and a state’s international 
relationships—these conditions gave rise to a specific set of  state behaviours, and above all to 
a view of  self, consistent with “middle power”-hood that would shape Canadian foreign policy 
throughout the 1990s.  
Upon entering office in 1996, Lloyd Axworthy would build on all of  these elements of  
precedent in Canadian foreign policy in constructing the human security agenda with which his 
tenure became synonymous. From the Pearsonian traditions of  peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding to the Liberal insistence on the primacy of  the individual, to behaviours typical 
of  “middle powers”, and public consultations as well as “niche diplomacy”, Axworthy would 
draw upon the historical traditions of  Canadian foreign policy, all the while driving forward a 
conceptually ground-breaking process of  foreign policy conceptualisation and implementation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
672 Nossal, Politics, p. 12. 
673 Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing 
World Order. Vancouver: Univeristy of  British Columbia Press, 1993; p. 19. 
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5.2. Policymaker uncertainty 
Canadian security policy in 1996 stood under the sign of  two conflicting imperatives. The 
first was to respond to a new international scenario that called, according to the precepts of  
Canadian internationalism, for greater involvement than ever in ending the conflicts unleashed 
by the end of  the Cold War, as well dealing with ever-increasing poverty and threats such as 
AIDS and environmental degradation. The second, which went directly counter to the first, 
was to take account, in the formulation and implementation of  policy, of  a new cycle of  sharp 
reductions in funding across all parts of  the Canadian federal government.  
There is no shortage of  indications by Canadian foreign policymakers that at the time of  
the development of  the human security agenda, they perceived that changes were underway on 
the international political scene. The academic reaction has been divided, with some observers 
adding their weight to the assertions that Axworthy assumed his post at the advent of  a new 
era, and others underscoring the continuity of  the conduct of  politics in the same period. 
Because it focuses on the conceptual contributions of  academics to the formulation of  the 
human security agenda in the transition period from precursor issues to conceptualising an 
operable framework, this discussion will not deal with statements concerning individual policy 
issues, of  which those with regard to landmines are particularly numerous. Also, the high level 
of  NGO participation in formulating policy with regard to these precursor issues acts as an 
interfering factor in the search for academic influence. 
A rationalist search for causality—for which came first, the new paradigm or the changed 
international scene—would only be further complicated by the frequent linkage in official 
declarations between the two. One salient finding that contributes to obfuscating linear 
linkages here is that where Brazilian and South African policymakers limited their observations 
of  change to international events and trends—to which they largely reacted within the already-
dominant paradigm (Brazil) or by appropriating it as the basis for a change in paradigm (South 
Africa), the human security team at DFAIT did not make rhetorical use of  change and 
uncertainty until doing so to argue that a new paradigm—theirs—had gained currency.  
By positing this new lens as a phenomenon beyond the immediate policy concerns of  the 
human security agenda, they sought to legitimise DFAIT’s own mode of  action. Rhetorical use 
of  uncertainty was made to justify conceptual choices already made (often with NGOs’ help, 
during the precursor issues period); thus, in Axworthy’s statements there are three categories 
of  statement to look out for: mentions of  a changed international environment (implicit 
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references, in many cases, to a threat to Canada’s “middle power” status); then, the next 
analytical step, namely the assertion that a new paradigm is in force; and finally the linkage of  
the first two with a view to establishing the applicability and legitimacy of  the human security 
agenda.  
 
5.2.1. Generated at the international level 
In the interest of  focussing on academics rather than NGOs, this discussion has explicitly 
placed the landmines issue outside its purview, there are important parallels between the sheer 
volume of  public statements by the landmine movement—in an effort to influence discursive 
practice with respect to that class of  weapon—and the goals pursued in official statements on 
international change and human security, the sheer number of  which is similarly vast. The 
analysis below holds equally true for the early stages of  the human security paradigm: 
[t]he process of  recasting the “true” nature of  landmines is apparent in these texts. A contestation over 
meanings is evident in the very barrage of  these publications, each of  which contributes to shifting the terrain 
underpinning the understanding of  landmines. […] Each participates in the redefinition of  landmines as a 
humanitarian crisis, retroactively (re)writing the story of  landmines as a scourge.674 
In observing the process of  laying the discursive foundation for the human security agenda, 
one can begin the compilation from the top, perusing Axworthy’s own public addresses with a 
view to the three abovementioned types of  assertion. Axworthy’s earliest addresses make 
passing references to international change; he asserts for example that “the end of  the Cold 
War […] has brought us […] not peace — but a new kind of  war”675 and that 
we are now living through one of  those profound historical shifts that really do mark a break with what went 
before. The convergence of  a related set of  phenomena — globalization, the information revolution, the end 
of  the Cold War, and the democratization of  international relations — is bringing about a fundamental 
change in how the world works.676 
In late 1996, Axworthy began incorporating into his public statements a set of  descriptions 
that would make repeated appearances as late as early 1998; in December of  1996, Canada’s 
chief  diplomat states that 
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“[i]n recent years, the world has experienced a profound geopolitical shift. The tectonic plates of  international 
relations have realigned themselves and, as always when two plates meet, spectacular forces have been 
unleashed. The aftershocks of  these movements have not yet died away, but a new landscape has emerged”677.  
This precise geological imagery of  “tectonic plates”, strong “forces”, a “new landscape” 
and a “profound geopolitical shift” makes several appearances over the course of  the next 15 
months, all identical or only lightly retouched.678. Axworthy would also speak repeatedly of  the 
“breakdown of  the bipolar world”679, “old certainties swept away”680, the “breakdown of  
order”681, “unprecedented global change”682, “grave new risks”683, “new (global) realities”684 and 
a “new global context”685. The most developed exposition of  this effort to highlight change, 
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given before an academic audience, goes beyond the merely descriptive into the concrete to 
focus on changes in the nature of  war: 
The global context in which the [United Nations Security] Council operates, the membership it represents and 
the challenges it faces are considerably different from a decade ago. […] As the world has changed — and 
continues to change — so too has our definition of  peace and security. As a result, our game plan is in need 
of  an update. To this end, a few certainties have emerged to guide us. 
As recent events in such different places as Kosovo and Sierra Leone have demonstrated, the “civilianization” 
of  armed conflict has become the most common and lamentable feature of  war in our time. More than ever, 
non-combatants, especially the most vulnerable, are the principal targets, the instruments and, overwhelmingly, 
the victims of  conflict. Casualties from armed conflict have doubled in just the past 10 years to about one 
million annually. And whereas during the First World War only 5 percent of  casualties were civilians, today 
that figure is closer to 80 percent. 
This is partly the result of  a change in the complexion of  war. Most conflicts now occur inside rather than 
between states. In the case of  failed states, modern-day warlords and vigilantes have emerged — aided and 
abetted by outside arms dealers and others who benefit from the marketplace of  conflict. These individuals 
take advantage of, brutalize and terrorize civilians. The result has been human tragedies of  devastating 
proportions: exploitation of  civilians, massive refugee flows and the grossest violations of  humanitarian law, 
including genocide.686 
The changing nature of  war—specifically its dislocation from predominantly inter-state war 
to that within states, and its increasing effects on civilians—came to constitute Axworthy’s 
primary indicator of  a changed international environment, and he would take it up on 
numerous occasions from late 1997 until the end of  his term as Minister687. Axworthy went 
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beyond pointing out changes in the make-up of  international politics, however; this is where 
his statements differ from those of  this Brazilian and South African counterparts.  
DFAIT’s head linked these changes to a change in the conceptualisation of  security, before 
going on to offer a solution in the form of  the human security agenda, following a two-part 
reasoning: conflicts have moved from being predominantly inter-state to taking place within 
states, and conflict has become “civilianised”, having ever more devastating effects on non-
combatants, especially women and children. Axworthy began by proclaiming in early 1997 that  
security can no longer be defined solely in military terms. Human security also depends on respect for human 
rights, good governance, adequate resources for social and economic investments, and environmentally 
sustainable development. To establish conditions conducive to stability and peace, governments must promote 
sustainable economic development, based on national consensus.688 
Noting change689 and evolution690 in the nature of  security threats, Axworthy explained that 
the unit of  analysis for security concerns has shrunk691, the focus now being on the 
individual692. Positing a “shift it what it means to be secure”693, he explicitly linked the above 
two-step progression to the human security agenda in a series of  speeches from 1997 to 
1999694. These arguments also appeared in several published works by Axworthy, in which he 
adds more concrete substance to his position. In one example, he makes all aforementioned 
three theoretical moves in a brief  passage: 
[a]s borders become increasingly porous, however, and as cold war threats die, international decision-makers 
often find themselves called upon to deal with issues directly affecting the lives of  individuals: crime, drugs, 
terrorism, pollution, human rights abuses, epidemics, and the like. The basic unit of  analysis and concern has 
shrunk from the state to the community and even the individual. At the same time, to tackle effectively 
problems that ignore state boundaries, the field of  action has expanded from the state to the region and even 
the globe.  
In response to these developments, the notion of  “human security” has emerged: the premise that security 
goals should be primarily formulated and achieved in terms of  human, rather than state, needs.695 
Axworthy received a mixed reaction to his pronouncements of  the arrival of  a new security 
paradigm from both official and academic sources; though the tenor of  the responses was 
largely supportive, criticisms surrounded his views on the internalisation of  conflict and the 
                                                 
688 Axworthy, Lloyd. Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, to the OECD 
Symposium “Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and Development”, Ottawa, Ontario, 18 March 
1997. Available from http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/101691.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=
E. Accessed 17 October 2003.  
689 Axworthy address, 25 February 1998. 
690 Axworthy address, 11 January 1997. 
691 See, inter alia, Axworthy address, 2 March 1998. 
692 See, inter alia, Axworthy address, 15 June 1998. 
693 Axworthy address, 16 June 2000; Axworthy, Lloyd. “Introduction”. In McRae, Rob and Don Hubert, eds. Human Security 
and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001; pp. 3-13. Here, p. 
3. The phrase is also the opening sentence in Canada. DFAIT. Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security. 
Ottawa: DFAIT, 2000 (hereafter, Freedom from Fear).  
694 See, inter alia, Axworthy address, 18 March 1997; Axworthy address, 2 March 1998; Axworthy address, 13 May 1999. 
695 Axworthy and Taylor, pp. 190-191. 
 219
novelty of  the search for a new policy paradigm. Several authors recalled that the search for a 
new policy paradigm had begun under the Mulroney government, and Hampson and Oliver 
challenged the assertion that interstate conflict had waned to the point of  not meriting a 
prominent place on the security agenda696. Axworthy’s démarche appears to respond explicitly to 
the previously published admonishments of  one prominent Canadian academic: 
[w]hat is striking about the stress on the uncertainty of  the current international environment is the emphasis 
on the danger of  organizing ideas as the central organizing idea. Flexibility and a capacity to respond to 
unknown and unforeseeable contingencies are themselves highly prized assets. Defence policy should be 
driven by capabilities rather than by organizing concepts and priorities. […]  
First, new knowledge must be generated that brings new problems to light, challenges existing evidence or 
interpretations, and creates a consensus around new policy issues and approaches to solutions. Second, new 
thinking must be put on the public agenda. This will happen only if  the attention of  elements of  the senior 
political leadership is captured and if  a political coalition can be built to support putting new problems or new 
interpretations on the table.697 
 
5.2.2. Generated at the domestic level 
Uncertainty generated at the domestic level appears to play less of  a role in the Canadian 
case than in Brazil or particularly South Africa. Though Kim Richard Nossal highlights the 
need for incoming governments to profile themselves as different from the incumbents698, the 
human security agenda represents both a shift away from and a continuation of  the policies 
pursued by the governments that preceded Jean Chrétien’s. Understandably, given Canada’s 
comparative level of  democratisation, the differentiation from the previous government is of  
nowhere near the same magnitude as after apartheid or the ditadura. Several authors cited above 
have pointed out that certain precursors of  the human security agenda were present in the 
policies of  Axworthy’s predecessors, while others have highlighted the extent to which the 
approach was different and constituted a “revolution”699.  
One undeniably important factor, though it crops up much less frequently in Axworthy’s 
pronouncements and in DFAIT publications, is the impetus given to finding an innovative 
policy paradigm by the financial constraints in place when the Chrétien government took 
office. Janice Gross Stein notes the difficulty of  maintaining business as usual when the federal 
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till runs empty700, providing an impetus for innovative thinking on how to confront an increase 
in threats requiring Canadian action simultaneously with a shrinking of  resources. 
Severe financial constraints led to deep cuts to DFAIT’s budget and to a paring-down of  
the Department’s bureaucratic structures; similar measures took effect at DND. The situation 
seemed tailor-made for selective internationalism in some form or another, and Canada’s 
security academics did not wait long to unleash a raft of  publications on the matter, whose 
preoccupations would range from “niche diplomacy” to a return to embracing “middle power” 
status to the state of  the debates between Continentalism and Atlanticism on the one hand, 
internationalism and isolationism on the other.  
In a 16 April 1996 statement before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade entitled “Foreign Policy at a Crossroad”, Axworthy outlined the financial 
hardships faced by DFAIT: 
Since 1988-89, the Department will have cut its budget on 10 occasions, bringing cumulative cuts to $292 
million by 1998-99. […] More importantly, from 1988-89 to 1998-99, the percentage of  spending for CORE 
PROGRAMS — that is “discretionary” spending—will decline from 70% to 36% of  total expenditures. Why? 
Because assessed contributions — that is Canada's share of  costs for UN membership, UNESCO, ILO and 
other international organizations–went from $137 million to $227 million, a growth of  66%. Because 
peacekeeping assessments jumped from $7 million to $134 million, an increase of  1814%.701 
DFAIT’s share of  the federal dollar remained constant from 1987-88 to 1995-96, however, 
varying between 0,77% and 0,85%. This compares quite favourably to the more drastic cuts 
faced by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), whose budget share 
dropped from 1,91% to 1,05% and whose appropriation in absolute terms shrank from CAD 
2,103 billion to 1,730 billion over the same period702. The magnitude of  these cuts cannot be 
compared to the massive trimming endured by the DND, which lost a greater amount of  
funding during the same period as both the initial total CIDA and DFAIT budgets 
combined703.  
In order to confront these financial constraints and still provide adequate service in the 
name of  Canadian foreign policy, a major programme of  restructuring was undertaken within 
DFAIT, particularly at headquarters; a concerted effort was made not to close Canadian 
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missions abroad704. The number of  functional and geographic bureaux, and thus the number 
of  Assistant Deputy Ministers, was reduced from 14 to seven in the summer of  1996705. The 
re-organisation spared the recently created Global (and Human) Issues Bureau—an innovation 
whose credit goes to then-Deputy Foreign Minister Gordon Smith706—which was to play a 
seminal role in the development of  the human security agenda. Another important 
contribution by Smith to the human security agenda was his early realisation of  the potential 
of  then-new information technologies such as e-mail and the Internet to change fundamentally 
the conduct of  diplomacy in the coming years707. 
As a product of  DFAIT that had a direct impact on core DND policy concerns, the human 
security agenda at times placed considerable strain on the relationship between the two 
departments. The implementation of  the human security agenda frequently requires recourse 
to DND means, especially the use of  the Canadian military (Canadian Forces—CF) for 
humanitarian interventions. These increased demands were made on a defence ministry even 
more hard-hit by the fiscal downturn that the traditional foreign policy departments.  
In an era where military humanitarian interventions ballooned in number and increasing 
demands were placed on the CF, the military’s budget dropped from 9,4% to 6,7% of  the total 
federal budget from 1987-88 to 1995-96.708 Department policy was last defined in a White 
Paper on Defence published in 1994709; in the same year, the defence budget was slashed by 
CAD 7.000.000.000 (seven billion) for the five years to follow710.  
The 1994 White Paper responds to these drastic funding cuts: indeed, the defence funding 
assumptions contained in the 1994 budget envisaged a level of  defence spending in the year 
2000 that, in real terms, would be less than 60 percent of  that assumed in the 1987 Defence 
White Paper711. This reduction in financial means had made itself  felt over the last decade and 
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a half  particularly through cuts in the number of  CF personnel. In 2002, the CF active force 
consisted of  52,300 men and women, of  whom 19,300 were serving in the terrestrial branch712.  
Of  this force, diminutive among its NATO peers713, the 1994 White Paper sets aside 
approximately 4,000 as permanently available for overseas commitments714. In describing the 
types of  operations in which the CF might participate, the 1994 White Paper reveals itself  as 
quite prescient regarding the imminent inception of  the human security agenda, laying the 
foundations for what one analyst termed “human security operations in all but name”715.  
In keeping with recent changes in military planning, the small size of  the force was to be 
balanced out by its increasing quality and mobility716; in keeping with the practice of  many 
Commonwealth nations, the Canadian defence ministry is essentially a “second-tier” ministry 
during peacetime, and experiences a sharp rise in visibility and support during times of  war 
and military conflict717. Canadian civil society’s strong interest in the country’s international 
affairs extends to military issues, however, especially when the matter at hand is Canada’s role 
in the world. By the time Axworthy entered office in 1996, the Canadian domestic situation, as 
well as the changes in the international system, had generated significant debate, particularly 
within the Canadian academic community. 
Uncertainty in the Canadian context cannot be said to result from a lack of  policymaking 
capacity within the foreign policy bureaucracy or from a perception that the elaboration of  a 
new policy response to a changed political environment cannot be undertaken without outside 
inputs. Where DFAIT did turn to outside individuals and organizations for input, the reason 
for doing so was different and those called upon were in general not members of  the academic 
community. Interaction with contributors from outside the policy process in the case of  the 
human security agenda centred on how the paradigm was implemented, not on its 
conceptualisation. Rather than turning to security academics for ideas, DFAIT turned to non-
governmental organisations that were able to mobilise constituencies to advance the 
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international norm shifts needed to further issues such as landmines and the protection of  
civilians.  
Decisive for the issue of  capacity within the bureaucracy was the make-up of  Axworthy’s 
team charged with conceptualising and operationalising human security. These policymakers 
possessed a high degree of  both competence and commitment, and many of  them were either 
ex-academics or shared an appreciation of  the values of  concepts and an idea-based approach 
to problem-solving. These policymakers showed two important characteristics necessary for 
outside experts’ involvement in the policy process: an appreciation for the utility of  the 
academic approach in solving policy problems (Axworthy’s academic background and 
predilection for academic sources of  input are well documented)718; and possession of  a well-
developed set of  normative commitments once in office.  
However, it was precisely the extent to which this agenda was already fixed—and NGOs’ 
early involvement in its setting—that would contribute to Canadian academics’ ultimately 
attaining considerably less influence than NGOs in both the formulation and implementation 
of  the human security agenda. The reasons for this are illustrated particularly clearly when the 
focus is on the role of  specialised knowledge and other attributes possessed by outside 
actors—from both the academic and NGO communities—involved in the Canadian security 
policymaking process under Foreign Minister Axworthy.  
 
5.3. Attributes of  academic advisors 
In the Canadian context, the attributes granting success to policy entrepreneurs in the 
formulation process are different from those in South Africa and Brazil, due to the much more 
prominent and influential role played by non-governmental organizations in Canada. In the 
other two states, due to factors such as militarisation and military rule, civil society—especially 
the academic community—has had much less freedom to develop specialised knowledge and 
some degree of  prestige.  
The present section therefore presents—in a departure from the formula followed in the 
preceding national case chapters—each variable in relation not solely to the academic 
community of  security experts, but also to NGOs and other actors with an interest in 
contributing to policy. In doing so, for comparative purposes the analysis presents the 
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relationship between academic experts and other potential advisors as a form of  competition 
for access and influence within the policymaking bureaucracy.  
After briefly presenting the development of  the interaction between NGOs and Ottawa in 
security matters, particularly the increasing formalisation of  those relations in consultations 
and governmental outreach mechanisms, the study goes on to investigate specialised 
knowledge in its various forms, adding to the two previous forms—practical and theoretical—
a third possessed exclusively by NGOs: field experience. Due to a variety of  factors that will 
be discussed, institutionalised prestige played a minimal role at best as a criterion for 
policymakers’ selection of  experts. The section concludes with the presentation of  a series of  
qualities possessed by NGOs that have had negative effects on their academic competitors’ 
ability to be heard in the halls of  power, such as ostensible democratic representativeness, 
fundraising ability, and implementation capacity linked to their presence in the field. 
 
5.3.1. NGOs and Canadian foreign policy  
NGO advisory input into the formulation process of  Canadian foreign policy dates back 
almost 40 years. As the number of  organizations with an interest in the foreign policy process 
grew, by the mid-1960s the Canadian government began to open up its “infamously insular 
culture”719. Bureaucrats in Ottawa began to “[tap] the expertise and resources of  the non-
governmental sector for development purposes” in the mid-1960s, and the NGO umbrella 
body—the Canadian Council on International Cooperation—was founded in 1968720. Several 
largely international crises led to ever-increasing NGO participation, including the energy 
shocks of  the 1970s and the widely publicised famines in the Horn of  Africa in the early 
1980s721; other concerns included the effects of  the United States’ Central American policy 
under President Ronald Reagan on civil rights in the region, and the global campaign to end 
minority rule in South Africa.  
By the 1980s, Canadian policymakers had recognised the utility of  NGOs’ ability to 
mobilise public opinion, and enlisted organisations in the United States in support of  their 
initiatives to combat acid rain722. Inputs began increasingly to flow into the foreign policy 
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process as well, as illustrated by the foreign policy reviews conducted by various governments. 
Whereas the Trudeau government conducted its 1968 review as an “in-house” affair, the 
Mulroney government in 1985-86 opened its doors to consultations; by the time of  the 1994-
95 review under Chrétien, over half  of  the briefs submitted to the Parliamentary Special Joint 
Committee came from representatives of  NGOs723.  
Chrétien’s Liberal government had come to power on a platform calling for the 
“democratisation of  Canadian foreign policy” and consultations with the general public on a 
variety of  issues. Axworthy himself  had called for such “democratisation” while in opposition, 
and had himself  entertained substantial contacts with NGOs as early as his time in the 
Provincial government in Manitoba724. Of  particular note is his association with NGOs in the 
fight against Canadian accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement725.  
His time as Minister for Human Resources, however, would show Axworthy that the 
relationship could cut both ways, as relations with civil society organisations (CSOs) during his 
tenure in that office were often rocky and included the picketing of  Axworthy’s house by 
NGO-linked protesters726. Similarly, NGOs were very critical of  Axworthy’s handling of  the 
Talisman affair involving a Canadian energy firm holding investments in civil war-ridden 
Sudan727. 
The Liberal government’s entry into office, and its efforts to institutionalise relations with 
CSOs, coincided with a period of  dramatic increase in the number of  such organisations both 
worldwide and in Canada itself728. Previous governments had taken steps to integrate inputs 
from civil society, including the creation of  the Canadian Institute for International Peace and 
Security729 (1984-1992, closely modelled after the Stockholm Peace Research Institute and 
quickly dismantled by the Mulroney government) and a system of  more informal consultations 
with NGOs, mainly on human rights issues, since the mid-1980s730.  
Over the course of  the last thirty years, several terms have arisen in Canadian parlance that 
all denote approximately the same notion of  opening the foreign policy process to inputs from 
                                                 
723 Chapin and Foster, p. 110.  
724 English, p. 104. 
725 Ross, p. 87. 
726 Bothwell, “Man of  principle”, p. A18. 
727 English, p. 105. 
728 van Rooy, “Civil Society”, p. 260; Waschuk, p. 216. 
729 For more on CIIPS, see Boulden, Jane. “Independent policy research and the Canadian foreign policy community”. 
International Journal. Vol. 54, No. 4 (1999); pp. 625-647. Here, pp. 638-641. 
730 Chapin and Foster, p. 111; Ross, p. 79. 
 226
actors from civil society: under Trudeau, it was “participatory democracy”731; the Liberals 
spoke of  the “democratisation” of  foreign policy, and in the context of  the landmines 
campaign and the issues later complied into the human security agenda, Axworthy and his 
collaborators referred to the increased role of  NGOs as a “new diplomacy”, a “new 
multilateralism” and “public diplomacy”, not always admitting the latter term’s origins in the 
less-than-new Wilsonian era. Differently from some of  these other monikers, however, the 
“democratisation” of  foreign policy was an explicit element of  the Liberal campaign and 
Foreign Policy Handbook—one that would be acted upon once the new government took 
office.  
Chrétien followed through on one of  several campaign pledges related to increasing civil 
society’s involvement in the political process when the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy 
Development (CCFPD) was founded in 1993. In the same year, the Peacebuilding Contact 
Group came into existence; it was to become the Canadian Peacebuilding Co-Ordination 
Committee following the first formal NGO consultations on peacebuilding in 1997. The 
Handbook pledge to institute a National Forum linking representatives of  CSOs and 
government was fulfilled with the first such annual meeting in March of  1994732. National 
Forum meetings have taken place every year since then, and NGOs have not only contributed 
to policy formulation but have—in what is more specifically referred to by the term “new 
multilateralism”—represented Canada in international fora as members of  delegations, so 
much so that one analyst described them as “the face of  Canadian foreign policy”733.  
Some critics have asked why there is a need further to “democratise” foreign policy when 
Canada’s political system is already one of  the world’s most open and representative. Indeed, 
during the early years of  the Chrétien government there appeared to be little agreement as to 
what the phrase actually meant. Although it clearly implies making the policy process more 
transparent and more accessible, according to two CCIC (Canadian Council for International 
Cooperation) authors  
“[d]emocratizing policy involves more than meetings and consultations (usually with a limited set of  informed 
constituencies). The process must have as a goal the expansion of  the public’s understanding of  increasingly 
complex issues by engaging its attention in ways which develop its capacity to analyze and understand the 
trade-offs involved in policy choices. […]  
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The democratization of  foreign policy requires a change in the roles of  “experts” and the “general public” in 
the policy process.734  
This shift in the role of  the expert has had grave consequences for the ability of  academics 
in Canada to win influence in the foreign policy formulation process, both in terms of  the 
special status of  the “expert” as related to the general public and with respect to the 
relationship between the academic community and other sets of  experts, such as precisely 
those representing NGOs. These consequences centre neatly on the role accorded specialised 
knowledge in this investigation’s argument.  
 
5.3.2. Specialised knowledge 
As a preface to assessing the place of  actors’ specialised knowledge in the context of  policy 
formulation in Canada, it is necessary to disassociate issues that preceded human security—
such as landmines and the International Criminal Court (ICC)—from the conceptualisation of  
the overarching human security policy framework itself. While NGOs were instrumental in 
establishing Canadian policy on the precursor issues—indeed DFAIT joined the NGO 
bandwagon on landmines and not the reverse—their role, and that of  academics, in 
formulating the conceptual underpinnings of  the human security agenda was minimal.  
Similarly, the question arises whether the field experience brought to the table by NGOs 
such as those involved in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) constitutes, in 
the context of  this investigation, a form of  specialised knowledge not possessed by (most) 
academics, or whether such experience is a separate form of  expertise altogether, more related 
to the implementation rather than to the formulation of  policy.  
The process known in Canada as the “democratisation” of  foreign policy has had a 
profoundly negative impact on the ability of  the country’s academics to use specialised 
knowledge to attain policy influence. The granting of  direct access to the policy bureaucracy to 
ordinary citizens as well as intermediary organisations such as NGOs, and the increased 
dissemination of  information from the foreign affairs departments to this public, has meant 
that the relevant categories of  knowledge, while still specialised, have become less and less the 
preserve of  specialists. Accordingly, academics can no longer rely on the exclusiveness of  their 
possession of  such knowledge as a means of  entry into the policy process. This is, of  course, 
not news to most members of  the academic community: 
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[i]t is often suggested that the power of  citizens to organize national and international mass coalitions quickly 
will act as a powerful counterweight to the organs of  state; moreover, the ease and speed of  data collection 
and transmission will erode the barriers to specialist knowledge until recently enjoyed by policy-makers and their advisers. At 
the same time, activists will be able to reach an ever growing segment of  the “wired” public on an on-going 
basis through email, facsimile, and the internet.735  
While the authors do not reflect on the fact that advancements in information technology 
also serve equally to increase academics’ ability to develop and disseminate specialised 
knowledge, the fact remains that the circle of  actors in possession of  information useful to 
policymakers has grown in two different ways. First, the number of  actors in possession of  the 
types of  specialised knowledge that were previously the domain of  academics and certain 
other actors has increased, heightening the level of  competition for policy influence among 
such actors. Similarly, the policy process has been opened by policymakers in search of  other 
forms of  specialised knowledge—such as field experience—which is largely possessed by 
actors other than academics. Taylor underscores this distinction: 
Mr. Axworthy was certainly very “plugged in” to the academic world and had consultations with academics, 
but my sense is that civil society was as much if  not more of  a driver of  the approach, particularly on issues 
such as landmines, small arms or child soldiers. This is not surprising since the human security approach is 
very much an observational approach, driven by experiences on the ground and development concerns — in 
some cases those of  academics doing field-work, but more often those of  NGO and aid workers. The end of  
the Cold War opened up a space for these concerns to be heard, and the academic community formalised the 
concepts, but it seems to me that the voices that first said “anti-personnel landmines and AK-47s are a greater 
real threat to the security of  human beings than nuclear weapons or missiles” were mainly from civil society.736 
The involvement of  outside actors in the policy process was much stronger during the 
period preceding the conceptualisation of  the human security agenda, when separate but 
similar issues such as landmines, the International Criminal Court and war-affected children 
were at stake; the origins of  these campaigns and the seminal role of  NGOs in putting them 
on the agenda, and then shaping that agenda, have already been briefly described above. The 
intellectual labour of  conceptualising the human security concept was largely carried out 
within DFAIT itself, without recourse to a consistently high degree of  input from either 
academics or NGOs. During the precursor period, however, there was close collaboration with 
NGOs, though not much with academics.  
Beyond the obvious factor that the issues later aggregated into the human security agenda 
originated in NGO campaigns, Canadian policymakers identified in interviews several reasons 
why NGOs’ inputs seem to have trumped those of  academics in the competition for policy 
influence. Many of  these observations echo the division between practical knowledge and its 
theoretical counterpart, and underscore the fact that while the DFAIT human security 
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conceptualisers already possessed a sufficient grasp of  the normative underpinnings necessary 
to carry out their work, what was being sought was practical knowledge on the precursor 
issues, specifically that more closely related to the implementation of  the agenda.  
Don Hubert, who was the principal contributor to Safety for People in a Changing World and 
was most closely involved in fleshing out the conceptual underpinnings of  human security, 
explicitly states that where inputs were sought in the early stages from both NGOs and 
academics, the former were sought out to provide inputs on specific, clearly-bounded issues 
while the latter, if  they were sought out all, were asked to provide inputs regarding broader 
conceptual issues737.  
 
5.3.3. Cogency and normative argumentation 
A number of  statements from Canadian policymakers indicate that the third actor attribute 
necessary for experts’ influence—the formulation of  their arguments in a manner 
demonstrating their immediate utility to a bounded policy problem—favoured practical over 
theoretical knowledge. This further placed academics at a disadvantage with respect to NGOs 
generally in possession of  field, rather than book, experience. The degree to which an actor’s 
knowledge is practical rather than theoretical seems to equate, in the Canadian context, with 
the perceived utility of  inputs from that actor. Hubert points out that the decoupling of  
academic work from a concern with policy relevance has resulted in the “declining utility of  
social science to policymakers”, due to work that is “too far divorced from the cut-and-thrust 
of  the political agenda”738.  
One senior DFAIT diplomat agrees with Hubert’s assessment, stating that many academics’ 
inputs are “too far removed to be actionable”. He adds that the inputs sought during the 
period in question where mostly operational, that policymakers had “little interest in theory” 
and that therefore “NGOs were called upon much more”. He ascribed this to the fact that 
“public servants are less attached to ideas” than academics and want to be “told how to act”, 
not given an academic thesis or an explanation of  the meaning of  a certain development for 
the discipline of  political science739.  
Sarah Taylor underscores the importance of  policy relevance as well: 
arguments being presented by academics are more likely to be incorporated into policy if  a) they are implicitly 
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or explicitly action-oriented, that is to say if  they allow one to draw specific conclusions about how to 
implement policy and b) they are based on some awareness of  the processes by which policy is implemented 
and the constraints on it.740  
A further senior DFAIT official also firmly places the onus of  adapting inputs to the policy 
context on the outside actors; this task is clearly more easily accomplished in the case of  
technical rather than normative inputs. According to this official, “the best specialised 
knowledge in the world is of  no use if  it isn’t translated into the policy context”. This DFAIT 
collaborator expressed a preference for “socially relevant analysis rather than problem-
solving”, adding that academics and other actors “need to know the policy context” and that 
NGOs were called upon rather than academics because of  their “field experience and ability to 
mobilise a constituency around an issue”741.  
The DFAIT document Freedom from Fear points out the “knowledge-intensive” nature of  the 
human security agenda, and while mentioning academics only in passing, highlights the 
importance of  NGOs’ presence in the field, noting that “NGOs are often close to populations 
at risk and sometimes possess expertise and enjoy access that states and international 
organizations do not”742. As the necessary attributes of  successful policy entrepreneurs consist 
of  a balance of  specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige, the emphasis placed by 
Canadian policymakers on specialised knowledge (largely of  the practical type), particularly in 
the context of  the “democratisation” of  foreign policy, has led to a significant reduction in the 
role of  prestige in gaining academics access to the foreign and security policy formulation 
process.  
The process of  “democratisation” of  foreign policy brings to light the inherently non-
democratic nature of  institutionalised prestige as an attribute affording enhanced access to the 
policy process. The notion is based on the existence of  an elite with privileged access to the 
policy process—a situation which efforts to “democratise” foreign policy are at minimum 
implicitly designed to change. The Canadian policymakers interviewed for this study did not 
attach importance to the concept as a criterion in selecting interlocutors from the academic 
community or from other elements of  civil society, underlining instead the importance of  the 
quality of  experts’ ideas regardless of  their prestige, and particularly the normative resonance 
of  their inputs.  
                                                 
740 E-mail communication from Sarah Taylor, dated 25 July 2003. 
741 Interview with senior DFAIT official, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 11 December 2002. 
742 DFAIT, Freedom from Fear, p. 14. 
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The “democratisation” process contributes to this situation by enlarging the circle of  
involved civil society actors beyond those with whom they might ordinarily interact in a more 
closed system; the latter situation is clearly more conducive to the importance of  prestige as a 
factor in gaining access. One senior DFAIT official declared prestige “irrelevant”, and 
indicated that when she chooses academics with whom to interact, “nothing derives from the 
institution”743 to which they are affiliated. Taylor, however, indicates that some degree of  
affiliation is required to both place an expert on the proverbial radar screen and to allow 
policymakers the possibility of  checking back on claims to expertise744.  
The first senior official indicated, when told of  the importance of  prestige in the Brazilian 
case, that there is a relative correlation between the egalitarian nature of  a society and a decline 
in the importance of  prestige in choosing experts to assist in policymaking745. It is also what 
this bureaucrat has deemed the “egalitarian” nature of  Canadian society that has allowed CSOs 
to flourish to an extent that they have not in Brazil and South Africa, particularly with respect 
to developing a set of  other attributes that give them an advantage over academics in attaining 
access to the policy process.  
 
5.3.4. NGOs’ advantages over academics: other qualities  
The failure of  academics to gain substantial access to the formulation process for the 
human security agenda is a result of  the abovementioned changes in the nature of  specialised 
knowledge, the relative inconsequence of  prestige, and additionally of  a set of  attributes not 
related to those variables. These attributes include (in many cases) field experience, fundraising 
ability, the ability to mobilise a constituency around an issue in civil society for purposes of  
political pressure, and their perceived democratic representativeness as opposed to putatively 
closed circles of  academics and policymaking elites.  
Field experience is clearly a factor in motivating policymakers to turn to NGOs for policy 
inputs for two main reasons: the first is agenda-setting, as shown in the case of  landmines; the 
second, NGOs’ programme-delivery capabilities, that is, their ability to implement policy once 
decided upon in a manner that allows policymakers to point to tangible and practical policy 
results. The precursor issues to the human security agenda were almost exclusively issues 
brought to the attention of  governments through the work of  NGOs, whose collaborators 
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had seen the effects of  weapons such as landmines in the field. Mark Gwozdecky and Jill 
Sinclair, both government officials instrumental to the landmines campaign, highlight the 
importance of  this factor: 
[a]s the cold war came to an end, many regional conflicts, often fought by proxies, began to die out. Into these 
postconflict environments flowed peacekeepers, aid, and development workers. What they saw was a 
humanitarian tragedy unfolding in slow motion: the deadly impact of  buried [landmines]. They were appalled 
and felt compelled to act. Without the constraints of  cold war ideology, new partnerships were forged 
between North and South around a common humanitarian goal and with the participation of  
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This effort coalesced in The International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL).746  
Hubert’s analysis of  the origins of  the landmine campaign further underscores its genesis 
among those individuals and organisations motivated to take action by having witnessed 
suffering personally747. Axworthy himself  linked the retention of  lessons learned on the 
ground to the Canadian peacekeeping tradition in an influential article in International Journal748. 
The role of  the NGO community in setting the security agenda during the early Axworthy 
period is also clearly demonstrated in the case of  war-affected children and particularly the 
protection of  civilians.  
Beyond agenda-setting, NGOs’ field presence allows them to engage in the implementation 
of  policy initiatives in a way academics cannot replicate. Among government officials who 
have published on the subject, Heinbecker points this out, but it is Alison van Rooy of  the 
NGO North-South Institute who offers a more thorough analysis of  what she has termed the 
“instrumentalist” imperative to involve NGOs in the making of  policy. She links the rise in 
prominence of  NGOs to a shift in the security agenda from issues traditionally considered 
“high” politics—such as security and monetary policy—to “low” politics issues such as 
development, the environment and social policy.  
This shift, van Rooy contends, has opened the policy process to a new set of  private-sector 
interlocutors better acquainted with these issues749. Van Rooy also highlights the specific 
contributions of  Canadian NGOs to programme delivery for Canadian policy, such as famine 
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relief  in the Horn of  Africa in the 1980s and various initiatives in Central America750. Denis 
Stairs explicitly links NGO influence to their programme delivery expertise as well: 
[t]heir influence results, rather, from their having become important sources of  pertinent information and 
expertise, and from their practical capacity to deliver programming abroad, on a contract basis, in a way that 
the government cannot hope to replicate. In addition, they can sometimes be mobilized as sources of  political 
ammunition by sympathetic ministers, who can make constructive use of  them in outflanking public servants 
or cabinet colleagues whose hearts are wedded to alternative agendas. There should be no surprise, therefore, 
in the discovery that they are now extensively courted through an increasingly elaborate array of  outreach 
mechanisms by both CIDA and the Department of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade.751  
Two senior DFAIT collaborators both underscored the importance of  field experience in 
agenda-setting, as well as programme delivery capacity, in interviews752. The participation of  
Canadian academics in programme delivery actions in the field is minimal at best, indicating 
that if  government representatives are indeed prone to involve NGOs in the policy 
formulation process because of  their expertise in programme delivery, this represents a clear 
advantage for these organizations in gaining access as compared to their counterparts from the 
academic community.  
A further activity contributing to enhanced access for NGOs is their ability to raise funds. 
Either funds raised privately by NGOs are used to implement government programmes, or 
NGOs serve as appropriate recipients of  government programme delivery funding. Stairs, who 
has in the past been critical of  excessive NGO participation in the policy process, has drawn 
attention to NGOs’ ability to assist in circumventing fiscal austerity753, and van Rooy has 
illustrated the ramifications for the balance between the foreign policy departments in Ottawa: 
[a] further pull towards engagement is not only the role of  NGOs in providing human security services (most 
notably in humanitarian intervention and lobbying), but also their role as funnels for new sources of  money. 
DFAIT has almost no money to implement its human security agenda and must look elsewhere. Tug-of-wars 
with CIDA over that agency’s annual budget of  almost [CAD] 2 billion have gained some success—[CAD] 
100 million for landmines eradication and over [CAD] 8 million for the International Conference on War-
Affected Children, for example—but the dollars do not come close to matching the agenda. However, non-
governmental bodies, funded through campaigns at home and matching dollars from CIDA (and its 
counterparts elsewhere in the OECD), add both human and financial resources to the endeavour754.  
The last two characteristics possessed by NGOs with which academics cannot compete are 
interlinked, and concern the putatively democratic and egalitarian representativeness of  civil 
society organisations as participants in the policy process. In their interviews, two senior career 
foreign policy bureaucrats highlighted the ability of  NGOs to “mobilise constituencies around 
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issues” as an important factor underlying their own decision to turn to these actors for 
inputs755. Academic reward structures do not place a premium on this ability, nor is the work 
of  academics, when conducted in accordance with those structures, particularly effective in 
this regard. More important with respect to democratic representativeness, especially in light 
of  the “democratisation” of  Canadian foreign policy, is the perceived democratic legitimacy 
NGOs bring to the table, so much so that it often appears that “democratisation” is used as a 
synonym for bringing NGOs to the consultation table.  
Quotation marks have been consistently placed around “democratisation” in the above text 
as a result of  the repeated and often cogent criticisms brought forth by academics and other 
authors concerning whether NGOs’ involvement indeed represents democratisation as it is 
intended by the process of  opening policymaking to the general public, in particular at the 
level of  the individual citizen. DFAIT collaborator Rob McRae outlines the democratic 
imperative as follows: 
[k]ey to the future of  human security will be our ability to engage our own citizens in both the issues involved 
and in the development of  crisis response mechanisms. Public understanding of  human security crises and 
public support for sometimes complex solutions are the conditions for success. […] How do we engage, and 
connect, our citizens while increasing their sense of  foreign policy ownership?756 
The CCIC put forth an earlier notion of  democratisation, and followed up with a set of  
recommendations:  
[t]he government should commit itself  to the effective participation of  the Canadian public in the ongoing 
development and review of  all areas of  Canadian foreign policy. The processes for consultations and making 
decisions must be inclusive, participatory, transparent and accountable.757  
Nossal contends, however, that the CCIC’s recommendations, rather than empowering the 
citizen, grant privileges, in no less elitist fashion, to middlemen: 
[a] further suggestion would have the government seek to involve foreign non-governmental organizations in 
the policy process, by creating an “international advisory group with eminent people, including representatives 
of  grassroots organizations”. […] 
At first sight, these sound like fine and eminently unobjectionable goals. But closer examination shows that 
what the CCIC is actually seeking, despite rhetoric that sounds democratic, is little more than an enhanced role 
for intermediate groups and their leaders in the policy process, rather than for the mass public, which is, after 
all, “short-sighted, ill-informed and easily manipulated”. The public must be “educated”, with explanations 
about foreign policy offered by the media and “experts”. “Eminent people”, those “recognized for their 
foreign policy expertise”, and leaders of  organizations are the ones to be involved in the state-society 
institutions for the encouragement of  a democratized policy process.758  
Hampson and Oliver follow the same current of  criticism:  
[b]ut it also important to ask for whom this vast array of  organizations with different interests, sources of  
funding, and constituencies (both nationally and globally) speaks? Do they always speak in the interests of  the 
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Canadian public? Are they always on the side of  the angels and seen as such by the average Canadian citizen? 
Profound issues about the meaning of  representative democracy in an increasingly interdependent world are 
raised by the widespread proliferation of  NGOs which increasingly enjoy privileged access to government 
precisely because they are well funded, well organized, and politically mobilized. As J. L. Granatstein asked 
recently before an audience of  foreign policy experts on peacekeeping, “who elected the NGOs?”759 
Stairs questions the democratic representativeness of  NGOs from another angle, focussing 
on the fact that while actors from civil society are free to pursue their specific agendas, they are 
free from the onus of  mediating and amalgamating a number of  specific agendas in order to 
formulate the policy that is best for the greatest number of  those concerned. In his 
contribution to the 1998 edition of  the influential yearbook Canada Among Nations, Stairs 
argues that “NGOs, specialized as they are, cannot make tradeoffs. They can only pursue their 
own agendas. In that sense, they have the easy decisions. States, by contrast, have the hard 
ones”760. Three years later, in his chapter in the 2001 edition of  that series, he elaborated on 
the point:  
[a]t the operational level, NGOs are fixated on their specific agendas. Their job is not to navigate a safe 
passage through a sea of  competing considerations but to advance the particular causes they happen in each 
case to hold most dear. Their task, in short, is not to aggregate interests but to articulate them, not to govern 
but to nag. […] Thus in the conflict of  roles lies the guarantee that tensions will ensue.761  
One senior DFAIT official defends NGOs’ pursuit of  particular agendas, however, stating 
in an interview that in her experience, NGOs have frequently contributed important inputs to 
policy initiatives “without flogging an agenda”, and citing Ernie Regehr, Executive Director of  
the Canadian NGO Project Ploughshares, as a prominent example. Arguing that she has found 
that while many academics “cannot separate out their agenda” from their inputs, “NGOs are 
the freer thinkers”. She states that “policymakers do not want a clean vector”, and that her 
own selection is based precisely on the “spin” actors bring to an issue, placing the onus on 
herself  and other policymakers to filter agendas and aggregate interests762.  
Stairs, in contrast, further laments the fact that NGOs’ agendas, while they may frequently 
seek to act on behalf  of  a global “common good”, often may not overlap with those of  the 
Canadian citizenry: “what is particularly interesting about the NGOs is that they are 
predominantly concerned with what might be described as ‘international public goods’ […] 
These are miseries that frequently have no discernable impact on Canada itself ”763.  
The “democratisation” of  Canadian foreign policy, as embodied in the increased 
participation by the ever-growing ranks of  CSOs, has led, for the reasons outlined above, to a 
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reduction in the possibilities of  academic experts to gain access to the policy formulation 
process on the basis of  exclusive possession of  a relevant body of  specialised knowledge. 
While there is truth to the claim that the participation of  academics on the basis of  a form of  
limited-access expertise constitutes a form of  elitism, the participation of  NGOs appears, at 
least in the eyes of  some Canadian academic observers—perhaps those most jealously 
guarding their privileged station—to have done little to inject increased representativeness into 
the process, all the while lowering academic security experts’ possibilities for access and 
influence. The fact that the intellectual genesis of  many of  the precursor issues to the human 
security agenda originated in the NGO community and were taken up within DFAIT has also 
had as a result a diminution of  the normative resonance within the Lester Pearson Building of  
many of  the inputs eventually proferred by Canada’s academic security experts.  
 
5.4. Resonance  
The inputs sought by policymakers within the Canadian security policy establishment can, 
for the purpose of  establishing which type of  inputs from the academic community might 
resonate normatively with bureaucrats’ preferences, be divided into two broad categories: those 
related to traditional Canadian foreign policy and departmental concerns, and those related to 
the conceptualisation and implementation of  the human security agenda per se.  
Departmental concerns include such considerations as budgetary constraints and distancing 
one federal administration’s issue content from that of  its predecessor. Traditional Canadian 
foreign policy issues in this respect include the classic cycle of  distancing and realignment with 
the United States, and (prior to 2003) the closely related issue of  the balance between foreign 
policy (security) and international trade concerns within the two divisions of  the Department 
of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade itself. Lastly, DFAIT policymakers are aware of  the 
legacy of  functional internationalism, particularly in terms of  how this imperative relates to 
Canada’s action within and relationship to international institutions.  
The formulation process for the human security agenda has been shown above to have 
consisted, in its most basic form, of  a twofold process: the adaptation of  the concept of  
human security first cogently elaborated by the UNDP in 1994 into implementable policy for 
the Canadian state, and the interrelationship between the conceptualisation process and more 
implementation-oriented policy initiatives already undertaken on a variety of  precursor issues 
such as landmines and the ICC.  
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What later became the human security agenda began as a collection of  issues on which 
Canada had for various reasons previously taken—often quite successfully—actions that were 
later subsumed under the encompassing concept of  human security. Thus, the early stages of  
the formulation of  the human security agenda saw the systematisation, through a search for 
commonalities of  approach and framing between issues, of  an ad-hoc approach into the 
beginnings of  an overarching normative architecture. These issues included the campaign to 
ban anti-personnel landmines—in which Canada by all accounts played a seminal role—and 
subsequent efforts to replicate that movement’s success and modus operandi taking as a focus the 
proliferation of  small arms and light weapons, the protection of  civilians in conflict situations 
(especially women and children), and the establishment of  an International Criminal Court to 
be seized with acts of  genocide and other war crimes. 
The clear demarcation of  the substantive meaning of  human security took approximately 
two and a half  years (from late 1996 to early 1999) and consisted of  the steady narrowing 
down to a policy-relevant platform of  the first widely publicised use of  the concept by the 
UNDP in 1994. Through a number of  addresses by Axworthy and other policy proclamations, 
the analysis presents the numerous definitions provided during this time to arrive at the final 
version provided in a government publication in 1999. It also includes Axworthy’s 
controversial adoption of  the concept of  “soft power” before moving on to the eventual 
implementation of  the human security agenda. 
Concerning the first of  these two sets of  interlocking issues, closer examination makes 
clear—in a finding that once again, as in both the Brazilian and South African case studies, 
links the issue of  resonance with that of  the perceived need for outside assistance found in the 
uncertainty hypothesis—that DFAIT policymakers understood the normative ramifications of  
the policy cornerstones derived from departmental and historical concerns.  
Rather than there being a realisation among Canadian policymakers that normative change 
was afoot and higher-level inputs from outside the policy process necessary to right a drifting 
keel of  state, there was certainty within the establishment as to what its higher-order policy 
priorities were, and how they were to be followed. This negated the propensity for academics 
to be called upon to provide the more abstract and higher-order form of  knowledge, as this 
was taken care of  largely “in-house”.  
Turning to the second set of  issues—the transposition of  the initially nebulous concept of  
human security into a deliverable agenda—this undertaking demonstrably required the 
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practical form of  specialised knowledge. Since such expertise largely derives from field 
experience and programme delivery capacity—which certain NGOs were obviously best suited 
to provide—in this domain as well, the facility with which academics could produce 
normatively resonant or clearly helpful inputs was greatly diminished.  
In summary, this meant that in those areas where academics are traditionally more likely to 
be asked to provide inputs (theoretical expertise), the Canadian foreign policy establishment 
did not see a need for outside assistance, condemning all inputs either to redundancy—and 
thus superfluity—or a lack of  resonance. Concomitantly, where input was sought, this was in a 
domain in which in addition to academics having little expertise to contribute, the presence of  
other actors who did possess such expertise in abundance served to marginalise the academic 
community even further from influential participation.  
The claim that normatively resonant inputs have a higher probability of  finding reflection in 
policy outcomes presupposes both a policy establishment open to such change and actors with 
the necessary attributes consciously seeking to effect such change. The case of  the Canadian 
foreign policy establishment and the human security agenda again illustrates the dynamics of  
the relationship between NGOs and academics as actors in competition for access to influence 
in the policy process. Through their seminal agenda-setting role in the campaigns around the 
precursor issues, NGOs also played a fundamental role in influencing DFAIT’s human security 
agenda.  
Once the conceptualisation process had crystallised this agenda into concrete initiatives that 
could be taken to the security policy constituencies, DFAIT—rather than being the object and 
locus of  ideational change through the machinations of  outside actors—in conjunction with 
the imperative to “democratise” foreign policy and in an appropriation of  the emphasis on 
opinion formulation more traditionally associated with the NGO community, became not the 
object of  change (as the Ministries’ role had been constituted in Brazil and South Africa) but 
its vector. 
 
5.4.1. Policymaker normative preferences and the human security agenda  
The normative preferences among those with the power to grant or deny access to the 
policy process surrounding human security can be recapitulated as follows. Axworthy and his 
collaborators’ efforts to formulate the concept of  human security are in several important 
ways a continuation of  the agenda of  the left wing of  the Liberal Party. From the Liberal 
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connection came the focus on the individual as the referent object of  security764, and Axworthy 
himself  saw reflected in the development of  the concept his own anti-reactionary leanings765 
and opposition to many policies pursued by the United States766. Axworthy’s motivation for 
seeking information from outside his own department stemmed at times from the realisation 
that DFAIT’s own intellectual culture was not conducive or amenable to innovation in this 
normative direction767. Rather, efforts were concentrated on transforming these underpinnings 
into precepts commensurate with state policy, particularly with a view to implementability768.  
The modifications undertaken within DFAIT, and the process to which outside actors 
contributed the most, centred around rendering deliverable from their inception the 
foundations of  human security policy. In this sense, the preoccupation with practicability 
militated against favouring the ostensibly more theoretically-inclined input of  academics. While 
Axworthy’s own background in academe predisposed him to value ideas and the academic 
approach to problem-solving, his engagement in developing human security did not always 
reflect this predilection.  
He leaned instead towards an emphasis on practicability and responsiveness to events and 
changes on the international scene (a summary of  their abundant mention by Axworthy and 
DFAIT is contained in the section on international change and the project’s first hypothesis). 
Given the expressed association of  NGOs with field practice and of  academics with a more 
theoretical approach, Axworthy’s own words condemn academics to the sidelines: “[a]s is often 
the case in public policy, practice has led theory”769.  
Efforts were undertaken, however, to consult with academics as well. Don Hubert provides 
ample evidence that academics were in fact consistently asked to contribute to the formulation 
of  the human security agenda, pointing out the efforts that follow here. A series of  workshops 
were held seeking explicitly to draw out the perspectives and contributions of  academics and 
NGOs (a daylong retreat in the summer of  1998 and a two-day meeting in the early part of  
1999). The further conceptualization of  human security was also one of  the main themes at 
the 1999 Peacebuilding Consultations.  
These meetings generated several academic articles. Axworthy subsequently called together 
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an advisory group made up of  NGOs and academics, and routinely consulted it. Further, the 
CCFPD held a dozen dedicated sessions on different parts of  the agenda. Hubert’s assessment 
of  the response to these overtures, however, is circumspect. He recalls that in many cases the 
DFAIT team were referred back to existing agendas by academics claiming that human security 
was synonymous with human rights or development concerns. Hubert points out the 
important contributions of  some international experts in “fleshing out different aspects of  the 
concept”, such as Astrid Suhrke, Sverre Lodgaard and Keith Krause. Hubert attributes the lack 
of  strong academic participation in DFAIT’s conceptual efforts to the lack of  academic work 
available on the concept prior to 1999; a time lag in academic research and publishing; 
academics’ desire to maintain scholarly independence; and the gap between research agendas 
geared towards, respectively, post-modernism and policy relevance. Hubert pointed out that 
while he believed that in the ensuing period—once conceptualization had proceeded past a 
certain point—the agenda began to elicit a response in the form of  academic work not present 
before the year 2000770. 
One senior diplomat’s experience led to the more empathetic observation that “academics 
are prisoners of  their reputations”. He added that while this project’s suppositions about the 
role of  resonance were “absolutely right”, academics are called upon to “shore up the extant, 
not to innovate”, and that the Canadian security studies community was not in a position to do 
this with respect to the human security agenda. He indicated that the more neorealist-
dominated strategic studies community was largely ignored due to its close association with the 
realist “mainstream” in the United States771.  
One senior DFAIT official based her own lack of  recourse to inputs from academics on her 
perception of  a lack of  resonance, pointing out that “they didn’t get it”. While she did 
highlight the role of  selected academics in specific issues—in particular a seminal paper on the 
stigmatisation of  landmines by Andrew Latham—her preferred interlocutors clearly are 
NGOs772.  
While perhaps overstating the reception granted the human security initiative, the senior 
DFAIT official’s assessment of  the Canadian academic community as “uniformly hostile” 
brings to light the fact that when a bureaucracy’s policy position is fixed—as was patently not 
the case in Brazil and South Africa—resonance is a two-way street. Thus it is equally important 
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in the Canadian case, where the bureaucracy’s position was relatively entrenched, to examine 
the resonance within the academic community of  the ideas put forth by the policymaking 
world.  
 
 5.4.1.1. Early issues  
The human security initiative began as a series of  foreign policy issues that had risen to 
prominence near the time at which Axworthy took office. Some enjoyed a high degree of  fit 
with Canadian foreign policy concerns, some were concretisations of  long-standing principles 
expressed in DFAIT policy, and still others reflected responses to changes on the international 
scene, such as the nature of  conflict, and its toll on civilians, in the post-Cold War world. 
These issues included a ban on anti-personnel landmines; the protection of  civilians, 
particularly women and children, in armed conflict; the establishment of  an International 
Criminal Court; and combating the devastating effects of  the proliferation of  small arms and 
light weapons in conflict-prone situations.  
The interconnectedness of  some of  these issues is a two-way relationship: while some were 
chosen as an echo of  principles consciously held, similarities between others not chosen in this 
manner showed the potential for an overarching framework, which began to emerge halfway 
through Axworthy’s term in office. Of  these issues, the foremost by far is the landmines 
campaign, which earned Axworthy a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997773. Over 
time, as an overarching framework for these issues was sought, they were subsumed under 
human security, but—approximately speaking—the first two years of  Axworthy’s tenure saw 
DFAIT focus, with considerable success, on a series of  individual issues. 
 
  5.4.1.1.1. Landmines 
The Canadian efforts on behalf  of  the global movement to ban landmines were the 
centrepiece of  the country’s foreign policy during the mid-1990s, and generated reams of  
literature and numerous accolades. Efforts to limit the propagation of  landmines began after 
the end of  the Vietnam War and culminated in the signing and ratification of  the Convention 
on the Prohibition of  the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction (dubbed the “Ottawa Convention”) on 3 December 1997. The 
Convention entered into force on 1 March 1999. 
                                                 
773 The prize was instead awarded to the ICBL and its co-ordinator, Jody Williams. 
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The early efforts to ban landmines were driven by those organisations whose 
representatives had personally witnessed the human effects of  landmines: international 
organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with representatives in the 
field in conflict zones who reported back to headquarters and mobilised opposition to this 
type of  weapon. These origins would be crucial to the role played by NGOs and IOs in the 
“Ottawa Process”, as the period of  14 months leading up to the signing of  the treaty in the 
Canadian process has been named, and in which the Canadian government played a seminal 
role. 
The International Committee of  the Red Cross (ICRC) convened two Conferences of  
Governmental Experts in 1974 and 1976 on certain types of  weapons, including landmines. A 
protocol concerning landmines was amended to the 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention (CCW). The modest restrictions instituted by this document were considered 
inadequate by anti-landmines advocates774; efforts to restrict and eventually to ban entirely this 
class of  weapon continued. After a period of  relative inaction, NGOs again began to take on 
the landmines issue in the early 1990s, triggered by the work in Cambodia, a heavily mine-
affected nation, of  aid organizations and by the arrival there in 1992 of  the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)775.  
NGO efforts began to coalesce in the early 1990s; a May 1993 conference in London 
assembled 40 NGOs to discuss strategy. Subsequently, representatives of  six NGOs came 
together to form the steering committee of  what became known as the ICBL776. During the 
same period, the ICRC continued its efforts to raise awareness of  the indiscriminate effects of  
landmines, in part through several influential publications and a series of  conferences777. The 
United Nations, in particular the Department of  Humanitarian Affairs, increasingly took up 
the landmines cause, becoming fully involved by 1994778.  
Following the failure of  the CCW Review Conference in late 1995 to arrive at significant 
progress regarding the limitation or prohibition of  landmines, the ICRC subsequently began a 
                                                 
774 Hubert, p. 6. 
775 One influential study on the history of  the movement to ban landmines lists three NGOs as crucial in the earliest years of  
the effort, all present in Cambodia. These are Handicap International, the Mines Advisory Group and the Coalition for 
Peace and Reconciliation. See Hubert, p. 7. 
776 These are: the Vietnam Veterans of  America Foundation, Physicians for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Medico 
International, Handicap International and the Mines Advisory Group. 
777 Hubert, pp. 9-10. 
778 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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campaign—its first such undertaking in almost 80 years—aimed at a total ban on landmines779. 
By this time, 40 states had come out in support of  a landmine ban, and eight in particular 
collaborated closely with the ICBL: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, 
Norway and Switzerland780. In early 1996, Canada offered to host a meeting among NGOs, 
IOs and pro-ban states781; the meeting, a crucial watershed in the landmine ban process, took 
place in Ottawa from 3-5 October 1996 under the title “Towards a Global Ban on 
Antipersonnel Mines”.  
As the pro-ban movement had by that time become increasingly disenchanted with the 
recurrent suggestion by several key states that the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament 
was the appropriate forum for talks on a landmine ban, knowing that the Conference’s 
consensus-based approach would stifle progress782, Axworthy used the opportunity of  his 
address at the closing session of  the conference to launch a formidable challenge to the 
delegates present: 
[a]nd so Mr. Chairman, I have one final point to add to your action plan. That point comes in the form of  
both an invitation and a challenge. The challenge is to see a treaty signed no later than the end of  1997. In the 
coming days, I will be writing to your ministers and to others not represented here to seek their views on how 
we can move ahead together. I will tell them that if  the will is there, Canada is prepared to convene a meeting 
in December 1997 to sign such a treaty. […] 
And so, today, I commit Canada to this goal, to work with our global partners to prepare a treaty that can be 
signed by December 1997 and implemented by the year 2000. I invite and challenge all of  you to join with us 
to attain that goal.783 
Axworthy’s challenge was met with enthusiasm from ICRC and ICBL delegates (whose 
leadership, together with a limited number of  DFAIT personnel, were the only delegates 
present to be informed beforehand) and with surprise and even hostility from some states and 
organisations784. During the period between Axworthy’s challenge and the signing of  the 
Ottawa Convention on 3 December 1997, Canada worked closely with a Core Group of  other 
                                                 
779 Hubert, pp. 14-15. On the role of  the ICRC in the landmines movement in general, see also Maresca, Louis and Stuart 
Maslen, eds. The banning of  anti-personnel landmines: the legal contribution of  the International Committee of  the Red Cross. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
780 Hubert, p. 17. 
781 Ibid., p. 17; Axworthy, Lloyd. Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, 
Before the House of  Commons on the Occasion of  the Tabling of  the Annual report on Military Exports in Ottawa, 
Ontario on 18 June 1996. Available from http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/102403.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=
E. Accessed 10 October 2003. 
782 Hubert, pp. 19-20; Gwozdecky and Sinclair, p. 30. 
783 Axworthy, Lloyd. Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, at the Closing 
Session of  the International Strategy Conference Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines in Ottawa, Ontario on 5 
October 1996. Available from http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/102423.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=
E. Accessed 10 October 2003. 
784 Gwozdecky and Sinclair, p. 31. 
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like-minded governments—Austria, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, New Zealand, Mexico 
and Belgium—as well as IOs and NGOs to pave the way for the signing of  the treaty785.  
The landmines issue and the Ottawa Process played a seminal role in influencing DFAIT’s 
relationship to Canadian civil society and to the NGO community. The norms and modi 
operandi to which Canadian diplomats and functionaries were exposed by interaction with 
NGOs such as those in the ICBL would play an increasingly large part in the conduct of  
Canadian foreign policy during the Axworthy era, effectively serving as a template to be 
“replicated”786 in the case of  at least two further issue-related negotiating processes.  
 
  5.4.1.1.2. Small arms and light weapons 
Inspired by the success of  the Ottawa Process and sensing a similar level of  interest within 
the NGO community, DFAIT policymakers began to investigate the possibility of  similar 
action with respect to the larger category of  weapons to which landmines belonged: that of  
small arms and light weapons (SALW)787.  
Many of  the efforts to stem the proliferation of  small arms have been undertaken within 
the framework of  IOs and regional institutions. The problem was mentioned as early as 1995 
in the Supplement to United National Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for 
Peace788. In keeping with guidelines set out in that document, the United Nations (UN) in 1997 
and 1999 convened, respectively, a Group and a Panel of  Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms. Among the recommendations of  those groups was the holding of  a United Nations 
Conference on SALW, which was eventually held in New York from 9-21 July 2001. It has 
been DFAIT policy to contribute actively to SALW initiatives worldwide since approximately 
1997789. This includes the hosting of  the international NGO conference at which the 
International Actions Network on Small Arms (IANSA) was founded in August 1998790.  
                                                 
785 For another excellent account of  the process leading to the Ottawa Convention, see Lawson, Robert. “The Ottawa Process: 
Fast-Track Diplomacy and the International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines”. In Hampson and Molot, Canada 
Among Nations 1998; pp. 83-99. 
786 Hubert, p. 41. 
787 Adam, Bernard. “Les initiatives internationales en vue de lutter contre la prolifération des armes légères”. In Rioux, Jean-
François, ed. La sécurité humaine: une nouvelle conception des relations internationales. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001; pp. 145-156. Here, 
p. 146. 
788 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Report of  the Secretary-General on the Work of  the Organization. Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace: Position Paper of  the Secretary-General on the Occasion of  the Fiftieth Anniversary of  the United Nations. United 
Nations Document Number A/50/60 - S/1995/1. 1995. Available from http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html. 
Accessed 11 October 2003; paragraphs 61-63. 
789 For an extensive list of  Canadian activities with respect to the small arms issue, see http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/arms/convweap3-en.asp. Accessed 30 July 2004. 
790 Hubert, p. 52.  
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  5.4.1.1.3. Protection of  civilians in conflict 
The issues of  landmines and small arms are closely connected to the idea of  protecting 
non-combatants—particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children—from the 
effects of  armed conflict, as it is with these two groups of  weapons that most conflict-related 
killings and injuries are carried out. Canadian efforts with respect to war-affected children 
followed the same initial formula as landmines and small arms, with Axworthy “joining an 
[NGO] bandwagon”791: a conference was held in Winnipeg in 2001 that brought together 
governmental and non-governmental representatives to elucidate what could be done about 
the issue792.  
Once again NGOs and IOs had led the way, with the United Nations appointing a Special 
Representative of  the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in September 1997. 
Further, many of  the NGOs whose efforts had met with success in the landmines context, and 
to which DFAIT now had excellent contacts, had moved on to the issue of  conflicts’ effects 
on children793, inter alia forming the Geneva-based Coalition to Stop the Use of  Child Soldiers. 
These efforts coincided with the run-up to the 2001 United Nations Special Session on 
Children, and found expression in the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of  Children in 
Armed Conflict794. 
 
  5.4.1.1.4. International Criminal Court 
The Canadian involvement in the campaign to establish an International Criminal Court 
mirrored the three other efforts listed here in important ways. Darryl Robinson sums up the 
basic idea being replicated from one campaign to the next: “[a] coalition of  supportive states, 
in tandem with interested nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), worked assiduously to 
promote an ‘idea whose time had come’”795. Canada once again took on the classic role of  
mediator, a calling to which it returned under Axworthy: 
[t]he stakes were high: Axworthy’s commitment to a human security agenda meant that a number of  
institutions needed to be strengthened or created to assure that both sticks and carrots could be held over 
international miscreants. […] 
                                                 
791 Axworthy admitted to this in the case of  landmines; cited in van Rooy, p. 254. 
792 Hampson, Hillmer and Molot, “Continentalism”, p. 3.  
793 Sorger, Carmen and Eric Hoskins. “Protecting the Most Vulnerable: War-Affected Children”. In McRae and Hubert, pp. 
134-151. Here, p. 139. 
794 On these efforts, see Snyder, Ross. “The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of  Children in Armed Conflict”. In McRae 
and Hubert, pp. 152-160; and Hubert, pp. 44-47. 
795 Robinson, Darryl. “Case Study: The International Criminal Court”. In McRae and Hubert, pp. 170-177. Here, p. 172. 
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As in the case of  the Landmines Convention, Canada joined what had begun as a United Nations (UN) and 
NGO campaign, chairing the like-minded group, urging members to identify shared cornerstone positions and 
to co-ordinate strategy. […] Axworthy showed strong leadership.796  
Simultaneously with the development of  a coalition of  NGOs to establish an ICC, the 
International Law Commission was charged with drafting a statute. The recrudescence of  calls 
for an ICC can be traced to the establishment of  war crimes tribunals for the conflicts in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Canada’s input into the ICC process was further enhanced 
by the fact that the Rome Conference at which the statute was created was chaired by the 
Canadian legal expert Philippe Kirsch. By 1998, Axworthy and members of  the Canadian 
foreign policy bureaucracy began to search for an overarching concept that would unite the 
commonalities of  these issues under one roof.  
 
 5.4.1.2. Conceptual forays and consolidation 
Axworthy first publicly highlighted the need for a new approach to security policy in his 
first address as Canada’s Foreign Minister to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
in 1996; identifying several new themes and threats in international security, he related them to 
the notion of  “sustainable human security”. The 1996 UNGA speech merits citation at length, 
as it serves as the broad basis of  an identification of  new threats and issues which would 
progressively be narrowed over the course of  the next three years into the concept of  human 
security used by DFAIT: 
[c]hanging times have set us a new and broader agenda, which includes focussing on the security needs of  the 
individual — in other words, sustainable human security. […] There remains too often a tendency to act 
according to the old power configurations of  the Cold War era, rather than to seek out collective approaches 
that address the roots of  conflict and attempt to resolve them through common action. […] There is an 
increasing focus on conflicts that take place within borders but that have severe ripple effects throughout a 
region or even the entire international system. […] What is clear is the need for a new tool-kit for the UN to 
respond to a variety of  different situations. […] 
In Canada, we are currently focussing our approach to these issues. We have started to rework our own tool 
kit to improve our ability to initiate and support peace-building operations in areas such as preventive 
mediation and dialogue; human rights monitoring and investigation; media and police training; judicial reform; 
and demobilization. […] 
There has been a recognition that human rights and fundamental freedoms, the right to live in dignity, with 
adequate food, shelter, health and education services, and under the rule of  law and good governance, are as 
important to global peace as disarmament measures. We are now realizing that security cannot be limited to 
the state's domain, but must incorporate civil society. 
These realizations stemmed in part from a growing sense of  insecurity in response to newly emerging but 
equally deadly threats — what one writer has termed the “underside of  globalization”.797 
                                                 
796 van Rooy, “Civil Society”, p. 255. 
797 Axworthy, Lloyd. “Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, to the 51st 
General Assembly of  the United Nations, New York, New York, September 24, 1996”. Available from 
http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/102415.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=
E. Accessed 12 October 2003. 
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During this early period, Axworthy increasingly linked human security to the notion of  
“soft power” developed by Joseph Nye in 1990. Writing in response to pessimistic predictions 
for the maintenance of  American hegemony after the end of  the Cold War, Nye posited the 
concept of  soft power as a supplement to traditional resource-based power:  
[a] state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have 
agreed to a situation which produces such effects […]. This second aspect of  power—which occurs when one 
country gets other countries to want what it wants—might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast to the 
hard or command power of  ordering others to do what it wants.798 
Where Nye did not see soft power as a replacement for traditional military concerns799, 
several academic analysts accused Axworthy of  inattention to the classic military components 
of  security policy, as will be seen below. Axworthy repeatedly took up the “soft power” theme 
in his public pronouncements in the period between his entering office and the publication of  
DFAIT’s primary exposition of  the Canadian version of  the human security concept, Safety for 
People in a Changing World. His first address to include mention of  the concept took place in 
December 1996, several months after the UNGA address in which he first took on human 
security itself:  
From these changes has come the concept of  “soft power” — the idea that knowledge and information 
confer international influence; and, in a wired world, that influence is power. This is a power of  attraction, not 
coercion. The strategic use of  information, and the ability to influence others by presenting attractive models 
and ideas, have become central components of  a nation's ability to exert political, economic or cultural 
influence. Of  course, economic and military power are still highly significant, but they are no longer the only 
basis of  a country's international clout. The mouse, if  not mightier, is at least as mighty as the missile.800 
The first speech highlighted the importance of  new information technologies in changing 
the conduct of  foreign affairs. In a speech a week later to the National Forum on Foreign 
Policy—one of  the series of  meetings held in accordance with the Red Book pledge to consult 
the Canadian public—Axworthy outlined how soft power could be exercised in concert with 
other “middle powers”: 
And, above all, we are well placed to wield the “soft power” needed to be effective in these new areas of  
diplomacy. By “soft power,” I mean the international influence that knowledge, information and an attractive 
set of  values confer. In a wired world, this influence is power — the power to get things done by building 
coalitions […].801 
                                                 
798 Nye, Joseph. “Soft power”. Foreign Policy. No. 80 (1990); pp. 153-171. Here, p. 166. Emphasis in the original. 
799 Ibid., p. 156. Nye elaborates the concept at greater length in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of  American Power. New York: 
Basic Books, 1990. 
800 Axworthy address, 6 December 1996.  
801 Axworthy, Lloyd. “Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World”. Address delivered by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, 
Minister of  Foreign Affairs, to a Meeting of  the National Forum on Foreign Policy in Winnipeg, Manitoba on 13 
December 1996. Available from http://webapps.dfait-
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After a period during which soft power fell into relative desuetude in Axworthy’s public 
pronouncements, it resurfaced in early 1998 and was linked explicitly to the human security 
agenda and other prominent components of  Axworthy’s stamp on Canadian foreign policy: 
We decided to pursue this new diplomacy in the face of  four factors: 
first, a seismic upheaval in the international landscape with the end of  the Cold War, shifting international 
patterns of  economic and political power and increased global integration;  
second, the increasing prominence of  human security issues on the world agenda: issues that strike home 
directly to the individual, such as the illicit drug trade, environmental problems, and human rights abuses;  
third, the advent of  powerful new players on the international scene, including corporations, non-
governmental bodies, and regional organizations such as the Rio Group, the CARICOM and the Andean 
Community; and 
fourth, the growing importance of  what scholar and diplomat Joseph Nye terms “soft power” — the power 
that springs from attractive ideas, shared values and partnership, rather than from military and economic 
might.802 
However, it was in a speech at Nye’s place of  work that Axworthy provided his adaptation 
of  the “soft power” approach to Canadian foreign policy, and outlined how he envisioned its 
implementation: 
As you are probably aware, Joseph Nye used this term at the start of  the decade to define an increasingly 
important aspect of  the conduct of  international relations in a globalized, integrated world — the power to 
co-opt, rather than coerce, others to your agenda and goals. In Nye's view, military and economic power, while 
still important, did not have the overwhelming pre-eminence they once did. Instead, the ability to 
communicate, negotiate, mobilize opinion, work within multilateral bodies and promote international 
initiatives was increasingly effective in achieving international outcomes.  
Soft power is particularly useful in addressing the many pressing problems that do not pit one state against 
another, but rather a group of  states against some transnational threat to human security. When there is 
mutual benefit to finding a solution, skills in coalition-building become increasingly important. This was the 
case in the landmines campaign, where major exporters and major users worked together to establish a new 
international norm that stigmatized these weapons.  
The application of  soft power to human security problems, like the landmines crisis, has turned the spotlight 
on a venerable area of  international affairs — humanitarian law, sometimes known as the “law of  war.” This 
mix of  old and new may seem surprising at first. On reflection, though, it is hardly surprising that as the 
nature of  conflict changes, the old rules on arms control and the treatment of  individuals in times of  war 
must change too.  
As we begin to understand these changes better, we are increasingly able to draw on soft power to reinvigorate 
humanitarian law and develop new norms within it. My hope is that the international community will be able 
to use the same approach to resolve other pressing human security issues such as the proliferation of  small 
arms and the use of  child soldiers in armed conflicts.803 
The citations illustrate the shift that occurred in Axworthy’s thinking with respect to the 
relationship between soft power and human security, and in the utility of  the two. While at first 
the use of  soft power had been conceptually embryonic and vague, it now was being proffered 
                                                 
802 Axworthy, Lloyd. Address delivered by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, to the Organization 
of  American States at the Conference of  the Americas in Washington, D.C. on 6 March 1998. Available from 
http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/101007.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=
E. Accessed 12 October 2003. 
803 Axworthy, Lloyd. “The New Diplomacy: The UN, The International Criminal Court and the Human Security Agenda”. 
Address delivered by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of  Foreign Affairs, to a Conference on UN Reform at the 
Kennedy School, Harvard University, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on 25 April 1998. Available from 
http://webapps.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/101039.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=
E Accessed 13 October 2003. There is clear foreshadowing here to the subsequent creation of  the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  
 249
as a means of  implementing the more overarching concept upon which Canadian foreign 
policy was being based under Axworthy: human security. This notion, of  course, had its own 
intellectual genesis and process of  adaptation to the needs of  Canadian foreign policy. 
According to one DFAIT collaborator who was instrumental in adapting human security to 
the Canadian context, its origins can be traced as far back as the beginnings of  the Red Cross 
in the 1860s804. There is clear evidence of  intellectual filiation with precepts elaborated in the 
reports of  the Brandt, Brundtland and Palme Commissions, and the concept is mentioned in 
the Agenda for Peace805. However, the common understanding is that the concept of  human 
security entered the international stage with the publication by the United Nations 
Development Programme of  its Human Development Report in 1994806. Authored by the late 
Pakistani development economist Mahbub ul-Haq807, the report ties together security and 
development logic to produce a sectorialisation of  security similar, though more wide-ranging, 
than that developed by the “Copenhagen school”. The UNDP report lists four essential 
characteristics of  human security: 
1.) human security is a universal concern; 
2.) the components of  human security are interdependent; 
3.) human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention; 
4.) human security is people-centred.808 
The UNDP definition stresses two ways in which the security concept must change: the 
focus must move from territorial to people’s security, and from security through armaments to 
security through sustainable human development809. The sectors it establishes are: economic, 
food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security810.  
Though many of  the innumerable analyses of  the intellectual genesis of  the concept of  
human security, as well as DFAIT’s own delineations of  the agenda, highlight the UNDP 
report, Jennifer Ross contends that the language of  human security was present within 
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Canadian foreign policy circles fully five years before Axworthy’s 1996 speech to the UNGA. 
According to Ross, the term was first injected directly into Canadian discussions by Jorge Nef, 
then Professor of  Latin American Studies at the University of  Guelph, at a conference 
sponsored by DFAIT in May 1991.  
Nef  traces his own use of  the concept to work conducted for the International 
Development and Research Centre (IDRC) in 1988. Ross asserts that Axworthy picked up the 
concept once this work was introduced to him by Gordon Smith, and underscores her 
contention by highlighting parallels between Nef ’s work and the first DFAIT document to 
outline Canada’s approach to human security811. Notwithstanding this possible earlier entry 
point of  the notion of  human security into Canadian parlance, the UNDP report remains the 
compelling reference for Canadian appropriations of  the term. 
The development-centred approach to security derived from the UNDP report was later 
narrowed by various foreign policy establishments which adopted the concept, moving away 
from development logic and returning to more traditional foreign policy concerns812. In an 
article written in the spring of  1997, Axworthy laid out a similarly broad conception of  human 
security, which still reflected clearly a development-based logic (focussing on quality of  life 
issues as opposed to the dominant life-or-death criterion of  traditional security logic), arguing 
that 
[i]t includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of  life, and a guarantee of  fundamental 
human rights. […] At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs [be] met, but it also acknowledges 
that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of  law, good 
governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and 
disarmament. It recognizes the links between environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic conflicts, 
and migration.813 
Canadian policymakers would later admit that this broad, too closely UNDP-based 
conception was “unwieldy as a policy instrument”814; they proceeded to narrow the approach 
considerably over the next three years815. In doing so, they would return to one of  the 
fundamental tenets of  liberal politics: the primacy of  the individual. Noting the inapplicability 
of  the UNDP approach as a policy paradigm, George MacLean stresses that 
[t]he central consideration for the Canadian government, on the other hand, is the way that insecurity affects 
the person, and the protection of  citizens from threats of  violence. Through its concentration on the person, 
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Canada’s human security agenda has codified five priorities: the protection of  civilians, peace support 
operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety.816 
In elaborating this codification, MacLean was by 2002 able to look back on at least four 
years of  official DFAIT documents, ministerial pronouncements and scholarly articles, as well 
as a wealth of  academic treatments of  the subject, in tracing the narrowing of  the Canadian 
operational definition of  human security. Shortly after his 1996 address to the United Nations, 
Axworthy linked the concept to peacebuilding817 and to NATO peace operations in Bosnia818. 
His choice of  this linkage illustrates the incipient desire to find a roof  concept for the issues 
with which Canadian foreign policy had been occupied until that moment. The choice to apply 
the concept in this way was one with significant consequences for the concept’s later 
implementation, for example in the case of  NATO’s 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign. 
According to Steven Lee, Executive Director of  the CCFPD, the critical point at which the 
principal impetus for Canadian foreign policy ceased to be the search for commonalities 
between specific issues, and efforts shifted towards the more conceptually-oriented task of  
elaborating a new paradigm, occurred in late 1998819. The first major step in making of  human 
security a concept that could serve as an overarching policy paradigm was a shift in the referent 
object of  the security provided by Canadian policy from the state to the individual, which inter 
alia presented a clean fit with Liberal policy precepts. Axworthy first identified this feature of  
the human security agenda publicly before the Canada Club in March 1998, presenting it as a 
response to shifts in the nature of  the international situation to which Canadian foreign policy 
needed to respond: 
The most significant of  these, in my view, has been the increasing prominence of  human security issues on 
the world agenda. These are the issues that strike home directly to the individual: the threats posed by illicit 
drugs, terrorism, environmental problems, human rights abuses and weapons of  mass destruction. These have 
become the daily concerns of  foreign ministers and governments. 
It is from these developments that the notion of  human security emerged: the premise that security goals 
should be primarily formulated, and achieved, in terms of  human, rather than state, needs. The basic unit of  
analysis and concern has shrunk from the state to the community, and even to the individual. At the same 
time, to tackle problems that ignore state boundaries, the field of  action has expanded from the state to the 
region, and even to the globe.820 
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By early 1999, the concept of  human security had been enunciated with sufficient clarity, 
and the ensuing agenda laid out so that the DFAIT policymakers could begin to turn their 
thoughts to the implementation of  the concept. In April, the Department published its 
authoritative definition of  the concept underlying its foreign policy in a pamphlet designed to 
present the new paradigm to the general public. Linking human security back ex post facto to the 
landmines and ICC campaigns821, Safety for people declares that “human security means safety for 
people from violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of  being characterized by 
freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives”822.  
This is a departure from the neo-realist conception of  security in at least two ways: rather 
than a situation needing to pose an existential threat, a menace to quality of  life suffices to 
constitute a human security risk; further, the referent object is, as Axworthy indicated in his 
earlier addresses, shifted away from the individual’s dependence on membership in a 
collectivity to which security is provided. In a first declaratory step towards operationalising 
the concept beyond linkage to issues on which Canada had already taken action in the past, the 
document explains the view that  
[t]here are also human security dimensions to a broad range of  challenges, such as gross violations of  human 
rights, environmental degradation, terrorism, transnational organized crime, gender-based violence, infectious 
diseases and natural disasters. […] The litmus test for determining if  it is useful to frame an issue in human 
security terms is the degree to which the safety of  people is at risk823. 
The shift in referent object outlined above, and especially the displacement of  the threshold 
for the securitisation of  an issue to questions of  well-being, reflects the legacy of  the concept’s 
origins in the development community. Safety for people makes explicit links to these roots, 
describing human security as “an enabling environment for human development” before laying 
out the concept’s implications for foreign policy and developing guidelines for a human 
security policy agenda824. At the time of  Safety for people’s publication in April 1999, human 
security’s implementation was already being put to the test as a result of  the bombing of  
Kosovo by the air forces of  NATO—the Royal Canadian Air Force very visibly included.  
Whereas Safety for people set out the conceptual guidelines for the human security agenda, 
another DFAIT publication, released in 2000, provided the cornerstones for its 
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implementation. After reiterating in slightly updated form the previous published definition of  
human security as a new policy paradigm, it contained an important operational directive that 
underscored the notion’s genesis in an interventionist morality—a characteristic that would 
serve as the main point of  contention for many of  the academic criticisms that would ensue: 
[i]n the face of  massive state-sponsored murder, the calculated brutalization of  people and appalling violations 
of  human rights, the humanitarian imperative to act cannot be ignored and can, in some cases, outweigh 
concerns about state sovereignty.825 
Incorporating this “humanitarian imperative” with parallels to a droit d’ingérence, the 
document lays out the plan for putting into practice the human security agenda: 
Canada has identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security: 
1. Protection of  civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to 
reduce the human costs of  armed conflict. 
2. Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and 
increasingly complex requirements form deployment of  skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these 
missions. 
3. Conflict prevention, concerned with strengthening the capacity of  the international community to prevent 
or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence. 
4. Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of  public and private sector 
institutions in terms of  established norms of  democracy and human rights. 
5. Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the 
growing threats posed by the rise of  transnational organized crime.826 
The remainder of  the document delineates issue areas relevant to Canadian activities under 
each enunciated priority, and is summarised in the following outline: 
Protection of  civilians    Peace Support Operations  Conflict Prevention 
 War-affected Children    Peace Support Capacity    Co-operative Conflict Prevention 
 Legal and Physical Protection  Expert Deployment     Targeted Sanctions 
 Internally Displaced Persons  Police in Support Operations  Small Arms 
 Human Rights Field Operations           Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
 Landmines       
 Humanitarian Intervention   
 
Governance and Accountability    Public Safety 
 International Criminal Court     Transnational Organized Crime 
 Security Sector Reform       Illicit Drugs 
 Corruption and Transparency     Terrorism 
 Freedom of  Expression and Opinion    
 Democratic Governance       
 Corporate Social Responsibility827      
This set of  guidelines neatly ties in the four major pre-human security issues outlined 
above, functioning simultaneously as the reaction to the first major external stimulus to put the 
human security agenda to the test: the Kosovo conflict828. The application of  the human 
security agenda to the Kosovo conflict, and the response to critics of  Axworthy’s adoption of  
                                                 
825 DFAIT, Freedom from Fear, p. 3.  
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828 Issues whose inclusion in the Canadian foreign policy agenda preceded the conceptual elaboration of  Canada’s version of  
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the “soft power” concept, were the subjects of  three articles in academic journals in 1999 and 
2000829 by Paul Heinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy and the 
highest-ranking member of  the DFAIT team charged with the conceptual development and 
prospects for implementation of  the concept.  
The main thrust of  Heinbecker’s three articles is to respond to three criticisms that 
emanated inter alia from the academic community, attacking the adoption of  the “soft power” 
idea, Canadian intervention in Kosovo, and the moral justification used by an otherwise 
quintessentially multilateralist state to justify acting on matters of  international peace and 
security outside the confines of  the UN Security Council (UNSC). As a foundation for 
countering these critiques, Heinbecker elaborated yet another definition of  human security: 
[o]ur definition of  human security 
a) takes individual human beings and their communities, rather than states, as its point of  reference; 
b) uses the safety and well-being of  individuals and their communities as the measure of  security; 
c) recognizes that the security of  states is essential, but not sufficient, to ensure individual safety and 
well-being; 
d) considers threats from both military and non-military sources (for example, intrastate war, small 
arms proliferation, human rights violations, crime, and drugs); 
e) regards the safety and well-being of  individuals as integral to global peace and security; 
f) is a complement to, not a substitute for, national security; 
g) acknowledges that civil society makes a direct contribution to human security; 
h) brings new techniques and new technologies to the repertory of  diplomatic tools […].830 
Point f) is a direct response to academic criticisms of  Axworthy’s adoption of  the soft 
power concept. Heinbecker’s defence of  soft power is twofold; he first reiterates Nye’s 
contention that soft power is a supplement to, not a replacement for, traditional hard power831, 
even making use of  military parlance to claim that “[h]uman security is very much ‘forward 
defence’. […] Human security is everyone’s forward defence”832. Secondly, he seeks to situate 
soft power within the Canadian foreign policy tradition, stating that it reflects long-standing 
Canadian preoccupations with tolerance, democracy and human rights833; in doing so he 
marshals a list of  Canadian achievements international envy of  which ostensibly serves as the 
basis for Canadian soft power, adding to the moral element of  his argumentation.  
In defending the Kosovo intervention, Heinbecker again turns to the Canadian tradition of  
espousing values in foreign policy834, and provides a moral argument in favour of  intervention: 
Why did we, Canada, of  all countries, act without an explicit UN Security Council mandate? What you might 
not be aware of  is that as President of  the Security Council in February, and subsequently, Canada tried 
                                                 
829 Heinbecker, Paul. “Human Security”. Behind the Headlines. Vol. 56, No. 2 (1999), pp. 5-9 (hereafter, BtH); Heinbecker, Paul. 
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830 Heinbecker, BtH, pp. 5-6. 
831 Ibid., p. 7. 
832 Heinbecker, “Hard Edge”, p. 13. 
833 Heinbecker, BtH, p. 7; Heinbecker, “Hard Edge”, p. 12. 
834 Heinbecker, “Hard Edge”, p. 15. 
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several times to see whether the Council could be brought to act responsibly. It became clear, nevertheless, in 
discussions Minister Axworthy had in New York, in Ambassador Fowler’s repeated soundings of  Council 
members, and in my own discussions with the Russians and others that a resolution to authorize intervention 
would have been vetoed.835  
Assessing the effects of  the Kosovo intervention, the same article draws consequences, 
noting that “[t]he lesson here is that humanitarian intervention trumps national sovereignty”836 
and that “[t]he UN’s future viability will depend on the institution’s ability to come to grips 
with the challenge of  Human Security”837. These two elements of  the human security agenda, 
also present in Heinbecker’s writings, would constitute the main point of  criticism of  Canadian 
foreign policy coming from the country’s security academics: a perceived neglect of  traditional 
instruments of  power in favour of  “soft power”, and the moral overtones permeating the 
enunciations of  Canada’s human security policy. 
 
5.4.2. The academic reaction to the human security agenda 
The scholarly criticisms of  DFAIT’s new agenda centred predominantly on five lines of  
argumentation. The main points of  contention raised in the academic community’s 
publications were: the perceived excessive reliance on morally based argumentation in 
justifying the human security agenda; contestation of  the doctrine’s authors’ frequently 
reiterated claims of  its innovative nature; the notion of  soft power and a perceived neglect of  
the traditional “hard power” elements of  security policy; criticism of  the basic tenets used to 
justify what was presented as a change in Canadian foreign policy; and the highlighting of  
perceived inconsistencies in its implementation, exacerbated by the moral argumentation at its 
base.  
A number of  Canadian academics voiced excoriating assessments of  the human security 
agenda’s moral component. Most prominent among these was an article by Fen Osler 
Hampson, editor of  the series Canada Among Nations series, and Dean Oliver, which labelled 
the human security agenda “pulpit diplomacy” for its moral overtones and was the first to label 
the new approach the “Axworthy doctrine”838.  
Ironically for such a trenchant critique, Hampson and Oliver begin their contribution by 
noting that public opinion polls had noted a strong streak of  “democratic moralism”839 among 
the interested Canadian public, which would indicate that the human security agenda enjoyed 
                                                 
835 Heinbecker, CFP, p. 21. Emphasis mine. 
836 Ibid., p. 22. 
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public support and could thus be deemed a democratically acceptable iteration of  foreign 
policy. While admitting that at its base “there is much of  value” in the “Axworthy doctrine”, 
the authors take umbrage at the fact that as it “has evolved, it has also assumed a note of  
stridency and self-confidence that is as unbecoming as it is unwarranted”840. Though his 
representation of  its consequences has strong shades of  a straw man, and many in DFAIT 
might not recognise their own agenda in his characterisation, William Bain has correctly 
identified the moralist component of  the human security agenda:  
[t]hus a Canadian foreign policy based upon the doctrine of  human security would not stop at securing the 
moral and material interests of  Canadians; rather it would transcend this proper purpose in an attempt to 
secure the interests of  humanity in its entirety. […] But in a society of  states which values pluralism, this view 
wrongly identifies the aspirations of  Canada with the aspirations of  the world.  
This excessive moralism which may infect Canada’s sense of  purpose in world politics is an unsuitable 
foundation for a nation’s foreign policy […]. But Minister Axworthy’s notion of  human security takes scant 
notice of  this conditional state of  affairs. Rather it is imbued with inchoate references and ill-considered 
commitments to a multitude of  abstract ideals and universal principles of  which the implications have not 
been sufficiently thought through.841  
It appears, however, that much of  the objection to the moralistic nature of  the new security 
policy derives more from the style in which they were made—labelled “proselytising”842, 
“incautious moralizing”843 and “force-feeding”844 in articles otherwise largely supportive of  the 
Axworthy agenda—than from the substance of  that moral stance. Moral argumentation is 
acknowledged by numerous authors as constituting a long-standing element in Canadian 
foreign policy, enjoying support in Canada and around the world, and hence not in need of  
explicit validation845—thus echoing Heinbecker’s contentions along the same lines. 
The academic community did not fail to comment on what some perceived as the 
contradiction inherent in the Axworthy team’s claims to both innovation and continuity. The 
criticisms here fell into line with the above admissions of  the continuity of  certain elements in 
the human security agenda and centred around the innumerable public statements by DFAIT 
officials that the human security agenda constituted a revolutionary innovation in the view of  
the world from 125 Sussex Drive. It can be countered, however, that this combination of  
innovation and continuity is consistent with a normal process of  incremental policy change 
involving the reframing of  issue areas.  
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The assessments were careful to differentiate, nevertheless, between what was and was not 
innovative about the human security agenda, and often gave significant credit to Axworthy for 
cogency in staying true to Canadian foreign policy traditions: 
..it is widely assumed by supporters and critics alike that Axworthy’s leadership was something of  a watershed 
in Canadian foreign policy. Its core elements had links to the past, and even with the embellishments that he 
gave to them they had well-developed precursors in the thinking of  the putatively quite different government 
that immediately preceded his own. But Axworthy assigned to these elements a new and more aggressive 
emphasis, and certainly he made use of  innovative political stratagems in driving his agenda home. 
Hampson and Oliver link the Axworthy era even more closely to extant Canadian foreign 
policy traditions: 
 […] Axworthy’s careful articulation of  foreign policy principles into a more or less cogent statement of  goals 
is a striking departure from the often muddled and cautious musings of  his predecessors. In journals like this 
one, on newspaper editorial pages, and in various speeches and policy statements, he has developed a complex, 
interlocking set of  assumptions and foreign policy objectives to guide Canada into the next century. Together 
they chart a course that moves Canada far from some of  its traditional diplomatic moorings while at the same 
time, and often incongruously, paying frequent tribute to their Pearsonian inspiration.846 
In Ross’s words, “he has succeeded in dressing up an old policy in a new outfit, which he 
has made fashionable on the world stage”. Not all of  Axworthy’s critics were so willing to 
admit the innovation of  Axworthy’s approach, particularly those concerned with its 
relationship to the more traditional, military concerns of  security policy: 
[t]he key element of  human security—the protection of  people—has been at the core of  Canada’s military 
operations for some time. To the extent that Axworthy’s agenda was but an extension of  traditional Canadian 
foreign policy objectives, then the Canadian Forces have been carrying out human security operations for 
close to 50 years, if  not longer.847  
Precisely this relationship between traditional “hard power” concerns and human security’s 
“soft” approach would be the target of  the most trenchant of  the doctrine’s critics. Even the 
novelty of  this notion came under fire from Hampson and Osler: 
[w]hat rankles some critics about Axworthy’s approach to “soft power” is less his use of  the term to describe 
why Canada is “bound to lead,” at least on some global issues, but his apparent “discovery” of  something that 
has been a truism in Canadian foreign policy for many years. In the past, however, soft power was one 
component of  the country’s foreign policy kit, not an all-in-one tool. In other words, despite its current 
rhetorical popularity, soft power is neither new in international politics nor universally applicable. […] 
While it is possible to exaggerate Canada’s historical role in this respect, the apogee for Canada’s exercise of  
soft power probably came when […] Lester B Pearson suggested the then exceptional concept of  using 
peacekeepers to resolve the 1956 Suez crisis.848 
Other analysts questioned Axworthy’s adoption of  a concept tailored by Nye to what they 
considered a specifically American context. Brooke Smith-Windsor assails the 
“counterproductive division and confusion stemming from the temptation on the part of  
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some to follow the American interpretative precedent”849. Axworthy’s most prominent critic 
concerning the notion of  soft power was Nossal. The main thrust of  Nossal’s critique of  
Axworthy’s espousal of  soft power was that in doing so, the Minister was neglecting more 
important traditional military aspects of  security policy. This was twinned with the objection 
of  soft power’s specificity to the American context:  
[o]ne small but revealing indication of  the depreciation of  military power is the embrace by the government in 
Ottawa of  the notion of  “soft power” to describe the Canadian approach to international politics. Lloyd 
Axworthy, who used the term in a number of  speeches in early 1998, seems unperturbed about using an 
American concept designed for an American context to describe Canadian policy. […] 
There is much to be said for rejecting the term “soft power” out of  hand as analytically fuzzy buzzwords that 
inappropriately hide the essential negativity of  power […] 
In short, “soft power”, when embraced by the Canadian government, seems little more than an elaborate 
justification for not spending more on so-called “hard” power resources, such as well-equipped military forces, 
well-endowed intelligence services, and a diplomatic service that is not constantly being downsized and 
reorganized.850 
Nossal then extended his critique, inculpating the human security paradigm itself  as the 
cause of  Canadian military insignificance: 
[i]n other words, Canadians have discovered that they can get away with an underequipped constabulary rather 
than a robust military force. They can embrace whatever concept of  security may be fashionable at the 
moment, adorning it with some catchy modifier – collective, common, co-operative, global, or human. […] 
They can get away with downsizing, privatizing, co-locating, and contracting out key elements of  Canada’s 
international diplomacy. Back-stopped by budget-friendly notions like “niche diplomacy,” “soft power,” and 
“co-operative security,” Canadians (and their government) have discovered that they can just say no – without 
guilt and without having to spend too much money.851  
Nossal’s reprise of  this line of  criticism in a newspaper editorial, which derided soft power 
as a “squishy notion” “for which we already have perfectly good words in English”852 fanned 
the flames of  Axworthy’s temper to the point where the DFAIT chief  felt compelled to 
respond in person. He did so in a fashion noteworthy for its unanticipated emotionality and 
robust language, refuting Nossal’s critique and castigating the nation’s academic community for 
its delay in adapting to the concerns addressed by the human security agenda, arguing that 
Nossal’s critique 
shows just how out of  touch some members of  our academic community are in understanding the changing 
world forces that face Canada. […] 
The reason I use [soft power] in my speeches is that it exemplifies the Canadian talent for drawing upon our 
skills […], for influencing the behaviour of  other nations not through military intimidation but through a 
variety of  diplomatic and political tools.853 
After countering the argument that he has neglected hard power assets, Axworthy espouses 
in closing a view that reveals DFAIT’s perception of  its relations with academics: “[w]hat is 
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clear from Mr. Nossal’s remarks is that many academics, like generals, are still fighting old wars 
on old issues, not those of  the present or the future”854. Despite Axworthy’s denial of  having 
given short shrift to military assets, Nye himself  voiced concern over the Canadian 
interpretation of  soft power, underscoring the interpretation that insufficient service had been 
paid in Canada to his conception of  soft power as a supplement to, not a replacement for, 
traditional hard power855.  
Finally, some critics took issue with the assumptions upon which Axworthy and his team 
grounded the need for a new policy paradigm. Hampson and Oliver contested the assertion 
that conflicts had shifted from inter-state wars to intra-state conflagrations856, and French 
scholar Daniel Colard contended that human security’s implied droit d’ingérence had a 
fundamentally destabilising effect on the structures of  international law857. Without clear 
conceptual definitions and threat scenarios858, implementation of  the concept was bound to 
show some inconsistencies, and certain scholars did not hesitate to point out the roads not 
taken by DFAIT in putting human security into practice.  
Wayne Nelles linked some of  these inconsistencies back once again to the problematic 
taking-over of  Nye’s brainchild, though he did not make immediate reference to the 
functionalist principle or the chronology of  human security’s genesis in relation to the issues 
that preceded in on the Canadian foreign policy agenda: 
[Axworthy] added that Canada had “both the capacity and the credibility to play a leadership role”, but it did 
so selectively against landmines, in launching an international criminal court, and in supporting war-affected 
children. Leadership on more intractable, complicated, and long-term challenges – meeting basic needs or 
tackling sustainable development, social equity, and related self-determination, terrorism or secessionism 
issues – has been less apparent. Canada has attempted “human security guarantees” in Kosovo through 
military intervention, but NATO bombing was a simplistic, crude, and non-proportional military response to a 
poorly assessed, complex set of  socioeconomic problems beyond local ethnic disputes or alleged human rights 
abuses. […] 
Platitudes aside, the Kosovo crisis gave Canada a greater appreciation of  military solutions to human security 
challenges, while development approaches (“freedom from want”) to eliminate socioeconomic foundations of  
war got short shrift.859 
Daryl Copeland has noted that Ottawa seemed more prone to intervene in the name of  
human rights where Canada’s more material interests were not at stake860. This seemed to be 
borne out by Axworthy’s failure to intervene in the case of  Talisman Energy, a Calgary energy 
                                                 
854 Ibid.  
855 Hampson and Oliver, pp. 390, 391; Rigby, p. 44. 
856 Hampson and Oliver, p. 383. 
857 Colard, p. 46. 
858 Thomas, Nicholas and William T. Tow. “The Utility of  Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention”. 
Security Dialogue. Vol. 33, No. 2 (2002); pp. 177-192. Here, p. 181. 
859 Nelles, pp. 461-462.  
860 Copeland, pp. 162-163. 
 260
firm active in Sudan in 1999. When a Canadian envoy reported back confirming suspicions 
that the Sudanese government was using revenues from these oil fields to finance its 
participation in the country’s ongoing civil war, Axworthy chose to express concern, but not to 
intervene, reaping harsh criticism from NGOs and academics alike861. On the whole, however, 
despite cogent academic and journalistic criticisms of  aspects of  the conceptualisation and 
implementation of  Axworthy’s human security agenda, the consensus among the Canadian 
public appears to be that Axworthy, in Bothwell’s words, “leaves Canadian foreign policy in 
more coherent and intelligent shape then when he found it”862. 
Whereas in the Brazilian and South African case studies, the dual audience faced by outside 
advisors to the policy process was bifurcated between civilian political decision-makers and 
members of  the armed forces seconded to the respective Defence Ministries, in the case of  
Canada and the human security agenda the division—when it existed—was between career 
foreign policy bureaucrats and their politically appointed, or democratically elected, 
counterparts. As in Pretoria and Brasília, in Ottawa one community—here the career policy 
specialists rather than seconded officers—favoured a more intellectually conservative approach 
while the political officials, like their civilian counterparts in the other two cases, were 
normatively more attuned to conceptual innovation and a departure from the status quo.  
In the Canadian case, the division between these groups provided a testing field for 
academics’ normative resonance and echoed the division between practical and theoretical 
specialised knowledge established in the previous hypothesis. Canadian foreign policymakers 
solicited input selectively once an agenda consisting of  free-standing precursor issues had 
coalesced into efforts at higher-order conceptualisation, thus strongly diminishing the 
opportunities for academics or NGOs (once Canadian state policy was at stake) to provide 
inputs based upon more theoretical concerns. The focus instead was on rendering 
implementable the human security agenda, which required a preoccupation with specialised 
knowledge of  a more practical nature, related to programme delivery and to discerning areas 
where high-impact measures could generate high-visibility successes. Such knowledge was 
largely not at the disposal of  the Canadian community of  security academics.  
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The normative preferences of  Canadian policymakers—embodied best in the Minister 
himself—were aligned with the notions brought to the table by many NGOs during the 
precursor issue period, and adhered more or less cleanly to precepts such as those of  the left 
flank of  the Liberal Party and Axworthy’s own mistrust of  reactionary stances and thus 
occasionally of  the policy positions held by the United States.  
The established preferences of  the academic community did not make for a particularly 
warm initial reception for human security’s agenda, although most of  the criticism was 
presented in a constructive manner. In recent years this has changed, and Canada’s academics 
have engaged with, and participated in, the further development of  the new paradigm. One 
aspect rendering problematic the security community’s reaction was the genesis—despite its 
moniker—of  human security within the development, and not the security, community, thus 
displacing the logical fount of  expertise towards an epistemic community whose membership 
reflected a much higher level of  involvement from NGOs than from academics.  
Why was the academic reaction to the human security agenda largely critical? According to 
two experienced analysts of  the interaction of  the scientific and policy worlds in Canada, this 
may be due to the conservative institutional culture among Canadian academics, which they 
assert favours the retention of  the status quo863. Janice Gross Stein seconds this assessment of  
Canadian academics’ relationship to innovation in an article assessing foreign policy options 
during the era of  the 1994 Foreign Policy Review and the report from the Canada 21 
committee864. 
In a paper from 2003, Andrew Mack, an academic closely involved in Canadian human 
security initiatives in the post-Axworthy era, attributes some of  the resistance to the concept to 
a reluctance on the part of  many mainstream academics to depart from the neorealist focus on 
the state, not the individual, as the appropriate referent object of  security865. While a close 
reading of  Hampson and Oliver’s, and especially Nossal’s, early critiques reveals that they 
indeed reflect a more “mainstream” conception of  security, one reference from the early 
period of  development of  the human security agenda belies the fact that resistance to the 
notion in Canadian academe was not total, that treatments of  the individual as the referent 
                                                 
863 Brooks, Stephen and Alain-G. Gagnon. Social Scientists and Politics in Canada: Between Clerisy and Vanguard. Montréal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988; p. 77. 
864 Stein, “ideas”, p. 42.  
865 Mack, Andrew. “The Human Security Report Project: Background Paper”. Available from www.summeracademy2003.etc-
graz.at/preparation/ Human_Security_Report_Background_Paper.pdf. 2003. 24pp. Accessed 23 November 2003; pp. 4-8. 
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object of  security existed in Canadian academe, and that these efforts nevertheless did not 
exercise strong influence on the conceptualisation of  the human security agenda.  
The exchange between Axworthy and Nossal betrays a surprisingly negative view of  the 
academic community for a Minister who once belonged to that community himself—though 
not in the security domain. Canadian expatriate academic Keith Krause, together with the 
Canadian scholar Michael C. Williams, introduce the notion of  the individual as referent object 
in their contribution to the volume they edited on the critical approach to security studies866. 
While Canadian policymakers acknowledged that Krause’s later work on the small arms issue 
had led to fruitful co-operation with DFAIT, they admitted that the critical security studies 
approach had not been influential during the conceptualisation phase, despite the widespread 
use of  the volume in university syllabi worldwide within a few years of  its publication.  
In a more recent contribution to an edited volume on human security, Krause points out, as 
does Mack, that the concept embodies a logic considerably more closely linked to the 
development community than to that concerned with security867. The makeup of  the 
community of  experts around development contains a far higher percentage of  NGO 
representatives relative to the security-borne “epistemic community”. The provenance of  
much of  the human security logic from the development community, with its strong 
involvement from NGOs and lesser contribution from academics, only adds to the veracity of  
the equation of  Canada’s policymaking and academic communities with the two linguistic 
solitudes described by MacLellan almost 60 years ago. Academics in Canada faced challenges 
not only in terms of  the first two hypotheses upon which this project is based, but just as 
much in terms of  their ability to remain loyal to their own profession and concomitantly 
produce inputs of  significant normative resonance within the policymaking community during 
its conceptualisation of  the human security agenda. 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
In its latter sections, this chapter departs from the structure of  the previous two in 
highlighting the role of  NGOs as competitors with academics for influence in the security 
policy formulation process. Following an illustration of  how human security represents strong 
                                                 
866 Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams. “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of  Critical Security Studies”. In Krause, 
Keith and Michael C. Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases. Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, 
1997; pp. 33-60. See especially pp. 44ff.  
867 Krause, p. 83. 
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elements of  both continuity and innovation in Canadian foreign policy, the chapter goes on to 
show how in the case of  each of  the three sets of  variables in question, academic security 
experts were at a disadvantage in their search for influence with respect to NGOs.  
The opening section presents the antecedents of  human security on the Canadian foreign 
policy tradition, ranging from functionalism to middle power status and “niche diplomacy”. It 
further presents the financial conditions under which DFAIT operated, as well as the 
traditional tension between both the trade and foreign policy components of  DFAIT’s calling 
and between maintaining good relations with the United States and a natural inclination 
towards multilateralism. The academic reaction to these same factors is similarly discussed, by 
way of  laying the foundation for a discussion of  academic response to the human security 
agenda in the final analytical section on resonance.  
The analysis of  the uncertainty variable initiates the departure from the previous case study 
structure. Whereas the first hypothesis posits a given foreign ministry as the object of  change, 
reacting to varying conditions at the international or domestic levels, it rapidly becomes clear 
that—while its catalytic role largely remained the same as in the other two cases, the DFAIT 
team’s rhetorical use of  change and uncertainty came at a later point during the formulation 
process In a reversal of  the role of  the Brazilian and South African defence ministries in this 
respect, DFAIT portrayed itself  not as a reactive object of  change, but as a proactive force 
motrice in bringing into being a new conception of  security. As a result, the role of  events and 
changing trends at the international level took on a different significance; rather than serving as 
a catalyst for changing policymaker perceptions, in a reversal of  intended causality it served as 
a justification for perceptions that had already been altered.  
In a further break from the pattern used in investigating the Brazilian and South African 
cases, the Canadian analysis looks at the variables relevant to expert attributes posited in the 
second hypothesis in relation to both the academic security community and its NGO 
counterpart. In tracing the increasing formalisation of  relations between civil society and the 
Canadian foreign policy establishment over the last forty years, this section presents important 
fora for co-operation such as the CCIC, CIIPS, the CCFPD and the yearly peacebuilding 
consultations that have taken place for over a decade.  
The increased participation of  civil society in the name of  “democratising” foreign policy 
has certainly led to the increased representativity of  the policy formulation process; this 
representativity has proved detrimental, however, to the status of  specialised knowledge as a 
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means of  gaining access to the policy sphere. This finding reveals the basis of  specialised 
knowledge in the assumed importance of  specific elites in policy formulation. Of  relevance 
here is Checkel’s finding that where access is limited, it is difficult to gain entry, though once an 
analyst has entered, influence is more easily attained; conversely, where access is more open, 
many analysts may contribute, but the competition for influence is displaced to within the 
formulation process.  
The “democratisation” of  Canadian foreign policy has increased access and opened the 
policy process, and placed academic analysts squarely in competition with NGOs. This 
competition centres on the role of  specialised knowledge in its various manifestations. In their 
relationship to NGOs, academics’ advantage lies in the provision of  theoretical specialised 
knowledge geared towards influencing the conceptual elements of  policy, while NGOs 
typically are able to provide practical inputs based on field experience that academics do not 
possess. Field experience revealed itself  to be of  particular importance during the agenda-
setting phase of  the policy process. In the case of  the human security agenda, the DFAIT team 
itself  engaged in the conceptualisation process and spearheaded the transition of  the agenda 
from the precursor issues to an overarching concept.  
The academics’ disadvantage was exacerbated by the fact that in a majority of  cases, the 
foreign policy establishment had already latched onto these precursor issues as a result of  
NGOs’ exercising further attributes academics struggle to attain: the ability to mobilise broad 
constituencies and to raise funds. Additionally, in the course of  becoming involved in such 
issues as landmines and small arms, DFAIT sought technical advice from NGOs. Here, the 
requirement for a policy input to be cogent to a bounded policy problem again worked in the 
NGOs’ favour, as several DFAIT policymakers noted that both in this phase and during that 
of  conceptualising the human security agenda, academics’ inputs did not evince the necessary 
tailoring and relevance to the problems on which their efforts were focussed.  
Institutionalised prestige retained very little importance as a selection criterion for potential 
collaborating experts. Most DFAIT officials flatly rejected both prestige within the discipline 
and that of  the discipline itself  as salient factors in their thinking, though one did note the 
importance of  a minimum of  reputation in verifying the potential quality of  possible inputs. 
This same policymaker noted that DFAIT often sought—particularly within the framework of  
the ongoing consultation processes—a satisfying geographical repartition of  participants, 
which again works against the notion that proximity to the federal capital (inasmuch as it 
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contributes to increased possibilities for influence) works in favour of  analysts possessing that 
attribute. In sum, the prominent role of  NGOs has detracted from the importance of  the 
variables specific to the second hypothesis in determining academics’ access to the policy 
process.  
In the context of  inputs’ resonance, the nature of  DFAIT’s conceptualisation process for 
the human security agenda—that is, rendering implementable a previously vague notion while 
seeking to find commonalities between precursor issues—clearly placed a premium on 
practical rather than theoretical specialised knowledge. Resonance correlated to a high degree 
with the extent to which submissions related clearly to issues surrounding implementation. By 
the advent of  the conceptualisation phase, policymaker preferences had already been strongly 
shaped by interaction with NGOs in dealing with such precursor issues as landmines, small 
arms, war-affected children, and the desired creation of  an International Criminal Court.  
At that juncture, very little work had been done within the academic security studies 
community using human security as a point of  departure. Coupled with DFAIT’s own role in 
the development of  the human security concept and the attendant clear definition of  its 
preferences and the desired output, this hampered academics’ ability to produce input with a 
high degree of  normative resonance. Such remained the case despite what DFAIT officials 
describe as extensive efforts to engage with and include the academic community in the 
conceptualisation process.  
The present analysis of  the case of  the human security agenda in Canada demonstrates that 
while the variables under investigation retained their importance, academics’ influence 
remained limited due to the prominent role of  NGOs. The shift in the relationship between 
these two elements of  civil society to a competition for access in front of  the door to the 
policy process to one for influence behind it clearly worked in favour of  NGOs. The 
determinant factors largely remained the same—even, to some extent, academics’ possession 
of  these attributes; however, at crucial junctures NGOs possessed these same attributes to a 
greater extent or in a more immediately applicable way, consequently relegating—
comparatively speaking—the academic community to the sidelines in the early stages of  the 
human security formulation process.  
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Conclusions  
  
 
“On résiste à l'invasion des armées;  
on ne résiste pas à l'invasion des idées”. 
—Victor Hugo, Histoire d’un crime—  
 
 
“Advice is like snow; the softer it falls,  
the longer it dwells upon,  
and the deeper it sinks into the mind”.  
—Samuel Taylor Coleridge— 
 
 
The present investigation has set out to shed light on the factors governing the degree of  
influence academic security experts are able to exercise on the formulation of  national security 
policy in the respective cases of  Brazil, South Africa and Canada. In looking at a specific set of  
variables for each of  its three hypotheses, the project is able to answer both this immediate 
question and a set of  more general ancillary questions to do with the relationship between 
experts and those in government and the issue of  policy relevance. The findings are resumed 
here followed by final observations.  
The three countries chosen as case studies provided ample data allowing for each 
hypothesis and its attendant variables to be adequately explored. The cases share important 
commonalities, many deriving naturally from the manner in which the cases were selected; yet 
it is their differences that grant the investigation greater explanatory power. Whereas the 
Brazilian and South African cases exhibit many similarities in the societal and economic realms, 
particularly with regard to the degree of  development of  civil-military relations—and its 
divisive effect on academics’ target audience of  policymakers—in many aspects the Canadian 
case presents a different scenario.  
Canada’s greater extent of  civilian control and more fully-developed tradition of  
international involvement, coupled with its higher degree of  economic and academic 
development, presented Canadian academics with a fundamentally different playing field (with 
respect to entering the policy formulation process) than that of  their counterparts in less 
developed Brazil and South Africa. This is especially true of  the level of  development of  
CSOs and the ensuing higher level of  competition between academics and non-academic 
NGOs, which are nearly absent the security sphere in the cases from the Southern 
Hemisphere. The cases also evince important commonalities with respect to individual 
variables, many of  them linked to all three states’ status as “middle powers”. Certain events at 
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the level of  international politics, such as the end of  the Cold War and of  communism as a 
force casting reflections in foreign and security policy, obtain in all three cases.  
The variables relevant to the first two hypotheses are less case-specific than the 
contextually-dependent normative preferences of  individual actors that the third hypothesis 
calls for the researcher to identify. The differences between the Canadian case on the one 
hand, and the South African and Brazilian on the other, provide the opportunity to compare 
situations in which for each variable, the differences are sufficient to produce significantly 
varying results. Thus, it is possible to compare the effects of  variance in conditions such as 
civilian control and the societal role of  the military, as well as the distance of  academic 
structures from global centres of  production and the relative age and degree of  
institutionalisation of  the fields of  International Relations and security studies.  
Further, the results of  the investigation reveal the extent to which the hypotheses are 
interconnected. These connections, such as that between uncertainty and the possession of  
specialised knowledge, and between theoretical specialised knowledge and political resonance, 
are dealt with in detail as each hypothesis is discussed below. The study’s findings permit the 
identification of  individual linkages where they occur; they do not suffice, however, to 
establish systematic and general claims as to how these linkages obtain. 
The first of  the claims upon which this investigation is based concerns the role of  
uncertainty in opening the policy formulation process to actors from outside the immediately 
competent bureaucratic bodies. Uncertainty is posited as deriving from changes at either the 
international or domestic levels, and as additionally leading to a realisation of  inadequate 
capacity on the part of  policymakers to fashion appropriate policy responses. The study’s 
argument views uncertainty as a theoretical assumption borne out in the corpora of  literature 
that provide its basis. Nevertheless, substantial empirical evidence does exist in each case to 
illustrate first that uncertainty was indeed perceived by policymakers, and second, that it did 
indeed serve to open otherwise closed policy processes to outside inputs.  
What is measured here in the search for uncertainty is not an objectively quantifiable extent 
of  change in international or domestic factors, but rather the perception on the part of  
policymakers that structural alterations at either level—creating the need for policy 
adjustments—have taken place. The relevant data are thus, in addition to indicators of  change 
itself, either private (gathered in interviews) or public statements from policymakers that this 
perception has in fact taken hold.  
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Uncertainty 
The end of  the Cold War and of  “real existing socialism” led in all three cases to a 
perception of  change at the international level that called for an adaptive policy response; the 
theoretical assumption of  uncertainty’s role in opening formulation processes was borne out. 
In the Brazilian context, it is difficult to disassociate the changes at the international level from 
those at the domestic level, though it is clear that both did have a role to play in bringing about 
perceptions that a change in policy was necessary. These changes at both levels dealt a dual 
blow to the Brazilian Armed Forces’ sense of  mission and to their ability to maintain a strong 
internal role in politics. The end of  the Cold War rendered obsolete the Army’s declared 
mission of  involvement in internal politics to combat the threat of  communist insurrection.  
A further important component of  traditional military planning was upended by the 
advancing regional integration process under Mercosul; there was clear discord between 
Argentina’s status as a close ally and trading partner and the military view of  it as a principal 
threat. The military’s concentration of  troops on Brazil’s southern border and the ongoing 
training in the military for an attack by Buenos Aires lost its rationale. Linking the international 
and domestic levels, the period under investigation in Brazil (1996-2002) must also be viewed 
as covering the aftermath of  the end of  the military dictatorship and the adjustments—
particularly in the area of  civil-military relations—that ensued.  
The unresolved state of  civil-military relations in Brazil split the defence policy 
establishment between uniformed and civilian decisionmakers, who each had clearly divergent 
aims. In this period of  uncertainty, military officials sought to define missions that permitted 
the armed forces to retain their privileged and interventionist role in politics, while civilian 
bureaucrats sought to do just the opposite, establishing once and for all democratic control 
over the monopoly on force.  
The South African case saw a similar division, with civilian and military security 
policymakers moving in opposite directions in a situation of  uncertainty. The breadth of  the 
chasm was less, however, as the degree of  militarisation of  society and of  military prerogatives 
in apartheid-era South African politics never reached the extent of  Brazil’s ditadura. 
Furthermore, the South African military establishment did not seek to retain the same extent 
of  interventionist role as its Brazilian counterpart.   
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With the advent of  South Africa’s Government of  National Unity, all involved defence 
policymakers and experts had seen international and domestic events totally revamp the 
normative foundations of  their security policy. The ANC and MK’s Marxist theory had been 
robbed of  its legitimacy (and funding) by the fall of  the Soviet Union; condemnation of  
SADF doctrine and of  the last remnants of  Total Strategy was even stronger. The specificity 
of  the South African case is that it outlines a possible second phase that obtains in some cases 
of  strong changes at the international or domestic levels: a lack of  policymaking capacity 
within a policy establishment can exacerbate perceptions of  uncertainty and open the 
formulation process very quickly.  
During the South African transition to democracy, the old had died before the new was 
born. Whereas the SADF possessed considerable advantages in practical specialised 
knowledge, this expertise was delegitimised by its connection to a theoretical doctrine based on 
minority rule. And while the ANC and MK enjoyed widespread normative acceptance and 
democratic legitimacy, they possessed neither practical specialised knowledge nor a workable 
set of  theoretical bases for security policy.  
The South African case illustrates with particular clarity the impact of  uncertainty on 
efforts to develop specialised knowledge; it focuses on the capacity gap ensuing from 
uncertainty-inducing international events that rendered inappropriate previously valid 
theoretical knowledge. In these two cases, both official documents (public and confidential) 
and interviews with policymakers revealed that these events had led to uncertainty and to the 
realisation that unchanged standard operating procedure, without outside help, would lead to 
continued inadequate policy.  
The case of  the formulation of  the concept of  human security in Canada presents a 
different situation entirely. The claim put forth in the present investigation is based upon a 
progression from a domestic or international change to a changed perception in the minds of  
policymakers. Thus, policymakers’ perceptions are seen as the object of  change following 
shifts in measurable indicators of  international structural variables. In the Canadian case, 
uncertainty’s rhetorical significance is located at a different point in the formulation process. 
While such perceptions, particularly concerning Canada’s continuing status as a “middle 
power” able to “punch above its weight”, clearly played a role in Ottawa’s policymakers’ search 
for a new paradigm, international-level change (in the form of  arguments that the nature of  
war had changed) as well as domestic considerations (budget constraints) made their 
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appearance in public statements only once the response had been formulated, as a justification 
for choices already made. DFAIT policymakers—with the assistance of  certain NGOs—
embarked on the reconceptualisation of  Canadian foreign policy first, and only later made 
mention of  international change to bolster their case for the new human paradigm.  
Human security resulted in part from efforts to find a common conceptual roof  for 
precursor issues such as landmines and child soldiers, which had been brought to prominence 
on the DFAIT agenda through interaction with NGOs. Once the concept had been put into 
place, events on the international stage were presented as providing justification for a new 
approach. DFAIT thus acted as the instigator, not the object, of  change.  
This belated (in terms of  the role for uncertainty assumed in the relevant literature) 
appearance can be ascribed to the fact that an associated tacit assumption did not hold true. 
The project’s model implicitly assumes that when unforeseen changes at either level place 
policymakers before a dilemma that their combined specialised knowledge cannot solve, they 
turn to the academic community, which harbours a larger and more broadly-based body of  
specialised knowledge from which the relevant lessons can be drawn. In other words, 
policymakers make use of  greater untapped policy formulation capacity in the academic 
community to alleviate a capacity gap. Canadian policymakers did not suffer from a capacity 
gap; in fact they possessed greater capacity to engage in a wholesale reconceptualisation of  
security than was present in the Canadian academic security studies community—at least that 
part of  the community inclined to produce normatively resonant output.  
In summary, then, uncertainty is empirically shown to play an important role in opening 
policy processes to outside inputs in the given cases. In keeping with the usage of  uncertainty 
as a circumscription for the positioning of  ideational factors alongside, not as a replacement 
for, structural factors, concrete changes at both the international and domestic levels led to 
perceptions of  uncertainty—in the form of  the realisation of  the inadequacy of  current 
policy—on the part of  policymakers. Structural change acted as a catalyst for ideational 
change.  
Therefore it can be said that the chain of  events posited with regard to uncertainty—a 
progression from material changes in the makeup of  the international scene to changed 
perceptions (of  inadequate policy response), and from there to a capacity gap and the opening 
of  the policy process to outside possessors of  knowledge—did occur in the expected form in 
the Brazilian and South African cases. The role of  domestic change in the South African case 
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only underscores the explanatory power of  this variable and its ensuing effects. The hypothesis 
speaks of  a combination of  domestic and international events leading to changed perceptions.  
The greater the sum of  such changes, the greater the likelihood that the process will be 
opened and the greater the extent of  the opening itself. In relative terms, the South African 
case demonstrates this association cleanly; here, the magnitude of  the changes at both levels 
combined was the greatest, as was, accordingly, the involvement of  outside actors in 
formulating national security policy. The Canadian experience simply underscores in negative 
fashion the correlation between policymakers’ uncertainty and the search for remedy through 
recourse to external specialised knowledge. In the three cases studied, where uncertainty 
obtained and greater specialised knowledge existed outside the policy community, the halls of  
power were opened; where greater specialised knowledge existed within the policy bureaucracy 
itself, such steps were not immediately taken.  
The position of  specialised knowledge as a remedy for uncertainty shows the 
interconnectedness of  this project’s first and second hypotheses. That second set of  
assumptions binds specialised knowledge together with a set of  other factors such as 
institutionalised prestige, cogency and normatively-based argumentation to provide a picture 
of  the attributes external experts must possess in order to enhance their chances at 
participation in policy formulation.  
 
Policymaker attributes 
Two attributes and two required types of  action enhance experts’ chances at influencing 
policy. Actors with a sufficient combination of  specialised knowledge and institutionalised 
prestige are more likely to enjoy privileged access to the policy world, and are most likely to 
enjoy success for their inputs if  these exhibit cogency to a bounded policy problem as well as a 
certain component of  normatively-based reasoning. Specialised knowledge is perhaps the most 
salient among these characteristics, and played a determinant role in academics’ success in all 
three cases. 
Specialised knowledge comes in either practical or theoretical form. Practical specialised 
knowledge consists of  technical knowledge of  military means and of  the strategic posture of  
countries relevant to the strategic assessment of  an analyst’s home country. Furthermore, 
practical specialised knowledge assumes familiarity with the bureaucratic démarches of  making 
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security policy, and of  the parochial political and institutional interests involved. This form of  
specialised knowledge is comparatively free of  normative assessments.  
The ability of  a given national academic community to develop this type of  specialised 
knowledge depends highly on the degree of  transparency of  the national military 
establishment, where much of  the requisite information originates. The extent of  this 
transparency is an oft-used indicator of  the degree of  civilian control exercised over the armed 
forces in a given polity. One can thus assume that where the democratic control of  the armed 
forces is weakly established, a side effect will be the lack of  practical specialised knowledge on 
defence issues in the relevant strata of  civil society, including academe. This was very clearly 
shown to be the case in Brazil and South Africa. 
Theoretical specialised knowledge enjoys considerably more likelihood of  serving as a 
criterion for the involvement of  academic analysts in policy formulation. This form of  
specialised knowledge is more normatively infused and less dependent on national context, 
consisting of  ideas and concepts that serve to frame possible courses of  action, to link issues, 
and to provide a “big picture” or holistic view of  the trade-offs involved in making policy. In 
the area of  security studies, theoretical specialised knowledge is grounded predominantly in the 
theories and concepts of  the international academic disciplines of  IR and security studies, 
though its applicability depends on academics’ ability to render it cogent to well-defined policy 
problems.  
Academics’ ability to develop this form of  specialised knowledge depends on the degree of  
institutionalisation of  these disciplines in their country and on the disciplines’ relative degree 
of  peripheralness with regard to the “centres of  production” of  these international disciplines 
in North America and Western Europe. Conversely, academics may act to counter these factors 
by personal effort, although in these cases they bear the onus of  rendering applicable foreign 
theories to their own national context. Particularly in the case of  Brazil, this responsibility 
highlights the need for cogency in policy inputs. 
The Brazilian case provides a strong example of  how academics’ accumulation of  both 
practical and theoretical specialised knowledge is hampered by the factors listed above. Almost 
all observers of  the Brazilian national debate on defence issues lament the lack of  expertise 
present in civil society with respect to military matters. Several, such as Domício Proença 
Júnior and Menezes, place the blame for this squarely on the Armed Forces. Three factors 
contribute to this situation: the incomplete establishment of  civilian control over the military, 
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allowing a lack of  transparency and information flow from the military establishment to 
continue; the continued impact of  a ubiquitous doctrine that is explicitly designed to define the 
contours of  the debate on military matters; and marginalising tactics engaged in by institutions 
connected to the development and teaching of  this doctrine.  
Accordingly, not only is the content of  the DSN designed to present itself  as the sole 
source of  legitimate specialised knowledge on military matters, but active measures are 
undertaken by ESG and the military education system to maintain this monopoly by shaping 
the very language used to discuss security in Brazil. One military officer involved in teaching 
the DSN explicitly refers to attempts to define the language used in security discourse; Proença 
describes the result as a military “monopoly on competence”.  
In the case of  practical specialised knowledge, the Brazilian case is an ironic one for many 
researchers: within Brazil itself, information on foreign military forces is more accessible than 
that on their Brazilian counterparts; simultaneously, information on the Brazilian Armed 
Forces is more readily available outside Brazil than within the country itself. This lack of  
transparency is a direct result of  the Armed Forces’ policy, which has until now been allowed 
to continue due to the incompleteness of  the establishment of  civilian control. With the 
advent of  the Ministry of  Defence and its nascent plans to produce a Brazilian White Paper on 
Defence, this is likely to change in the future, though likely only at the glacial pace that 
characterises much policy change in Brasília.  
With regard to theoretical specialised knowledge, explicit steps have been taken to 
dismantle the hegemony of  ESG and the DSN over the defence debate in Brazil. The MD has 
taken a leading role in this process, seeking to engage civil society, co-operate with universities, 
reform ESG, and to creating its own internal research centre for defence issues as well as a 
Secretariat for Studies and Cooperation. A series of  Round Tables held by the MD with the 
participation of  numerous academics during 2003-2004 has brought positive results in this 
respect, although the impact on policy remains to be seen.  
The military establishment’s lack of  transparency played a similar role in inhibiting the 
development of  practical specialised knowledge within the South African academic security 
community. Here, however, it was less a matter of  establishing a system of  military teaching 
centres instilling the doctrine (although this did exist in a less preponderant form than in 
Brazil) than of  co-opting extant civilian research centres on defence issues, which were (and 
largely still are) not present in Brazil.  
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In South Africa, the degree of  militarisation of  politics and society, while pronounced, did 
not attain the same levels as in the formal takeover of  power by the Armed Forces in Brazil. 
Nevertheless, the academic study of  defence issues within the country was limited to research 
centres aligned with Total Strategy, such as ISSUP. Many of  the progressive academics who 
later became security experts began their focus on defence studies during the transition itself, 
or, in cases where their studies began while minority rule was still in effect, in exile.  
The 1990 Lusaka meeting between progressive academics and members of  the SADF 
revealed the academics’ glaring lack of  specialised knowledge, to the extent that the military 
participants bluntly told some academics “you have no idea what you’re talking about”. This 
served as a catalyst for the swift creation of  such specialised knowledge, practically ex nihilo, 
and for the formation of  the Military Research Group. This grouping united ANC and MK 
leaders with academics who had taken an interest in defence issues. While these academics 
certainly possessed the progressive leanings and focus on development that echoed the 
government’s preferences, they did not have the technical specialised knowledge (particularly 
familiarity with the tools of  the military trade and with the vicissitudes of  the policy process 
itself) needed to transform these proclivities into successful policy inputs right away.  
The ability to develop feasible policy options came as a result of  policymakers’ 
communicating to the group’s academic members their concrete needs, which were then 
fashioned into policy inputs through a combination of  technical know-how with the hitherto 
less cogently-applied theoretical specialised knowledge possessed by the academics. The South 
African case illustrates the need for the two types of  specialised knowledge to be coupled for 
successful inputs to be produced. Theoretical specialised knowledge was largely the domain of  
the same military personnel and co-opted researchers that had served the apartheid regime; 
tapping this source was complicated by normative legitimacy issues due to apartheid 
academics’ association with the previous government. Concomitantly, those in possession of  
politically acceptable theoretical specialised knowledge did not possess the practical 
counterpart required to infuse their suggestions with the necessary cogency to policy.  
The Canadian case produced results highlighting two particular aspects of  specialised 
knowledge. The first is the basis of  the power of  specialised knowledge in its exclusivity, an 
inherently undemocratic virtue that came to light only in the Canadian case due to that 
country’s level of  democratic consolidation, which is significantly higher than that of  South 
Africa and Brazil. The second underscores the presence of  other forms of  specialised 
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knowledge such as field experience and the mobilisation of  political constituencies. The 
importance of  political mobilisation again depends on the specificity of  Canada’s higher 
degree of  democratisation, while the other cases provide evidence for the limitations on the 
types of  specialised knowledge that academics can hope to possess. This finding also highlights 
academics’ ensuing disadvantage vis-à-vis other actors from civil society, such as NGOs, when 
forms of  knowledge favouring the latter are more in demand from the policy sphere.  
DFAIT policymakers identified NGOs’ field experience and capacity for political 
mobilisation as key factors for including them in when formulating Canadian policy on the 
precursor issues to human security, such as landmines and war-affected children. In a 
statement that underscores the increased likelihood that academics will contribute theoretical, 
rather than practical, specialised knowledge (which is more readily and reliably available 
elsewhere), Don Hubert indicated that NGOs were turned to for practical specialised 
knowledge—based on field experience—before beginning serious conceptual work on human 
security. Academics, on the other hand, were called upon during the process to provide 
conceptual and ideational inputs. Whereas NGOs were in possession of  practical specialised 
knowledge during the precursor period, when DFAIT turned to the academic community for 
theoretical support for the human security paradigm, very little theoretical work had been 
conducted in the relevant vein in academic security studies. The contribution was therefore not 
of  the same magnitude.  
Like the Brazilian case, the Canadian experience illustrates the fact that specialised 
knowledge only functions as a factor in selecting outside experts for possible inclusion when 
policymakers perceive that the necessary specialised knowledge is more readily available 
outside the policy establishment than within. In Brazil, military policymakers depended too 
heavily on a doctrine that ultimately did not provide sufficiently updated concepts and thus 
adequate theoretical specialised knowledge, but they did not turn to outside help because of  
the doctrine’s claims to self-sufficiency. In the Canadian case, DFAIT policymakers also did 
not perceive outside assistance to be necessary, though in the latter case this because enough 
specialised knowledge had been gleaned from the NGO’s and enough theoretical specialised 
knowledge existed within the policymaking bureaucracy.  
The major difference between the Canadian case and its two southern counterparts—and 
this first becomes salient in the realm of  specialised knowledge—is that of  the presence or 
lack of  serious competition from other civil society actors for influence in the policy process, 
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and the role in determining their presence of  the level of  democratisation of  a given country’s 
polity. As noted above, the power of  specialised knowledge to gain academics credibility is 
based upon its exclusivity, bolstered by consensus among a recognised community of  experts.  
Exclusivity vests the criterion of  access with a fundamentally anti-democratic quality. In 
states in which the democratic imperative—manifest as broad public participation in the policy 
process—is not strongly developed, the exclusivity of  specialised knowledge and the closed 
nature of  the process are mutually reinforcing. So long as policymakers share the notion that 
the criterion limiting access coincides with academics’ advantages, such as specialised 
knowledge, these actors stand a greater chance of  influencing policy outcomes. However, 
where access is not as limited and the number of  involved actors is not only greater, but 
derives its right to participate from fundamentally different imperatives, specialised knowledge 
loses its impact as a criterion that favours academics.  
In this correlation, the degree of  public participation in policymaking parallels the degree 
of  decentralisation in Checkel’s model of  access to policymaking. In highly centralised 
decisionmaking systems, as in systems with a low degree of  public consultation, initial access 
to the centres of  decisionmaking is difficult, but once the Prince’s ear has been lent, the 
likelihood of  influence is relatively high. In decentralised systems, as in policy processes open 
to the public, access is gained fairly easily, but it leads to far stronger competition. Influence 
must be fought for at a later stage at which access has already been gained.  
Thanks to the consultation and “democratisation” processes of  Canadian foreign policy, the 
Canadian case resembles the second of  these two possibilities and the other two cases the first. 
Because in Brazil and South Africa, the policy process was less open and less transparent, 
NGOs and non-academic civil society actors were virtually absent; public consultations for the 
South African Defence White Paper produced relatively few usable inputs. 
A great lack of  transparency hampers the formation of  specialised knowledge in the 
academic community; however, “too much” transparency is even more detrimental to 
academics’ position in the policy process, as the exclusivity of  their specialised knowledge, 
upon which their privilege is based, is eroded when the information is available to a greater 
number of  competitors. In this sense, divergences in factors that increase transparency, such as 
access to advanced means of  telecommunication, contribute to explaining the differences 
between the Canadian case and the other two. The distinction between the Canadian case on 
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the one hand, and Brazil and South Africa on the other is upheld in the area of  
institutionalised prestige as well.  
 
Institutionalised prestige  
Though specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige act in tandem to dictate 
academic experts’ chances of  gaining access to policy formulation processes, prestige appears 
to play a subordinated role to specialised knowledge. The balance between these two factors is 
related to the level of  democratisation of  a given nation’s polity in a dual fashion, both 
indirectly and directly. Indirectly, institutionalised prestige enjoys greater significance as a 
selection criterion relative to specialised knowledge when a lack of  transparency in information 
flow from the military establishment renders more difficult the accumulation of  specialised 
knowledge by academics. In a more direct fashion, prestige plays a lesser role in more 
thoroughly democratised societies; the egalitarian nature of  these societies militates in favour 
of  the ideational content of  inputs rather than the place in a hierarchy of  their provenance.  
Canada presents the clearest example of  this phenomenon; a senior DFAIT official 
declared flatly that one salient indicator of  prestige—institutional affiliation—was irrelevant 
compared with the quality of  a potential advisor’s input. Institutional affiliation is a secondary 
indicator of  the degree of  institutionalisation enjoyed by the university system generally—and 
IR and security studies specifically—in a national context. As such affiliation functions as one 
of  two measures of  institutionalised prestige, the other being the standing of  an individual 
expert within her discipline.  
In the three cases studied, the explanatory power of  the prestige of  a discipline works 
predominantly in a negative fashion: as might be assumed, where the prestige of  the academic 
endeavour is lessened, association with it loses its power to catapult academics onto 
policymakers’ “radar screen”, whereas where the “ivory tower” retains prestige as an institution 
in civil society, it allows them to take their place alongside other potential advisors, and 
individual prestige within a given community of  specialists rises in importance.  
The Brazilian case provides an excellent opportunity for measuring the prestige of  the 
academic endeavour as it relates to other sources of  prestige; it likewise provides a measure of  
the individual’s reputation within the academy. This possibility is presented by the data taken 
from the inputs from the Experts’ Commission and the ensuing travaux préparatoires for the 
modernisation of  national defence policy.  
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According to the MD official in charge of  the selection process, academics were first 
selected for consideration on the basis of  evidence of  published work and recommendations 
from colleagues, both elements of  prestige within their respective disciplines. The final texts, 
however, belie a preference for the input of  the Commission’s non-academic members, a sign 
that the prestige of, for example, retired military personnel outweighed that of  representatives 
of  the university system. This is consistent with the dependence of  disciplinary prestige on 
both internal consensus and particularly the extent of  institutionalisation. Brazilian universities 
enjoy prestige as “the brains of  the nation” and clearly fulfil an elite-producing function; 
however, IR and especially security studies are very weakly institutionalised and show at best 
embryonic levels of  theoretical sophistication. The first IR programme of  study was founded 
in 1985, and the first Ph.D. programme in 2001; these programmes have not yet had the 
chance to gain prestige in what broadly remains a socially static polity.  
The South African case presents a similar scenario, with specialised knowledge taking 
precedence over prestige as an inclusion criterion for potential advisors. The products of  the 
established—and co-opted—security research centres enjoyed little prestige after the switch to 
majority rule on account of  their association with the state, which demonstrates the secondary 
role of  normative resonance in determining prestige. Many MRG members held degrees in 
other disciplines, such as sociology, or obtained their academic training and degrees only after 
they became involved with defence issues.  
Neither the prestige of  the fields, nor analysts’ stature within them, seem to be clear 
determinants of  South African academics’ later influence; here, instead, specialised knowledge 
clearly took the upper hand. Prestige of  a type related to normative resonance, however, played 
a very important role, in the form of  “struggle credentials”. This must be seen, however, not 
as prestige as posited in this investigation’s explanatory scheme, but rather as an intervening 
variable.  
In short, prestige plays a subordinate role to specialised knowledge, and only is only a 
salient factor in polities where hierarchy plays a greater role than egalitarianism. The prestige 
of  a given discipline and the relative individual prestige of  its members act at chronologically 
distinct phases of  the selection process, as the Experts’ Commission results imply: individual 
reputation acts partially to determine initial selection, whereas the academy’s lack of  prestige 
can sabotage academics’ opportunities for influence in cases of  co-opted or under-
institutionalised university systems or IR/security studies subfields. 
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Cogency 
The discussion of  cogency marks the transition from the attributes potential advisors must 
possess to attain influence to those they must show during the policy process itself  in order to 
ensure the success of  their inputs. This marks the critical point in the progression of  the 
hypotheses from structural variables to a preoccupation with ideational content.  
The reward structures of  the academic and policy worlds often work at cross purposes; if  
an academic seeks to become an actor in the policy realm, the onus is on her to “bridge” that 
“gap”, in George’s words. This further underscores the point that the selection process is a 
one-way street: academics must tailor their inputs to the policy process and cannot depend on 
busy policymakers to sift out the important sections from a lengthy, academic-style input.  
In order for the requirement of  cogency to be met, however, and as a side effect of  the 
unidirectional selection process, policymakers must communicate their criteria for cogency 
clearly. As cogency is a function of  policymakers’ requirements being met, bureaucrats must let 
academics and others know exactly what they want; otherwise the interaction is condemned to 
futility. 
The South African and Brazilian cases present opposite outcomes of  the interaction 
between clear communication from policymakers and the consequent ability of  policymakers 
to furnish suggestions with a high degree of  relevance to practical policy problems. In the 
South African case, MRG members were in constant contact with decisionmakers in both the 
executive and legislative branches; the latter communicated clearly the practical needs of  the 
executive branch planners as well as lawmakers’ normative commitments. As a result, MRG 
members were able to provide demonstrably highly relevant inputs and other information to 
the policy process, which were later taken up, in some cases verbatim, into declaratory policy. 
One example consists of  the early MRG research reports written by Rocky Williams, which are 
clearly positioned as inputs seeking to fill gaps in policymakers’ specialised knowledge.  
The case of  the Brazilian Experts’ Commission presents the other extreme. Many of  the 
inputs provided by the Commission’s members show minimal cogency to the goals of  the 
policy reformulation process, if  any at all. Some contributions inexplicably retell the history of  
the creation of  the MD, some others consist of  theoretical bases which are not placed in any 
explicit relation to policy concerns, while still others consist of  extremely generalist threat 
scenarios. All in all, the analysis of  the texts revealed that the Experts’ Commission yielded—
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relative to the inputs submitted, particularly with respect to other sources of  information used 
to establish the document—very little of  use in terms of  what found its way into the MSDN.  
Almost all of  the 19 submissions have different titles and main subject matters, each one a 
divergent interpretation of  the Ministry’s original request regarding the topic of  the desired 
advice. The original request was for assistance in “delineating a modern system of  defence 
allowing the country to respond to eventual threats in the military arena”. The lack of  
definition of  this request explains the great variety in the responses provided and the 
consequently limited “targetedness”, or cogency, of  their content.  
The Canadian case illustrates how—by means of  clearly expressed needs determining 
cogency—different phases of  the policy process can favour one form of  specialised 
knowledge over the other. In the case of  the single issues that preceded the human security 
agenda, DFAIT sought practical specialised knowledge from NGOs, only later turning to 
theoretical specialised knowledge from academics in a more conceptually-oriented phase of  
the formulation process.  
As has been noted, the results of  the academic enterprise favour theoretical over practical 
specialised knowledge. Since cogency often relates to how well academics are able to bridge the 
gap between academic rewards and the needs of  the policy process, the criterion of  cogency 
often centres on practical issues such as programme delivery and implementation. In this 
sense, at least in the Canadian case, the inclusion of  practical specialised knowledge is more 
likely to confer cogency upon a policy input than its theoretical counterpart. As the divergent 
degrees of  success of  the academic and NGO communities in Canada show, this places 
academics at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other outside actors whose inclusion rests on other 
criteria.  
 
Normative argumentation 
In the latter phases of  the policy process, the disadvantage to academics can be undone 
through effective normative argumentation in favour of  a given proposal, which in turn rests 
upon the theoretical specialised knowledge favoured by scholars. This condition marks the 
definite step away from the presumption of  scientific neutrality. It implies that rather than 
serving the function of  simply generating different possible policy options, academics increase 
their probability of  leaving a mark on policy if  they argue in favour of  one option among 
several on grounds derived from normative commitments rather than scientific results.  
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This variable revealed itself  to be the most difficult to investigate, as doing so entails 
gaining access to detailed policy documentation for the latter stages of  a policy process. Such 
documentation was not available in Brazil, as the policy formulation process has not yet in fact 
reached these stages but rather remains at an embryonic stage of  confidential documents that 
have yet even to cross the President’s desk. That the post of  Defence Minister has become 
somewhat of  a revolving door of  late has not helped the situation. Evidence on the impact of  
normative argumentation in the Canadian case is limited to one senior DFAIT official’s 
statement of  preference for normatively-based argumentation, as it reveals normative agendas 
that might otherwise be hidden; this preference, however, presupposes that policymakers 
themselves bear the responsibility for deciding which inputs will be selected and must 
themselves sort out normative from technical advice. 
Fortunately, the South African case does provide an extensive example of  normative 
argumentation and its effect on influence. It illustrates again the importance of  the clear 
communication by policymakers of  what their normative commitments are, so that inputs can 
be submitted which enjoy a greater cogency to those commitments—better described in this 
case as normative resonance, the subject of  the third hypothesis. In democratic systems, these 
normative commitments, often present in the platforms on which governments are elected—
are more likely to be publicly accessible and commonly known than the nature of  the 
immediate policy problems whose communication is necessary for the tailoring of  technically 
cogent policy inputs.  
In the South African case, one particular avenue of  normative argumentation proved to 
possess a great deal of  convincing power: linking a proposal to its role in increasing 
democratic legitimacy (or representativeness) led to the success of  several MRG initiatives. 
This finding again reveals the duality of  the audience faced by potential advisors: military and 
civilian policymakers may evince considerably different normative preferences. Beyond those 
preferences themselves, the positivist underpinnings of  much military training predisposed at 
least one South African policymaker to take recourse to the classic marginalising tactic of  
claiming rationality—or neutrality—for one’s own view and political or normative motivation 
for that of  another. A result of  this kind constitutes the first step towards demonstrating the 
link between the second and third hypotheses: normative forms of  argumentation will only 
work if  their conclusions resonate with the viewpoint of  the target audience.  
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Normative resonance and synthesis 
The need for normative resonance places academic advisors before the final step in making 
the transition from putatively neutral scientificity to open advocacy. This investigation has 
divided its analysis into first the elucidation of  the normative preferences of  both 
policymakers and of  outside advisors; and second on identifying the locus at which the 
synthesis of  these viewpoints into a definitive declaratory document takes place. In the sense 
in which they are posited here—as elements of  a synthesis with another set of  
commitments—policymaker preferences derive from three main concerns: general political 
and normative viewpoints, policy preferences, and immediate expediency, which derives from 
parochial concerns such as bureaucratic politics or intra-organisational competition between 
office or individuals.  
Academics’ preferences do not necessarily derive from any higher set of  motives; the inputs 
these experts proffer may seek to vindicate the stance taken by a scholar within his profession 
through “real-world” success. Finally, as the treatment of  the second hypothesis above has 
shown, the selection process both for actors and later for inputs remains a one-way street: 
inclusion occurs at the pleasure of  the policymaker, and it is with her that the process of  
synthesis begins and ends.  
In Brazil and South Africa, civil-military relations and the bifurcation of  the policymaking 
establishment once again play an important role, presenting advisors with a heterogeneous set 
of  preferences. The relationship to the policymaking principal takes on added importance, as 
do her proclivities with regard to the value of  academic inputs, and the strength of  her 
position vis-à-vis attempts by the armed forces to exercise their own influence during the 
policy process. As a general rule—though this is by no means a universal proposition—military 
establishments tend to evince conservative political positions and to favour positivist and 
realist worldviews. Thus, the more progressive the commitments of  the civilian 
decisionmakers, the greater the normative gap is likely to be.  
This gap was perhaps greatest in the South African case, a situation that can be traced back 
to the abruptness of  the transition and the total dissonance of  values between the old and new 
rulers. MRG members purposefully set out to engage with and to discredit the paradigms upon 
which Total Strategy and other aspects of  minority rule had been based. MRG members 
enjoyed considerable resonance within policymaking circles, as shared normative commitments 
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such as support for the government in power were a significant selection criterion for 
members.  
The episode of  the Green Paper demonstrates most clearly of  all cases the extent to which 
normative outlook shared with policymakers dictates policy success. This draft was produced 
by members of  the defence old guard, from whom the new policymakers were attempting to 
distance themselves normatively, but who possessed considerably more practical specialised 
knowledge than other possible authors. Upon reading the draft, Kasrils rejected it—
supposedly literally throwing it in a trash bin—as “too militaristic, too Cold War in its 
orientation and too inconsistent with the values of  the ANC”868.  
Kasrils installed Nathan as the White Paper’s lead drafter, favouring normative similitude 
over greater specialised knowledge (though by the end of  the drafting process the lacuna in 
specialised knowledge had virtually ceased to exist). This pattern of  favouring Nathan’s inputs 
over those of  ex-members of  the SADF—for instance, armed forces chief  General George 
Meiring—continued later in the revision process, although much tempered by the need to 
avoid alienating the upper echelons of  the Defence Force and to balance views at this later 
stage of  the process.  
In Brazil, many members of  the academic security community espouse relatively 
progressive views; some experienced mistreatment at the hands of  the military dictatorship 
and in the name of  its conservative doctrine. This leads many of  them to concentrate their 
work on civil-military relations; such remains the main focus of  many of  the country’s centres 
for defence-related research. This strong current of  academic preferences, centred on reigning 
in the political prerogatives of  the armed forces, coincided with the interest of  civilian 
policymakers in attaining the same goal.  
The Canadian experience highlights the disparate origins of  policymaker preferences in one 
of  the three aforementioned categories, as well as the connection between normative 
preferences and the differentiation between types of  specialised knowledge. In the case of  the 
human security agenda, the origins of  policymaker preferences lay in objectives derived from 
policy concerns. DFAIT collaborators were concerned with rendering implementable concepts 
that had been adopted from the 1994 Human Development Report and the precursor issues 
on which they had co-operated successfully with non-governmental organisations. In this 
sense, their normative preference overlapped with a preference for a specific—practical—type 
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of  specialised knowledge. This again placed an emphasis on NGOs’ field experience, and by 
extension, on academics’ lack thereof. 
Where theoretical specialised knowledge did come into play, due to effective democratic 
control of  the armed forces—and the clear delegation of  the making of  security policy to the 
foreign policy establishment—potential advisors’ target audience was not bifurcated but rather 
reflective of  the progressive interests held by civilian policymakers. The point is made, 
however, that a similar division did exist in Canada between the politically appointed members 
of  the conceptualisation team and career foreign policy bureaucrats who favoured a more 
traditional approach to policy formulation. This provided an impetus for Axworthy to seek 
advice from outside that bureaucracy—hence the establishment of  the academic advisory 
board and the frequent consultations with NGOs and civil society.  
Initially, the search for normatively resonant output did not yield substantial results, because 
the most prominent academics were not enthusiastc about the new paradigm. Established 
academics such as Hampson, Oliver and Nossal, who through their relative prestige within the 
academic community found it easier to produce a quick public response, shaped the initial 
reaction to the human security agenda. Only after specialised knowledge—and later normative 
resonance—had supplanted institutionalised prestige as a criterion for involvement (it did so 
quite rapidly) did the overall profile of  published academic work being to take on a profile 
more friendly to DFAIT’s efforts.  
The case of  the human security agenda also illustrates more clearly than the other two 
studies the importance of  whether the normative preferences of  policymakers are based upon 
the desire for change or the desire to shore up the status quo ante. The fit between extant 
policymaker commitments and the content of  academic inputs matters less in cases where 
policymakers are seeking to maintain and strengthen their view, rather than seeking to translate 
more vaguely-held political commitments into the defence realm. As the originators of  a 
policy-ready human security agenda, the DFAIT team were looking for further ammunition for 
a fixed view rather than, as were their South African counterparts, seeking to adapt a broader-
based progressive agenda to the terms of  the defence debate.  
In summary, there is evidence that in the three cases, all three sets of  variables affected the 
degree of  policy advisors’ influence on policy formulation in the way predicted. The 
interrelationship of  the hypotheses’ claims—especially the validated contention that they 
                                                                                                                                                    
868 Emphasis mine. 
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progressively build upon one another—at times complicated the task of  separating each out 
for exclusive analysis; in terms of  the identification of  relevant variables, however, this type of  
leakage only underscores that the factors chosen were the correct ones. The credibility of  the 
results with respect to the specific questions asked in the analysis indicates their aptitude to 
serve as the basis for attempting to answer more general questions concerning the relationship 
of  theory and practice, and. overall, the role of  the defence scholar. 
 
Implementation 
An analysis of  policy formulation per se without mention of  its subsequent implementation 
is of  limited applicability. A thorough analysis of  the implementation of  the policies 
investigated above goes well beyond the purview and possibilities of  this study, supplying 
enough data and requiring enough effort to provide fodder for a second dissertation. A 
connection of  the findings back to the “real world” of  concrete implementation, however, 
remains ineluctable. The observations made here are current as of  July 2004. 
The process initiated within the Brazilian Ministry of  Defence to modernise the conceptual 
underpinnings of  the country’s defence policy has stagnated since the drafting of  the 
Modernização do Sistema de Defesa Nacional. In addition to the that derived from military 
opposition, the document—or at least its immediate implementation—was doomed, just as 
was the original Política de Defesa Nacional, by the proximity of  its date of  publication to a 
presidential election and a change of  government.  
Defence issues have been a very low priority for the government of  Luís Inácio Lula da 
Silva. The President has yet to see the MSDN, and it appears as though Minister Viegas will do 
little to advance the conceptual modernisation of  Brazilian defence policy. A Modernisation 
working group continues to meet at the Ministry of  Defence, but the more immediate 
priorities within the Ministry at this time are issues such as military wages and pensions, the 
acquisition of  major weapons systems in all three branches of  the armed forces, and 
participation in peace operations such as the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. A possible 
Cabinet reshuffle may bring renewed impetus to conceptual modernisation in the near future. 
Brazil and South Africa signed a defence pact on 3 June 2003. 
A great many of  the conceptual innovations brought to South African defence policy by the 
1996 White Paper were undone or denatured by the implementation-oriented Defence Review 
that followed two years later. This document, which dealt with force design, posture and 
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budget, and upon which acquisitions were based, reverted to many realist-based and threat-
oriented conceptualisations and provided fertile ground for a much-publicised arms acquisition 
scandal in 2001. The cost of  acquiring several major weapons systems, including fighter planes, 
submarines and corvettes, rocketed to 5,5 billion US dollars; the defence establishment 
responded by highlighting the systems’ necessity given South Africa’s desire to play an active 
role across the African continent. The ANC stumbled over allegations of  corruption on the 
part of  Defence Department acquisitions officials and other politicians.  
As this situation illustrates, with the completion of  the White Paper and Defence Review, 
similarly to the Brazilian scenario, the attention of  the security policymaking community, 
particularly the armed forces, returned to the more traditional concerns of  budgeting and the 
acquisition of  major weapons systems. The second-order planning and implementation of  
these programmes were undertaken largely in isolation from the novel conceptual 
underpinnings entrenched by the previous round of  policy formulation.  
This indicates in both cases the victory of  traditional military concerns over civilian 
attempts to inject a new conceptual agenda; respectively, the lack of  recourse to the precepts 
of  the White Paper in South Africa or to the embryonic normative guidelines set forth by the 
Brazilian Ministry of  Defence raise pressing questions about the effective state of  the 
democratic control over the armed forces in those polities. In ancillary fashion, these questions 
find reflection in concerns about the “real-world” value of  the formulation processes—
particularly in terms of  their conceptual innovation—to which academic production serves as 
inputs.  
Due perhaps to the completed institutionalisation of  civilian supremacy over the military in 
Canada, the human security agenda has met with greater success in retaining its status as the 
basis for policy implementation. In the Canadian case, a change in government has greater 
effect on policy continuity than the current state of  military subordination to political 
authority. As can be expected because of  its strong connection with Axworthy’s person, 
human security’s star has waned somewhat since his leaving office, particularly under his 
immediate successor, John Manley. Under Bill Graham—another Foreign Minister with a 
background in academe—the concept has enjoyed something of  a revival. It remains an 
important component of  Canadian foreign policy, and at this writing, its conceptualisation 
continues, particularly with an eye to its application to regional scenarios and a series of  
ongoing policy issues. 
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In the first two cases, the processes to which academics contributed appear to have had 
little effect on concrete indicators of  policy priorities such as force postures, budgeting and, in 
particular, the acquisition of  major weapons systems. In both cases, certain acquisitions in fact 
went directly against the directives established by the declaratory documents under 
investigation here. This is a disheartening finding for those who see in policy participation an 
avenue for effecting change or advancing a given agenda.  
Yet this situation reflects more the position of  the civilian policy establishment vis-à-vis the 
armed forces, rather than providing an indication of  the overall utility of  declaratory policy 
and influence upon it. It remains to be seen what the effects of  these documents would have 
been had civilian control been better established. As it is, they continue to provide the basis for 
policy planning and other elements of  foreign and defence relations, and the possibility exists 
that with greater civilian control these documents will rise to prominence beyond their value as 
what some scholars derisively call “window-dressing”.  
 
Final observations 
The above analysis has shown that under certain conditions, and with certain caveats, 
academics as a class of  outside actors do have the potential to influence the outcome of  
declaratory policy on security issues at the national level. Bringing this observation to a more 
abstract level of  inquiry reveals important conclusions about the relationship of  academic 
work and its relevance to policy. While policymakers value certain characteristics of  academic 
production, and it is these characteristics that lead to academics’ selection as policy advisors, 
this appreciation is limited in important ways. Policymakers’ criteria for policy relevance differ 
from the reward structures inherent to the academic enterprise. When these two sets of  
priorities clash, when the focus is policy, it is the bureaucrats’ preferences which win out. That 
a piece of  academic work is judged valuable by academic standards is important only inasmuch 
as this factors into one element of  policymakers’ criteria: prestige.  
The opening of  the policy process to outside inputs is decidedly a one-way street. There is 
very little academics can do to force open policymakers’ doors; indeed, it is impossible to 
conduct academic work with the goal of  policy relevance without prior knowledge, 
communicated by policymakers, of  their needs and normative views. Often, academic reward 
structures in fact militate against policy relevance; ironically, this is particularly the case with 
the production of  the very academics who most consider policy relevance an important value.  
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Policy-relevant knowledge quintessentially derives from question-driven research, while the 
canon of  academic policy relevance is most frequently upheld by proponents of  paradigms 
that favour method-based inquiry. As the power of  opening the policy process or leaving it 
closed resides with policymakers, so does the onus of  communicating clearly with the 
academic community in order to ensure that its potential is tapped. Academics cannot produce 
work relevant to the “real world”, without having beforehand at least a basic idea of  what is 
needed and what the ever-changing criteria for policy-relevant content are.  
The desire for policy relevance must take into account academe’s subordinated role in the 
opening of  the policy process. Academics’ engagement with policy often derives from one of  
two major motivations: personal professional advancement or vindication, or the desire to 
contribute to society in return for the freedom and funding academics are granted869.  
The latter motivation lends itself  more easily to acceptance that policymakers have the 
upper hand, for if  the goal is service to society (through the state), it is natural that this service 
should be at the behest, and following the wishes, of  the recipient. In the former case, the 
paradox arises that using proximity to policy as a means of  legitimising a research agenda 
necessarily places that which is to be vindicated further away from the criteria upon which it is 
considered. In short, academics can have a great deal of  influence on the conceptual aspects 
of  government policy, but only if  they do not insist on pursuing it on their own terms alone. 
                                                 
869 See Smith, Steve. “Power and truth: a reply to William Wallace”. Review of International Studies. Vol. 23, No. 4 (1997); pp. 507-
516. Here, p. 509; and Wallace, William. “Truth and power, monks and technocrats: theory and practice in international 
relations”. Review of International Studies. Vol. 22, No. 3 (1996); pp. 301-321. Here, p. 305. 
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Appendix 
Methodology: notes on case selection and data collection 
 
 
Though this be madness, yet there is method in’t. 
—William Shakespeare, in Hamlet, Act II, Scene 2— 
 
 
Several factors were used to select countries as showcases for the testing of  the project’s 
hypotheses. These factors were chosen to ensure the ability to collect, in each national 
context, the necessary data to serve as indicators of  the variables and conditions called for 
by the argument outlined above. The table below illustrates the variables for each 
hypothesis, primary and secondary indicators for each variable, and potential sources in 
which they were deemed likely to be found prior to case selection and finally field research.  
 
Data requirements 
The basic types of  data are threefold: interviews with policymakers and academic 
security experts; official government documents, including documentation related to the 
formulation process of  official policy statements prior to their final publication; and 
secondary literature on a state’s foreign relations, civil-military relations, university 
structure, as well as publications by academic experts. As many of  the variables under study 
consist of  perceptions held by policymakers, the primary sources of  much of  the necessary 
data, as the table indicates, are interviews and other forms of  communication with relevant 
members of  a given security policymaking bureaucracy. In the sense that they establish 
evidence of  the perceptions held by policymakers in relation to the other actors in the 
policy process, these statements in large part constitute what are in speech-act theory 
deemed “argumentative performatives”.  
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Hypothesis Variable 
Primary Indicator 
(Ind1) 
Major Secondary 
Indicator (Ind2) 
Sources  
(requisite data) for 
Ind1 
Sources (req. data) 
for Ind2 
Hypothesis 1 
uncertainty 
(domestic) 
policymakers' 
statements change in government 
policymaker 
interviews/statements 
secondary 
literature/media 
     government documents 
   change in policy priorities  
secondary 
literature/media 
     government documents 
 uncertainty (int'l) 
policymakers' 
statements change of state's int'l status 
policymaker 
interviews/statements 
secondary 
literature/media 
   change in int'l norms  
secondary 
literature/media 
     official documentation 
   change in nature of int'l conflict 
secondary 
literature/media 
     official documentation 
 uncertainty (capacity) 
policymakers' 
statements change in personnel 
policymaker 
interviews/statements official documentation 
     policymaker interviews 
   change in perceived threats  policymaker interviews 
Hypothesis 2 spec. kn. (practical) 
policymakers' 
statements experts' publications 
policymaker 
interviews/statements 
experts' publications/sec. 
lit. 
   peer recommendation/reputation expert interviews 
 spec. kn. (theoretical) 
policymakers' 
statements experts' publications 
policymaker 
interviews/statements 
experts' publications/sec. 
lit. 
   peer recommendation/reputation expert interviews 
 inst. pres. (of disc.) 
policymakers' 
statements degree of institutionalisation 
policymaker 
interviews/statements 
secondary 
literature/media 
   time discipline established  
secondary 
literature/media 
 inst. pres. (in disc.) 
policymakers' 
statements 
peer 
recommendation/reputation 
policymaker 
interviews/statements expert interviews 
   professional rank  expert interviews 
     biographical data 
   publications/teaching  
experts' publications/sec. 
lit. 
 inputs' norm. content 
policymakers' 
statements experts'policy inputs 
policymaker 
interviews/statements experts' policy inputs 
 cogency of input 
policymakers' 
statements experts' policy inputs 
policymaker 
interviews/statements experts' policy inputs 
Hypothesis 3 expert preferences experts' statements experts' publications expert interviews 
experts' publications/sec. 
lit. 
    secondary literature  
 
policymaker 
preferences 
policymakers' 
statements previous policy documents 
policymaker 
interviews/statements 
previous policy 
documents 
 
degree of fit/content 
of final document textual analysis final policy documents 
policymaker 
interviews/statements final policy documents 
    expert interterviews  
    experts' publications  
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Argumentative performatives are acts of  speech in which a statement doubles as an 
action (or a change in the state of  the object of  a sentence), such as “I believed”, “we felt 
threatened by”, or “the Ministry denies”870. Such statements constitute actions in that they 
are methodologically valid externalisations of  the perceptions held by individual 
bureaucrats, or in the case of  those authorised to speak in the name of  their governmental 
division, of  the perceptions held within a ministry or office at a given time. Data in the 
form of  statements that constitute argumentative performatives are gained from two types 
of  statement: interviews and official documentation such as correspondence internal to the 
policy bureaucracy in question.  
Alongside policymaker perceptions expressed by means of  speech acts, the remaining 
data comes in the form of  written documentation, primarily official government 
documents and secondary literature—largely academic—on foreign policy and the national 
university context. Official government documentation includes not only the final 
published declaratory security policy documents, but also, importantly, the travaux 
préparatoires that bear witness to the interplay of  ideational forces that produced the final 
document, where one can trace the influence of  academics. Official government 
documentation is important particularly in the case of  the resonance hypothesis and for the 
tracing of  the synthesis of  interests.  
Secondary academic literature provides important information with respect to providing 
both the national context for each case, and important secondary indicators with regard to 
domestic and international shifts leading to uncertainty as well as the state of  
institutionalisation of  the discipline of  security studies. Elements of  the literature authored 
by academics who are the subject of  the study also provide important data on their degree 
of  specialised knowledge and ultimately their prestige, publication being one indicator of  
prestige within a given discipline. The countries chosen as case studies for this study were 
selected in accordance primarily with the extent to which these three types of  data—
interviews, public and non-public government documents, and a substantial body of  
relevant secondary literature—were readily available. 
 
Case selection 
As indicated, the availability of  the requisite data was the primary factor influencing case 
selection, and accordingly narrowed the search to states with three main attributes. An 
                                                 
870 For a brief exposition of speech-act theory as it relates to the securitisation of policy issues, see inter alia Buzan, Barry, 
Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. Security: a new framework for analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998; pp. 26-27.  
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original list of  possible case studies was generated based on three factors. These included a 
sufficiently well-established academic community to permit the existence of  a sufficiently 
substantive body of  secondary literature in the abovementioned fields; a foreign policy 
bureaucracy large and well-institutionalised enough to issue official policy documents and 
permit the tracing of  the formulation process for such a policy document through 
preparatory documents; and access to a sufficient number of  both policymakers and 
academics to allow research based heavily on interviews to be successful.  
These criteria effectively narrowed the realm of  possible loci for case studies to nations 
in Europe and North America, as well as India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Japan, Korea, Israel, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. Linguistic considerations further 
narrowed this list871. Finally, potential case studies needed to present a security context 
allowing for significant change in their defence environment and policy; thus, nuclear 
powers, permanent members of  the United Nations Security Council, and states involved 
in territorial conflicts were excluded. These factors were deemed to produce a static 
defence policy establishing semi-permanent parameters making significant policy change 
unlikely. This left a final list of  “middle power” states composed of  the following 
possibilities: 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Germany 
Norway 
South Africa 
Switzerland 
“Middle powers” were considered in this case to offer the greatest potential for 
generalisability, due both to the relative large number (compared to other power-based 
categories of  states) in the international system and to their mid-range level of  bureaucratic 
sophistication. The primary factors governing the selection of  three states from this list 
were access to policymakers and academics in the given country, and the desire for 
maximum geographic repartition. This resulted in the final choices of  South Africa, Brazil 
and Canada, which best fulfilled all of  the successive sets of  criteria outlined above.  
 
Data construction 
The case selection process involved preliminary research focussed largely on secondary 
literature and some official documentation available at libraries in Geneva and on the 
                                                 
871 At the time the field research began the author possessed an active knowledge of English, French, German, 
Portuguese, Spanish and Italian, and a passive knowledge of most Germanic and Romance languages sufficient to 
allow for the research treatment of official documents and secondary literature given a short acclimatisation period. 
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Internet. Following the definitive selection of  cases, this research was expanded 
considerably to include further official documentation. This allowed the preparation for 
each of  the three countries of  a “skeleton draft” outlining the given national context and 
laying the groundwork for the research to be conducted in the field. These texts serve as 
the introductory sections providing context in each of  the three case chapters. 
Simultaneously, contact was established with members of  the academic community in each 
country prior to departure, and they in turn provided contacts within each policy 
establishment.  
The field research consisted of  stays in each of  the three countries of  between three 
and five months’ duration. In the cases of  South Africa and Canada, status as a Visiting 
Researcher at leading research centres in Cape Town and Toronto proved invaluable in 
granting access to the policy establishment. The bulk of  the field research was devoted to 
conducting interviews and obtaining official documentation; by the time of  arrival, much 
of  the secondary literature was already in hand. The research in Brazil was conducted 
without institutional affiliation. 
 
Interviews 
With respect to research, the collection of  relevant data demanded a top-down, small-
“n” approach to the interview process. Accordingly, during the course of  the field research, 
a total of  37 interviews were conducted; 20 with academics (eight in South Africa, nine in 
Brazil and four in Canada) and 17 with policymakers (four, nine and four, respectively). 
Policymakers and academics were given different types of  interview, though the approaches 
used had important commonalities. Whereas frequently it was possible to interview 
academic experts multiple times for research purposes—as well as engaging in informal 
conversation on non-research occasions with several of  them—policymaker interviews 
were considerably more formal because of  time constraints and issues surrounding access. 
The attempt was made to interview academics before policymakers. In this way it was 
possible to gather general information beforehand, so as to avoid the need to solicit it 
during the limited time available at this stage.  
The interviews were conducted in both structured and unstructured form using 
exclusively open-ended questions. Academic interlocutors were first asked to provide 
general information such as biographical data (including important publications and 
interactions with the policy process), information pertinent to the specificities of  the 
university setting in their respective countries, the nature of  the national security policy 
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process and on the relationship between academe and government. This first set of  data 
was then used in formulating more specific questions for policymakers.  
Subsequently, experts were asked additional unstructured open-ended questions related 
directly to their own interaction with the policy process and of  direct relevance to the 
hypotheses. These questions became increasingly detailed as follow-up questions exhausted 
one subject matter before another topic was broached. This line of  questioning occurred 
prior to subjects’ knowledge of  the hypotheses and assumptions underlying the research. 
Following this, a set of  structured questions was asked once a short summary had been 
given of  the hypotheses and assumptions. Here, academic experts were asked to tailor their 
answers more closely to questions directly related to the research; many voluntarily offered 
commentary serving to refine the argument directly rather than through blind questioning. 
Finally, academic interviewees were asked, in unstructured form, to provide clarification or 
elaboration on their published work, as well as a listing of  pertinent interlocutors in the 
policy realm, and further contacts. 
This modus operandi reflects academics’ triple role as interlocutors in the research as 
subjects of  its analysis, colleagues senior to the author serving as sources of  ancillary 
analysis (often in the form of  commentary on their own published secondary literature), 
and sources of  further contacts in both the academic and policymaking communities. 
Many of  these interviews included, in the form of  interspersed informal conversation, 
discussions of  theoretical literature in security studies and international relations. These 
interjections served to reveal important theoretical and normative assumptions not 
necessarily expressed in published work but of  relevance to the testing of  this project’s 
hypotheses.  
Many academic interviewees took considerable professional interest in the subject 
matter and allotted large blocks of  time (up to thirteen hours in one case) for the interview 
and for informal discussion. In terms of  allotted time, the opposite held true of  
policymakers (although strong professional interest was expressed here as well), and the 
interview methodology was adjusted accordingly. Interviews with bureaucrats typically 
lasted just under an hour and did not include informal conversation or discussion of  the 
academic facets of  the focus topic. The types and forms of  questioning followed a similar 
pattern, with a brief  introductory unstructured section requesting personal data and 
summary information on the intricacies of  the policy process. This was followed, as in the 
case of  academics, by a brief  set of  unstructured questions prior to presentation of  a 
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summary of  the project and a set of  structured questions on their interaction with 
academic experts during policy formulation thereafter.  
Finally, bureaucrats were asked for any comments they wanted to add, which centred 
most often, and at their behest, on their evaluation of  their interaction with specific 
members of  the academic community. As a last step, they were asked to indicate further 
interlocutors within their Ministry and for the names of  relevant additional academic 
experts not previously mentioned. The interviews were enhanced by conversations with 
many previous academic interviewees, and some from the policy realm, in informal settings 
and (in the case of  Brazil) in the interstices of  academic conferences held during the period 
of  stay in each country. These conferences additionally provided the opportunity to 
observe directly the interaction of  the two communities in a formalised and public setting.  
 
Analysis of  textual data 
The textual analysis of  the documents gathered serves the purpose of  ascertaining the 
degree of  similarity in content between documents originating in the academic community 
and those outlining declaratory state security policy. Such similarity between the work of  
academics preceding the formulation of  policy, and the resulting final official document, is 
taken as an indicator of  the influence of  the academic in question. Much of  the 
methodological literature pertaining to analysing texts is grounded in the positivist 
paradigm or rests upon assumptions, implicit or explicit, that are not appropriate to the 
aims of  this investigation, as they are insufficiently self-conscious with regard to the 
normative commitments held by researchers and that underpin their research.  
The purpose of  the textual analysis in this investigation is to establish the degree of  fit 
among three sets of  documents and statements in each case: experts’ inputs and previous 
work; preparatory correspondence and inputs from various elements within the policy 
bureaucracy during the formulation process; and the final policy document with declaratory 
authority. Various methods of  textual comparison are used together to this end, although 
these efforts for reasons of  time and space necessarily stop short of  providing, for 
example, a full cognitive mapping of  policymakers’ approach to security. Discourse analysis 
in particular affords the possibility of  bringing to light actors’ basic assumptions and the 
impact of  how security issues are framed on perceptions of  their legitimacy. Many of  the 
variables outlined above are related to the focus of  discourse analysis on the legitimation 
of  actors as speakers of  security and the construction of  power relationships. 
 298
In the case of  testing for influence, it is often the case that suggestions are taken up 
verbatim or linguistically modified only slightly, which means that the search for overlap is 
frequently quite straightforward. As is pointed out in the above table, textual analysis is 
used in the search for “secondary” indicators, in the sense that it is guided by information 
communicated directly by the participants during the interviews (performatives as primary 
indicators). The textual analysis involves documents that mark the end of  the formulation 
process and thus is situated at the crossroads between policy formulation and 
implementation. Though implementation is not discussed at length in the bodies of  the 
case chapters, it does receive substantial attention in the overall conclusions to this enquiry. 
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